On 25 August 2016, the Knowledge Platform hosted a workshop in The Hague, in which learning from the peacebuilding approaches of rising powers was the central theme. The workshop, organized by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), fed insights from country and case studies in a range of settings, from Turkey to India and Brazil to South Africa, into new ideas for peacebuilding policy and programming of the EU, UN and other major donors.

Bringing together a diverse group of policymakers, academics and practitioners working in or on rising powers, the workshop encouraged constructive discussions about what the value and pitfalls of differing approaches to peacebuilding are.

PRESUMPTIONS AND FINDINGS

Charles Call, in his overview of the findings of the country and case studies, highlighted a common presumption: rising powers do peacebuilding differently. But is this true? And if so, what are the differences, and do these differences exist between the rising powers as well? The discussions showed that while there are indeed differences in approaches, the distinctions are not black and white.

In Turkey, as Onur Sazak explained, peacebuilding as a concept does not have a static definition. He illustrated the centrality of humanitarian and development assistance to the process of peacebuilding. Where previously, especially before 2002, peacebuilding in Turkey related more to peacekeeping, Turkish peacebuilding efforts currently have a clear ethical motivation and focus mainly on using humanitarian assistance and development assistance to make a difference in the lives of people who are suffering from conflict. This process contributes to a long-standing and long-lasting peace.

Adriana Erthal Abdenur showed how in Brazil, peacebuilding as a concept is more emergent than existing. Ms Abdenur discerned two strands in Brazil-style peacebuilding: the first, observed at the UN, is the technical and bureaucratized discourse. The second encompasses underground and grassroots initiatives, South-South development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. The discussion showed that while non-intervention and demand-driven cooperation underlie Brazil’s conception of peacebuilding, the nature of its peacebuilding works means that these principles are not necessarily always respected in practice.

A crucial insight from South Africa, highlighted by Charles Nyuykonge, is the inclusion of all actors in mediation. In South Africa, the experience with the ANC (“terrorists”), and the 1993-2005 peace talks in Burundi with the involvement of military coup leaders, proved an important element in mediation for peace. For South Africa, the focus is not on the speed of processes of peacebuilding, but on the extent to which they are able to address the challenges of stakeholders.

Coming from a reality in which no international cooperation architecture existed after independence in 1947, peacebuilding in India is still very much a work in progress with much ambiguity. Despite India’s lack of financial resources to contribute to peacebuilding efforts, it has deep expertise and experience with education. Lt. Gen. P.K. Singh noted that India’s history of development, similar to that of other countries requiring assistance, facilitates the transfer of knowledge to these settings. He argued that rising powers have a greater ability to understand local contexts.

COMMON THEMES

In the case and country studies, several themes recurred between the approaches of rising powers. First, peacebuilding for rising powers has a different time horizon – efforts both have a longer duration and are not specifically attached to projects. However, it was noted that longer time horizons sometimes meant that short-term negative consequences were ignored. Secondly, non-conditionality forms the starting point for peacebuilding for many of the rising powers. However, despite this commitment, it was acknowledged that strategic interests continue to impact peacebuilding activities.

Rising powers do not typically have a history of peacebuilding. As a result, there are no crystallized narratives around which bureaucracies and academic circles have developed. There are less hard distinctions between types of peacebuilding, so that broader types of peacebuilding can be implemented.

Demand-driven peacebuilding efforts are another common practice. Linked to this is the importance of listening to local actors, governments and experts in defining what is needed, rather than sending external technical teams to complete needs assessments.

Stemming from different ideas about how international relations should operate, rising powers emphasize deference to sovereignty. National ownership is often seen to supersede local ownership. This encourages equality in the international world order and enhances the developmental aspect of the UN, rather than the militaristic aspect of the Security Council.

TAKEAWAYS

What can we learn from the rising powers’ approaches to peacebuilding? To begin with, traditional peacebuilding actors like the EU and UN must encourage longer-term time horizons for projects. However, the discussions illustrated that short-term negative results from projects with a long time horizon must not be overlooked, otherwise tensions will fester. Continual assessment will stimulate positive change. Furthermore, encouraging the local definition of needs and the enhancement of state capabilities can help traditional peacebuilding actors’ efforts succeed. Finally, by engaging with countries in need as equals, rising powers enable target states to rebuild state structures, and engender a more cooperative and equitable developmental environment between partner countries.

