



Women, Peace and Security

The current state of affairs



Women, Peace and Security

author: K. Barnes Robinson
P. Domingo & C. Cummings
A. Ekvall
A. Young
date: 10 February 2015



Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Netherlands



Table of contents

	Introduction	5
1	Women's participation in security sector reform and peacekeeping operations	7
1.1	What makes a difference? Enabling factors	8
1.2	Obstacles and constraints	11
1.3	Entry points for international support	12
1.4	Concluding remarks and areas for further consideration	15
1.5	References and useful resources	16
2	Women's participation in post-conflict transition politics and governance	17
2.1	What makes a difference? Enabling factors	18
2.2	Obstacles and constraints	21
2.3	Entry points for international actors	22
2.4	Legacies of violence, security constraints and women's political voice	24
2.5	Concluding remarks and areas for further consideration	25
2.6	References and useful resources	27
3	Men, masculinities and 1325 in implementing the women, peace and security/ 1325 agenda	29
3.1	Why work with men and masculinities?	29
3.2	Conceptual framework	30
3.3	Implications and consequences for the 1325 agenda	31
3.4	Working with men and masculinities – a few examples	32
3.5	Further thoughts	34
3.6	References and useful resources	36
4	High Impact National Action Plans	39
4.1	What does it mean for a NAP to be a tool of foreign policy?	39
4.2	The Dutch National Action Plan - What can we learn from the Dutch model?	40
4.3	Lesson 1: Align the NAP with national policy priorities	40
4.4	Lesson 2: Adopt a targeted strategy	41
4.5	Lesson 3: Collaborate with civil society	43
4.6	Conclusion	45

Introduction

In 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted the first Resolution on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). This historic Resolution not only recognized the disproportionate impact of armed conflict on women but also stressed the under-utilized and under-valued contributions of women to peace processes and conflict prevention, resolution and transformation. The Resolution builds on the many resolutions, treaties, conventions and reports dealing with armed conflict and its impact on women and general civilian populations. UNSCR 1325 is binding upon all UN Member States and its stipulations should be integrated systematically in the work of all UN entities dealing with the maintenance of peace and security across the world. The WPS agenda deals with the participation of women in all affairs of peace and security, the protection of women and girls and the systematic integration of a gender perspective in UN peace support operations, trainings, SC missions, post-conflict processes and UN programming.

In 2004 and 2005, the President of the Security Council urged UN Member States to develop National Action Plans to implement UNSCR 1325, or to develop other strategies to ensure women's inclusion in peace and security¹. Currently, there are over forty National Action Plans worldwide, with Afghanistan's NAP approved in the last quarter of 2014 and with Japan on the verge of finalization (for further information, please see www.peacewomen.org).

In the Netherlands, UNSCR 1325 became the cornerstone for the stand-alone policy on gender, peace and security as well as the guiding document for the integration of gender in the Foreign Ministry's overall policy on peace and security. Currently, the Netherlands is implementing its second National Action Plan, which is a unique framework for collaboration between the government (four ministries and the Dutch police) and civil society (including knowledge institutes). The Netherlands also actively supports the UN's Global Study and the UN High-level Review process on Women, Peace and Security. In this regard, the Netherlands hosted an international expert conference on the 16th and 17th of February 2015 that will feed into these processes. This conference provides a platform for different actors (representatives from civil society organizations, governments, international organizations and academia) to exchange knowledge and develop national, regional as well as global recommendations on enhancing the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

¹ S/PRST/2004/40 & S/PRST/2005/52

In order to ensure a common starting point for discussions at the conference, three experts were invited to present their discussion papers during a brainstorm event. These discussion papers present a short state of affairs on:

- 1 The security sector, women and peacebuilding;
- 2 Participation of women in post-conflict processes such as state-building and peacebuilding; and
- 3 Masculinities and the role of men in implementing the women, peace and security/ 1325 agenda

Chapter 1

Women's participation in security sector reform and peacekeeping operations

Karen Barnes Robinson, Overseas Development Institute

Peacekeeping missions and security sector reform (SSR), while distinct processes, are both vital steps in re-establishing safety, security and the rule of law in post-conflict contexts. Peacekeeping, whether led by the United Nations or other international actors, is generally understood to refer to operations that maintain peace and security in countries emerging from conflict, and involves activities such as protecting civilians, coordinating disarmament and demobilization of troops and promoting human rights. SSR, on the other hand, is a broader process that encompasses all actors and institutions involved in ensuring the security of a state and its people, including those in the formal and informal sectors. They both provide important opportunities for reforming a country's security institutions, actors and processes to become more democratic, accountable and legitimate, and can exist in tandem with one another or at different stages of a country's emergence from conflict. They are also relevant in developed or donor country contexts, where security institutions continue to be reformed and are subject to many challenges relating to integrating a gender perspective.

This paper considers some of the key factors, challenges and opportunities for integrating gender perspectives and involving women in peacekeeping and SSR reform processes. While distinctions are made where relevant, the two processes are considered together given the many similarities that can be drawn between them and the overlaps in terms of the actors and institutions that they focus on.

The argument for adopting a gender-sensitive approach in peacekeeping and SSR is compelling: if done effectively, it can not only ensure that both men and women's security needs are addressed, but it can also enhance service delivery in the security sector, representation and inclusivity, local ownership, oversight and accountability and respect for human rights (DCAF 2007; OECD 2013). However, despite the adoption of several UNSC Resolutions on women, peace and security and the proliferation of policies, guidelines and action plans by national, regional and international actors on integrating gender into

peacekeeping and security sector reform, there remains an urgent need to refocus attention on this issue. There are several reasons why this matters:

- *Men and women's security-related experiences, needs and priorities differ.* For example, while the proliferation of small arms and light weapons can present risks to entire communities, it manifests in different ways. Women and girls may need protection from domestic violence, whereas men and boys may need to be supported to avoid being recruited by gangs or being involved in urban violence.
- *Operational effectiveness can be strengthened by integrating a gender perspective and involving women.* Beyond the normative arguments, there is emerging evidence that doing so can also enhance the effectiveness, local ownership and accountability of security sector reform and peacekeeping processes.
- *It can be a powerful tool for challenging discriminatory attitudes and cultures about women's roles in society.* Increasing women's representation and effective participation in peacekeeping missions and security institutions can increase the likelihood that gender-related insecurities will be identified and responded to. It can also provide positive role models and influence public awareness and perceptions around post-conflict security, justice and governance.
- *It is essential for effectively addressing sexual and gender-based violence.* Gender-based violence remains a key concern in all countries emerging from conflict. As key entry points for providing security, peacekeeping missions and security institutions can play a vital role in preventing and responding to these crimes where specific measures are included in their mandates, operating procedures and programming.
- There is also *an instrumental value in supporting women's participation* in security reform and peacekeeping, as evidence demonstrates it can enhance the prospects of integrating gender issues into later peace processes and post-conflict governance processes (as noted in the paper on post-conflict governance).

1.1 What makes a difference? Enabling factors

Although there is still a long way to go until gender issues and women's participation are fully integrated into peacekeeping and security reforms, some progress has been made over the past fifteen years. From these experiences, it is possible to identify some factors that can result in more gender-sensitive institutions and outcomes as well as increased participation of women as security actors.

Although by no means specific to the case of peacekeeping and SSR, it is vital to emphasize the importance of context, early inclusion and adopting a holistic approach as general principles that can increase the impact of gender-related efforts. Each country and community is faced with specific opportunities and constraints, and the security of the local people, both men and women, should be the starting point for all interventions, with gender-sensitivity rather than just token participation of women as the goal. The earlier a gender

perspective is integrated, the more effective those efforts will be. Comprehensive approaches that combine bottom-up and top-down approaches and that actively seek to engage both formal and informal actors are likely to be the most sustainable and effective. With these general points in mind, it is possible to identify the following key enabling factors relating to integrating a gender approach into peacekeeping operations and SSR:

The commitment and leadership of senior officials (for example, Force Commanders, SRSGs or Ministers of Defense) to supporting gender equality, if translated into practical measures, can increase the likelihood that the issue will be taken seriously and that reforms adopted will take root throughout security institutions. For example, in the case of peacekeeping operations, an evaluation of MONUC's experience with gender mainstreaming found that an SRSG or force commander committed to integrating gender into the mission's mandate and work tended to lead to more positive results. This also applies to high-level decision-makers across a range of security institutions who can provide a model for accountability as well as influence the direction of, or set the agenda for, gender-sensitive reform.

The existence of gender expertise within peacekeeping missions and security institutions supports the mainstreaming of gender into security-related policies and programs. There has been some progress in this regard, with all nine multidimensional peacekeeping missions of the UN active as of December 2013 having gender units led by senior gender advisors (P-5 or P-4 level), while the seven traditional missions had gender focal points (UN 2014). There has therefore been some progress since 2011, where although 100 percent of DPKO field missions had gender components, only 60 percent were headed by a senior gender expert (UN Women, 2012). However, in the latter case, these are not always full-time positions, and gender advisors do not always participate in senior management decision-making processes or have direct access to mission chiefs. While each country's context differs, it is generally the case that gender advisors within security institutions engaged in SSR tend to be junior, and usually female, staff members and may find themselves working in a silo. A lack of accountability for taking action on gender issues can also limit the effectiveness of gender advisory roles, but evidence shows that they are nevertheless vital for providing momentum and expertise on these issues within security institutions. Identifying ways to increase their impact, for example by providing direct channels to senior officials or creating networks of gender focal points in different departments, is essential.

As mentioned above, the security of individuals and communities is the starting point and ultimate goal of peacekeeping and security reform. Prioritizing the *involvement of local communities*, including women's groups, in determining security needs and priorities as well as in designing and delivering services, can increase local ownership and make these reforms more sustainable and effective. Adopting bottom-up approaches that build on existing initiatives and actors at the local level can also help to ensure that they are adapted to local norms and cultures (OECD 2013, p. 44). For example, a recent NATO study on the impact of a gender-sensitive approach on operations found several examples where simple initiatives to involve local communities resulted in greater awareness of gender-differentiated security needs and allowed the international community to improve its effectiveness. One such example involved the establishment of women's markets in NATO bases and targeted meetings between local women and NATO officials to discuss security

priorities in Afghanistan. Women, in particular, may have access to different types of information regarding security threats such as the location of arms caches. If tapped, their roles in grassroots peacebuilding and reconciliation can help to increase trust in the security sector.

