What does it take to ensure security and justice programming is adaptive? Is adaptiveness actually desirable? These questions formed the basis of the series of lunch meetings and brainstorms on adaptive programming hosted by the Platform Secretariat over the past months. The concluding session, which took place 22 November, aimed to extract and synthesize the most important learnings from the series and translate these into concrete ideas for programming.

Click here for the summary reports of the first, second and third meetings on adaptive programming.

Enabling Factors

The discussion started by assessing what enables adaptive programming in practice, and focused on timeframes, organizational culture, indicators and knowledge. There needs to be ample time for programs to adapt to changes in their contexts; short-term programs thus do not lend themselves well to adaptiveness. On the other hand, long-term programs, it was noted, can suffer from stagnation if regular self-reflection intervals for program workers are not built in from the beginning.

This self-reflection must be an intrinsic quality in staff and organizations. While practitioners with decades of experience may seem a logical fit to lead programs, they may lack the ability to strategically assess where change must occur, thereby limiting potential for adaptiveness. True program ownership by having a stake in the issue and building in effective evaluation tools helps to prevent creeping biases from hurting learning processes.

What knowledge is necessary for adaptive programming? Practitioner experience, research, and monitoring and evaluation can all contribute to better adaptiveness. However, programming requires that each of these  types of knowledge identify on the one hand relevant indicators to ensure valuable input, and on the other hand valid entry points for change. They must plug into relevant program cycles and avoid wasting the often large volume of data that has been collected. Instilling in programming an expectation of knowledge sharing among practitioners, researchers, and policymakers, but also among organizations, will improve the value of knowledge.

Constraints

The discussion also identified a number of constraints to adaptive programming. First, trust is an issue. There is a lack of trust between practitioners, researchers and policy makers, between implementers and beneficiaries, between organizations and staff. Staff members face undue burdens in their organizational procedures, limiting their ability to make choices on the fly that help programs adapt. It was also pointed out that program designers often lack sufficient trust in local beneficiaries’ ability to correctly identify their needs. More trust and less “template thinking” can boost flexibility, reactivity and relevance.

The input from policymakers identified the limitations on adaptiveness due to political constraints. Parliaments and ministries want differing degrees of control over objectives and targets, both at the baseline and in indicators through program execution. This may not be ideal from an adaptive programming perspective, but it is important to understand that this is the political reality in which programs operate.

Finally, can adaptive programs be scaled up? Large scale programs that are able to adapt quickly are rare. The discussion highlighted the freight ship analogy. While small programs are agile like speedboats, large-scale programs are more like freight ships: it is possible to change their course, but only incrementally – especially with help from “adaptive speedboats”!

Evidence shows that  higher levels of education do not necessarily ensure  decreased radicalization. In fact, many of those who have engaged in violent extremism successfully completed high school or university. To understand this phenomenon, the Platform, in collaboration with Human Security Collective, The Hague Institute and the International Center for Counter Terrorism (ICCT), organized a workshop to explored the links between education and radicalization as part of the Spark IGNITE! Conference 2016.

Understanding and dissecting education and radicalization

Three are at least two competing approaches to the role of education in preventing radicalization. Does taking a hardline – securitized – approach, where allegedly radical ideas and behaviors are suppressed and diverging opinions are shut out of the conversation increase the risk of violence? Does a developmental approach that encourages critical thinking and exchange of ideas suffice? How can these approaches be balanced to meet the growing challenge of radicalization?

Starting with an overview of some of the dilemmas related to radicalization, Agnese Macaluso, researcher at The Hague Institute for Global Justice, explained that the relationships between education and radicalization is not straightforward. Education creates expectations: degree holders expect jobs and a social status that reflects their qualifications and skills. Where these expectations cannot be met, frustration and a feeling of injustice can give rise to susceptibility to radicalization. As Floor Kroft of RadarAdvies argued, education alone is not enough. Education must go hand-in-hand with the creation of real, sustainable job opportunities.

But what about education itself? How must we adapt education to enhance our ability to root out radicalization? The participants in the workshop identified a number of approaches. Fostering tolerance between religions and ethnicities is crucial in societies where divisions are emerging or established. To this end, Indira Aslanova of Search for Common Ground presented programs undertaken in Kyrgyzstan, where secular elements are included in religious curricula, and vice versa, to promote mutual understanding and appreciation.

In The Netherlands, Heleen Cousijn explained, Diversion is helping teachers and students to discuss taboo topics and to understand that conversation is the best way to challenge the assumptions that underlie marginalization and drive radicalization. From a more global perspective, Dr. Eri Park of University College Roosevelt presented the UCARE curriculum, which provides a toolkit to foster citizenship and social skills by teaching high-school students social competences, building resilience against those factors that can lead to radicalization.

Takeaways from group sessions

After learning about the various approaches to radicalization, the workshop’s participants split into groups, exchanging ideas about the challenges and opportunities in using education as a tool against radicalization. The interactive conversations generated a number of valuable insights.

For example, it was noted that the preference for security-based approaches to deal with radicalization is driven by a need to measure and quantify the success of counter-radicalizations efforts. Governments should not prioritize hard data if this prevents alternative approaches from gaining traction.

