DOI: 10.12797/Politeja.12.2015.31_2.13

Caspar ten DAM
Leiden University
info@ctdamconsultancy.com; c.t.ten.dam@umail.leidenuniv.nl

with **Tomasz POLANSKI**

BRUTALITIES IN ANTI-IMPERIAL REVOLTS[1]

COMMONALITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN DISTINCT YET OVERLAPPING FORMS OF VIOLENCE BY PERIPHERAL ETHNIC-INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES AND IMPERIAL POWERS IN CLASSICAL, MEDIEVAL AND MODERN (INDUSTRIAL) TIMES

ABSTRACT In order to understand and resolve internal armed conflicts one must comprehend why and how people revolt, and under what conditions they brutalise i.e. increasingly resort to terrorism, banditry, brigandry, "gangsterism" and other forms of violence that violate contemporary local and/or present-day international norms that I believe are, in the final analysis, all based on the principles of *conscience*, *empathy* and *honour*.[2] Contemporary "global" or regional norms distinct from those of the rebelling community, and the norms of the regime community and/or colonial power, are also considered. My pessimistically formulated and thereby quite testable *brutalisation* theory combines theorising elements of disciplines ranging from cultural anthropology to military psychology, so as to better explain rebellions or any armed conflicts and their morally corrosive effects. The theory's main variables are: *violence-values* (my composite term) on proper and improper violence; *conflict-inducing motivations*, in particular grievances, avarices, interests and ideologies, that bring about i.e. cause or trigger the conflict; *combat-stresses*

[1] I presented an earlier version of this paper at the conference on "Ethnicity, Culture, Politics: Mutual Dependencies" at Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland, 18-19 April 2013.

[2] See C. ten Dam, 'Patriotism and Brutality vis-à-vis Nationalism, Ethnicity and other Identity Formations' (Editorial), *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2014), esp. pp. 8-9.

like fear, fatigue and rage resulting from or leading to traumas (and hypothetically to brutalities as well); and *conflict-induced motivations*, in particular grievances, avarices, interest and ideologies, that happen by, through and during the conflict.[3] The present paper is an exploratory introduction to an ambitious research project, succinctly titled "Brutalisation in Anti-Imperial Revolts", with advice and support from Professor Tomasz Polanski. The paper addresses the project's relevance and its epistemological and methodological challenges. The project seeks to explain rebellion, banditry and other forms of violence that may or may not be inherently brutal. It seeks to ascertain the causes and degrees of any brutalisations i.e. increasing violations of norms during rebellions by peripheral, marginalised ethnic (indigenous) communities against their overlords in classical, medieval and "modern" (industrial) times. It introduces seven selected cases of "peripheral--ethnic revolts" by indigenous communities – as (semi-) state actors, non-state actors or both (yet possessing at least residual ruling capabilities) – against Imperial powers across the ages, with a special focus on banditry, "brigandry" (brigandage), guerrilla and other forms of irregular warfare. The first stage of the research will analyse and compare the causes i.e. motivations and involved norms, sorts of violence and degrees of brutalisation in these seven cases.

Keywords: armed conflicts, violence, brutalization theory, anti-imperial revolts

> *To face and deal with cruelty, torture and terror is to look into the face of a horrible sphinx. It is a face that we would prefer to forget. All the same it nags at us, even fascinates us. Cruelty, torture and terror constitute the ultimate pornography, the ultimate inhumanity. And yet these behaviors remain shockingly, utterly, exclusively human. They are the first and deepest challenge, the annihilation of society in the midst of society, a black, festering hole that may open itself anytime, anywhere, given the right conditions.*[4]
>
> Hans ten Dam, *How People Make the World*, 2010

[3] From 2005 until early 2014, I have described my Brutalisation theory, with some modifications, as *a cycle of violence involving four main variables:* values *on "good" and "bad" violence (variable 1);* grievances *leading to armed conflict (variable 2);* combat stress *leading to atrocities (variable 3); and* new conflict grievances *emanating from such atrocities (variable 4), spawning counter-atrocities and eventually hardening or debasing the original violence-values (the cycle returns to the first variable)* – C. ten Dam, 'How to Feud and Rebel: 1. Violence-values among the Chechens and Albanians', *Iran and the Caucasus*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2010), p. 331, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157338410X12743419190340>. Since then, I have widened and reformulated the theory's variables, so as to more equally represent different motivations as explanations of brutal behaviour.