Increased *representation and the visible participation of women* in peacekeeping missions and in security institutions can have a positive impact in terms of challenging traditional gender roles and discriminatory attitudes. Whilst increased numbers of women does not necessarily lead to more gender-responsive institutions, establishing the structures and processes to enable their effective participation in peacekeeping and security reform is an essential step. Nevertheless, the actual numbers of women represented within the security sector has been slow to increase in most countries, even where gender-sensitive recruitment policies have been adopted. In the case of peacekeeping, according to DPKO data, since 2010 there has been an increase in the proportion of female troops (2.35% to 2.9%), individual police (11.8% to 16.7%) and in formed police units (5.7% to 5.9%), but the number of female military experts employed across the UN's peacekeeping missions has recently decreased again. These figures also fall short of the target of 20 percent of women police officers in peacekeeping missions (UN 2014). On a positive note, 2014 saw the appointment of Major General Kristin Lund of Norway to UNFICYP as the first female Force Commander of a UN peacekeeping force. However, it is also the case that generally, women's representation declines in more senior positions. In the case of SSR, each national context differs, but research by UN Women (2011) has shown that increased participation of women in security institutions has led to improvements in areas such as intelligence gathering, reporting of SGBV-related crimes and the protection afforded to female victims and witnesses. However, the same report finds that globally, women average just 9 percent of police, illustrating the long way there is still to go on achieving greater gender balance in the security sector.

Integrating gender analysis and gender-specific and sex-disaggregated data is an essential step towards ensuring that peacekeeping and SSR processes can become more gender sensitive. For example, including references to women or gender-specific security needs in reports on the security situation in fragile and conflict-affected states helps ensure that they are recognized and taken into account in peacekeeping and SSR processes. This is also critical for effective program design and monitoring the impact of any reforms that have been implemented. According to data from 2013, 14 out of 20 UN Security Council resolutions relating to the establishment or renewal of UN-led or other peacekeeping missions contained references to women, peace and security. This represented a 23 percent increase from 2012 (UN 2014). One area that could offer potential for strengthening action in this area is the adoption of National Action Plans (NAP) on Women, Peace and Security. As of today, over forty countries have developed plans which outline the specific commitments, programs and activities at the national level in areas including peacekeeping and SSR. Embedding NAPs within parallel efforts to redesign security policies, institutions and strategies as countries emerge from conflict could result in more coordinated and effective efforts and further enhance their relevance.

1.2 Obstacles and constraints

Despite some examples of good practice and a growing recognition of the importance of a gender perspective in peacekeeping and security sector reform (at least at the discursive level), significant constraints remain, both in terms of structural challenges as well as challenges in the ways of working of these actors.

One of the most persistent obstacles remains the deeply entrenched **masculine cultures of military and security institutions**, and is thus an ever-present characteristic of both peacekeeping operations and SSR processes. This can manifest in the dominance of male actors, persistent impunity, normalization of violence against women and the perception of women as victims rather than agents with the power to define and demand their own security needs. Another major obstacle is that the links between masculinity and peacebuilding are not yet well understood. The close linkages between men's and women's (in)securities are often not recognized, which can reduce programming effectiveness. While training, awareness-raising and the development of strict accountability mechanisms can go some way to combating discriminatory cultures in security institutions, the positive impact of these efforts may only be seen over a period of years.

Globally, data on the low representation of women within peacekeeping and across the range of security institutions reflects the difficulties in **recruiting and retaining women in the security sector** within both conflict-affected and troop contributing countries. This can be due to factors such as lack of support and mentoring for women, the tendency for women to have limited roles within peacekeeping units and security institutions (such as the police) that recreate gender hierarchies, and the difficulties of negotiating family life alongside a military career. Positive examples such as the Genderforce partnership in Sweden provide innovative strategies that can be adopted to foster more gender-sensitive institutions.

While frequently presented as a technical exercise, addressing gender inequalities is a complex, political issue. The establishment of security and rule of law are also closely linked to the distribution and exercise of political power within society.

This can lead to high levels of resistance to addressing gender. In particular, it can result in a **focus on 'hard' security that excludes gender issues and women's participation from consideration**, despite existing policies and commitments. Although gender is often cited as a "cross-cutting issue", experiences from countries as diverse as Kosovo and Afghanistan show that at the strategic level, these issues are too frequently left out of the conversation. Women or their interests rarely feature in security-related negotiations, strategies or policies. For example, although at the international level there has been progress in integrating gender analysis into security assessments, recent research has found that gender issues are largely absent from country-specific discussions on SSR within the UN Security Council (NGOWG 2014). Given the difficulties women face in attaining high-level positions in security institutions and the lack of male champions, there are often few individuals engaged in peacekeeping or SSR with the leverage or authority needed to effectively advocate for gender sensitivity. Linked to this, a **lack of resources and political will** for challenging the status quo, particularly at the national level, can obstruct efforts to integrate gender into the security sector.

Informal security actors and institutions can often play key roles in post-conflict societies, which pose additional challenges in relation to women's participation and integrating a gender perspective. Just as in the formal sphere, women tend to be under-represented among traditional and customary leadership structures and so may find it difficult to ensure that their security needs are met. Developing effective ways of working with these groups, particularly to address problems related to violence against women, remains a challenge but is vital since gender-related security concerns are often resolved at this level.

Building trust between local communities and security actors remains incredibly difficult in countries that have been affected by civil war. In particular, where women are excluded from peace negotiations and post-conflict institutions, there may be little confidence that their needs will be addressed. The post-conflict backlash that pushes women back into traditional roles can also result in them being faced with new security risks that may not be recognized in SSR processes. The lack of experience, capacity, and access of women's organizations to security actors and institutions means that their **knowledge and resources are either lost or not capitalized on adequately**. While initiatives such as the UN's Open Days on Women, Peace and Security can help break down these barriers, annual or token events cannot replace the need for systematic and institutionalized mechanisms of engagement.

In relation to addressing SGBV, SSR and peacekeeping missions can be key entry points but to date responses have been lacking in this area. This is due to factors such as a lack of data, persistent discriminatory attitudes within security institutions and across society as a whole, difficulty accessing protection and security services, and the difficulty faced by security actors in tackling problems that are perceived to be outside of their remit in the private or domestic sphere.

1.3 Entry points for international support

There are a range of tools available to support women's increased participation and the integration of a gender perspective in SSR and peacekeeping. It is again important to emphasize that all efforts need to be context-specific, holistic, and politically informed. Integrating gender into the security sector is necessarily a long-term process that involves challenging deeply-held beliefs and entrenched discriminatory cultures and practices. Nevertheless, it is possible for international actors to support efforts to integrate gender into peacekeeping and SSR by taking advantage of a number of key entry points. While the focus of this paper is on the international level, effective change requires action and collaboration at all levels from the local to the national to the international. While not comprehensive, the examples below highlight tools that have been used across a variety of contexts to bring about positive change:

Gender training for security officials to raise awareness of gender-differentiated security needs and strategies that can be applied to ensure that women can participate and that gender is integrated across all policies, programs and activities. Training can focus on practical skills such as how to carry out a gender analysis as well as on challenging attitudes and beliefs about security and women's roles in society. It can be an effective way to raise

awareness, build skills, change practices and create a more optimal organizational culture for integrating gender. It can also be used as a mechanism for bringing different actors together, for example from across different security institutions or from within government and civil society to discuss shared issues. Organizations as diverse as the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, DPKO and Saferworld have developed training modules that can provide a useful starting point for educating and building capacity in the area of gender-sensitive security reform and peacekeeping. However, difficulties remain in measuring the impact of training in terms of retained learning, changed practice and behaviors and programming outcomes. There is therefore a need for innovative ways to monitor and evaluate training efforts in both the security sector and in peacekeeping missions.

In order to address the lack of women's representation in security institutions, several organizations and countries have adopted **special measures to support the recruitment of women**. For example, the Liberian government initiated a fast-track high school education program for girls who had been forced out of school during conflict, recognizing that the lack of a pre-requisite high school diploma was preventing them from applying to jobs in the security sector. It is, however, also important to look beyond recruitment. Focusing only on representation of women can result in other important factors, such as the types of jobs held by both men and women in security institutions or retention rates, being overlooked. Reforms that lead to more gender-sensitive institutions, such as the **establishment of women's police associations at the national and regional levels**, can also contribute to the recruitment and retention of women. This can accelerate reforms to workplace culture and practices that make women's participation in the security sector difficult.

One of the most important entry points for international actors seeking to foster security and meaningfully address conflict and violence is to **work closely with and enable civil society organizations and other local actors**. They can provide knowledge about security priorities within their communities, play the role of security provider or (in oversight) increase buy-in and community support for SSR processes, and can help to build gender expertise within security institutions through training and mentoring (Bastick and Whitman 2013). Examples of good practices that are often referred to are the involvement in women in the DDR process in Liberia and women's organizations' influence over the defense review process in South Africa.

Enhancing women's access to security services is an important element of both peacekeeping missions and SSR processes. For example, the **development of gender or women-specific services**, such as family support units within the police, have in many places proven to be an effective way of increasing the numbers of gender-based crimes being reported. While such solutions can risk putting gender issues in a silo and can be tokenistic rather than signifying a real change in the culture of security institutions, there is potential to build on learning from the examples in countries such as Brazil and Sierra Leone. The creation of **all-female units within peacekeeping and police forces** has the potential to be effective in reaching out to women in local communities and in challenging societal stereotypes. However, they should not be considered a panacea and more research needs to be carried out on the impact that these units can have.

Capacity-building is needed for local women's organizations to engage more effectively with security actors and to build the skills necessary to participate in security-related decision-making. It is also necessary to help military and security actors to recognize and address gender-related issues, and to support and engage with women and grassroots actors who can address drivers of insecurity and violence that both women and society are vulnerable to. In particular, regular and institutionalized **consultations with local communities on security issues** can enable a top-down and bottom-up exchange of knowledge and expertise. Such forums can also provide the opportunity to provide training and capacity-building to local organizations seeking to engage on SSR. Community-based policing is one tool that has been used with some success to reorient security provision to the local level and as such presents an opportunity to address gender issues and women's protection needs more specifically.