Another interesting insight from the group discussion was that while education should accentuate differences between people and continue to teach tolerance and understanding, there should also be a renewed focus on common identities and similarities, to help build a sense of belonging to the same community or group.

The workshop highlighted that being neutral in the face of radicalization is nearly impossible. Personal misgivings about radical thoughts and ideas are difficult to avoid. However, despite these personal reservations about others’ perspectives, marginalization and alienation of those who think differently  in the classroom, and more broadly, should be avoided as much as possible. An open and inclusive conversation where differing opinions are not immediately shut down must be the objective.

Finally, the groups all noted the dangers of framing. Radicalization itself is a term that can lead to exclusion and stigmatization. Furthermore, especially in the West, there has been a substantial focus on radicalization of Muslim youth. It is crucial to keep sight of all types of radicalization – nationalist and left-wing, among others.

Migratory flows within the Northern and Western Africa, as well as between Africa and Europe, have become a top priority for policymakers both in The Netherlands and abroad. On 1 November, the Platform Secretariat organized an Interactive Brainstorm exploring how migration management programs can respond effectively to the realities of migration and human smuggling and trafficking on the ground in Northern Africa and the Sahel region.

In surveying how migratory flows are currently affecting countries like Libya, Mali and Niger, a number of dilemmas for migration management policies are apparent. First, the majority of trans-region migration is intra-regional, rather than directed towards Europe. Second, evidence suggests that investment in border control drives the smuggling industries in the region. Third, criminal smuggling networks, and the proceeds generated through their operations, are sometimes substantially embedded in local and national politics.

What are the drivers of these migration flows? Overarching megatrends, such as climate change and irregular rain, push farmers out of the Sahel and elsewhere towards traditionally richer societies such as Libya. Additionally, violent conflict at home and, particularly, the lack of economic opportunities and a bleak future remain important drivers.

Migration and smuggling as development and empowerment

A key difficulty identified during the meeting was the substantial contribution to local and national economies generated through migrant smuggling. Migration is not only a protection strategy, but also a development strategy. Hotels, car mechanics, bus operators and other commercial businesses earn from migrants passing through. Simultaneously, security forces rely on revenue extracted from migrants at roadblocks and elsewhere to supplement their incomes. These practices are often institutional, rather than incidental: in one city a mayoral decree regulated distribution of profits from migration.

The challenge in managing migration is how to replace the income generated through smuggling. Smuggling is a tool for empowerment and financial gain in Libya, Mali and Niger. Without sustainable alternatives, particularly for youth, smuggling practices will continue, and securitized migration policies may only exacerbate the abuses that migrants suffer.

At a superficial level, actors in the smuggling economy want quick money. At a deeper level, however, smuggling networks are entrenched in the political economies in which they operate. Communities engage in smuggling as livelihood protection to cope in a tumultuous environment and social empowerment, for marginalized communities to reposition themselves in their societies.

Particularly in Libya, the smuggling economy is the glue that holds together much of the fragmented Libyan society. Indeed, violence between armed groups rarely affects the viability and continuity of smuggling routes – business comes first.

Migration and smuggling often provide a degree of stability in the region. The aforementioned smuggling economy provides jobs that prevent youth from being tempted by armed groups and terrorist organizations. Furthermore, for communities that rely on smuggling as an opportunity for empowerment, rooting out this trade could have devastating effects.

Lack of reliable data

The discussion accentuated the difficulty in collecting current and reliable data on almost all aspects of migration. Despite data collection from a number of NGOs, CSOs and others, it is nearly impossible to bring all this data together. There is a need for coordination between these actors to fill knowledge gaps that are crucial to seeing the whole picture in the region.

How can we move forward?

The discussion presented a number of takeaways that can inform how to enhance migration management strategies given the realities for migrants in these areas. First, the security approach to addressing migration, without taking into account the developmental and political aspects of the smuggling economy, will not work. Comprehensive strategies that simultaneously try to limit migratory flows and foster economic opportunities, both for migrants at home and for those living along migratory routes, may help to incrementally reduce the flows.

Second, it is absolutely essential for all actors to understand that stemming migratory flows entirely is nearly impossible. The inability of some actors to accept that migrants will almost always continue to move, particularly from countries where they lack opportunities, hinders the development of both effective and compassionate policies.

Third, there is a need to identify credible actors at all levels and at every points along migratory routes in order to better understand needs in each community and to develop sustainable policies that have supporting and implementing partners on the ground. These partnerships will also help to gain a more nuanced understanding of the issues the migrants, smugglers, bureaucrats, security forces and other actors must deal with. Part of this identification is also the ability to understand the way in which these actors themselves are part and parcel of the smuggling economies in their regions.

Finally, the human rights dimension of all policies and programs aiming to manage migration must be a priority. The abuses migrants suffer on their journeys and in arriving at their destination only serve to encourage onwards migration. Particularly in Libya, violations of human rights mean increased migratory flows to Europe. EU programs must continually assess the human rights impact of the policies adopted.