Libya is a state in turmoil. Many dimensions of the current situation in Libya pose challenges to its further stability and problematize the ability of internal and external actors to intervene effectively. To this end, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Platform organized an expert meeting on 4 October. Bringing together a diverse group of experienced practitioners working in and policymakers working on Libya, the event aimed to explore the implications of the current state of affairs for ongoing and future security sector reform efforts by the European Union and the Netherlands more specifically.

The meeting began with a surveying of the current situation in Libya, taking in the effects of migration and related criminality, the activities and competing interests of the militias currently active throughout the country, and Libya’s political dynamics, particularly the legitimacy and acceptance of the Government of National Accord (GNA).

It was noted that Libya is and always has been a destination country for migrants. Millions of economic migrants from all corners of the African continent see Libya as an endpoint in their journeys. However, the deteriorating safety situation in the country, exacerbated by rampant human rights violations, violence and the rise of ISIS - who have taken to targeting migrants - have shortened the transit time and encouraged onward migration over the dangerous Mediterranean Sea path.

Recent developments, particularly legislation criminalizing immigration and the increased involvement of criminal gangs in the smuggling economy, may exacerbate the conditions fueling migration. Many migrants arrested in Libya, as well as those turned back by the coast guard at sea, are brought to detention centers characterized primarily by conditions that migrants attempted to escape from in the first place. Ensuring that policies and program that stem migration do not cause further harm, particularly violations of basic human rights and dignities, should be a central concern for all external actors in Libya.

Economic interests

The discussion illustrated the impact of the economy on many facets of the security situation in Libya. The lack of economic opportunities fuels the turn towards criminal activity, such as smuggling. Militia membership provides many with an income, meaning the demobilization cannot occur effectively without job opportunities after the fact.

All of the participants agreed that oil production remains central to the prospects for stability in Libya. Without the income and jobs flowing from the oil industry, the Libyan state and economy will not be able to provide conditions for sustainable peace. To this end, guaranteeing the … of the Libyan oil production infrastructure, as well as the equitable distribution of oil wealth through the Libyan Central Bank, are priorities for external interventions.

The discussion throughout the day questioned whether improving economic prospects in Libya was the first element that external interventions should focus on in order to generate the most tangible results overall. On the one hand, it was argued, an enhanced economy can help to assuage a range of other drivers of conflict in the country: increased militarization; the smuggling economy; weak institutions; lack of education and social programs - all of which would ameliorate the state of the security sector. On the other hand, economic initiatives require relative stability and security. The current unstable situation would hamper the ability of actors to find reliable partners and initiate sustainable programs.

Militias and politics

Following from the previous discussion, the participants noted that effective interventions in Libya, are impeded by the ever-changing nature of the security sector and its main actors. New groups, coalitions and alliances arise, older groups atomize, new leaders come to the fore and key figures depart from the scene. Mapping exercises and surveyance of the situation on the ground are necessary, but must be updated continuously. Information on leaders and authority structures from before 2014 is essentially irrelevant at this time, yet external actors continue to use out-of-date information as the foundation upon which interventions are built.

With respect to militias, groups are hybrid and fluid in nature. They are often characterized by hyper-regionalization and localization, undermining the notion of “national” armed groups. Groups emerge from particular (geographic) contexts, capturing the specific grievances that are present in these contexts as a basis for their existence. Brigades from Misrata, Sirte and elsewhere have competing interests and are supported by different, sometimes foreign, parties. Additionally, armed Salafist groups and the rise of ISIS further complicate the situation.

Have EU and other external interventions failed?

Given the unstable setting in which interventions take place, how can programs be insulated such that their effectiveness will not be tarnished? It was noted that it is crucial to take a long-term historical view of the readiness of Libyans for interventions. Libya is grappling with a legacy of incoherent institutional approaches, unclear and opaque administrative processes and disruption and disappearance of crucial data. Assumptions made by external actors, such as which ministry to direct resources to for specific ends, often do not take into account this legacy. The lack of unity in government has caused politicization of many of the elements of the Libyan government, for example the Libyan Central Bank and the ministry of oil.