Supporting policy reforms at all levels, including introducing guidelines and disciplinary procedures within security institutions, can help create a more conducive environment for gender mainstreaming, although challenges in implementation remain acute. For example, including references to zero tolerance for sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping mission mandates has become more widespread (UN 2014), and many governments have included specific reference to gender-sensitive SSR in their National Action Plans on UNSCR 1325.

Increasing the number of gender experts, advisors and focal points to support gender mainstreaming within peacekeeping missions and security institutions is a critical entry point. However, in order to maximize their potential impact it is vital that gender advisors are supplied with adequate resources, access to senior-level decision-makers, and that measures are put in place to ensure accountability for fulfilling gender-related commitments across the organization. A recent NATO review of operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan found that greater numbers of female soldiers can make operations more effective and that gender expertise placed close to mission commanders is important. Ensuring that some men, particularly those in leadership positions, are visibly supporting and championing gender issues and women's rights can also be effective. This was seen in the DRC, where Major-General Patrick Cammaert played a vital role in spearheading efforts to address gender-based violence while he was commanding MONUC's Eastern Division.

Finally, the international community can play a vital role in ensuring that the financing necessary for building capacity, implementing institutional reforms and carrying out programming to support more gender-sensitive peacekeeping and SSR is available. Research shows, however, that funding for gender-related activities within peacekeeping and SSR processes falls far short of the amounts necessary to bring about change. For example, although there is a commitment to allocate 15 percent of UN-managed funds in support of peacebuilding to gender-related projects, this target has not been reached. Similarly, the OECD reported in 2010 that only 10 percent of donor funding for security system management and reform focused on gender equality in fragile states. **Gender-responsive budgeting**, such as the allocation of specific funding streams for gender-related initiatives within security sector plans and national budgets, can be an effective way of channeling more resources towards ensuring the gender-sensitivity of the security sector. Earmarking funding streams

and closely monitoring allocations for SSR and peacekeeping-related activities in NAPs could also contribute to addressing the persistent resource gaps.

1.4 Concluding remarks and areas for further consideration

While there has been some progress in recognizing women's security needs at the policy level and in implementing reforms to provide greater protection for women in conflict-affected contexts, there remains significant scope to integrate gender into peacekeeping and SSR. The 15th anniversary of UNSCR 1325, in particular, provides an opportunity to highlight areas where reforms and progress are most needed in relation to integrating gender and supporting women's participation in security reform and peacekeeping. Some suggested areas where more attention and/or research is needed are as follows:

Regular consultations between peacekeepers and security officials with local women's groups, and any mechanisms that bring different stakeholders together on a sustained and institutionalized basis to discuss gender-related security needs and priorities, provide vital insights for strengthening operational effectiveness and security programming. However, such efforts are rarely implemented on an ongoing basis and do not receive adequate financial resources, and there is not always the willingness to create opportunities to bring diverse groups of stakeholders together.

- In order to strengthen gender trainings for security officials, both in peacekeeping missions and national institutions that have been developed, more attention should be placed on evaluating and monitoring the impact of training received. Training is often short-term and one-off, and more evidence is needed to understand what types of learning and practical skills acquisition leads to behavioral change among security actors.
- There is a need for more research on what strategies can effectively combat negative masculine stereotypes and cultures within security institutions and on the complex interaction between men's and women's security in post-conflict contexts. Linked to this, efforts to appoint more senior-level gender advocates, particularly men, within security institutions should be continued and more innovative ways to incentivize and ensure accountability for integrating gender issues should be identified.
- One of the major challenges in integrating gender issues into peacekeeping and SSR is the lack of systems for collecting gender-disaggregated data to better understand the security context and to better target initiatives according to needs.
- In many contexts, customary and informal security actors and institutions are more relevant to women's security, particularly in relation to addressing violence against women, than formal national or international actors. There is therefore significant scope for collecting more evidence about how to most effectively involve them in peacekeeping and SSR and how to bridge formal, top-down approaches to providing security with informal and bottom-up ones.

1.5 References and useful resources

Bastick, Megan and Whitman, Tobie. 2013. *A Women's Guide to Security Sector Reform*. Geneva/Washington, DC: DCAF and Institute for Inclusive Security.

DCAF, 2011. *Gender and Security Sector Reform: Examples from the Ground*. Geneva: DCAF.

DPKO, 2010. *Ten-year Impact Study on Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security in Peacekeeping*, Final report to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support. New York: UN.
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/10year_impact_study_1325.pdf.

NGOWG 2014. *Mapping Women, Peace and Security in the UN Security Council for 2013-2014: Trends and Recommendations*. New York: NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security

OECD 2013. *Gender and Statebuilding in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States*. Paris: OECD

UN Women, 2011. *Progress of the World's Women: In Pursuit of Justice*. New York: UN

UN Women, 2012. *Tracking Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)*. New York: UN.

UN, 2014. *Report of the UN Secretary-General on women, peace and security*, 24 September 2014. S/2014/693.

Chapter 2

Women's participation in post-conflict transition politics and governance

Pilar Domingo & Clare Cummings, Overseas Development Institute

This background paper presents an overview of the state of knowledge regarding women's participation in post-conflict and transition settings. The paper is structured as follows. First, it summarizes what we know about women's participation in negotiating peace agreements and in constitutional reform processes. The paper then outlines key factors that contribute to enabling women's voice and participation, and recurring challenges that women and gender advocates face. This is followed by a brief review of the types of entry points and interventions that feature in international action aimed at supporting women's participation in post conflict governance. The wider context of unresolved legacies of conflict and ongoing safety and security challenges often reflects major obstacles to women's meaningful political participation in shaping post-conflict political settlements and engaging in political life more generally, and thus needs to be taken into account. The paper ends with concluding reflections on what we know about women's voice in post-conflict and fragile contexts. Key themes that need to be considered include the following:

- Post-conflict processes feature different pathways and opportunities for negotiating a new political bargain. In such contexts, **peace negotiations and constitutional reform processes are potentially key windows of opportunity for women and gender advocates** to embed principles of gender equality and inclusiveness - including for political participation - in the emerging political settlement.
- Fifteen years since UNSCR 1325 was passed, there has been some progress in terms of **increased visibility of gender issues** and concrete achievements in constitutional gains for gender equality and political representation for women in public and elected office in post-conflict settings.

- Yet, in most cases **women continue to face major barriers** to access peace negotiations and constitutional reform processes. In addition, women are still marginalized from key decision-making roles and political forums, and structural gender bias continues to characterize access to political participation more generally, both at national and sub-national levels.
- The quality of women's voice in shaping post-conflict governance processes is also connected to how legacies of conflict are resolved, and to ongoing gender-based violence aimed at undermining women's political participation. How women contribute to shaping post-conflict transitional justice efforts, as well as longer-term security and justice sector reform processes, is relevant to supporting progress in women's political participation.

2.1 What makes a difference? Enabling factors

Women continue to be mostly excluded and marginalized from the political negotiations underpinning peace negotiations and from constitutional reform exercises. Where women have been able to influence peace negotiations the prospects for advancing women's voice in post-conflict governance and achieving gains in women's rights. This has been seen in the cases of South Africa, Nepal, Kenya, East Timor and indeed, Burundi. These are examples where effective mobilization by women's groups in peacebuilding and constitutional reform processes has secured concrete constitutional and policy gains for women, including quotas and some social and economic rights - albeit variably so, and with varying levels of effective implementation. These gains are important reminders, despite the recurrence of recent setbacks, that peacebuilding and statebuilding are rarely uni-linear stories of progress, and that discriminatory gender relations are resilient.

Typically, introducing quotas for women's access to different levels of elected office and presence in public administration positions is an important outcome of such processes. The assumption is that increased women's presence in political and public life will result in advances for gender equality agendas. However, we also know that women do not constitute a homogenous voice. Not all women are gender equality advocates or have a shared understanding of gender goals. Women activists and politicians (like male activists), represent different agendas and interests, and it is important to take account of the range of class, ethnicity-based, religious, ideational and other socio-political identities along which women's interests may be divided. Thus, the presence of women in political life does not assure a prioritization of women's rights.

Since UNSCR 1325, there has been an increase in women's participation and in references to gender issues in peace agreements, but gender-blind peace agreements are still the norm (Bell and O'Rourke 2010; UN Women 2012). A report by UN Women (2012) found that of 31 major peace processes between 1992 and 2011, only 4 percent of signatories, 2.4 percent of chief mediators, 3.7 percent of witnesses and 9 percent of negotiators were women.

Between 1990 and 2010, only 16 percent of peace agreements make specific references to women, but since the passing of resolution 1325, references to women increased from 11

percent to 27 percent and this rise was more dramatic when the UN was involved in the process.

UNSCR 1325 has contributed over time to supporting enabling environments for women's voice in post-conflict political life, and there are now National Action Plans in place (over forty, currently). This has contributed to 'thickening' the normative and policy frameworks that women and gender activists can invoke to advance gender equality goals and women's political participation. While there are no mechanisms to hold states or international actors to account on concrete commitments, the ideational and discursive value of the policy framework is not unimportant. However, overall the evidence remains mixed as to whether UNSCR 1325 or, indeed, the development of National Action Plans, have made a substantive difference to women's political voice in post-conflict political change processes in concrete ways. Rather, these are only effective tools in the degree to which they can be deployed to reinforce locally-driven processes and to strategically support local agents of change - both men and women.

Evidence of what works to secure meaningful gains in substantive voice and representation in political and social life for women in post-conflict transition settings remains limited. But there are some recurrent enabling factors. These vary significantly depending on the political economy of context. It is also clear that women's ability opportunity to influence post-conflict governance is not limited to their formal participation in negotiations or formal political space. Rather, women and gender advocates participate in a number of ways to shape political outcomes, including through social mobilization, and at different local, national and transnational levels. Enabling factors include the following:

First, there may be a *change in gender roles as a result of the experience of conflict*. Women can become the main breadwinner in the context of conflict, or may take on combatant roles leading to a change in traditional gender relations. This may result in the development of critical consciousness about gender injustices, and attitudes of self-affirmation that translate into political agency. Such experiences can motivate individual change and collective mobilization capabilities for women. However, depending on the drivers of conflict, they can also affirm divisive cleavages around which women activists may align. Moreover, it is important to avoid essentialist narratives about women as victims or peace-builders; nor can we take for granted that women activists will espouse or prioritize gender equality or inclusionary agendas.

