Are security and justice (S&J) programs in fragile and conflict-affected countries (FCAS) fit for purpose? Existing literature demonstrates that this is not the case, so why is awareness of the limitations of the international community’s current approaches to programming not leading to the expected degree of change? And what does it take?

Security & justice programming challenges

Current programming approaches tend to pull from pre-existing standardized and limited menus of activities that are applied irrespective of context, and often executed in an overly technical and concept-driven manner. Programs continue to be silo-ed, both within the S&J field, and with respect to how they are connected with broader development efforts. While a significant amount of time is invested in good program design, this is much less the case for program implementation and monitoring. Furthermore, our understanding of the political economy in which programs play out remains inadequate and national ownership of programs continues to be both ill-understood and underemphasized.

Currently, domestic donor politics increasingly drive development efforts, displacing the political dynamics in fragile and conflict-affected States as prime factors of influence. In addition, domestic accountability requirements, rather than genuinely learning from successes and mistakes, form a key driver of much programming.

How to overcome the 3 main hurdles?

To explore these challenges in greater detail, the event delved into three key issues that seem to stand in the way of better programming in the S&J area:

1) The strong domestic focus on donor accountability prevents a more diverse and flexible interpretation of results from arising

As a result, ways need to be explored in which donor accountability can be broadened and rendered more sophisticated:

1. Given the difficulties in measuring S&J program results and the relative meaninglessness of many indicators, the present focus on “outcome indicators” should be replaced by an understanding of the processes by which outcomes are reached, and what local stakeholders or coalitions play a role.
2. Overall, we appear interested in counting our successes, but not in understanding change. Rather than thinking about outputs and outcome measurements, which tell us little about change, donors should focus more on the process and relational aspects of change. Learning should be at the center of S&J programming.
3. A much stronger and principled approach by donors to strengthening local (in addition to donor-only) accountability - underpinned by a corresponding devolution of power to local organizations, is urgently needed given the significant imbalances in how S&J programs are currently designed.
4. Longer-term programming (8-10 years)would help spur change that is more sustainable in nature.

2) Staff skillsets amongst many international development organizations are currently inadequate for good S&J programming

As a result, we need to pay much greater attention to nurturing and mobilizing the skills needed for such programming, including highly developed change management, risk management and diplomatic skills:

1. To develop flexible and adaptive approaches to programming, staff do not only need to have the right capacities but also display a certain personality. Emerging evidence suggests that the following aspects matter: entrepreneurial, networking and relationship-building skills, a natural curiosity, an interest in local politics, good analytical skills, and humility. As a case in point, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade-supported “Strategy Testing” approach invites donor staff to regularly test and challenge their programmatic assumptions, revisit theories of changes, adjust programs accordingly, and ensure the documentation of learning.
2. Nonetheless, no single person can do it all. The focus should lay on the right combination of skills within a team, which involves experts, generalists as well as operational program managers.

3) The procedures, habits and paradigms of large donor bureaucracies create inertia that prevents areas for innovation in which programmatic experimentation can occur from emerging

Big organizations have a tendency to have fixed routines that are resilient to change in the face of relative failure. Combined with pressures such as ministers demanding immediate action and results, this promotes setting priorities in a risk-averse manner and short-term thinking. In which instances do bureaucracies innovate or “overcome” themselves?

1. Decentralization to e.g. Embassies has proven to be an effective method to adopt more flexible approaches to programming.
2. Reducing the amount of development funding per donor staff member can free up resources for analysis and reflection instead of administration and reporting.
3. Regular strategy meetings can help test, discuss and develop ideas. Staff should receive training on out-of-the-box thinking and rewards for innovation. Meanwhile donor budgets can be earmarked for creative programs.

MINUSMA faces enduring challenges in the implementation of its mandate seeking to advance the Malian peace process, support reconciliation, provide humanitarian assistance, ensure the protection of civilians and promote human rights, especially of women and children. Which credible institutional framework can adequately support reconciliation and human security, in particular upon MINUSMA’s eventual departure from Mali?