[4] H. TenDam, *How People Make the World: The Ten Global Challenges – An essay on politics, civilization and humanity*, Ommen 2010 (1st ed. 1991), p. 59.

INTRODUCTION

In order to understand and resolve internal armed conflicts one must comprehend why and how people revolt, and under what conditions they brutalise, i.e. increasingly resort to terrorism, banditry, brigandage, "gangsterism" and other forms of violence[5] that violate contemporary local and/or present-day international norms (see Appendix B for my chosen definitions of these and other concepts of violence).[6] Contemporary "global" or regional norms distinct from those of the rebelling community, and the norms of the regime community and/or colonial power, are also considered. My pessimistically formulated and thereby quite testable *brutalisation* theory combines theorising elements of disciplines ranging from cultural anthropology to military psychology, so as to better explain rebellions or any armed conflicts and their morally corrosive effects. In current research, I falsify, i.e. test, the theory by exploring the values (norms, customs, beliefs), aims (objectives, aspirations, ideologies) and methods (targets, tactics, techniques) of violence by Chechen and Albanian separatists between 1979 and 2001. Their armed struggles lasted long enough and were successful enough to sensibly test the hypothesised brutalisations of increasing terrorism, banditry and other (war) crimes by intolerant *violence-values*, *conflict--inducing motivations* (grievances, avarices, interests and ideologies) leading up to the conflict, *combat-stresses* leading to trauma (and perhaps brutalities); and *conflict-induced motivations* (grievances, avarices, interests and ideologies) during the conflict, the theory's main variables. Such a cycle of violence thus leads to revenge and tit-for-tat retributions (see Appendix A for a cyclical model of the theory and its variables, with a formal and summary description[7]). These variables, their theoretical and disciplinary backgrounds, and preliminary findings on the values, aims and methods among Chechen and Albanian insurgents, are already described in my 'How to Feud and Rebel' Series in the peer-reviewed journal *Iran and the Caucasus* (Brill)[8] and in my book chapter 'The Limitations of Military Psychology' in a *Festschrift* in honour of Prof. Garnik Asatrian (Brill).[9]

---

5 I will discuss and defend my definitions of these forms of violence in future publications, notably in *Conceptualising Brutality and Violence: How to Define, Grasp and Deal with Terrorism and Other Forms of Violence in a Post 11 September World*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing (CSP), forthcoming.

6 Appendix B is virtually the same as the one in: C. ten Dam, 'Let's be Clear: A Call for Tripartite Action-Actor-Motivation Conceptualisations in Social-Scientific Research' (Editorial), *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2015), pp. 13-18 (Appendix).

7 The "old" Brutalisation model can still be found and downloaded from <http://sites.google.com/site/tristansolutions> (sitemap "Brutalisation theory"). See further note 3.

8 See C. ten Dam, 'How to Feud and Rebel: 1...', pp. 331-65; idem, "How to Feud and Rebel: 2. Histories, Cultures and Grievances of the Chechens and Albanians' *Iran and the Caucasus*, Vol. 15, No. 1-2 (2011), pp. 234-273, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157338411X12870596615674>; idem, 'How to Feud and Rebel: 3. Combat-stress and Violence-values among the Chechens and Albanians', *Iran and the Caucasus*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2012), pp. 225-245, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573384X-20120010>; idem, 'How to Feud and Rebel: 4. Conflict Motivations among the Chechens and Albanians' (forthcoming).