Read more about the Rising Powers in Peacekeeping report here.

During a networking day for Dutch civilian experts, participants had the opportunity to engage with policymakers in the MFA, and connect with each other on their experience and challenges of working in multilateral missions for short periods of time, as well as on practical and substantive questions involved in their day to day work.

The Platform facilitated several of the discussions during this networking day. The opening panel, with P.J. Kleiweg-De Zwaan (Director Security Policy), Gert Kampman (Deputy Director Stabilization and Humanitarian Aid), Jaïr van der Lijn (Senior research fellow Clingendael/ SIPRI) and facilitated by Sergei Boeke (Senior research fellow ICCT), delved into the challenges of measuring and impact of missions, in an era of an increased focus on showing concrete results of interventions. While it is indeed difficult to present immediate results of interventions, more specifically the role of civilian experts in these missions, we should try to steer away from a focus on outputs. Instead we should look into the long term perspective and acknowledging the fact that change generally takes more than the cycle of one mission and is by no means a linear process. The valuable role of civilian experts in these missions was underlined, in terms of their contributions to sustainable peace as well as their important role as linking pin between the MFA and the field.

Various breakout sessions were facilitated by Platform members, focusing on Rule of Law in conflict contexts in European and African regions (The Hague Institute for Global Justice, Clingendael); SSR, accountability and governance with specific inputs from the work of MINUSMA (GPPAC); the specific challenges for gender experts in multilateral missions (IDLO); and related to the role of multilateral missions in protection of civilians (PAX).  

‘Imagine we are 5 years ahead, and minister Ploumen will visit the twelve countries where the ARC projects will be implemented; what will she see, and will she be satisfied with what we have achieved?’ This question was posed during a talk show with the MFA’s special envoy on migration, Bram van Ojik, the MFA’s Director General of International Cooperation, and representatives of NGO’s from South-Sudan, Burundi and Pakistan.

With the talk show, the kick-off meeting of the Addressing Root Causes Fund on Monday the 20^th of June came to an end.

The ARC kick-off, organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and facilitated by the Platform, marks the start of a unique, five-year collaboration in which the MFA, together with 15 NGO’s and their partners, will work together to address root causes of violent conflict, instability and irregular migration.

Some 180 participants engaged in numerous breakout sessions with the view of getting to know each other, to explore key common challenges for program development under the ARC fund, and to exchange tools and approaches for effective partnerships and adaptive programming.

Progress on themes like rule of law and employment creation in conflict affected areas is often small and incredibly hard to measure. Special attention was therefore paid to the creation of a joint results framework, on which the organizations within ARC, as well as the Ministry, can report to the parliament and the Dutch public.

Jelte van Wieren, the MFA’s Director of Stability and Humanitarian Aid, emphasized in his opening speech: ‘For too long, development aid in Fragile and Conflict Affected States has been approached as if we, development actors, are the drivers on a train going from point of departure to point of destination. But I think we can all agree it has been more like a sailing trip on a boat - or an ark – planning to cross an unpredictable, stormy and dangerous ocean with an uncertain destination’.

To answer Bram’s question, Salome Zuriel, conflict thematic manager at ACORD, emphasized that in fragile contexts, it is hard to predict the extent to which our programs will contribute to stability after 5 years of engagement. The results framework we are about to develop however, might actually provide for the opportunity to attain concrete results in creating employment, enforcing rule of law or increasing physical human security. Today’s kick-off meeting was a first step in that direction.

The Platform hosted an interactive discussion on 23 June 2016 in The Hague, exploring the challenges and opportunities of measuring peace through indexes. The discussion, moderated by Rob Sijstermans of Clingendael, centered around three indexes; the Global Peace Index (GPI) by the Institute for Economics and Peace, the Flourishing Community Index (FCI) by Cordaid and the Fragile States Index (FSI) by The Fund for Peace, outlining the motivations behind their development, difficulties in the process and what these indexes have to offer to policy-making and program development in the field. Camilla Schippa, Director of the Institute for Economics & Peace officially launched the latest Global Peace Index at The Hague Institute for Global Justice the following morning.

Convening a group of practitioners from a range of fields, including the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the financial sector and mediation organizations, the discussion generated important insights into the value and pitfalls of indexing as a measure of peace.

