What does it take to ensure security and justice programming is adaptive? Is adaptiveness actually desirable? These questions formed the basis of the series of lunch meetings and brainstorms on adaptive programming hosted by the Platform Secretariat over the past months. The concluding session, which took place 22 November, aimed to extract and synthesize the most important learnings from the series and translate these into concrete ideas for programming.

Click here for the summary reports of the first, second and third meetings on adaptive programming.

Enabling Factors

The discussion started by assessing what enables adaptive programming in practice, and focused on timeframes, organizational culture, indicators and knowledge. There needs to be ample time for programs to adapt to changes in their contexts; short-term programs thus do not lend themselves well to adaptiveness. On the other hand, long-term programs, it was noted, can suffer from stagnation if regular self-reflection intervals for program workers are not built in from the beginning.

This self-reflection must be an intrinsic quality in staff and organizations. While practitioners with decades of experience may seem a logical fit to lead programs, they may lack the ability to strategically assess where change must occur, thereby limiting potential for adaptiveness. True program ownership by having a stake in the issue and building in effective evaluation tools helps to prevent creeping biases from hurting learning processes.

What knowledge is necessary for adaptive programming? Practitioner experience, research, and monitoring and evaluation can all contribute to better adaptiveness. However, programming requires that each of these  types of knowledge identify on the one hand relevant indicators to ensure valuable input, and on the other hand valid entry points for change. They must plug into relevant program cycles and avoid wasting the often large volume of data that has been collected. Instilling in programming an expectation of knowledge sharing among practitioners, researchers, and policymakers, but also among organizations, will improve the value of knowledge.

Constraints

The discussion also identified a number of constraints to adaptive programming. First, trust is an issue. There is a lack of trust between practitioners, researchers and policy makers, between implementers and beneficiaries, between organizations and staff. Staff members face undue burdens in their organizational procedures, limiting their ability to make choices on the fly that help programs adapt. It was also pointed out that program designers often lack sufficient trust in local beneficiaries’ ability to correctly identify their needs. More trust and less “template thinking” can boost flexibility, reactivity and relevance.

The input from policymakers identified the limitations on adaptiveness due to political constraints. Parliaments and ministries want differing degrees of control over objectives and targets, both at the baseline and in indicators through program execution. This may not be ideal from an adaptive programming perspective, but it is important to understand that this is the political reality in which programs operate.

Finally, can adaptive programs be scaled up? Large scale programs that are able to adapt quickly are rare. The discussion highlighted the freight ship analogy. While small programs are agile like speedboats, large-scale programs are more like freight ships: it is possible to change their course, but only incrementally – especially with help from “adaptive speedboats”!

Evidence shows that  higher levels of education do not necessarily ensure  decreased radicalization. In fact, many of those who have engaged in violent extremism successfully completed high school or university. To understand this phenomenon, the Platform, in collaboration with Human Security Collective, The Hague Institute and the International Center for Counter Terrorism (ICCT), organized a workshop to explored the links between education and radicalization as part of the Spark IGNITE! Conference 2016.

Understanding and dissecting education and radicalization

Three are at least two competing approaches to the role of education in preventing radicalization. Does taking a hardline – securitized – approach, where allegedly radical ideas and behaviors are suppressed and diverging opinions are shut out of the conversation increase the risk of violence? Does a developmental approach that encourages critical thinking and exchange of ideas suffice? How can these approaches be balanced to meet the growing challenge of radicalization?

Starting with an overview of some of the dilemmas related to radicalization, Agnese Macaluso, researcher at The Hague Institute for Global Justice, explained that the relationships between education and radicalization is not straightforward. Education creates expectations: degree holders expect jobs and a social status that reflects their qualifications and skills. Where these expectations cannot be met, frustration and a feeling of injustice can give rise to susceptibility to radicalization. As Floor Kroft of RadarAdvies argued, education alone is not enough. Education must go hand-in-hand with the creation of real, sustainable job opportunities.

But what about education itself? How must we adapt education to enhance our ability to root out radicalization? The participants in the workshop identified a number of approaches. Fostering tolerance between religions and ethnicities is crucial in societies where divisions are emerging or established. To this end, Indira Aslanova of Search for Common Ground presented programs undertaken in Kyrgyzstan, where secular elements are included in religious curricula, and vice versa, to promote mutual understanding and appreciation.