Second, *post-conflict peace processes and constitutional reform exercises represent unique windows of opportunity* for gender advocates - and other actors in the socio-political landscape - to try to influence the outcome of these processes. Peace agreements and constitutional reforms are especially important sites to renegotiate the terms of the underlying political settlement and thus address underlying structural causes of conflict and discrimination. They represent opportunities to change political bargains about the key rules regarding social, political and economic engagement.

When women and gender activists are able to participate in and influence the outcomes of these processes, it appears to make a difference to the advancement of gender equality agendas at these potentially foundational milestones of political change.

Third, the extent to which feminists lobby and are active in the process of constitutional design is crucial to how far women's rights are enshrined in new constitutions. Activists may even be excluded from formal decision-making processes but can still have a clear impact on a peace agreement. Early mobilization of *women's movements and gender activists in anticipation of and during peace negotiations and constitutional reform processes is important*. The evidence clearly signals that the existence of a *vibrant and active civil society and network of women's movements* at local, national and transnational levels cannot be underestimated in achieving gender equality gains. Especially when there is limited access to formal political space, the oppositional voice of women's groups gives visibility to gender injustices, and to women's needs and demands. Women's groups at local and national levels remain a key space for the advancement of gender equality policy agendas goals, and, importantly, for monitoring progress on implementation of established legal and policy commitments.

Fourth, *overcoming differences among women's movements* is important - even when these are transitional, and occur only at critical junctures. The formation of strategic alliances between women rights activists, other women's and social movements, as well as within legislatures, political parties, and governments has been found to be effective. This was important in South Africa where women came together crossing race and ideological divisions, in Burundi where Hutu and Tutsi women came together, and in Northern Ireland where women overcame divisions based on faith. By contrast, in Nepal, the women's caucus in the constituent assembly was unable to bridge divisions based on caste, class and culture (International Idea 2009). Thus, diversity of women's interests cannot be overlooked, and unity behind a gender agenda cannot be taken for granted.

Fifth, *strategic engagement with a range of key actors* who do have access to decision-making processes is important. Women are often excluded from formal decision-making processes - as well as from the negotiations that take place behind closed doors. However, gender advocates (men or women) can have influence on the outcomes of peace agreements and constitutional reform processes through strategic political engagement and networking in parallel forums, lobbying and targeting key individual with access to decision-making spaces. Coalitions with political brokers who do have access to formal political space can offset the fact of being excluded from a seat at the negotiating table. The process itself of participation and strategic networking during such critical junctures contributes to building political capabilities among women activists.

Sixth, *technical, legal or gender expertise* has been found to be important to enabling more effective voice and capacity to influence formulation of law, policy or constitutional outcomes. Such expertise can contribute to ensuring that gender equality agendas do not get side-lined. But, critically, this needs to be embedded in local processes, and through support to building up such skills among national gender advocates. International experts parachuting in with little close experience and knowledge of context is ineffective, and can be

counterproductive, unless it is harnessed to locally-driven change processes, and local capabilities.

Seventh, women's participation is also a reflection of *collective and individual capabilities* in place to exercise voice and agency. Resources, such as education and literacy are important for voice. These are often more present among women activists in capital cities or urban settings. But poor access to education or high levels of illiteracy among women in local contexts, as in the case of Afghanistan, means that women are effectively disenfranchised. In addition, *material resources* which provide logistical support and funding for concrete needs, such as logistics for getting women activists to where peace negotiations are taking place, are important.

Finally, the political economy features of a context define *the 'receptiveness' of the political system* and the prevailing balance of power to engaging with gender agendas. This includes the regime type and degree of openness of the political system. In nascent transition processes where there is still fluidity and uncertainty around emerging political bargains, the balance of power between contending actors and the gendered consequences of this are especially relevant. The responsiveness of other key actors to gender-related concerns is hugely influential. It is important not to underestimate the effect of resistance, including from female politicians, to the fulfilment of gender-related rights, not least because what is at stake is the redistribution of power and resources.

2.2 Obstacles and constraints

Increasing women's formal participation in post-conflict governance - whether in peace processes and constitutional reform or in post-conflict elections at different levels - is an important gain. However, this alone does not guarantee gender-positive outcomes. Even when strong *de jure* gender provisions are achieved, their implementation in practice is vulnerable to numerous obstacles and pressures.

The *weight of social norms* is a formidable obstacle to advancing women's meaningful political voice. It is found that in post-conflict settings, including following initial mobilization by women's groups, there is often a reaffirmation of traditional gender roles and relations. Gender specific interests may not be prioritized as consolidation of the new regime becomes the main concern. Gender-based discriminatory social norms and attitudes regarding women's role in public and private life are especially resilient. Moreover, these carry different weight across urban-rural, national-sub-national and other cleavages.

Reconciling gender equality issues with other cleavages that may divide women is a challenge, as noted. This is exacerbated by the affirmation of traditional gender norms that shape dominant attitudes towards women's role in public and private life. It is also very difficult to use gender as a category for disrupting traditional priorities and policies without essentializing women. Associated with this, it is problematic that women are perceived as victims and beneficiaries, rather than as agents of change.

Efforts to *challenge gender relations and gender norms can result in backlash*. When interventions promoting gender equality are perceived as a threat to male members of the community - or the established order - it can result in heightened risk of backlash. This takes different forms of violence and intimidation, with profound consequences for women's political voice, both at the local and national level. Stories of women and gender activists suffering from violence aimed at discouraging their political participation are rife both at local and national levels, as documented in a recent study by Saferworld (2013) on Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Patriarchal norms within state bodies or security providers result in a failure to protect women, and reflect high levels of complicity with perpetrators of violence or harassment against women. Overall, unresolved legacies of conflict and continuity in recourse to violence by different actors in state and society, is deeply problematic for women's sense of safety and security, affecting capacity and opportunities for voice and agency. Concretely, women participating in political and public life can be the object of punishment and social ostracism at the community level. This is widely documented in the case of Afghanistan, for instance, but prevalent elsewhere too.

Weaknesses in women's capabilities arising from limited access to education and achievement of legal and technical expertise, and few opportunities to develop political skills, can undermine the effectiveness of women's voice. The literature especially signals this at the local and community level, where traditional gender norms limit women's access to formal political space as well as to the range of informal and often masculine forums where key players meet to decide on community affairs. At the national level, this can be problematic in terms of framing gender demands within a peace agreement or constitutional text.

The prevalence of *gender hierarchies in formal political space* remains a formidable barrier to women's effective access to decision-making roles or meaningful voice. Quotas may go a long way to ensuring women's presence in political and public life, but the quality of women's presence is mediated both by how quotas intersect with the specificities of different electoral systems or political party mechanisms; and with informal rules that often dictate political outcomes, such as patrimonialism or clientelism. There is a need for more research on the institutional *politics of process* that defines which women get into politics and public life, and what power-related and institutional factors will define the direction of their political allegiances as well as the likelihood, quality and autonomy of their voice as gender advocates.

2.3 Entry points for international actors

There are a number of entry points that international actors have followed with varying levels of effectiveness and commitment. Some recurrent features of how international actors have sought to support women's political voice in post-conflict political change processes include the following:

- Working to facilitate international and national networks and coalitions of women's movements/ other activists to influence the negotiations can represent key support at critical moments of political change. For instance, support to women's groups in East

Timor was important to achieve a collective project of drafting a set of common demands. A coalition of national and international organizations helped establish a Gender and Constitution Working Group that developed a ten-article Charter of Women's Rights, resulting in concrete gains on women's social and political rights.

- Similarly, international actors have contributed to facilitating dialogue between women's groups and government actors or key decision-makers is a way of enhancing women's influence and voice. These can be difficult processes in post-conflict settings given high levels of distrust and ongoing fear of reprisal and vulnerability to violent backlash. In Colombia, UN Women has provided what has been described as an 'accompanying' role in facilitating exchanges between women's groups, legislative actors and government. This has contributed, for instance, to women's groups having a say in shaping legislation relating to transitional justice and land restitution - and feeling safe in the exchange with state actors due to the presence of an international actor.
- There is merit in the objective of supporting women's capabilities for political engagement activism through training and capacity development to strengthen negotiation and leadership skills. However there is very limited evidence on the effectiveness of such efforts. This remains a major gap in the knowledge base. It is clear that such interventions must avoid taking the form of internationally imported templates. Capacity development of this kind needs to be embedded in deep knowledge of the political economy of context. Moreover, more long-term approaches to supporting capabilities might benefit from more integrated approaches that address women and girls empowerment through access to education at different levels.
- Practical support in facilitating participation is often critical in the immediate short term of post-conflict political negotiations around peace and constitutional reform. Getting women activists to the sites of peace talks and to participate in constitutional reform requires material support to fund travel, accommodation and expenses. Finally, women politicians themselves require resources to be able to compete for political posts. There is very limited research on the linkages between women's autonomous access to resources and effective political voice for women

Supporting the establishment of quotas in law or constitutional reform results in quick gains in terms of women's presence in politics. The use of quotas has been one of the most successful methods for guaranteeing a minimum percentage of women in official negotiations as well as in government positions. But, as noted, quotas can only put women in power; they cannot guarantee that women's concerns will be addressed, or that women in power will prioritize gender equality issues. Moreover, the impact of quotas in ensuring meaningful political voice is closely linked to the features of the electoral system and internal party politics, as well as the wider regime characteristics.

- Support to early involvement by women's groups and gender activists combined and long-term funding appear to be important in helping to consolidate early gains. This includes anticipating the end of conflict to build up women's groups' capacity to mobilize for post-conflict opportunities for political engagement. At the same time, long-term funding matters as transformation requires a longer-term perspective. On-going engagement is needed to provide backing to women's groups and other CSOs to support implementation of peace agreements and constitutional changes, and to support women's further participation in politics at the national as well as sub-national levels.

