Looking at Conflict Patterns: Declining Frequencies yet Persistent Brutalities in both Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Conflicts

What brutalises rebels? What makes them cruel, or makes them do things that we consider cruel and immoral? That is a primary question—which can be put to all kinds of armed actors—of Ten Dam's research on rebels and rebellion, the “violent opposition to the ruler, government regime, or state for any personal, collective or ideological purpose.

Arguably, rebels or insurgents are the most important and dominant kind of armed non-state actors. After all, without rebels, no rebellions.

The question of brutalisation i.e. increasing resort to violence that violates local and/or international norms—that Ten Dam holds are ultimately based on conscience, empathy and honour. Apparently, most conflicts are internal, insurgent, ethnic and separatist in nature, and one wishes to prevent or curtail the suffering involved.

Although the technical meanings of the terms “ethnic,” “ethnoreligious,” “communal,” and “national” are not identical, it is becoming an increasingly standard shorthand to refer to the whole field as the study of “ethnic conflict”. In contrast, Ten Dam argues that conflicts per se may refer to other contrary interests than mutually antagonistic identity claims by actual and (self-_perceived ethnicities. 

Second, one should not assume that invariably majorities suppress minorities in armed conflicts. Conflicts can be initiated by minorities against majorities, or by minorities against other minorities, and often representatives of minorities dominate and suppress others. 

In many cases numerical minorities suppress numerical majorities; think of South-Africa under Apartheid, or ontemporary Sudan essentially ruled by three Arab tribes constituting just five percent of its population.