In The Netherlands, Heleen Cousijn explained, Diversion is helping teachers and students to discuss taboo topics and to understand that conversation is the best way to challenge the assumptions that underlie marginalization and drive radicalization. From a more global perspective, Dr. Eri Park of University College Roosevelt presented the UCARE curriculum, which provides a toolkit to foster citizenship and social skills by teaching high-school students social competences, building resilience against those factors that can lead to radicalization.

Takeaways from group sessions

After learning about the various approaches to radicalization, the workshop’s participants split into groups, exchanging ideas about the challenges and opportunities in using education as a tool against radicalization. The interactive conversations generated a number of valuable insights.

For example, it was noted that the preference for security-based approaches to deal with radicalization is driven by a need to measure and quantify the success of counter-radicalizations efforts. Governments should not prioritize hard data if this prevents alternative approaches from gaining traction.

Another interesting insight from the group discussion was that while education should accentuate differences between people and continue to teach tolerance and understanding, there should also be a renewed focus on common identities and similarities, to help build a sense of belonging to the same community or group.

The workshop highlighted that being neutral in the face of radicalization is nearly impossible. Personal misgivings about radical thoughts and ideas are difficult to avoid. However, despite these personal reservations about others’ perspectives, marginalization and alienation of those who think differently  in the classroom, and more broadly, should be avoided as much as possible. An open and inclusive conversation where differing opinions are not immediately shut down must be the objective.

Finally, the groups all noted the dangers of framing. Radicalization itself is a term that can lead to exclusion and stigmatization. Furthermore, especially in the West, there has been a substantial focus on radicalization of Muslim youth. It is crucial to keep sight of all types of radicalization – nationalist and left-wing, among others.

Migratory flows within the Northern and Western Africa, as well as between Africa and Europe, have become a top priority for policymakers both in The Netherlands and abroad. On 1 November, the Platform Secretariat organized an Interactive Brainstorm exploring how migration management programs can respond effectively to the realities of migration and human smuggling and trafficking on the ground in Northern Africa and the Sahel region.

In surveying how migratory flows are currently affecting countries like Libya, Mali and Niger, a number of dilemmas for migration management policies are apparent. First, the majority of trans-region migration is intra-regional, rather than directed towards Europe. Second, evidence suggests that investment in border control drives the smuggling industries in the region. Third, criminal smuggling networks, and the proceeds generated through their operations, are sometimes substantially embedded in local and national politics.

What are the drivers of these migration flows? Overarching megatrends, such as climate change and irregular rain, push farmers out of the Sahel and elsewhere towards traditionally richer societies such as Libya. Additionally, violent conflict at home and, particularly, the lack of economic opportunities and a bleak future remain important drivers.

Migration and smuggling as development and empowerment

A key difficulty identified during the meeting was the substantial contribution to local and national economies generated through migrant smuggling. Migration is not only a protection strategy, but also a development strategy. Hotels, car mechanics, bus operators and other commercial businesses earn from migrants passing through. Simultaneously, security forces rely on revenue extracted from migrants at roadblocks and elsewhere to supplement their incomes. These practices are often institutional, rather than incidental: in one city a mayoral decree regulated distribution of profits from migration.

The challenge in managing migration is how to replace the income generated through smuggling. Smuggling is a tool for empowerment and financial gain in Libya, Mali and Niger. Without sustainable alternatives, particularly for youth, smuggling practices will continue, and securitized migration policies may only exacerbate the abuses that migrants suffer.

At a superficial level, actors in the smuggling economy want quick money. At a deeper level, however, smuggling networks are entrenched in the political economies in which they operate. Communities engage in smuggling as livelihood protection to cope in a tumultuous environment and social empowerment, for marginalized communities to reposition themselves in their societies.

Particularly in Libya, the smuggling economy is the glue that holds together much of the fragmented Libyan society. Indeed, violence between armed groups rarely affects the viability and continuity of smuggling routes – business comes first.

Migration and smuggling often provide a degree of stability in the region. The aforementioned smuggling economy provides jobs that prevent youth from being tempted by armed groups and terrorist organizations. Furthermore, for communities that rely on smuggling as an opportunity for empowerment, rooting out this trade could have devastating effects.