External interventions have thus far often been characterized by a short-term perspective and a lack of institutional memory. The same mistakes are made repeatedly. Actors intervene on the basis of faulty or incomplete information, mapping is not comprehensive, and efforts are rife with incorrect assumptions. However, as the discussion illustrated, the perception among many Libyans that external interventions have been detrimental to the Libyan situation are not entirely correct. External mediation, for example, has enhanced the success of local ceasefires. The worst era of fighting in recent years, in 2014, was that in which no external mediation took place. Furthermore, the efforts to strengthen the GNA offer some hope for the future, and should not be halted prematurely. The problem many humanitarian efforts, such as those led by the EU, face is the lack of access. Many organizations are unable to work effectively in Libya, causing a lack of reliable humanitarian partners.

How can we move forward?

The main thread throughout the discussions was the inability of almost all actors to gain a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the situation on the ground. As such, there is a need for a greater push for scaled and well-grounded analyses evaluating various aspect of the political economy of Libya.

External actors are at risk of falling for drawing board program. The template-based solutions on offer, such as elections, will not necessarily fit the complex and ever-changing reality on the ground in Libya. Indeed, solutions of this kind aimed at reforming the security sector can play into the hands of those wielding the most influence at the time. Coupled with the aforementioned deep analyses, developing adaptive programming that takes into account the power dynamics on the ground will help to improve the effectiveness of efforts.

Institutions must be built up from a basic level. The legacy left over from under the Gaddafi regime greatly impacts their ability to function going forward. This legacy must be taken into account and dealt with, by improving coherence of institutional cooperation and clarity of institutional mandates.

The needs of the Libyan population, however diverse, must remain a focal point for all efforts. While the GNA must eventually take up the mantle of responsibility for these needs, external actors must find ways to support the Libyan population directly, bypassing the GNA where it lacks the capacity or ability to act and where the needs are pressing. However, these efforts must not undermine the legitimacy of the GNA and its ability to govern in the future - efforts must retain a long-term focus on sustainable self-governance.

Should donors engage informal justice systems when developing justice related programming? And if so, how? This was the central question that was discussed during the Interactive Brainstorm ‘Understanding and Engaging Informal Justice’, which took place in The Hague on 20 October 2016.

The discussions of the day were based on the report ‘Understanding and Engaging Informal Justice’, written by Geoffrey Swenson. This report, as well as the insights from the event, will feed into a policy brief that aims to provide donors with concrete recommendations on how to best consider and engage informal justice systems when developing justice related programming in developing states.

A plea to improve inclusiveness in programming, a demand for increased applied research into what works (and what does not work) versus a call to translate the (anthropological) research that is readily available into meaningful policy advise, focus on underlying socio-economic challenges and not just on justice concerns: these are just a few of the many arguments and experiences that were shared during this interactive brainstorm. Geoffrey Swenson kick-started the discussion by presenting the main points of his report, namely the importance of the (political) context, and clarity and transparency regarding donor’s goals for engagement and the inevitable trade-offs that come with them. Are donors trying to increase the use of informal justice systems, is the aim to change these systems’ modus operandi by for example adding in international human rights standards, or is the intention to change the relationship between informal justice systems and the state system, by formalizing the informal?

The report was well received and the contributions of the participants served to fine-tune the argument. Notably, the discussion underlined the importance of an increased focus on power dynamics, not only between formal and informal justice systems and between these systems and their users, but also within the systems themselves. Linked to this, donors should also realize that whichever way they intervene, their interventions will affect power structures. As a result, if the impact of engagement cannot be fully understood, in some instances it might be better not to engage at all. However, as one of the participants argued, the question is not whether we want informal justice or not, as it is a reality that is not likely to disappear. Donors should ask themselves: what do we want to achieve, and what will be the impact of supporting informal justice systems? In addition to this, donors should be wary of using the word change because of its related high expectations. Instead, it makes much more sense to look at what actually works, what can be built upon, and gradually start introducing other groups to the process. It is only through these types of processes that incremental change can happen.