2.4 Legacies of violence, security constraints and women's political voice

The debilitating effect of unresolved legacies of conflict-related violence and enduring patterns of impunity result in 'silencing' individual and collective victims in post-conflict transition settings, and thus is a powerful obstacle to women's voice and political participation. As indicated by the other background paper on peacekeeping and security sector reform, the gendered experience of violence and insecurity during conflict, and in post-conflict settings, underlines the need to include women in addressing the range of interconnected issues, ranging from developing transitional justice mechanisms to participating in security sector reform processes.

Transitional justice increasingly features in the post-conflict political landscape. It can include a range of objectives: giving voice to victims of violence; establishing the facts of what happened; holding perpetrators of violence to account both to give justice to victims and to deter future violations; providing material reparations to victims and their families; rebuilding rule of law and justice; and enabling reconciliation. Transitional justice takes various forms, including: mechanisms for truth telling and establishing a record of past violations, and giving voice to victims and their experience; (retributive) justice, through international, regional, domestic formal justice mechanisms, or more customary arrangements like *gacaca* in Rwanda; and reparations (restorative justice'. In practice, the variations in transitional justice are important, reflecting the scope of what is possible given political conditions and prevailing balance of power - including in gender terms.

There are now more efforts to embed gender concerns in transitional justice and to include women's experience of conflict-related violence in the pursuit of some form of accountability. The 2007 Nairobi Declaration on the Right of Women and Girls to a Remedy and *Reparation*, for instance, seeks to use reparations as a way of transforming structural gender inequalities and as a participative process through which women may gain political power. However, the literature on women's role in and experience of transitional justice is mostly normative and prescriptive, and the evidence base of what works and with what impact remains underdeveloped.

Crucially, whether and how transitional justice mechanisms feature in post-conflict settings, as in the case of security sector reform, is deeply political. Failure to address the past leaves impunity intact, with important implications for the balance of power underlying the politics of negotiating peace and statebuilding processes. At the same time, the pathways of transitional justice and security sector reform in themselves are a reflection (and outcome) of the balance of power between different political interests vying for power, impunity or accountability. Thus, transitional justice, as in the case of other agendas seeking the affirmation of rights or inclusive political settlements, is deeply political and involves contesting gendered power structures. Supporting women in transitional justice must be approached in ways that: firstly, do not see women principally as victims but rather as agents of change who through their participation can give body to processes of accountability and justice; and secondly, that take account of the fact that such efforts are inevitably enmeshed in the wider political economy of political transition, which is rarely linear and likely to feature multiple layers of change, resistance and impunity.

Navigating context-specific realities of how the political power settlement is being contested, and the risks of backlash - including through gendered manifestations of threat and violence - is a challenge that requires international efforts to support women's participation in politically informed and contextually adapted ways. This is true across the range of issues that feature in post-conflict political transitions, ranging from support to women's access to formal political space, to other issues such as shaping transitional justice and security sector reform, or long-term processes of redefining social norms and gender relations.

2.5 Concluding remarks and areas for further consideration

The knowledge base on the gendered nature of post-conflict political settlements, and how women participate and can be supported to have voice in reshaping the rules of the game and becoming active citizens and political players, is a growing field in academic and policy research. There continue to be important gaps in the evidence base, but some recurrent issues can be drawn on to inform policy on women's political participation:

- Peace agreements and constitutional reform provide important windows of opportunity for women and gender activists to embed women's rights and gender equality agendas in the emerging political settlement. Early engagement of women's groups and gender advocates in these appears to enhance the chances of embedding inclusive rules in the emerging political settlement regarding women's participation and role in political life. Women's movements and civil society groups at local, national and transnational level feature consistently as key actors in supporting policy and legal change, and providing oppositional voice that can give visibility to gender injustices. They also provide a space for voice where access to formal political space is limited. It is also important not to lose sight of women's diverse political and social identities and interests, so that women's voice is not assumed to prioritize gender equality gains.
- Gains in women's access to political space, in the degree to which it results in gender activists influencing decision-making processes on issues of transitional justice, reforms in security and justice provision, service provision, or the distribution of power and resources (including land, inheritance and access to education) is deeply political. Quotas and women's presence alone will not secure meaningful voice for women - including because of the divisions between women. Rather, there needs to be ongoing investment in building capabilities for women's participation, and strategic political engagement to contest ongoing resistance and obstacles to contesting gender roles and norms, and wider inclusionary agendas.
- The importance of context is recognized among international actors. However, the challenge continues to be that of not only embedding within programming a nuanced analysis of gendered power relations, but using this analysis to inform practical engagement on the ground through what are increasingly termed 'iterative and adaptive' approaches to international practice. This means tackling the 'political' head-on, engaging in politically strategic and adaptive ways, identifying opportunities for change as these arise, and being alert to the risks of backlash and 'doing harm' in order to prevent endangering the lives of individuals and collectives.
- The different features of sub-national socio-political contexts is also important. When central political processes are disconnected from local governance, gains at the national

level in terms of women's political voice may have little effect in challenging gender-based discrimination and traditional social norms at the local level. Understanding the variation in power dynamics between national and sub-national levels of post-conflict transition and how change happens at the local level remains an important gap in the literature.

- The evidence also shows that meaningful change occurs when it is locally owned and locally driven and takes place at all levels, including the national and sub-national. International policy frameworks such as UNSCR 1325 provide important normative anchors for strategic action on the ground by women's movements and political activists driving gender equality agendas. Understanding how international actors can support local initiatives without dominating them is an important objective for international interventions.

2.6 References and useful resources

This includes a selection of useful sources. It is intended only as an indicative list, and draws on a growing body of academic and policy research in the area of women's political participation in shaping post-conflict political settlements and transition processes.

Accord (2013) 'Women building Peace', London: Conciliation Resources.

Bell, C. and O'Rourke, C. (2010) 'Peace Agreements or Pieces of Paper? The Impact of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Peace Processes and Their Agreements'. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 59(4): 941-980.

Campbell, P. (2005) 'Gender and post-conflict civil society', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 7:3, pp. 377-399,

CARE (2010) 'From Resolution to Reality; Lessons learned from Afghanistan, Nepal and Uganda on women's participation in peacebuilding and post-conflict governance', CARE International

Domingo, P., Holmes, R., Rocha Menocal, A. and Jones, N. with Bhuvanendra, D. and Wood, J. (2013) 'Assessment of the evidence of links between gender equality, peacebuilding and statebuilding', London: ODI.

El Bushra, J. (2012) *Gender in Peacebuilding: Taking Stock*. International Alert, London.

Falch, A. (2010) *Women's Political Participation and Influence in Post-Conflict Burundi and Nepal*, Oslo: Peace Research Institute

Haynes, D.F., Cahn, N. and Ni Aoláin, F. (2011) 'Gendering Constitutional Design in Post-conflict Societies'. *William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law* 17(3).

OECD (2013) *Gender and Statebuilding in Fragile and Conflict-affected States*, Conflict and Fragility, OECD Publishing

Olonisakin, F. K. Barnes and E. Ikpe (eds) (2011) *Women, Peace and Security*. Abingdon: Routledge

Pankhurst, D. (2008) *Gendered Peace: Women's Struggles for Post-War Justice and Reconciliation*, New York: Routledge and UNRISD.

Saferworld, (2013) *Security barriers to women's public participation in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen*

Tripp, A. M. (2012). *Women's Political Empowerment in Statebuilding and Peacebuilding : A Baseline Study* November 2012

UN WOMEN (2012) "Women's participation in peace negotiations: Connections between presence and influence" in *UN Women Sourcebook on Women, Peace and Security*. New York: UN Women.

Chapter 3

Men, masculinities and 1325 in implementing the women, peace and security/ 1325 agenda

Åsa Ekvall

Most efforts to improve gender equality, whether in the context of UNSCR 1325 or otherwise, have been about empowering women and combating violence against women, paying little attention to men's role in the equation. However, there are multiple reasons for engaging men and to work on norms on masculinities in relation to violence and conflict: 1) without the sensitization and support of men, it is much harder for women to reach leadership positions in society; 2) the fact that the large majority of perpetrators of any kind of violence is men, whether in a context of armed conflict or not, makes it more than important to involve men and question norms permitting men this violence; 3) both the military and militarism build on a certain idea of masculinity and men; 4) men are also victim of gender norms, of destructive norms on masculinity, such as being forced to be strong, to provide, and in many cases to fight and not having the right to be perceived as a victim; and 5) more and more research show that there are gendered drivers of conflict, that patriarchal norms on femininities and masculinities play a role in conflict dynamics, making work on changing masculinities an investment in prevention. Equating gender with women and gender perspective with just adding women and girls is thus problematic for several reasons. Not analyzing and taking into account the way norms on masculinity has an effect on violence, conflict and militarization will seriously hamper the possibilities to achieve sustainable peace.

3.1 Why work with men and masculinities?

This paper will provide a state of affairs, starting by addressing the conceptual framework around norms on gender and especially on masculinities and their relationship to violence and conflict. Then the paper will provide a selection of examples of how different organizations and institutions work with men, masculinities and 1325, and finally propose a number of issues requiring further thought, discussion and possible action.

3.2 Conceptual framework

First of all, it is important to remember that gender does not equal women. Every human being has a gender. Furthermore, masculinity does not equal men, but is a concept that encompasses how we think a “real” man should be, look, think and behave. As there are many social, cultural and religious norms on how an ideal man should be and behave, there are a multitude of masculinities. Overall, norms on masculinity (and femininity) can be found on a continuous line, or long gliding scale, between patriarchal and egalitarian. Noteworthy is that no society is 100 percent patriarchal nor 100 percent egalitarian; all societies are to be found in between the two extremes on the scale and their position on the scale changes over time. Norms on gender are produced, maintained and transmitted by social, cultural, political and economic institutions and structures such as religion, education, welfare systems, legislation, the military and media. Patriarchal norms on masculinity notably encourage dominance; competition; risk taking; power over women; disdain of homosexuals; strength and control of emotions. Patriarchal norms can also be hegemonic, stipulating that not only should men dominate women, thus effectively preventing women’s empowerment, some men should also dominate other men. This creates hierarchical structures where people are ranked not only according to gender, ethnicity, age, education, sexual orientation etc., but also according to their conformity to patriarchal norms. Patriarchal norms on both femininity and masculinity intersect with a lot of other factors in society, for instance: religion; education; socio-economic status; age cohort and more, thus creating a variety of unique contexts that each has to be analyzed on its own in order to be fully understood.