Lack of reliable data

The discussion accentuated the difficulty in collecting current and reliable data on almost all aspects of migration. Despite data collection from a number of NGOs, CSOs and others, it is nearly impossible to bring all this data together. There is a need for coordination between these actors to fill knowledge gaps that are crucial to seeing the whole picture in the region.

How can we move forward?

The discussion presented a number of takeaways that can inform how to enhance migration management strategies given the realities for migrants in these areas. First, the security approach to addressing migration, without taking into account the developmental and political aspects of the smuggling economy, will not work. Comprehensive strategies that simultaneously try to limit migratory flows and foster economic opportunities, both for migrants at home and for those living along migratory routes, may help to incrementally reduce the flows.

Second, it is absolutely essential for all actors to understand that stemming migratory flows entirely is nearly impossible. The inability of some actors to accept that migrants will almost always continue to move, particularly from countries where they lack opportunities, hinders the development of both effective and compassionate policies.

Third, there is a need to identify credible actors at all levels and at every points along migratory routes in order to better understand needs in each community and to develop sustainable policies that have supporting and implementing partners on the ground. These partnerships will also help to gain a more nuanced understanding of the issues the migrants, smugglers, bureaucrats, security forces and other actors must deal with. Part of this identification is also the ability to understand the way in which these actors themselves are part and parcel of the smuggling economies in their regions.

Finally, the human rights dimension of all policies and programs aiming to manage migration must be a priority. The abuses migrants suffer on their journeys and in arriving at their destination only serve to encourage onwards migration. Particularly in Libya, violations of human rights mean increased migratory flows to Europe. EU programs must continually assess the human rights impact of the policies adopted.

In 2014, the Ebola virus broke out in Monrovia, Liberia. The task of organizing an effective response largely fell to local government. Under the leadership of Mayor Clara Doe Mvogo, municipal authorities reached out to community leaders it worked with on a daily basis, spreading information about correct methods to contain the virus’ spread—even as national health officials struggled against public distrust to convey the same messages.

Monrovia’s response to the Ebola outbreak is a stark example of the utility of local government in fragile and conflict-affected states, where a key driver of insecurity and instability is the weak relationship between state and citizens. There is growing international recognition that sub-national actors like local governments can perform a practical role in building inclusive dialogue and collaboration between state institutions and the public, as in Monrovia during the Ebola crisis; or providing concrete conflict mitigation and dispute settlement mechanisms that prevent or reduce violence.

With that potential in mind, on November 4 the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) and PAX co-hosted an event with the Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law, exploring ways in which sub-national actors can contribute to peacebuilding and statebuilding. With support from the Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law, the event brought together local government, policymakers, and practitioners to share insights on how donors can support sub-national institutions to strengthen citizen trust and state legitimacy in fragile contexts. Invited participants included practitioners with perspectives from the field, like Dion van den Berg of PAX; scholars like RTI International’s Dr Derick Brinkerhoff and CCDP’s Dr Oliver Jütersonke; and local government leaders like Monrovia’s own Mayor Mvogo. Keith Krause, Director of CCDP, moderated the discussion.

During the substantive closed-door roundtable, participants critically assessed the cross-national contributions of sub-national actors to citizen trust and state legitimacy, drawing on diverse evidence from Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Côte d'Ivoire, Libya, and elsewhere. Participants grappled with how more inclusive political governance at the local level might strengthen state-citizen relations even in the context of deeply exclusive national-level governance; and whether donors should prioritize support to improving local service delivery or local government accountability mechanisms to deliver the biggest gains in trust and legitimacy.

The unique event concluded that international policymakers must develop a more nuanced understanding of the advantages and limitations of supporting sub-national governments as actors in peacebuilding and statebuilding, including by building the mechanisms for inclusive political governance from the local level up. Later this month, PAX and CCDP will co-publish an outcome report capturing key points of agreement and contention from the event intended to inform more effective policy frameworks. 

Libya is a state in turmoil. Many dimensions of the current situation in Libya pose challenges to its further stability and problematize the ability of internal and external actors to intervene effectively. To this end, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Platform organized an expert meeting on 4 October. Bringing together a diverse group of experienced practitioners working in and policymakers working on Libya, the event aimed to explore the implications of the current state of affairs for ongoing and future security sector reform efforts by the European Union and the Netherlands more specifically.