During the remainder of the day, pitches by the experts sparked debate on a multitude of issues, and experiences from Mali, Sierra Leone, DR Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Bangladesh were shared. Semantics were discussed: oftentimes, it is difficult to distinguish between formal and informal systems – especially in fragile settings. Informal justice systems can be highly formalized and vice-versa. Next to this, it is important to think about how to keep all stakeholders, including the state and the wider community, involved in justice programming. Discussants suggested exploring ways in which justice provision can be seen as a public service was suggested, as was linking formal and informal systems to arrive at the closure of what was dubbed the ‘justice gap’ by one of the participants: the impunity that persists because some crimes are not targeted by either system.

Recommendations

During the recap of the discussion, the most pressing issues and important recommendations were shared. In order to understand informal justice systems, donors should:

• Pay thorough attention to power dynamics between all stakeholders, and including the dynamics at play within informal justice systems themselves;
• Realize that informality is not a local issue, but that it exists at all levels of society;
• Pay attention to the interface between formal and informal justice, and be cautious that the two are not always easily distinguishable;
• Comprehend what justice actually means to whom, and develop programming accordingly;
• Build on the (academic) knowledge that is available.

 In order to engage with informal justice systems, donors should take care to:

• Clearly articulate policy objectives;
• Be modest in ambition and have realistic goals and expectations – and communicate honestly about these. On a scale from 1 to 10, moving from 2 to 3 is sometimes the best possible outcome;
• Realize that only incremental change is possible, and that all change is political;
• Create a safe space for innovative programming, including ample room for continuous adaptation as the programme develops;
• Promote inclusivity and involve all stakeholders, including potential spoilers;
• Identify the justice gap and put access to justice centre-stage;
• Not apply different standards for working with formal and informal justice systems, for example in terms of international human rights standards;
• Take evidence-based programming seriously;
• Be cautious not to break what is there.

With the projects under the Reconstruction Tender having concluded, Oxfam Novib and the Platform organized an informal learning event entitled “Great Lakes Reconstruction Tender: Linking and Learning” on 26 September. The informal event offered a venue for participants to share lessons learned from the project under the tender and explore how to integrate these learnings into future projects implementation.

Read more about the projects here.

Takeaways

The fruitful discussion throughout the day provided many interesting ideas for improving future implementation of programs. But what should really be taken into account?

There is no need to reinvent the wheel. Taking into account existing programs and frameworks, building on the challenges and opportunities they have encountered, and working complementarily instead of replicating work will save time, money and improve quality across the board.

Local partners should acknowledge and act upon the strength of their own capacities, expanding their presence in their working space and reducing reliance on external parties and organizations. In the same vein, external parties that work with local partners must develop honest and realistic exit strategies that bolster continuity and sustainability of initiatives that have been undertaken.

Flexibility and continual assessment are, as ever, key factors in determining whether or not programs make an impact. Ignoring changing realities, refusing to tweak and adjust along the way and being unable to alter objectives to the situation at hand are all detrimental to effective programming.

Finally, having a relationship with donors that extends past stretching out hands for money can only be beneficial. Involving them more closely with project design fosters a better working relationship, allowing donors to also cooperate better when a crisis situation does occur.

Agri-Business Creation (ABC) in Burundi - SPARK

SPARK’s ABC program in Burundi aimed to generate small-scale sustainable livelihoods for young people in the agricultural sector. Young people in the Great Lakes region are not interested in agriculture because of high intensity work and low profits. Additionally, there is little innovation in the sector and the priorities of the Burundian government, particularly after the 2015 crisis, lie elsewhere. However, SPARK’s project inspired a number of young people by providing them with consistent incomes.

The project generated many valuable insights. The first is that the cooperative was able to leverage its production capabilities to negotiate pricing with multinational it produced for. Additionally, augmenting economic opportunities in this way fills the gaps in a country where the government cannot provide for all its people. The discussion produced two notable recommendations for future planning: to integrate peacebuilding training into economic opportunity programs, so as to combine two parallel efforts; and to evaluate how to move the project’s impact beyond the local level to a more national scale.