Methodology

The three indexes all encountered questions over methodology. The Global Peace Index, as Camilla Schippa detailed, integrates indicator data from a variety of respected sources, such as SIPRI and various UN agencies as well as analysis from experts working with the Institute. The FSI employs a similar methodology. Conversely, the Flourishing Community Index compiles local community voices. Each approach has strengths and weaknesses that must be dealt with and explained to consumers. A related challenge for the indexes, Nate Haken, Senior Associate of The Fund for Peace explained, is the perception of the results among its target audiences. For the GPI and FSI, the rankings as a final product were controversial at face value. Officials from some states disagreed with the simple numerical comparison of their countries with others they felt were performing worse. A common problem is that consumers get hung up on rankings, failing to understand the indicators and analysis that inform indexes.

Crucial to resolving these concerns is to explain in detail the methodology behind the rankings, and to encourage consumers to delve into the indicators, and make their own comparisons. While each index offers valuable insights into differing indicators of communities, at the local or national level, the practitioners accentuated the need for transparency of process to avoid oversimplification of results. Additionally, argued Rosan Smits, Deputy Head of the Conflict Research Unit of Clingendael, indexes should not be the starting point in identifying watch lists or developing research and policy priorities.

Managing expectations

Expectations among surveyed individuals, practitioners and policy-makers on what indexes can achieve present another challenge. With FCI, explained Roderick Besseling of Cordaid, providing the opportunity for local communities to express grievances created expectations that these could be addressed. Similarly, Haken noted that while the FSI offers valuable insights, it does not offer solutions or practicable measures to address driving factors of conflict. Besseling and Haken both noted that creators of indexes grapple with the purpose of their measurements: is an index a forecasting tool? A grievance collection tool? A need-analysis tool? A tool to evaluate the progress resulting from programs? Without clearly defined goals and objectives, it is difficult to manage expectations and ensure value of indexes.

Main takeaways

The discussion proved that indexes are great advocacy tools, useful for starting the conversation in various fora and spurring deeper research into specific problems and underlying factors. Critical and comparative study of a variety of indexes can encourage more targeted research and policy work and may help to develop accurate early-warning conflict analysis, but should not be the be-all and end-all of measuring peace work. Takeaways for improving the usefulness of indexes were twofold. Firstly, further cooperation and integration of measuring efforts, be they more global indexes or more specific on-the-ground expertise, is crucial to providing the most informed and accurate picture to all stakeholders in the process. Secondly, increasing understanding of both the opportunities that indexes present and their limitations as tools for measuring peace will help all users improve their ability to extract value from the important insights that indexes produce.

In the process of building peace and justice, a series of connected injustices are worthy of increased attention. Justice tends to be thought about within the confines of rule of law and accountability. Yet justice is not dispensed but experienced, and failing to respond to injustice is to court conflict. As such, the event suggested we should grapple with the breadth of those experiences and meanings of justice across societies in order to build peace. This entails, it was felt, involving a wider array of actors in collaborative actions to help solve justice challenges.

In an attempt to begin that process, the expert roundtable organized by the Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law and Saferworld on 26th May gathered a mix of professionals in The Hague – some of whom may not usually work together. Building on an on-going expert blog series, participants spanned the fields of behavioral economics, private sector development, media, DDR, governance, rule of law, peacebuilding, youth, gender, urban planning and climate change.

Video clips from Bangladesh, Kenya, the United Kingdom, South Sudan and Armenia/Azerbaijan portrayed experiences of injustice that people encounter within their communities and how they impact on conflict dynamics. Although from different societies at distinct stages of conflict, the complexity, richness and indivisibility of perceptions of injustice is clear. However, the way in which these issues are understood and funded can sometimes belie that complexity, interpreting justice problems as simply rule of law issues. Rule of law is of course crucial, but should not become lazy short-hand for all justice work.

Participants therefore reflected on the peace and justice potential of putting equality and fairness at the center of political, economic, legal and social policy. Justice is not only a product generated by the state and formal institutions, but something that arises in everyday interactions.