Patriarchal societal structures in most countries in the world, not only developing and conflict-affected ones, teach young men to use violence to get respect and to avenge perceived wrongs. This prescription of violence as a preferred means of retribution and conflict solving is further exacerbated in so-called honor cultures, which exist all around the world to different degrees and not only in the Middle East, as is notoriously believed. These patriarchal and honor-related structures can lead to interpersonal violence, such as men beating each other for an insult or a scratch on the car or violence against women from their partners as retribution for a perceived wrong. They can also lead to societal violence when groups find themselves insulted or discriminated against in various ways. These norms approving of violence are maintained and promoted in society at several levels, for instance through liberal gun laws, closed communities, religion and peer pressure. Patriarchal and hegemonic norms on masculinity are thus extremely important to take into account when working to prevent or manage violence since norms are strong, collective beliefs on what is right and what is wrong, acting as (in)formal guidelines for accepted and expected behavior, both of ourselves and others.

The norms we hold explain a lot of our behavior, which is why we need to look at norms on masculinity and their relationship to violence to understand and prevent violent behavior. As an example, it has been found that societies where men are permitted to acknowledge fear, which patriarchal norms typically prohibit, levels of violence are relatively low. In contrast, in societies where masculine bravery and men’s denial of fear are idealized, levels of violence are much higher. Patriarchal norms are often detrimental for men and not only those perceived as “unmanly”, such as homosexuals and other who don’t fit the ideal criteria of manhood. In times of economic difficulties and insecurity, it is often difficult for men to

fulfill society's expectation of them as men, for instance providing for a family, which might lead them to use violence as a means to gain respect and power in another way. Indeed, a sense of powerlessness while feeling entitled to a certain standing, respect and power in society has been shown to be linked to aggressive and violent behavior. It is furthermore important to remember that patriarchal norms on masculinities also can be held by women.

There are many examples of situations where women have incited men to commit violence and shamed those who did not. Women can also be violent. A recent study from Sweden shows that teenagers of both sexes agreeing with stereotype, patriarchal statements on gender norms and masculinity were several times more likely than their peers to have committed a violent act. Militarism is defined as processes by which characteristically military practices are extending into the civilian arena, blurring distinctions between war and peace and between military and civilian, thus normalizing armed and military conflict-solving methods. Militarism is, moreover, heavily influenced by patriarchal and hegemonic norms, where soldiers are considered archetypes of the ideal man and the system is strictly hierarchical. Indeed, the patriarchal norms stipulating a man should be strong, powerful, aggressive, take risks and ignore his emotions, are easily combined with norms about weapons, resulting in many cultures and sub-cultures around the world where a "real" man is one carrying a gun. The military institutions, education and identities are also often creating and sustaining misogyny and sexism, including towards men who are not considered manly enough.

Furthermore, according to patriarchal norms, men are supposed to be the protectors of the supposedly "weak" members of society (women, children, the elderly and the un-manly men) as well as of the community. This kind of protection easily becomes armed. Weapons can be used both as a symbol and a tool to demonstrate and enforce power and hegemony over others. This is often the case in conflict and post-conflict situations. Societies that are not involved in an armed conflict, as well as countries considered experiencing peace although participating in international military interventions, can also be militarized and militaristic: spending large portions of GNP on the military; developing, producing and selling arms; using conscription, thus teaching (mainly) young men military values; showing soldiers as heroes in media; having liberal gun legislations etc. Working on lowering levels of militarization is a way to reduce the normalization of military actions as the preferred way to solve conflicts instead of seeing it as a last resort.

Taking into account the ways patriarchal norms are linked to both norms approving of different types of violence and actual violent behavior at various levels in society, we consider violent conflict to have gendered drivers.

3.3 Implications and consequences for the 1325 agenda

Recent research has found that the very best predictor of armed conflict is high levels of violence against women, meaning that in societies where there are high levels of violence against women it is very likely that a potential societal conflict would turn violent. In fact, the second and third best predictors of armed conflict are also indicators of gender inequality and patriarchal norms, namely unequal family law and polygamy. These predictors are far

stronger than previously used predictors such as democracy and GDP per capita. Thus, it seems that cultures where violence against women is normalized create generalized contexts of violence and exploitation at the societal level. These norms on violence have been shown to be linked to a variety of phenomena, from population growth to economics and regime type. Working to end violence against women would then be an important part of conflict prevention. Moreover, changing norms on masculinity so that men do not feel obliged to resort to violence in order to prove their masculinity, in combination with work to reduce poverty and socio-economic inequalities, is equally important for the reduction and prevention of violence. For instance, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures that do not take into account how the demobilized men's identities are linked to the power that comes with carrying a gun are likely to fail.

During conflict, gender-based violence that existed pre-conflict often becomes more visible and more extreme. Sexual victimization of both women and men during conflict is often performative and serves the function of objectifying, feminizing and denigrating the victim and his/her community by extension, whilst reaffirming the power and masculinity of the perpetrator. Sometimes the perpetrator is forced by his superior to perform these abuses, under threat of being abused (or worse) himself. Again, working to prevent sexualized violence and promote changing masculinities in peace time is an important preventive measure to both lower the vulnerability of men and to prevent or reduce sexual violence during a possible conflict.

Evidence from several countries including South Sudan, Somalia, Kosovo, Colombia, Afghanistan and Uganda show that militarized norms on masculinity which valorize domination and violence have motivated men to join armies and militia groups. Furthermore, in situations where it is difficult for men to live up to their society's norms on masculinity, for instance by not being able to find a job and provide for their family, joining armed forces, be they regular or irregular, is a possible way to acquire status and live up to ideals of manhood. In some cases, for instance in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia, political leaders have been responsible for promoting violent and militarized masculinities for their own purposes, motivating men to participate in violence and women to support them or pressure them to do so.

While women have made up an important part of combatants in many conflicts, for instance Nepal, Nicaragua, Liberia, Colombia, Sri Lanka and others, they are often seen as transgressing the traditional gender roles when doing so, as violent behavior is not considered a feminine attribute but a masculine one. This transgression might still be seen as necessary in times of armed conflict but usually the female combatants in the guerrillas and militias are not allowed into the regular armed forces once the conflict is over, thus cementing the irregular and exceptional character of female violence.

3.4 Working with men and masculinities – a few examples

There are many different strategies of working with men being used depending on the type of organization and context. There is also a large variety internationally. A few examples will be described here. The main strategy of both the Dutch armed forces, NATO and the Dutch

police force when it comes to make military and police men, their own and those in countries of deployment, understand why it is important to incorporate women in the forces is to stress the operational relevance. The idea is that without female troops or female police officers, it is hard and sometimes even impossible to gather intelligence from local women; intelligence that is vital for both security and the success of operations. Improving the male-female ratio in the forces is not seen and presented as being about women's rights or about changing gender dynamics and thus having an impact on the levels of violence, but as a way to improve the efficiency of the operations. The NATO strategy is to use male officers of rank to train military men on gender issues in countries where they deploy; using the hierarchy inherent in military structures to make the local soldiers more easily accept the message.

When it comes to civil society, the range of strategies and focuses around the involvement of men in the work on gender equality is a bit more varied depending on the organization and the context. These strategies generally have a more transformative aim than the focus of operational value of the security sector and can be divided into two groups: those who openly advertise their activities and programs as being about norms, masculinities and their connection to violence and inequalities; and those who use other points of entry, such as active non-violence, and then end up addressing norms on masculinity a bit further down the line.

A Dutch example of an organization that addresses norms on masculinity and their connection to violence and conflict directly is the Women Peacemaker's Program. Their training of trainers project "Overcoming Violence: Exploring Masculinities, Violence and Peace" inspired their participants to work on the topic in their home countries all around the world. Examples can be found for instance in Burundi, where a large project to change gender norms and prevent violence is undertaken by the organization Fountaine-Isoko. They work at several levels of society at the same time: on individual level through educational workshops; on the relationship level through role models and advocacy networks; on community level through round table discussions, advocacy and monitoring networks and mobile video projections; and on societal level through radio programs. This project is now on its third year and targets over 40, 000 people. Their point of entry is not gender analysis, however. In order to attract the participants and start a discussion, they start by talking about violence in general and by teaching active non-violence. Little by little, they introduce notions about gender norms. This is a strategic choice, as they estimate that few men would want to participate in a project that is advertised as being about changing masculinities. A similar type of strategy is being used by organizations in for instance Kenya, Pakistan, and Israel. Organizations in other countries, such as India and Nicaragua, use a more direct approach, advertising trainings and other activities as being about violent and hegemonic norms on masculinity.

In order to achieve an effective and sustainable change, it is important that different actors coordinate and cooperate. Today, though, it seems that most of the cooperation consists of information sharing. In the Netherlands, for instance, the security sector does interact with local NGOs in countries where they deploy, albeit in a random way, in order to both receive and disseminate information. Back home, the Dutch security sector is getting help and support with advocacy and lobbying from notably WO=MEN, the Dutch gender platform, where many of the Dutch civil society organizations working on gender are active. Many local and

national organizations around the world working with men and boys are cooperating through the MenEngage network, which recently had a large conference on the topic of men, anti-violence and gender equality with over 1000 participants. However, there seem to be few formal mechanisms for cooperation between different types of actors.

3.5 Further thoughts

As projects addressing masculinities, violence and conflict are still comparatively rare compared to all projects focusing on women's empowerment around the world, the participants of the conference are invited to consider how to best develop and implement projects and actions to take this work forward concretely.

A first point would be to consider what men should be included in the work around UNSCR 1325. Military? Police? Elected representatives? Civil society representatives? Others? Different target groups might be required for the different aims of resolution 1325. Also, different organizations and institutions will have different target groups and sharing the information on who works with whom would be valuable for strategy making.

Considering the limited quantity of programs in the field of changing norms on masculinity, it would be useful to take stock of what actually has been done in order to collect best (and worst) practices in an organized way, benefitting policy makers, donors and civil society organizations. Furthermore, cooperation and coordination on the matter could be done not only between institutions of a similar type, such as various national police forces deploying in international missions, but also between different types of institutions and organizations internationally in order to increase impact.