Mr. Chukwuemeka Eze (Executive Director – West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, WANEP) and Mr. Kissima Gakou (University of Law and Political Science of Bamako) took part in a discussion with members of the Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law who are active in Mali. Participants assessed priorities, outstanding SSR challenges, and the role ECOWAS and the EU missions should play at a 14 April informal meeting, hosted by the Knowledge Platform and the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict.

Which role for ECOWAS? Key takeaways

-         To reassure the Malian people that the country will remain stable upon the departure of the international community, it is important for ECOWAS to take ownership and proactively ensure the sustainability of on-going efforts.

-         The ECOWAS peace support operation will constitute an opportunity to prove that its standby force is operational, and requires the following:

• Resource mobilisation to prevent a post-MINUSMA void.
• Sufficient space for dialogue, which is currently lacking.
• Protection of civilians in the North, to undercut a legitimising factor of the rebel groups.
• Well-articulated DDR, which lays the onus on reintegration.
• Inclusion of the diaspora and refugees in peace efforts.

-         A fact-finding mission to assess existing stakes and human security challenges must additionally be deployed to further inform policy decisions. It will enable findings gathered by civil society to date be validated.

Lessons learned from MINUSMA for ECOWAS

-          To advance the peace process, a different focus on leadership is needed. A mediator who is from the region and who inspires confidence on the side of the government and the rebels, other than a sitting Head of State, must be looked for by ECOWAS.

-          Extremist tendencies across the region need to be monitored to be able to assess and respond to any changes upon MINUSMA’s departure. A more proactive approach and comprehensive economic framework overall are needed to prevent vulnerable and demobilised youth from resorting to violent extremism.

-          The development of entrepreneurial skills is important, but should be accompanied with opportunities to enhance leadership and strengthen youth participation in governance, as they have the potential to alter conflict dynamics.

-          While many resources have been spent on border control and management, efforts have failed to yield results. As external actors can only do so much, the non-involvement of local communities in initiatives has been an important gap and must be looked at, while carefully balancing endeavours with the free movement of goods and people, and ECOWAS’ integration.

-          The Malian government is perceived to have done little to advance local level reconciliation and ECOWAS does not possess the mandate, nor the skills to do so. Close cooperation with civil society to support community reconciliation and develop a comprehensive approach to human security are therefore essential.

Coordination and regional politics

As the coordination of efforts by the EU, UN etc. remains unclear, ECOWAS needs to assume responsibility, develop a clear strategy, and show openness to engage with other initiatives, including by the AU, through the development of a joint ECOWAS-AU workplan.

The Group of Five for the Sahel (G5, composed of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger), which operates on the basis of commitments at the Head of State level, benefits from a stronger political impulse as well as significant back up by international partners so as to respond to terrorist threats. Yet, ECOWAS is heavily dependent on the same partners, but receives less investment. As the G5 escapes from Algeria’s grip, and its lack of credibility as a peace broker, it is in a position to advance more rapidly. Meanwhile, ECOWAS’s inability to overcome security deficits in the region has led to its discredit in public opinion, where it is perceived as a political envelope devoid of content. Harmony in actions between ECOWAS and the G5 thus continues to be lacking.

Significant regional politics are furthermore at play. France’s weight in Mali places ECOWAS in a second position. However, the ECOWAS Commission’s new President from Benin has the potential to lead to new responses that are more detached from politics. Together with the full support provided to ECOWAS’ strategy in Mali by the President of Nigeria, these changing regional dynamics are hoped to yield a positive impact.

The role of the European Union and outstanding SSR challenges

While there has been more attention to MINUSMA than to the EU, its contributions should be adequately assessed to improve coherence and impact of interventions. Indeed, the EU Training Mission for the Malian military, focused on mass combat, is perceived to lack alignment with the local operational context of terrorism, both in the North and in Bamako. The perception of northern Malians is that individuals originating from the South are sent to the North, which has a potential of aggravating local conflict dynamics. This offensive EU involvement clashes with its role in the peace process and precipitates a lack of credibility as regards the EU’s long-term development endeavours.