The challenge is, therefore, to ensure that justice work addresses underlying causes rather than merely symptoms of conflict. By taking a problem solving approach to justice work, a much larger space for innovative approaches opens up, one that can harness the right blend and consortiums of different actors from different sectors. This might require a different taxonomy of what the most serious challenges are. If the peacebuilding and justice communities can embrace this breadth and put fairness and human rights at the center of their work, this would encourage us to question our default tendency to privilege addressing “crimes”, and instead focus on addressing interlinked justice problems and conflict drivers.

Keep an eye out on our website for a Saferworld position paper on avenues for how structural transformations across a range of interconnected fields might have a bearing on peace.

Are security and justice (S&J) programs in fragile and conflict-affected countries (FCAS) fit for purpose? Existing literature demonstrates that this is not the case, so why is awareness of the limitations of the international community’s current approaches to programming not leading to the expected degree of change? And what does it take?

Security & justice programming challenges

Current programming approaches tend to pull from pre-existing standardized and limited menus of activities that are applied irrespective of context, and often executed in an overly technical and concept-driven manner. Programs continue to be silo-ed, both within the S&J field, and with respect to how they are connected with broader development efforts. While a significant amount of time is invested in good program design, this is much less the case for program implementation and monitoring. Furthermore, our understanding of the political economy in which programs play out remains inadequate and national ownership of programs continues to be both ill-understood and underemphasized.

Currently, domestic donor politics increasingly drive development efforts, displacing the political dynamics in fragile and conflict-affected States as prime factors of influence. In addition, domestic accountability requirements, rather than genuinely learning from successes and mistakes, form a key driver of much programming.

How to overcome the 3 main hurdles?

To explore these challenges in greater detail, the event delved into three key issues that seem to stand in the way of better programming in the S&J area:

1) The strong domestic focus on donor accountability prevents a more diverse and flexible interpretation of results from arising

As a result, ways need to be explored in which donor accountability can be broadened and rendered more sophisticated:

1. Given the difficulties in measuring S&J program results and the relative meaninglessness of many indicators, the present focus on “outcome indicators” should be replaced by an understanding of the processes by which outcomes are reached, and what local stakeholders or coalitions play a role.
2. Overall, we appear interested in counting our successes, but not in understanding change. Rather than thinking about outputs and outcome measurements, which tell us little about change, donors should focus more on the process and relational aspects of change. Learning should be at the center of S&J programming.
3. A much stronger and principled approach by donors to strengthening local (in addition to donor-only) accountability - underpinned by a corresponding devolution of power to local organizations, is urgently needed given the significant imbalances in how S&J programs are currently designed.
4. Longer-term programming (8-10 years)would help spur change that is more sustainable in nature.

2) Staff skillsets amongst many international development organizations are currently inadequate for good S&J programming

As a result, we need to pay much greater attention to nurturing and mobilizing the skills needed for such programming, including highly developed change management, risk management and diplomatic skills:

1. To develop flexible and adaptive approaches to programming, staff do not only need to have the right capacities but also display a certain personality. Emerging evidence suggests that the following aspects matter: entrepreneurial, networking and relationship-building skills, a natural curiosity, an interest in local politics, good analytical skills, and humility. As a case in point, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade-supported “Strategy Testing” approach invites donor staff to regularly test and challenge their programmatic assumptions, revisit theories of changes, adjust programs accordingly, and ensure the documentation of learning.
2. Nonetheless, no single person can do it all. The focus should lay on the right combination of skills within a team, which involves experts, generalists as well as operational program managers.

3) The procedures, habits and paradigms of large donor bureaucracies create inertia that prevents areas for innovation in which programmatic experimentation can occur from emerging

Big organizations have a tendency to have fixed routines that are resilient to change in the face of relative failure. Combined with pressures such as ministers demanding immediate action and results, this promotes setting priorities in a risk-averse manner and short-term thinking. In which instances do bureaucracies innovate or “overcome” themselves?

1. Decentralization to e.g. Embassies has proven to be an effective method to adopt more flexible approaches to programming.
2. Reducing the amount of development funding per donor staff member can free up resources for analysis and reflection instead of administration and reporting.
3. Regular strategy meetings can help test, discuss and develop ideas. Staff should receive training on out-of-the-box thinking and rewards for innovation. Meanwhile donor budgets can be earmarked for creative programs.

Improving the effectiveness and sustainability of value chains in fragile and conflict-affected countries such as Burundi can, in the long-run, contribute to stabilise the broader ecosystem in which such chains are evolving.