The meeting began with a surveying of the current situation in Libya, taking in the effects of migration and related criminality, the activities and competing interests of the militias currently active throughout the country, and Libya’s political dynamics, particularly the legitimacy and acceptance of the Government of National Accord (GNA).

It was noted that Libya is and always has been a destination country for migrants. Millions of economic migrants from all corners of the African continent see Libya as an endpoint in their journeys. However, the deteriorating safety situation in the country, exacerbated by rampant human rights violations, violence and the rise of ISIS - who have taken to targeting migrants - have shortened the transit time and encouraged onward migration over the dangerous Mediterranean Sea path.

Recent developments, particularly legislation criminalizing immigration and the increased involvement of criminal gangs in the smuggling economy, may exacerbate the conditions fueling migration. Many migrants arrested in Libya, as well as those turned back by the coast guard at sea, are brought to detention centers characterized primarily by conditions that migrants attempted to escape from in the first place. Ensuring that policies and program that stem migration do not cause further harm, particularly violations of basic human rights and dignities, should be a central concern for all external actors in Libya.

Economic interests

The discussion illustrated the impact of the economy on many facets of the security situation in Libya. The lack of economic opportunities fuels the turn towards criminal activity, such as smuggling. Militia membership provides many with an income, meaning the demobilization cannot occur effectively without job opportunities after the fact.

All of the participants agreed that oil production remains central to the prospects for stability in Libya. Without the income and jobs flowing from the oil industry, the Libyan state and economy will not be able to provide conditions for sustainable peace. To this end, guaranteeing the … of the Libyan oil production infrastructure, as well as the equitable distribution of oil wealth through the Libyan Central Bank, are priorities for external interventions.

The discussion throughout the day questioned whether improving economic prospects in Libya was the first element that external interventions should focus on in order to generate the most tangible results overall. On the one hand, it was argued, an enhanced economy can help to assuage a range of other drivers of conflict in the country: increased militarization; the smuggling economy; weak institutions; lack of education and social programs - all of which would ameliorate the state of the security sector. On the other hand, economic initiatives require relative stability and security. The current unstable situation would hamper the ability of actors to find reliable partners and initiate sustainable programs.

Militias and politics

Following from the previous discussion, the participants noted that effective interventions in Libya, are impeded by the ever-changing nature of the security sector and its main actors. New groups, coalitions and alliances arise, older groups atomize, new leaders come to the fore and key figures depart from the scene. Mapping exercises and surveyance of the situation on the ground are necessary, but must be updated continuously. Information on leaders and authority structures from before 2014 is essentially irrelevant at this time, yet external actors continue to use out-of-date information as the foundation upon which interventions are built.

With respect to militias, groups are hybrid and fluid in nature. They are often characterized by hyper-regionalization and localization, undermining the notion of “national” armed groups. Groups emerge from particular (geographic) contexts, capturing the specific grievances that are present in these contexts as a basis for their existence. Brigades from Misrata, Sirte and elsewhere have competing interests and are supported by different, sometimes foreign, parties. Additionally, armed Salafist groups and the rise of ISIS further complicate the situation.

Have EU and other external interventions failed?

Given the unstable setting in which interventions take place, how can programs be insulated such that their effectiveness will not be tarnished? It was noted that it is crucial to take a long-term historical view of the readiness of Libyans for interventions. Libya is grappling with a legacy of incoherent institutional approaches, unclear and opaque administrative processes and disruption and disappearance of crucial data. Assumptions made by external actors, such as which ministry to direct resources to for specific ends, often do not take into account this legacy. The lack of unity in government has caused politicization of many of the elements of the Libyan government, for example the Libyan Central Bank and the ministry of oil.

External interventions have thus far often been characterized by a short-term perspective and a lack of institutional memory. The same mistakes are made repeatedly. Actors intervene on the basis of faulty or incomplete information, mapping is not comprehensive, and efforts are rife with incorrect assumptions. However, as the discussion illustrated, the perception among many Libyans that external interventions have been detrimental to the Libyan situation are not entirely correct. External mediation, for example, has enhanced the success of local ceasefires. The worst era of fighting in recent years, in 2014, was that in which no external mediation took place. Furthermore, the efforts to strengthen the GNA offer some hope for the future, and should not be halted prematurely. The problem many humanitarian efforts, such as those led by the EU, face is the lack of access. Many organizations are unable to work effectively in Libya, causing a lack of reliable humanitarian partners.