In the Netherlands, it has been suggested that more trainings are needed in order to improve the understanding of gender and gender norms among Dutch troops, not only when troops deploy but also during the initial training when they join the forces. Increased training on gender norms and roles, taking into account both femininities and masculinities, could most probably benefit most military and police forces around the world, as well as international organizations, donor agencies and others.

The focus on the operational value of having women in the military and the police forces can be perceived as problematic in that it lacks any analytical dimension, thus missing out on potential transformative effects. While it is perfectly understood that using operational arguments is a good entry point, it would be valuable to add an analytical perspective.

There is a difference between addressing masculinities and engaging men. Some programs that work with engaging men and boys around the world, especially projects focusing on eliminating violence against women, focus on strengthening the role of men as protectors of women and children, rather than gender equality, thus reinforcing patriarchal norms rather than questioning them. Also, in order for men to meaningfully and durably invest in addressing gender inequities, it is fundamental that they conceive of doing so as being in their own interest. Successful programs address masculinities, illustrate how men and boys are harmed by inequitable gender norms and show how they, and society as a whole, benefits

from change. They focus on showing that more gender equitable attitudes and behaviors can bring benefits for men's physical and mental health, as well as for their relationship with women, children and other men. There are a number of organizations that have developed good programs to work with men on masculinity norms, gender equality, violence and conflict. There is ample opportunity to improve the collaboration on these matters and learn from these organizations. It would also be of importance to reflect on how to ensure that no people who identify as either male or female are both protected and included in UNSCR 1325 related activities.

One conflict-related phenomenon that has not been studied in relation to masculinities and violence is the increasingly large presence of private military/security companies around the world and the hyper-masculinity that they embody and project. Studying what impact this development has on conflict, violence and gender norms would be a useful contribution to the field of conflict prevention.

Development projects aimed at empowering women, especially economically, without including men, have backfired in several instances. In cultures where it is of high importance for the man to be the provider of the family, it can further increase the powerlessness of an unemployed man and lead to him using violence to regain status. This is unfortunately a rather common phenomenon, showing the importance of tailor-making every intervention to fit the local context, taking gender into account.

Donors have started to fund projects aiming to work with men and addressing patriarchal and violent masculinities. However, sometimes this happens at the cost of the funding of projects of women's organizations. It is important to not sideline women and instead to work with men and masculinities as a complement to women's activism (and not as a substitute), and to see men as potential allies of women and not competitors. It is furthermore important to train donors on the links between gender norms and violence (as opposed to the current focus on women's empowerment) in order to increase their understanding of the importance of funding projects aimed at changing patriarchal, hegemonic and destructive norms on gender and especially on masculinities. Moreover, as social norms are known to change slowly, it is important the donors agree to fund long-term projects that cannot show immediate results.

Finally, the lack of evaluation tools when it comes to changing norms and violent behavior makes it difficult to measure the impact of various programs. The development of measurement tools and their consistent cross-sector use would be most useful for the creation of high-impact programs. It is moreover important to thoroughly analyze each context before any intervention and to tailor programs to each situation.

For instance, directly working on empowering women in certain volatile situations might be counter effective and further polarize gender relations; programs on governance should focus on transforming a masculinized political culture; and poverty reduction programs should take gender relations into account in order to not create a violent backlash if women get economically empowered and men do not, etc.

3.6 References and useful resources

Breines I., Connell R., Eide I., 2000. *Male roles, masculinities and violence: a culture of peace perspective*. Paris: UNESCO.

Cohn C., 2004. *Mainstreaming Gender in UN Security Policy: A Path to Political Transformation?* Boston Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights Working Paper No. 204

Connell R., 1995. *Masculinities*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

---, 2002. 'Masculinities, the reduction of violence and the pursuit of peace' in Cockburn C., Zarkov D. (eds), *The Postwar Moment: Militaries, Masculinities and International Peacekeeping*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

---, 2003. *The Role of Men and Boys in Achieving Gender Equality*. United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) in collaboration with International Labour Organization (ILO) Joint United Nations Programmes on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Expert Group Meeting on "The role of men and boys in achieving gender equality" 21 to 24 October 2003 Brasilia, Brazil.

Ekvall, Å. 2013. *Gender equality, attitudes to gender equality and conflict* in M. Texler Segal and V. Demos (eds.) *Gendered Perspectives on Conflict and Violence* (Advances in Gender Research Vol. 18a), 273-295. Emerald Group Publishing Limited: Bingley.

Enloe C., 2007. *Globalization and Militarism: Feminists Make the Link*. Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield.

Esplen E., 2006. *Engaging men in gender equality: positive strategies and approaches*. Brighton: Bridge/Institute of Development Studies.

European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, 2013. UNSCR 1325 IN EUROPE 20 case studies of implementation. Brussels.

Fontaine-ISOKO, 2013. *My role in ending gender-based violence: Engaging men in transforming masculinities and promoting women's rights in post-conflict Burundi*. Theory of Change. Bujumbura.

Gender Action for Peace and Security, 2007. *Report on Involving Men in the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security*. Report based on a GAPS event hosted by the Canadian High Commission on March 13th 2007 at Canada House.

Hudson V.M., Ballif-Spanvill B., Caprioli M., and Emmett C.F. 2012. *Sex and World Peace*. New York and Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press.

Narby, C. and Austin, K. 2014. *Unga, maskulinitet och våld*. Myndigheten för ungdoms- och civilsamhällesfrågor. Stockholm.

Poteat, V. P., et al. 2011. *The Moderating Effects of Support for Violence Beliefs on Masculine Norms, Aggression, and Homophobic Behavior During Adolescence*. *Journal of Research on Adolescence* 21(2): 434-447.

Revcon Policy Brief. *Hitting the Target. Men and Guns*. Presented at the First Review Conference on the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York, 26 June - 7 July. 2006.

Sjoberg, L. and S. Via, Eds. 2010. *Gender, War and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives*. Santa Barbara, Denver and Oxford: Praeger.

Sonke Gender Justice Network, 2012. *Engaging Men for Gender equality and improved Reproductive Health* accessed at <http://www.genderjustice.org.za/101179-engaging-men-for-gender-equality-1/file>

Women Peacemakers Program, 2010. *Together for Transformation: Men, Masculinities and Peacebuilding*. The Hague.

---, 2014. *Gender and militarism. Policy Brief*. The Hague

Wright, H., 2014. *Masculinities, conflict and peacebuilding. Perspectives on men through a gender lens*. Saferworld: London.

Chapter 4

High Impact National Action Plans

Angelic Young, Institute for Inclusive Security

In the most basic terms, a National Action Plan is a document that details the actions that a government will take to meet the obligations of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. These plans are one of the most powerful tools governments and civil society have to increase the inclusion of women in politics and peacebuilding, strengthen their voice and role in decisions about security, and ensure the protection of women and girls in times of war. National Action Plans take stock of existing objectives, activities, and strategies with an eye toward improving coherence, avoiding duplication, and addressing gaps that inhibit inclusion. Strong plans reflect a government's commitment and accountability to the goals outlined in Resolution 1325. The process of developing a plan is as important as the product. To maximize impact, governments should collaborate closely with civil society through the development, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of the plan.

4.1 What does it mean for a NAP to be a tool of foreign policy?

Often, foreign policy encapsulates a series of priority issues or philosophies a nation seeks to promote. National Action Plans can serve as a tool of foreign policy, domestic policy, or a combination thereof. If a plan is primarily inward-looking, seeking to transform the lives of men, women, boys, and girls within that particular country, it is important that the activities, objectives, and other elements of the plan are aligned with and integrated into national-level domestic policies. If the plan is outward-looking, seeking to transform lives in other countries or regions, then it is important that the plan is aligned with and integrated into foreign policies. Some plans are both inward- and outward-looking, seeking to transform domestic and foreign policy priorities. Most, however, lean one direction or the other. Several outward-looking plans align with inward-looking NAPs in other countries, meaning that they prioritize supporting the development and implementation of other plans.

For a National Action Plan to be an effective tool of foreign policy, its outcomes, outputs, and activities must contribute to the achievement of foreign policy objectives. While this may seem straightforward, misalignment serves as an obstacle to the full and successful implementation of many plans.

4.2 The Dutch National Action Plan - What can we learn from the Dutch model?

The current Dutch NAP has a singular emphasis: enhancing participation and leadership of women in fragile states, conflict/post-conflict countries, and countries in transition. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) offers €4 million per year in support of local and regional initiatives aimed at increasing the political power and leadership skills of women in seven geographical focus areas: Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, Sudan and the Middle East and North Africa region.

Inclusive Security has worked with several countries to assist with designing, implementing, and monitoring and evaluating their NAPs. This work has yielded several key lessons. This policy note will address three of these lessons: (1) alignment with national policy priorities is an excellent means through which to secure and sustain political will, (2) targeted plans that seek to achieve one or two key objectives are easier than broader plans to align with national policy priorities, and (3) collaboration with civil society is essential, but cooperation models must be customized to the country context.

4.3 Lesson 1: Align the NAP with national policy priorities

One of the key contributors to NAP implementation success is the ability of plan architects to secure and sustain political will. If political leadership supports the plan and sees it as integral to achieving larger policy goals, then resources are more likely to flow. For many, however, securing such will is a difficult battle. NAPs are often seen as complementary but rarely as central to achieving national policy priorities. In other words, women's inclusion is important, and Resolution 1325 matters - but it's not essential. In aligning their plan with already existing foreign policy priorities, Dutch NAP architects may have overcome this oft-encountered obstacle.

For example, Dutch foreign policy priorities in Afghanistan include building the capacity of criminal justice institutions and supporting women's equality - making their NAP objective of increasing "women's representation at all decision-making levels in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict in fragile states" appear directly relevant to their ability to achieve foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan.² Similarly, in the DRC, the Netherlands prioritizes security, human rights, and combatting sexual violence - all objectives seemingly well aligned with Dutch NAP priorities.³

Other examples of plans linked to national policy priorities are the Sierra Leonean NAP (SiLNAP) and the Irish NAP. The SiLNAP aligns with the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy priorities,⁴ while Ireland's NAP has a pillar dedicated to promoting Resolution 1325 using Irish

² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. "Women: Powerful Agents for Peace and Security- Dutch National Action Plan (2012-2015)." Accessed January 12, 2015. http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/NationalActionPlans/dutch_nap_2012-2015.pdf.