9 Idem, 'The Limitations of Military Psychology: Combat-stress and Violence-values among the Chechens and Albanians' in U. Bläsing, V. Arakelova, M. Weinreich (eds.), *Studies on Iran and the*

The present paper is an exploratory introduction to an ambitious research project, succinctly titled "Brutalisation in Anti-Imperial Revolts", with advice and support from Professor Tomasz Polanski.[10] Hopefully, other scholars will participate in or collaborate with the project in the near future. The project seeks to explain rebellion, banditry and other forms of violence that may or may not be inherently brutal. It seeks to ascertain the causes and degrees of any brutalisations i.e. increasing violations of norms during rebellions by peripheral, marginalised ethnic (indigenous) communities against their overlords and/or external, usually more powerful enemies (i.e. Imperial powers) in classical, medieval and "modern" (industrial)[11] times. The project's main hypotheses are brutalisation by a) violence-values, b) conflict-generating motivations (grievances, avarices, interests and ideologies), c) combat-stresses (shock, fear, fatigue, rage, etc.) and d) conflict-generated motivations (grievances, avarices, interests and ideologies), according to the theory's main variables. Radicalisation and criminalisation are seen as alternative or contributory factors in each hypothesis. Obviously this project is or can be highly relevant, as it could and should enhance our understanding of human behaviour, and improve the prospects and durability of just and peaceful society. Indeed, studying brutality in all its manifestations of "cruelty, torture and terror" is essential, as it arguably constitutes the "oldest challenge" the human race has had to grapple with.[12]

Fortunately, violence in any shape or form seems to become increasingly rare. Indeed, its frequency and lethality seems to decline through the *civilizational processes* of reason and empathy due to the rise of commerce, science and education over the last decades, centuries, or even millennia, according to Steven Pinker.[13] As I have pointed out elsewhere, the *overall downward trend of political violence – indeed of* any *type of private and public violence across the last decades, centuries and even millennia, as convincingly shown by Steven Pinker (2011, 2012) – even reverses the accumulation of old, unresolved, continuing armed conflicts since World War II*.[14]

Caucasus. In Honour of Garnik Asatrian, Leiden 2015, pp. 577-627. Expanded and updated version of: idem, 'How to Feud and Rebel: 3...', pp. 225-245.

10 Prof. T. Polanski worked at the Institute of Classical Philology at Jagiellonian University between 1998 and 2008 (Head of the Department of Greek and Latin Language), and since then has headed the Department of Ancient History at the Jan Kochanowski University of Kielce, Poland.

11 I prefer "timeless" circumscriptions and applications of the concepts *tradition* and *modernity*, not linked or limited to any particular epoch, culture or type of tribal or non-tribal society. See Appendix B for my definitions of these terms. See for argumentation: C. ten Dam, 'How to Feud and Rebel: 1...', pp. 339-340.

12 H. TenDam, *How People Make the World...*, pp. 53, 54 (quotes).

13 See S. Pinker, 'Decline of Violence: Taming the Devil within Us', *Nature*, Vol. 478, No. 7369 (2011), pp. 309-311, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/478309a>. See further idem, *The Better Angels of Our Nature. Why Violence has Declined*, New York 2011. I refer more extensively to Pinker's works in C. ten Dam, 'Looking at Conflict Patterns: Declining Frequencies yet Persistent Brutalities in both Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Conflicts', *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2015) (incl. Critical Responses and authors' reaction), pp. 9-25.

14 Ibid., p. 11.

If true, brutality and brutalisation will dwindle even if their dynamics are not grasped and addressed, simply because the number of cases in which they may appear is declining for a variety of reasons. Even so, brutality and brutalisation may lead to renewed and worse conflicts and other bouts of violence (riots, lynching, gang warfare), which could dampen or halt the decline in armed conflicts and other (private and domestic) violence. These violations and the increasing violations of local and/or international norms of violence may even conceivably *reverse* the downward trend(s). For this reason alone, one must stay alert, and seek to detect, explain (the present focus of my research) and prevent or curtail any instances of brutality in conflict – not just the conflict itself. Even if ones agrees with the *declining-violence* proposition by Pinker and others, and shares their optimism as I do, one must stay *vigilant* in the best sense of the word.