How can we move forward?

The main thread throughout the discussions was the inability of almost all actors to gain a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the situation on the ground. As such, there is a need for a greater push for scaled and well-grounded analyses evaluating various aspect of the political economy of Libya.

External actors are at risk of falling for drawing board program. The template-based solutions on offer, such as elections, will not necessarily fit the complex and ever-changing reality on the ground in Libya. Indeed, solutions of this kind aimed at reforming the security sector can play into the hands of those wielding the most influence at the time. Coupled with the aforementioned deep analyses, developing adaptive programming that takes into account the power dynamics on the ground will help to improve the effectiveness of efforts.

Institutions must be built up from a basic level. The legacy left over from under the Gaddafi regime greatly impacts their ability to function going forward. This legacy must be taken into account and dealt with, by improving coherence of institutional cooperation and clarity of institutional mandates.

The needs of the Libyan population, however diverse, must remain a focal point for all efforts. While the GNA must eventually take up the mantle of responsibility for these needs, external actors must find ways to support the Libyan population directly, bypassing the GNA where it lacks the capacity or ability to act and where the needs are pressing. However, these efforts must not undermine the legitimacy of the GNA and its ability to govern in the future - efforts must retain a long-term focus on sustainable self-governance.

Should donors engage informal justice systems when developing justice related programming? And if so, how? This was the central question that was discussed during the Interactive Brainstorm ‘Understanding and Engaging Informal Justice’, which took place in The Hague on 20 October 2016.

The discussions of the day were based on the report ‘Understanding and Engaging Informal Justice’, written by Geoffrey Swenson. This report, as well as the insights from the event, will feed into a policy brief that aims to provide donors with concrete recommendations on how to best consider and engage informal justice systems when developing justice related programming in developing states.

A plea to improve inclusiveness in programming, a demand for increased applied research into what works (and what does not work) versus a call to translate the (anthropological) research that is readily available into meaningful policy advise, focus on underlying socio-economic challenges and not just on justice concerns: these are just a few of the many arguments and experiences that were shared during this interactive brainstorm. Geoffrey Swenson kick-started the discussion by presenting the main points of his report, namely the importance of the (political) context, and clarity and transparency regarding donor’s goals for engagement and the inevitable trade-offs that come with them. Are donors trying to increase the use of informal justice systems, is the aim to change these systems’ modus operandi by for example adding in international human rights standards, or is the intention to change the relationship between informal justice systems and the state system, by formalizing the informal?

The report was well received and the contributions of the participants served to fine-tune the argument. Notably, the discussion underlined the importance of an increased focus on power dynamics, not only between formal and informal justice systems and between these systems and their users, but also within the systems themselves. Linked to this, donors should also realize that whichever way they intervene, their interventions will affect power structures. As a result, if the impact of engagement cannot be fully understood, in some instances it might be better not to engage at all. However, as one of the participants argued, the question is not whether we want informal justice or not, as it is a reality that is not likely to disappear. Donors should ask themselves: what do we want to achieve, and what will be the impact of supporting informal justice systems? In addition to this, donors should be wary of using the word change because of its related high expectations. Instead, it makes much more sense to look at what actually works, what can be built upon, and gradually start introducing other groups to the process. It is only through these types of processes that incremental change can happen.

During the remainder of the day, pitches by the experts sparked debate on a multitude of issues, and experiences from Mali, Sierra Leone, DR Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Bangladesh were shared. Semantics were discussed: oftentimes, it is difficult to distinguish between formal and informal systems – especially in fragile settings. Informal justice systems can be highly formalized and vice-versa. Next to this, it is important to think about how to keep all stakeholders, including the state and the wider community, involved in justice programming. Discussants suggested exploring ways in which justice provision can be seen as a public service was suggested, as was linking formal and informal systems to arrive at the closure of what was dubbed the ‘justice gap’ by one of the participants: the impunity that persists because some crimes are not targeted by either system.