An open and candid discussion about the challenges and opportunities of such an ambitious goal took place during the closed door expert session “partnering for local value chain development in contexts of instability”, organized by the Platform in The Hague on 26 April 2016.

Financed by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the research project that culminated in this event brought together partners from the public, private, civil society and research sector, including Heineken International and its subsidiary Brarudi, Spark, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit (CRU). Following a presentation of the main research findings the discussions focussed on the interaction of conflict causes and business constraints in the context of Burundi and explored concrete impact channels between the sorghum beer chain and persisting conflict dynamics. 

Effects of the 2015 crisis on the value chain

The violence that broke out in Burundi in April 2015, has had an impact on the general economy of the country and on the sorghum beer value chain in particular. The impact that for example inflation, foreign currency shortage, and growing insecurity have had on all chain actors and their activities were discussed as well as the coping mechanisms of farmers, truck drivers, the brewery and distributors, NGOs and finance institutions. Stakeholders around the table were keen to exchange good practices as well as to explore areas for improvement.

Interaction between the value chain and its broader context

Opportunities for positive influence stemming from the company’s position in the country as the largest operational private company were debated by the participants. Increased interaction across conflict lines, the transfer of knowledge and information, and the creation of jobs and business opportunities, particularly for young men and women in the rural areas were put forward as positive influences attributable to the collaborative efforts of chain actors and supporters.

On the other hand, threats to the sustainability of the chain and its interaction with broader conflict dynamics were highlighted as well. Volatility of markets, devaluation of local currency and rising living costs not in line with incomes and margins, risks of co-option and growing insecurity were discussed as potential disruptive issues hampering the sustainability of the value chain.

Keep an eye on our website for more information on the outcomes of the research study.

MINUSMA faces enduring challenges in the implementation of its mandate seeking to advance the Malian peace process, support reconciliation, provide humanitarian assistance, ensure the protection of civilians and promote human rights, especially of women and children. Which credible institutional framework can adequately support reconciliation and human security, in particular upon MINUSMA’s eventual departure from Mali?

Mr. Chukwuemeka Eze (Executive Director – West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, WANEP) and Mr. Kissima Gakou (University of Law and Political Science of Bamako) took part in a discussion with members of the Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law who are active in Mali. Participants assessed priorities, outstanding SSR challenges, and the role ECOWAS and the EU missions should play at a 14 April informal meeting, hosted by the Knowledge Platform and the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict.

Which role for ECOWAS? Key takeaways

-         To reassure the Malian people that the country will remain stable upon the departure of the international community, it is important for ECOWAS to take ownership and proactively ensure the sustainability of on-going efforts.

-         The ECOWAS peace support operation will constitute an opportunity to prove that its standby force is operational, and requires the following:

• Resource mobilisation to prevent a post-MINUSMA void.
• Sufficient space for dialogue, which is currently lacking.
• Protection of civilians in the North, to undercut a legitimising factor of the rebel groups.
• Well-articulated DDR, which lays the onus on reintegration.
• Inclusion of the diaspora and refugees in peace efforts.

-         A fact-finding mission to assess existing stakes and human security challenges must additionally be deployed to further inform policy decisions. It will enable findings gathered by civil society to date be validated.

Lessons learned from MINUSMA for ECOWAS

-          To advance the peace process, a different focus on leadership is needed. A mediator who is from the region and who inspires confidence on the side of the government and the rebels, other than a sitting Head of State, must be looked for by ECOWAS.

-          Extremist tendencies across the region need to be monitored to be able to assess and respond to any changes upon MINUSMA’s departure. A more proactive approach and comprehensive economic framework overall are needed to prevent vulnerable and demobilised youth from resorting to violent extremism.

-          The development of entrepreneurial skills is important, but should be accompanied with opportunities to enhance leadership and strengthen youth participation in governance, as they have the potential to alter conflict dynamics.

-          While many resources have been spent on border control and management, efforts have failed to yield results. As external actors can only do so much, the non-involvement of local communities in initiatives has been an important gap and must be looked at, while carefully balancing endeavours with the free movement of goods and people, and ECOWAS’ integration.

-          The Malian government is perceived to have done little to advance local level reconciliation and ECOWAS does not possess the mandate, nor the skills to do so. Close cooperation with civil society to support community reconciliation and develop a comprehensive approach to human security are therefore essential.