Meanwhile, EUCAP, the EU’s civil security mission, is felt to have provided training on ways of working which were not understood by the Malians in their context, and hence, have not been implemented.

Most recently, the EU’s SSR mission has been deployed but has been inactive as both the Malian army and the police are already in the process of being reformed, and the government has convinced its international partners that the reintegration of former combatants, through the newly established National Commissions on DDR and Integration, must take place before SSR can proceed. This assessment points to the fact that the 3 EU missions have not been thought through jointly, or in line with local realities, as evidenced by the WOSCAP project, currently reviewing the EU’s conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions. The EU shall therefore think creatively about its interventions and where and how exactly SSR will occur.

Overall, Dutch interventions in Mali are positively perceived as they work closely with the population, which can be capitalised upon. As neither France nor MINUSMA are however seen as credible international actors by some Malians, the EU in particular would possibly be well placed to respond to on-going SSR challenges, on the condition that it moves beyond the respective interests of its member States and internal dissent, and finds solutions that are in line with local needs. Its significant neutrality, power, and relatively new role account for its potential. However, if it continues to fail, this option will also evaporate, to the detriment of Mali’s on-going peace process.

Hard Contexts, Hard Choices | #srolconf #hardchoices

How to tackle the Hard Choices that Security and Rule of Law policy, programming and knowledge exchange require in the Hard Contexts presented by fragile and conflict-affected settings? Guest experts from countries covering Libya, Burundi, Lebanon, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, Colombia, Germany, Kenya, Guatemala, The United States, Belgium, South Africa and France shared insights, and jointly identified avenues to adjust tools for interventions and chart the way forward with an eclectic mix of policymakers, practitioners and researchers. About 200 participants were asked to choose between the 24 featured parallel sessions, shaped and facilitated with the active involvement of a record-high of 32 Platform member organizations.

After the welcome remarks and an energizing negotiation exercise, Simone Filippini (Cordaid), Kathryn Nwajiaku-Dahou (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding - OECD), Katy Thompson (UNDP), and Jelte van Wieren (The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs) reflected in a moderated keynote conversation on the main tools, strategies and approaches that provide assistance in attempting to navigate the most difficult choices and challenges they face in working in these hard contexts. The experts stressed that we have no choice but to make hard choices; that we cannot compromise statebuilding engagement in violent situations; that we need to think politically about Rule of Law engagement; and that we need a better understanding of the intractability of violent conflicts.

 The majority of the day featured parallel sessions divided amongst the three conference themes, spiced up with several skills workshops.

Under theme 1 ‘Which balance to adopt in addressing current and emerging transnational security challenges ?’, some of the key takeaways included the recognition that State terrorism, corruption, exclusion, poverty and marginalization should not be forgotten in efforts to address violent extremism, which must be deployed within a rule of law framework. While criminalization by governments sends a strong message to the public, it is not the answer.

Meanwhile, the assumption that tackling unemployment in countries of origin will reduce the outflow of young migrants often proves to be wrong. Indeed, it fails to address the different labor expectations, the importance of social networks, or the opacity in existing employment systems.

The implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals through the current indicators risks creating perverse incentives. For Goal 16 in particular to matter, global, normative understandings of peace and justice need to be reconciled with more local needs and interpretations of justice. These were some of the key takeaways under theme 2‘Towards more politically transformative rule of law support’ of the conference's program.

Under theme 3 ‘Innovation in security and rule of law programming’, it was said that much remains to be learned to effectively adapt policy and programming to fragile contexts. Currently, organizational learning focuses heavily on the creation of knowledge alone, while much more attention to its transfer and retention within and amongst organizations is needed. This requires a clear vision be developed, which goes beyond individual learning so as to yield higher organisational returns and incorporates adequate incentive structures.

In order to adequately take into account the complexity of the situations we face, political economy analyses are another useful tool but need to become more flexible and adaptive. This requires looking at structural factors, levels of agency, and uncertainty.