Enhancing Local Peace Committees (LPCs) - ZOA & Radboud University Nijmegen

Corita Corbijn (ZOA) and Matthijs van Leeuwen (Radboud University Nijmegen) presented the results of their program, which explored assumptions guiding support for LPCs. The research then produced two toolkits, for practitioners and local stakeholders, visualize programmatic choices in intervention design.

The questions that were asked as part of the research showed that there was a disconnect between what questions the researchers considered important and those that were more important in practice. The larger questions, like the peace versus justice debate, were highly relevant to the LPCs, contrary to what was assumed. Furthermore, participants highlighted the importance of self-critique in interventions. Identifying and questioning assumptions is a crucial part of improving programmatic design.

Building Peace and Promoting Human Security in Post-Conflict Societies - CCR

This South Africa-based Centre for Conflict Resolution project initially aimed to benefit police, military and government institutions, but the focus was later adjusted to prioritize NGOs, CSOs and religious leaders due to conflicts in the Great Lakes region.

The project illustrated the need to focus on training 2 or more participants from specific organizations. Staff turnover means that knowledge of conflict resolution processes learned from trainings disappeared. In order to ensure sustainability, it was necessary to target multiple participants, from both positions of responsibility and the organization’s day-to-day project implementers. This way, CCR could encourage knowledge “cascading” throughout organizations.

Additionally, it was remarked that flexibility and continuous needs assessments are central to ensuring that training remain cognizant of new developments, especially in countries with fragile and ever-changing political environments.

Partners and a Regional Approach to Peacebuilding

Peace Beyond Borders - Oxfam Novib

The Peace Beyond Borders (PBB) project established and implemented through a consortium of partners a Regional Roadmap to Peace, designed from the bottom up by conflict-affected communities. The roadmap intended to address causes and consequences of conflict relating to land and governance.

Working with a consortium of partners enhanced the ability of the project to capitalize on the strengths and effective approaches of specific organizations. The consortium approach improved access to parties from various sectors, using the organizational connections built up by each member to great effect. This also helped to boost the legitimacy of the project as a whole.

The PBB project aimed to involve national, regional and international stakeholders at the design stage of the program. Instead of coopting stakeholders last minute, encouraging involvement at the design stage helps to ensure ownership of the process.

Another important insight from the project: building confidence and capacity of partners organizations and raising their awareness that it is their own space that they act in. What stops organizations like OAP and others from entering and working in this space without the engagement of parties like Oxfam Novib? These organizations must become the masters of their own space.

On the 23rd of September 2016, the African Diaspora Policy Centre (ADPC) organised a seminar entitled “Partnerships for Peace: Engaging with Diaspora”. During the seminar, an interactive and open exchange of experiences among diaspora organizations, NGOs and policymakers took place, focusing on the challenges and opportunities in creating partnerships in the field of peacebuilding. Building on these experiences, the seminar worked towards identifying next steps and actionable recommendations to establishing and utilizing these partnerships for peace more effectively.

After a word of welcome from the director of ADPC, Awil Mohamoud, Mrs. Juliènne Doppenberg-Difukidi (Tosangana) and Mr. Olivier Muhizi (African Human Rights Network) shared their first-hand experiences in running a diaspora organization in the field of peacebuilding. Both provided some interesting best practices of what partnerships can bring. Whereas Juliènne’s organisation has been deeply involved in the National Action Plan 1325, a partnerships of different organizations and government on issues related to women, peace and security, Olivier recently established a new platform, which links up international NGOs with local human right defenders. Another great example of what type of partnerships exists. Both stressed the importance of working together to be able to contribute to sustainable peace.

On the basis of participants expertise and linkages with their activities, they then split up into peace network groups on either gender, radicalisation or youth. Facilitated by colleagues from WO=MEN, ICCT and The Hague Peace Projects, the groups delved deeper into the challenges and opportunities they face in their work when building partnerships and jointly identified next steps to address these. A key insight from the event was to turn the challenge faced by many diaspora organizations of having little capacity and resources, into the opportunity of joining forces, also with NGOs, when developing projects.