³ Government of the Netherlands. "The Dutch Do's on Women, Peace and Security -Diplomacy, Defence and Development in Partnership" (2010).

⁴ Government of Sierra Leone. "The Sierra Leone National Action Plan for the Full Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000) & 1820 (2008)." Accessed January 12, 2015. http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/NationalActionPlans/sierra_leone_nap.pdf.

regional and international foreign policy. Ireland utilizes its EU presence to advance this objective, both in related venues like the EU Taskforce on Women, Peace, and Security but also during its OSCE Chairmanship in 2012, the Human Security Network, and the International Network on Conflict and Fragility.⁵

4.4 Lesson 2: Adopt a targeted strategy

A critical element of a successful, high-impact plan is a series of SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound) outcomes. Many national action plans consist of a series of detailed, specific activities without similarly crafted outcomes. Some plans contain outcomes that are unrealistic given the available resources, political will, or time frame.

The majority of countries with national action plans have adopted strategies that address each of the four pillars identified in Resolution 1325: participation, protection, prevention, and relief and recovery. However, many have struggled to fully implement these strategies, raising the question of whether a narrower, targeted focus would enhance the impact of NAPs. Others would argue that some pillars haven't received enough attention: prevention, for example, is hardly the focus of any country's strategy.

Ultimately, plans that align with national priorities are more likely to engender political support, attract resources, and inspire sustained commitment. That reality begs for a customized, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach. Moreover, the pillars themselves can prove unwieldy. For example, some practitioners identify the fourth pillar as "gender mainstreaming" rather than "relief and recovery." The pillar formulation also misses key issues, such as the need to change societal behaviors and attitudes towards women. And, despite being framed as a "women, peace, and security" resolution, collectively the pillars tend to more effectively capture the impact of insecurity on women (e.g., preventing violence, protecting women and girls, and addressing their needs through inclusive relief and recovery efforts) than promote the ability of women to impact security. Developing strong linkages to national security frameworks is one way to generate and sustain political will and an understanding of the NAP's relevance to foreign policy, domestic policy, or both.

Instead of viewing Resolution 1325 through the lens of these four pillars, Inclusive Security's research and experience working with government and civil society practitioners suggests a framework of three overarching objectives. These objectives encompass the priorities outlined in the pillars while allowing plan architects to develop a more targeted, customized approach to implementing Resolution 1325.

- 1 *Attain meaningful participation of women in peace and security processes.* Meaningful participation is more than just the numbers - women must have the capacity to participate, and key laws and policies must empower them to do so. This is the same as the participation pillar as currently described, because ensuring women have a place and a voice in all levels of decision-making remains critically important.

⁵ Government of Ireland. "Ireland's National Action Plan for Implementation of UNSCR 1325, 2011 – 2014."

http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/NationalActionPlans/ire_nap_nov2011.pdf

- 2 *Affirm women's contribution to peace and security.* Most activities that successfully support implementation of Resolution 1325 result in changing laws, policies, or other institutional and legal barriers to women's full participation. It takes time, however, and attention to the human element to truly transform the way society views and treats women. For example, criminalizing sexual and gender-based violence has little impact if communities don't understand, agree with, or play their part in enforcing or respecting new laws. Moreover, far too many National Action Plans fail to include activities relating to engaging men. Paying more attention to activities aimed at transforming societal behaviors and attitudes towards women will help sustain the impact of Resolution 1325.
- 3 *Achieve women's human security.* This objective focuses on removing barriers to equality and ensuring women are able to exercise their rights, but within the greater context of human security: security for the people, not the state. For example, activities relating to delivering equal access to justice, reparations, economic, or education opportunities for women would be included in this objective under the rubric of removing barriers to equality. But creating the legal framework alone is insufficient. It's important to ensure that women are able—and actually do—exercise their rights. Projects related to educating women and men about their rights, encouraging them to participate in new opportunities, or facilitating their physical access to justice (e.g., breaking down infrastructure barriers by changing or creating laws and policies) would fit within this objective.
- 4 *Attain, Affirm, and Achieve* allows the basic principles of Resolution 1325 to live on in broader, more customizable objectives. Inclusive Security has utilized these to effectively support our partner countries' design, implementation, and monitoring efforts. Our intent is not to make this a "3 A's" formula for others to follow; rather, we expect countries to use these objectives as a starting point, and to tailor them to their specific needs and goals, to ensure greater buy-in, support, and sustained commitment.

4.5 Lesson 3: Collaborate with civil society

Process is just as important as content when it comes to high-impact plans. A comprehensive problem analysis, along with a focus on building and sustaining political will, are essential attributes of such plans. It's also important that plan architects identify and secure resources, and specify responsibilities, timelines, and coordination mechanisms for implementation of activities. Additionally, designers should commit to developing a monitoring and evaluation plan and to publically communicating the results of reviews and/or formal evaluations.




Fig. 1: Level of Civil Society Involvement Among Existing National Action Plans (*does not include the Gambian NAP*)

Perhaps the most essential feature of a successful design and implementation process, however, is the stakeholder cooperation model. Civil society participation is an essential ingredient to a high-impact plan, often determining a plan's comprehensiveness and impact.⁶ After nearly 15 years of Resolution 1325 and nearly 50 NAPs around the world, there are a myriad of different approaches to engaging civil society. The Dutch NAP, however, is often hailed as the model for civil society collaboration.

⁶ Miller, Pournik, Swaine, "Women in Peace and Security through United Nations Security Resolution 1325: Literature Review, Content Analysis of National Action Plans, and Implementation," The George Washington University Institute for Global and International Studies (May 2014).

http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/NationalActionPlans/miladpournikanalysisdocs/igis_womeninpeaceandsecuritythroughunsr1325_millerpournikswaine_2014.pdf. The 13 NAPs that specify civil society actors involved in drafting are the most specific; 18 NAPs which mention but fail to specify civil society involvement in drafting are slightly less specific; and the 10 NAPs that make no mention of civil society's role in development are the least specific.

In Inclusive Security's experience, most cooperation models break down into four categories⁷:

Formal inclusion

Some countries have chosen to set up formal coordination boards in which both government and civil society participate. These formal mechanisms not only provide a voice for civil society, but also tend to distribute responsibility and accountability among government and civil society implementers. Thirteen of the 48 existing NAPs fall under this category, with the Dutch and the Bosnia and Herzegovina plans serving as primary examples.

Informal inclusion

Many countries have chosen to establish informal working groups in which both government and civil society participate, but to which no formal responsibility is attributed. These informal mechanisms provide a voice for civil society and an opportunity for them to interact with government representatives, but keep responsibility and accountability for success of the NAP solely attributed to the government. Seven of the existing 48 NAPs fall under this category, including Norway.

Informal interaction

This category covers several kinds of situations. Some countries start out with this kind of model; others start with a formal or informal inclusion model that weakens over time. In many countries, joint government/civil society working groups have become defunct over the years, or meet too infrequently to serve as a coordinating mechanism. Or, civil society working groups may exist and meet regularly, but have no established, regular channel of communication with government stakeholders. In this model, the government is solely responsible for the success of the NAP, with civil society typically playing a sometimes limited watchdog role. In countries like this, government and civil society's relationship may be tenuous or even antagonistic at times. Civil society may lack the necessary resources to effectively or safely organize such that they can provide useful input to government. In many cases, the political environment may mean that government representatives don't value or prioritize collaboration with civil society. Culture plays a large role in determining to what extent informal interaction will have a meaningful impact on plan implementation. Nineteen of the existing 48 NAPs fall into this category, and include the United States, Liberia, and the soon-to-be-released Japanese plans.

Limited to no interaction or inclusion

Of the existing 49 NAPs, 10 either don't specify a mechanism for civil society's involvement or don't mention civil society. In these cases, either the relationship is too antagonistic to be productive, or there is no relationship at all. In instances where the national government has not adopted a NAP, civil society may organize independently to create its own strategy (as in the case of Israel) or may not be aware or supportive of government strategies that lack their input. The Swiss and Icelandic plans are examples of NAPs that either don't specify civil society's role or don't mention them at all.

⁷ Note that these four categories, as broadly described, could not possibly capture all the nuances of each and every individual stakeholder cooperation model. These categories, instead, are meant to capture the essence of the different ways in which government and civil society interact around National Action Plans.

Which cooperation model will work best is dependent on the environment and culture. If government does not trust civil society (or vice versa), a formal inclusion model may not be appropriate, and may even hinder plan development. In some cases, civil society may prefer to emphasize their role as a watchdog rather than collaborator (although most civil society organizations prefer to do both). Few countries have achieved the level of formal collaboration which the Netherlands and Bosnia and Herzegovina have - and it simply may not be a relevant model for all NAP architects.

Civil society stakeholders don't need to be signatories to a NAP for it to be inclusive. More important is that stakeholders—government and civil society—engage in regular, meaningful dialogue. Establishing an authentic feedback loop through which stakeholders can “agree to disagree” may be more meaningful than a formal mechanism which lacks staying power over time. Regardless of the structure designers choose to establish, what remains essential is that government and civil society engage in regular dialogue to sustain commitment to implementing, measuring, evaluating, and communicating the results.

4.6 Conclusion

For NAPs to be effective tools of foreign policy, they must align with and augment a country's existing national priorities. When a NAP is viewed as a critical element of achieving larger national policy goals, it ensures two critical components of effective implementation: political will and resources.

In designing such high-impact plans, one of the most important aspects is stakeholder cooperation. Civil society's involvement often determines the overall reach of a country's NAP, and the Dutch NAP's example of civil society-government collaboration is known the world over.

Plans that complement and influence foreign policy don't need to rely on the four pillars of Resolution 1325 to be successful. Rather, this paper suggests a different lens: attaining meaningful participation of women in peace and security processes, affirming women's contribution to peace and security, and achieving women's human security. Based on our experience working with partners in varying political climates, these overarching objectives offer a framework for activities to be more easily customized to a country's specific goals.



Sophialaan 10
2514 JR The Hague
The Netherlands

T +31 (0)70 302 8130
info@kpsrl.org
www.kpsrl.org