Coordination and regional politics

As the coordination of efforts by the EU, UN etc. remains unclear, ECOWAS needs to assume responsibility, develop a clear strategy, and show openness to engage with other initiatives, including by the AU, through the development of a joint ECOWAS-AU workplan.

The Group of Five for the Sahel (G5, composed of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger), which operates on the basis of commitments at the Head of State level, benefits from a stronger political impulse as well as significant back up by international partners so as to respond to terrorist threats. Yet, ECOWAS is heavily dependent on the same partners, but receives less investment. As the G5 escapes from Algeria’s grip, and its lack of credibility as a peace broker, it is in a position to advance more rapidly. Meanwhile, ECOWAS’s inability to overcome security deficits in the region has led to its discredit in public opinion, where it is perceived as a political envelope devoid of content. Harmony in actions between ECOWAS and the G5 thus continues to be lacking.

Significant regional politics are furthermore at play. France’s weight in Mali places ECOWAS in a second position. However, the ECOWAS Commission’s new President from Benin has the potential to lead to new responses that are more detached from politics. Together with the full support provided to ECOWAS’ strategy in Mali by the President of Nigeria, these changing regional dynamics are hoped to yield a positive impact.

The role of the European Union and outstanding SSR challenges

While there has been more attention to MINUSMA than to the EU, its contributions should be adequately assessed to improve coherence and impact of interventions. Indeed, the EU Training Mission for the Malian military, focused on mass combat, is perceived to lack alignment with the local operational context of terrorism, both in the North and in Bamako. The perception of northern Malians is that individuals originating from the South are sent to the North, which has a potential of aggravating local conflict dynamics. This offensive EU involvement clashes with its role in the peace process and precipitates a lack of credibility as regards the EU’s long-term development endeavours.

Meanwhile, EUCAP, the EU’s civil security mission, is felt to have provided training on ways of working which were not understood by the Malians in their context, and hence, have not been implemented.

Most recently, the EU’s SSR mission has been deployed but has been inactive as both the Malian army and the police are already in the process of being reformed, and the government has convinced its international partners that the reintegration of former combatants, through the newly established National Commissions on DDR and Integration, must take place before SSR can proceed. This assessment points to the fact that the 3 EU missions have not been thought through jointly, or in line with local realities, as evidenced by the WOSCAP project, currently reviewing the EU’s conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions. The EU shall therefore think creatively about its interventions and where and how exactly SSR will occur.

Overall, Dutch interventions in Mali are positively perceived as they work closely with the population, which can be capitalised upon. As neither France nor MINUSMA are however seen as credible international actors by some Malians, the EU in particular would possibly be well placed to respond to on-going SSR challenges, on the condition that it moves beyond the respective interests of its member States and internal dissent, and finds solutions that are in line with local needs. Its significant neutrality, power, and relatively new role account for its potential. However, if it continues to fail, this option will also evaporate, to the detriment of Mali’s on-going peace process.

Hard Contexts, Hard Choices | #srolconf #hardchoices

How to tackle the Hard Choices that Security and Rule of Law policy, programming and knowledge exchange require in the Hard Contexts presented by fragile and conflict-affected settings? Guest experts from countries covering Libya, Burundi, Lebanon, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, Colombia, Germany, Kenya, Guatemala, The United States, Belgium, South Africa and France shared insights, and jointly identified avenues to adjust tools for interventions and chart the way forward with an eclectic mix of policymakers, practitioners and researchers. About 200 participants were asked to choose between the 24 featured parallel sessions, shaped and facilitated with the active involvement of a record-high of 32 Platform member organizations.

After the welcome remarks and an energizing negotiation exercise, Simone Filippini (Cordaid), Kathryn Nwajiaku-Dahou (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding - OECD), Katy Thompson (UNDP), and Jelte van Wieren (The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs) reflected in a moderated keynote conversation on the main tools, strategies and approaches that provide assistance in attempting to navigate the most difficult choices and challenges they face in working in these hard contexts. The experts stressed that we have no choice but to make hard choices; that we cannot compromise statebuilding engagement in violent situations; that we need to think politically about Rule of Law engagement; and that we need a better understanding of the intractability of violent conflicts.

 The majority of the day featured parallel sessions divided amongst the three conference themes, spiced up with several skills workshops.