Overall the participants of the seminar expressed a clear interest and willingness to continue this exchange of experiences, to be able to learn from each other. A concrete idea would be to have this continued conversation as a way to actually explore possibilities of establishing partnerships.

Why do we need the African Union? This question was the central theme of the interactive meeting organized by the European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) and hosted by the Platform on 28 September.

Bringing together experts and practitioners from Europe and Africa, and from NGOs, the meeting delved into what the AU has achieved in the 15 years since its founding, what role it can play now and in the future, and how to improve cooperation and coordination between the AU and other regional and international bodies, most specifically the European Union.

The AU: working for Africa?

The meeting started with a session that set the scene, questioning the achievements of the AU so far, and what threats and opportunities face the AU in this day and age. In a relatively short time, it was said, the AU has been an agent of change in the region. While its remains an “imperfect” organization, it is an African Union, representing African interests and aspirations.

The African Union is necessary in a global world where decentralization is needed for more effective governance. Engagement beyond African borders, particularly with actors like the EU and the UN, is streamlined with the AU as the face of its 54 member states, bringing their common needs and perspectives together. Additionally, the AU is a more effective advocacy tool, leveraging the negotiating power of 54 countries at the same time. However, while the AU was seen as a historic step forward a generation ago, uniting the continent, it is crucial for the Union to remain in touch with young people in Africa, some of whom see the AU as a question mark.

The AU will play a particularly important role in addressing some of the megatrends that loom not only over Africa, but also the rest of the world. Exponential population growth, urbanization, climate change and the global economic slowdown have all impacted Africa. These threats require a comprehensive and collective response from the AU, with a focus on sustainable and long-term programs, better education, improved infrastructure, enhanced freedom of movement in Africa, fair and free trade and more.

Equality, honest and self-reflection

One of the most crucial insights from the meeting was the lack of equality in dealings between the AU and EU, as well as other partners. The need for conversations about efforts to address problems inside and outside of Africa to be held from positions of equal footing and respect were highlighted repeatedly. One of the consequences of this unequal partnership is the misunderstanding of priorities between the EU and AU. Where the EU often cites migration and terrorism as pressing threats, African states may be more concerned by climate change, resource depletion, the youth bulge and lack of economic opportunities. This disconnect hampers the efforts undertaken on both sides. Similarly, the tension between justice and peace and reconciliation remain prevalent. Should Europe continue to insist on justice in particular contexts, where boundaries between victims and perpetrators are blurred and renewed conflict is around the corner? Can the AU tackle impunity itself, while maintaining prospects of real peace?

EU/ AU deals, like the one concluded in 2015 in Valletta, should not be imposed on African states. Instead, joint efforts should be made that can harness the capacities the AU and its constituent members have developed in dealing with local issues. Furthermore, there was a call for European states to be honest in their dealings with Africa and the AU. Altruism may factor into development projects and security programs, but often the motivations behind European initiatives is security at home. Clear communication about self-interest, while trying to find areas of overlap and common goals, will lead to more frank negotiations and, eventually, fruitful cooperation going forward. This will in turn encourage better implementation, engender a sense of ownership and enhance self-sustainability for AU programs, all of which will contribute to sustainability of practices.

Of course, the AU and its members must also reflect on their own deficiencies. The AU must define clearly its role on the continent, especially vis-a-vis Regional Economic Communities. Who should do what in peace and security efforts? What operational capabilities are missing? Who has the political legitimacy to mount and lead peace efforts? The AU has earned an important place for itself on the international stage - now it must answer the questions that remain to ensure that that place is not lost.

On 25 August 2016, the Knowledge Platform hosted a workshop in The Hague, in which learning from the peacebuilding approaches of rising powers was the central theme. The workshop, organized by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), fed insights from country and case studies in a range of settings, from Turkey to India and Brazil to South Africa, into new ideas for peacebuilding policy and programming of the EU, UN and other major donors.