Recommendations

During the recap of the discussion, the most pressing issues and important recommendations were shared. In order to understand informal justice systems, donors should:

• Pay thorough attention to power dynamics between all stakeholders, and including the dynamics at play within informal justice systems themselves;
• Realize that informality is not a local issue, but that it exists at all levels of society;
• Pay attention to the interface between formal and informal justice, and be cautious that the two are not always easily distinguishable;
• Comprehend what justice actually means to whom, and develop programming accordingly;
• Build on the (academic) knowledge that is available.

 In order to engage with informal justice systems, donors should take care to:

• Clearly articulate policy objectives;
• Be modest in ambition and have realistic goals and expectations – and communicate honestly about these. On a scale from 1 to 10, moving from 2 to 3 is sometimes the best possible outcome;
• Realize that only incremental change is possible, and that all change is political;
• Create a safe space for innovative programming, including ample room for continuous adaptation as the programme develops;
• Promote inclusivity and involve all stakeholders, including potential spoilers;
• Identify the justice gap and put access to justice centre-stage;
• Not apply different standards for working with formal and informal justice systems, for example in terms of international human rights standards;
• Take evidence-based programming seriously;
• Be cautious not to break what is there.

With the projects under the Reconstruction Tender having concluded, Oxfam Novib and the Platform organized an informal learning event entitled “Great Lakes Reconstruction Tender: Linking and Learning” on 26 September. The informal event offered a venue for participants to share lessons learned from the project under the tender and explore how to integrate these learnings into future projects implementation.

Read more about the projects here.

Takeaways

The fruitful discussion throughout the day provided many interesting ideas for improving future implementation of programs. But what should really be taken into account?

There is no need to reinvent the wheel. Taking into account existing programs and frameworks, building on the challenges and opportunities they have encountered, and working complementarily instead of replicating work will save time, money and improve quality across the board.

Local partners should acknowledge and act upon the strength of their own capacities, expanding their presence in their working space and reducing reliance on external parties and organizations. In the same vein, external parties that work with local partners must develop honest and realistic exit strategies that bolster continuity and sustainability of initiatives that have been undertaken.

Flexibility and continual assessment are, as ever, key factors in determining whether or not programs make an impact. Ignoring changing realities, refusing to tweak and adjust along the way and being unable to alter objectives to the situation at hand are all detrimental to effective programming.

Finally, having a relationship with donors that extends past stretching out hands for money can only be beneficial. Involving them more closely with project design fosters a better working relationship, allowing donors to also cooperate better when a crisis situation does occur.

Agri-Business Creation (ABC) in Burundi - SPARK

SPARK’s ABC program in Burundi aimed to generate small-scale sustainable livelihoods for young people in the agricultural sector. Young people in the Great Lakes region are not interested in agriculture because of high intensity work and low profits. Additionally, there is little innovation in the sector and the priorities of the Burundian government, particularly after the 2015 crisis, lie elsewhere. However, SPARK’s project inspired a number of young people by providing them with consistent incomes.

The project generated many valuable insights. The first is that the cooperative was able to leverage its production capabilities to negotiate pricing with multinational it produced for. Additionally, augmenting economic opportunities in this way fills the gaps in a country where the government cannot provide for all its people. The discussion produced two notable recommendations for future planning: to integrate peacebuilding training into economic opportunity programs, so as to combine two parallel efforts; and to evaluate how to move the project’s impact beyond the local level to a more national scale.

Enhancing Local Peace Committees (LPCs) - ZOA & Radboud University Nijmegen

Corita Corbijn (ZOA) and Matthijs van Leeuwen (Radboud University Nijmegen) presented the results of their program, which explored assumptions guiding support for LPCs. The research then produced two toolkits, for practitioners and local stakeholders, visualize programmatic choices in intervention design.

The questions that were asked as part of the research showed that there was a disconnect between what questions the researchers considered important and those that were more important in practice. The larger questions, like the peace versus justice debate, were highly relevant to the LPCs, contrary to what was assumed. Furthermore, participants highlighted the importance of self-critique in interventions. Identifying and questioning assumptions is a crucial part of improving programmatic design.

Building Peace and Promoting Human Security in Post-Conflict Societies - CCR

This South Africa-based Centre for Conflict Resolution project initially aimed to benefit police, military and government institutions, but the focus was later adjusted to prioritize NGOs, CSOs and religious leaders due to conflicts in the Great Lakes region.