Through the skills workshops, participants had the opportunity to enhance their research uptake skills, fine-tune their understanding of impact pathways, learn about behavioural change approaches, acquire a taste of crisis communication and get tips as to how to navigate power relations and structures in designing a range of campaigns and events so as to optimize impact.

A 'Bazaar of Publications' provided the opportunity to learn about the first research results and the work of the research consortia and other participants, both in hard copy and via a user-friendly conference app.

This year’s Conference aimed to contribute to delineating the Platform’s programmatic and research priorities, at the forefront of international developments and emerging challenges. It sought to foster innovative approaches to security and rule of law and showcased results by 16 represented NWO-WOTRO’s research projects, affiliated with the Platform. In an open and interactive atmosphere at the Bazaar of Ideas, enhanced in collaboration with an artist, participants had the opportunity to link up with a vibrant network of national and international security and rule of law professionals.

Key insights, ideas and proposed avenues will be gathered, charting the future directions and activities of the Platform. We are looking forward to continue to engage the Platform’s network in realizing our new programmatic and research agenda.

The summary report of the conference is now available here. Please keep an eye on the blog series inspired by the conference. All our publications are grouped under #srolconf and #hardchoices.

Kindly find here the timetable of the conference, and more information on the different breakout sessions.

Even with the recent bad news from Mali, Jean-Herve Jezequel, Senior Analyst at the International Crisis Group is optimistic: in a preview of a new ICG report at a lunch meeting at the Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law, he explained how he believes the tide is changing, and set out four key issues for reform.

A narrow escape

In Summer, the situation in Mali came very close to disaster. The peace agreement reproduced the shortcomings of earlier agreements and events proved these weaknesses, with fighting resuming in the north. Under international pressure, the Malian President managed to calm the situation, and the warlords and drug dealers involved in the fighting engaged in a series of low-profile peace talks.

New optimism

With discrete support by the international community, the peace talks in Anefis led to the first successful ceasefire in two years. Levels of intercommunal tension remain high and civil society is very much divided along the same lines. Some groups that have not been included in the agreement remain active. However, with the ceasefire, albeit fragile, there is something to build on, and a sense that something can be done. There are also limited positive signals in the capital, Bamako.

Four key issues

The agreement comes with risks and opportunities. The risk is that it will be a return to the previous regime, with fighting now halted “because it is bad for business”, only to give the warring groups time to recuperate and then resume violence. Jezequel also sees an opportunity: to implement the agreement as a tool for reform in the north. Reform should address four key issues:

1. Demilitarizing the north to deal with the heavy militarization of society and politics. Focus should be on removing the heavy weapons and integrating militias into the national army, in which the militias may also have an interest now that hostilities have ceased. This does mean that the vicious cycle of militias being integrated into the army only to desert when hostilities resume, somehow has to be broken. And the Malian government has to be convinced that its ‘divide and rule’ strategy for the north is not in its own benefit.
2. “Bring the money to the population”: learning from past failures, funds should be directly channeled to local organizations and authorities – in parallel to continuing support to the central government. Even with local corruption there is a high chance the funds will be invested locally, and in this way the population will be better able to see where the money goes and to hold their leaders to account.
3. The government of Mali should focus less on asserting its authority, and more on proving its utility to its citizens. In the end, its authority will increase if it increases its utility to citizens.
4. The feeling of lack of justice: development is not the number one issue and poverty is not the main factor. It rather is people’s access to services: justice, healthcare, education, with people saying “We are not poor, we are angry.”

Islamist groups

Is the influence of Islamist groups growing? Jezequel pointed out that the international community currently tends to read everything through a lens of radicalism: this obscures the fact that there are other developments, and that things are moving. Some groups that have been excluded from the peace process are active, and enjoy local support. It is important that these groups are engaged in the political dialogue at some point, because they reflect local grievances. In fact, individuals who are part of these groups and navigate between militia, jihadist groups, and military, may be very difficult to engage, but might prove very useful.

Photo credit: 27 July 2013, UN Mission in Mali via Flickr, A Malian soldier patrols the perimeter