Under theme 1 ‘Which balance to adopt in addressing current and emerging transnational security challenges ?’, some of the key takeaways included the recognition that State terrorism, corruption, exclusion, poverty and marginalization should not be forgotten in efforts to address violent extremism, which must be deployed within a rule of law framework. While criminalization by governments sends a strong message to the public, it is not the answer.

Meanwhile, the assumption that tackling unemployment in countries of origin will reduce the outflow of young migrants often proves to be wrong. Indeed, it fails to address the different labor expectations, the importance of social networks, or the opacity in existing employment systems.

The implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals through the current indicators risks creating perverse incentives. For Goal 16 in particular to matter, global, normative understandings of peace and justice need to be reconciled with more local needs and interpretations of justice. These were some of the key takeaways under theme 2‘Towards more politically transformative rule of law support’ of the conference's program.

Under theme 3 ‘Innovation in security and rule of law programming’, it was said that much remains to be learned to effectively adapt policy and programming to fragile contexts. Currently, organizational learning focuses heavily on the creation of knowledge alone, while much more attention to its transfer and retention within and amongst organizations is needed. This requires a clear vision be developed, which goes beyond individual learning so as to yield higher organisational returns and incorporates adequate incentive structures.

In order to adequately take into account the complexity of the situations we face, political economy analyses are another useful tool but need to become more flexible and adaptive. This requires looking at structural factors, levels of agency, and uncertainty.

Through the skills workshops, participants had the opportunity to enhance their research uptake skills, fine-tune their understanding of impact pathways, learn about behavioural change approaches, acquire a taste of crisis communication and get tips as to how to navigate power relations and structures in designing a range of campaigns and events so as to optimize impact.

A 'Bazaar of Publications' provided the opportunity to learn about the first research results and the work of the research consortia and other participants, both in hard copy and via a user-friendly conference app.

This year’s Conference aimed to contribute to delineating the Platform’s programmatic and research priorities, at the forefront of international developments and emerging challenges. It sought to foster innovative approaches to security and rule of law and showcased results by 16 represented NWO-WOTRO’s research projects, affiliated with the Platform. In an open and interactive atmosphere at the Bazaar of Ideas, enhanced in collaboration with an artist, participants had the opportunity to link up with a vibrant network of national and international security and rule of law professionals.

Key insights, ideas and proposed avenues will be gathered, charting the future directions and activities of the Platform. We are looking forward to continue to engage the Platform’s network in realizing our new programmatic and research agenda.

The summary report of the conference is now available here. Please keep an eye on the blog series inspired by the conference. All our publications are grouped under #srolconf and #hardchoices.

Kindly find here the timetable of the conference, and more information on the different breakout sessions.

Can the military contribute to the prevention of violent conflict, and if so, how can it collaborate with civil society in a preventive manner? These questions were at the heart of a discussion facilitated by GPPAC, the Alliance for Peacebuilding and the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, building on a presentation on the ‘Understand to Prevent' initiative, supported by the Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law.

Traditionally, the military is seen to ‘resolve’ conflict through means of force. At the same time, the military is increasingly called upon to provide humanitarian assistance and monitor ceasefires in post-crisis peacekeeping. The Understand to Prevent (U2P) initiative by the Multinational Capability Development Campaign aims to consolidate these efforts and provide new opportunities for a military contribution to the prevention of violent conflict.

While the project is primarily aimed at a military audience, the speakers noted that key to the success of the U2P process is reaching an understanding of the conflict environment by sharing information and engaging with non-military actors before a crisis occurs. This requires winning the trust of civil society organizations (CSOs), as the role of the military in conflict prevention and the comprehensive approach is not necessarily welcomed by all CSOs, who defend their need for independence and operational space. 

Key issues brought to the attention by respondents include:

• The understanding that conflict is an inherent feature of human relationships, and that the focus should be on preventing the escalation of conflict into violent conflict
• The importance of acknowledging the distinctions within the broad range of non-military actors, including government officials, civilians, CSO representatives and humanitarian agencies
• The need to build on local capacities and needs by asking what local communities need in each specific situation
• Rather than further complicating the conflict environment, the military should seek to contribute to the overall coherence and coordination of civilian and military efforts

Photo credit: Cimic Centre of Excellence CCOE / Sven Dube