The project illustrated the need to focus on training 2 or more participants from specific organizations. Staff turnover means that knowledge of conflict resolution processes learned from trainings disappeared. In order to ensure sustainability, it was necessary to target multiple participants, from both positions of responsibility and the organization’s day-to-day project implementers. This way, CCR could encourage knowledge “cascading” throughout organizations.

Additionally, it was remarked that flexibility and continuous needs assessments are central to ensuring that training remain cognizant of new developments, especially in countries with fragile and ever-changing political environments.

Partners and a Regional Approach to Peacebuilding

Peace Beyond Borders - Oxfam Novib

The Peace Beyond Borders (PBB) project established and implemented through a consortium of partners a Regional Roadmap to Peace, designed from the bottom up by conflict-affected communities. The roadmap intended to address causes and consequences of conflict relating to land and governance.

Working with a consortium of partners enhanced the ability of the project to capitalize on the strengths and effective approaches of specific organizations. The consortium approach improved access to parties from various sectors, using the organizational connections built up by each member to great effect. This also helped to boost the legitimacy of the project as a whole.

The PBB project aimed to involve national, regional and international stakeholders at the design stage of the program. Instead of coopting stakeholders last minute, encouraging involvement at the design stage helps to ensure ownership of the process.

Another important insight from the project: building confidence and capacity of partners organizations and raising their awareness that it is their own space that they act in. What stops organizations like OAP and others from entering and working in this space without the engagement of parties like Oxfam Novib? These organizations must become the masters of their own space.

On the 23rd of September 2016, the African Diaspora Policy Centre (ADPC) organised a seminar entitled “Partnerships for Peace: Engaging with Diaspora”. During the seminar, an interactive and open exchange of experiences among diaspora organizations, NGOs and policymakers took place, focusing on the challenges and opportunities in creating partnerships in the field of peacebuilding. Building on these experiences, the seminar worked towards identifying next steps and actionable recommendations to establishing and utilizing these partnerships for peace more effectively.

After a word of welcome from the director of ADPC, Awil Mohamoud, Mrs. Juliènne Doppenberg-Difukidi (Tosangana) and Mr. Olivier Muhizi (African Human Rights Network) shared their first-hand experiences in running a diaspora organization in the field of peacebuilding. Both provided some interesting best practices of what partnerships can bring. Whereas Juliènne’s organisation has been deeply involved in the National Action Plan 1325, a partnerships of different organizations and government on issues related to women, peace and security, Olivier recently established a new platform, which links up international NGOs with local human right defenders. Another great example of what type of partnerships exists. Both stressed the importance of working together to be able to contribute to sustainable peace.

On the basis of participants expertise and linkages with their activities, they then split up into peace network groups on either gender, radicalisation or youth. Facilitated by colleagues from WO=MEN, ICCT and The Hague Peace Projects, the groups delved deeper into the challenges and opportunities they face in their work when building partnerships and jointly identified next steps to address these. A key insight from the event was to turn the challenge faced by many diaspora organizations of having little capacity and resources, into the opportunity of joining forces, also with NGOs, when developing projects.

Overall the participants of the seminar expressed a clear interest and willingness to continue this exchange of experiences, to be able to learn from each other. A concrete idea would be to have this continued conversation as a way to actually explore possibilities of establishing partnerships.

Why do we need the African Union? This question was the central theme of the interactive meeting organized by the European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) and hosted by the Platform on 28 September.

Bringing together experts and practitioners from Europe and Africa, and from NGOs, the meeting delved into what the AU has achieved in the 15 years since its founding, what role it can play now and in the future, and how to improve cooperation and coordination between the AU and other regional and international bodies, most specifically the European Union.

The AU: working for Africa?

The meeting started with a session that set the scene, questioning the achievements of the AU so far, and what threats and opportunities face the AU in this day and age. In a relatively short time, it was said, the AU has been an agent of change in the region. While its remains an “imperfect” organization, it is an African Union, representing African interests and aspirations.

The African Union is necessary in a global world where decentralization is needed for more effective governance. Engagement beyond African borders, particularly with actors like the EU and the UN, is streamlined with the AU as the face of its 54 member states, bringing their common needs and perspectives together. Additionally, the AU is a more effective advocacy tool, leveraging the negotiating power of 54 countries at the same time. However, while the AU was seen as a historic step forward a generation ago, uniting the continent, it is crucial for the Union to remain in touch with young people in Africa, some of whom see the AU as a question mark.