Bringing together a diverse group of policymakers, academics and practitioners working in or on rising powers, the workshop encouraged constructive discussions about what the value and pitfalls of differing approaches to peacebuilding are.

PRESUMPTIONS AND FINDINGS

Charles Call, in his overview of the findings of the country and case studies, highlighted a common presumption: rising powers do peacebuilding differently. But is this true? And if so, what are the differences, and do these differences exist between the rising powers as well? The discussions showed that while there are indeed differences in approaches, the distinctions are not black and white.

In Turkey, as Onur Sazak explained, peacebuilding as a concept does not have a static definition. He illustrated the centrality of humanitarian and development assistance to the process of peacebuilding. Where previously, especially before 2002, peacebuilding in Turkey related more to peacekeeping, Turkish peacebuilding efforts currently have a clear ethical motivation and focus mainly on using humanitarian assistance and development assistance to make a difference in the lives of people who are suffering from conflict. This process contributes to a long-standing and long-lasting peace.

Adriana Erthal Abdenur showed how in Brazil, peacebuilding as a concept is more emergent than existing. Ms Abdenur discerned two strands in Brazil-style peacebuilding: the first, observed at the UN, is the technical and bureaucratized discourse. The second encompasses underground and grassroots initiatives, South-South development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. The discussion showed that while non-intervention and demand-driven cooperation underlie Brazil’s conception of peacebuilding, the nature of its peacebuilding works means that these principles are not necessarily always respected in practice.

A crucial insight from South Africa, highlighted by Charles Nyuykonge, is the inclusion of all actors in mediation. In South Africa, the experience with the ANC (“terrorists”), and the 1993-2005 peace talks in Burundi with the involvement of military coup leaders, proved an important element in mediation for peace. For South Africa, the focus is not on the speed of processes of peacebuilding, but on the extent to which they are able to address the challenges of stakeholders.

Coming from a reality in which no international cooperation architecture existed after independence in 1947, peacebuilding in India is still very much a work in progress with much ambiguity. Despite India’s lack of financial resources to contribute to peacebuilding efforts, it has deep expertise and experience with education. Lt. Gen. P.K. Singh noted that India’s history of development, similar to that of other countries requiring assistance, facilitates the transfer of knowledge to these settings. He argued that rising powers have a greater ability to understand local contexts.

COMMON THEMES

In the case and country studies, several themes recurred between the approaches of rising powers. First, peacebuilding for rising powers has a different time horizon – efforts both have a longer duration and are not specifically attached to projects. However, it was noted that longer time horizons sometimes meant that short-term negative consequences were ignored. Secondly, non-conditionality forms the starting point for peacebuilding for many of the rising powers. However, despite this commitment, it was acknowledged that strategic interests continue to impact peacebuilding activities.

Rising powers do not typically have a history of peacebuilding. As a result, there are no crystallized narratives around which bureaucracies and academic circles have developed. There are less hard distinctions between types of peacebuilding, so that broader types of peacebuilding can be implemented.

Demand-driven peacebuilding efforts are another common practice. Linked to this is the importance of listening to local actors, governments and experts in defining what is needed, rather than sending external technical teams to complete needs assessments.

Stemming from different ideas about how international relations should operate, rising powers emphasize deference to sovereignty. National ownership is often seen to supersede local ownership. This encourages equality in the international world order and enhances the developmental aspect of the UN, rather than the militaristic aspect of the Security Council.

TAKEAWAYS

What can we learn from the rising powers’ approaches to peacebuilding? To begin with, traditional peacebuilding actors like the EU and UN must encourage longer-term time horizons for projects. However, the discussions illustrated that short-term negative results from projects with a long time horizon must not be overlooked, otherwise tensions will fester. Continual assessment will stimulate positive change. Furthermore, encouraging the local definition of needs and the enhancement of state capabilities can help traditional peacebuilding actors’ efforts succeed. Finally, by engaging with countries in need as equals, rising powers enable target states to rebuild state structures, and engender a more cooperative and equitable developmental environment between partner countries.

Read more about the Rising Powers in Peacekeeping report here.