The AU will play a particularly important role in addressing some of the megatrends that loom not only over Africa, but also the rest of the world. Exponential population growth, urbanization, climate change and the global economic slowdown have all impacted Africa. These threats require a comprehensive and collective response from the AU, with a focus on sustainable and long-term programs, better education, improved infrastructure, enhanced freedom of movement in Africa, fair and free trade and more.

Equality, honest and self-reflection

One of the most crucial insights from the meeting was the lack of equality in dealings between the AU and EU, as well as other partners. The need for conversations about efforts to address problems inside and outside of Africa to be held from positions of equal footing and respect were highlighted repeatedly. One of the consequences of this unequal partnership is the misunderstanding of priorities between the EU and AU. Where the EU often cites migration and terrorism as pressing threats, African states may be more concerned by climate change, resource depletion, the youth bulge and lack of economic opportunities. This disconnect hampers the efforts undertaken on both sides. Similarly, the tension between justice and peace and reconciliation remain prevalent. Should Europe continue to insist on justice in particular contexts, where boundaries between victims and perpetrators are blurred and renewed conflict is around the corner? Can the AU tackle impunity itself, while maintaining prospects of real peace?

EU/ AU deals, like the one concluded in 2015 in Valletta, should not be imposed on African states. Instead, joint efforts should be made that can harness the capacities the AU and its constituent members have developed in dealing with local issues. Furthermore, there was a call for European states to be honest in their dealings with Africa and the AU. Altruism may factor into development projects and security programs, but often the motivations behind European initiatives is security at home. Clear communication about self-interest, while trying to find areas of overlap and common goals, will lead to more frank negotiations and, eventually, fruitful cooperation going forward. This will in turn encourage better implementation, engender a sense of ownership and enhance self-sustainability for AU programs, all of which will contribute to sustainability of practices.

Of course, the AU and its members must also reflect on their own deficiencies. The AU must define clearly its role on the continent, especially vis-a-vis Regional Economic Communities. Who should do what in peace and security efforts? What operational capabilities are missing? Who has the political legitimacy to mount and lead peace efforts? The AU has earned an important place for itself on the international stage - now it must answer the questions that remain to ensure that that place is not lost.

On 15 September 2016, NIMD, the Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law, IDEA, and the Berghof Foundation hosted an expert meeting in The Hague with the aim of identifying key strategies for donor and practitioner organisations to effectively work with political actors in fragile and conflict affected settings.

Experts, policymakers and practitioners convened to share insights and learn from each other’s experiences in a range of settings. This was an opportunity to discuss both challenges and lessons learned from engaging in these contexts, in order to improve future efforts.              

Jelte van Wieren (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Arthur Boutellis (International Peace Institute), and Veronique Dudouet (the Berghof Foundation) discussed what role donors can play in supporting political parties and political party assistance within the international development aid agenda. The discussion revealed a pressing need for donors to adopt a long term, post-conflict vision of engagement and to grant priority to the advancement of legitimate and inclusive politics, without which conflict affected societies will remain unstable. 

Following the first panel on the donor perspective; the second part was dedicated to exploring the practitioner’s perspective further, in a discussion with Soumano Moumouni (CMDID Mali), Andres Navas (NIMD Colombia), Fabien Nsengimana (BLTP Burundi), Frank Kayitare (IDEA), and Egbert Pos (NIMD). They addressed some of the major challenges that they face as practitioners working with political parties, but also compared success stories and ways forward. One recurring challenge is the integration of former armed groups into the political arena. Experience from Colombia illustrates the necessity to construct inclusive political settlements, and to provide support for the transition of these armed groups into becoming political parties.  

Further challenges to engaging with political parties in fragile settings include a generalised lack of trust, low levels of legitimacy for international efforts, and difficulties to synchronise differing agendas.

Panelists agreed on the necessity to engage in the long term, and to keep efforts consistent, open, and inclusive in order to effectively respond to these challenges.

A key takeaway from the afternoon was the widespread recognition on behalf of policy experts, academics, and practitioners of the crucial importance of engaging with political parties to achieve peaceful and sustainable development. Beyond the necessity to engage, exchanges throughout the afternoon highlighted the crucial importance of doing so with a long-term vision and with an emphasis on inclusivity and legitimacy.