The "Brutalities in Anti-Imperial Revolts" project will eventually deal with all four variables of my brutalisation theory – violence-values, combat-stresses and conflict--inducing and conflict-induced motivations – as partially shown in my 'How to Feud and Rebel' Series in *Iran and the Caucasus* (see notes 4 and 8). For instance, regarding combat-stress, classical and medieval sources already describe incidents of fear, fatigue, rage and other brutality-inducing stresses among rebels, in much more detail and rather than their norms and motivations for revolt. For this reason, standard Table I in Appendix C relates combat-stresses as well as violence-values to the *just war* or "just conflict" principles apparent and prevalent in each case. Standard Table II in Appendix II relates the sub-variables of conflict-inducing and conflict-induced grievances, i.e. "complaints" about past or current deprivations like discrimination, repression, plunder and killings, to (violations of) humanitarian and human rights norms (see further section 'Normative concepts in local and international law').

Due to lack of space, the source references to military psychology and related disciplines dealing with combat-stress are minimal here[15] – just like source references to theories and literatures informing the other variables of the brutalisation theory.[16]

Suffice to say here is that the theory, particularly its second and fourth variables, conflict--inducing and conflict-induced motives (of grievances, avarices, interests and ideologies), contain elements from the contrasting theories of *frustration-aggression*,[17] *absolute deprivation*,[18]

[15] My 'How to Feud and Rebel: 3...' amply cover these sources, even more so in my 'The Limitations of Military Psychology...'. See further note 9.

[16] See for a slightly outdated summary of some of the main theories informing the brutalisation theory: C. ten Dam, 'How to Feud and Rebel: 2...', pp. 234-273 ('Saliency of Grievances and Aspirations').

[17] See esp. J. Dollard al., *Frustration and Aggression*, London 1944 (*International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction*) (first published New Haven 1939); N.E. Miller, et al., 'The Frustration--Aggression Hypothesis', *Psychological Review*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (1941), pp. 337-342, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0055861>; L. Berkowitz, *Aggression. A Social Psychological Analysis*, New York 1962 (*McGraw-Hill Series in Psychology*); idem, *Roots of Aggression; a Re-examination of the Frustration--Aggression Hypothesis*, New York 1969.

[18] See esp. E.J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels. Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Century*, Manchester 1959; idem, *Bandits*, London 1969; P. Bourdieu, *Political Interventions. Social Science and Political Action*, texts selected and introduced by F. Poupeau, T. Discepolo, trans. by D. Fernbach, London–New York 2008; J.B. Bell, *The Myth of the Guerrilla; Revolutionary Theory*

relative deprivation,[19] *depredation*,[20] *new (predatory) war*[21] and *transformed (irregular) war*.[22] Basically, the first three conflict theories depart from the motivational premise of *grievance* (complaint-of-a-hardship-or-injustice) about a *deprivation*, i.e. lack of needs ranging from food, water and bodily safety to political and socio-economic rights; the latter three theories depart from that of *greed* (search-for-private-gain in power or wealth) leading to *depredation*, i.e. the plunder and destruction of goods and properties.[23]

Therefore, these are some of the main theories that have inspired, informed and helped me to further shape the brutalisation theory and its constituent variables, theories whose strengths and weaknesses I describe and discuss in more depth and detail in other texts that will appear in future publications, like in my books *Conceptualising Brutality and Violence* (Cambridge Scholars, forthcoming) and *Ways to Rebel*.[24]

Indeed, I examine the historic and contemporary grievances, avarices, interests and ideologies of insurgents and other armed actors, and those of the people these actors (claim to) represent, because all these drives, emotions, reasons and purported aims to improve one's life and prevent any further deprivations and depredations (and perhaps

and Malpractice, New York 1971; idem, *The Dynamics of the Armed Struggle*, London–Portland (OR) 1998.

19 See esp. SA Stouffer et al., *The American Soldier*, Vol. 1: *Adjustment during Army Life*, Princeton 1949 / Manhattan (Kan.) 1977 (*Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*, 1); W.G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice – A study of attitudes to social inequality in twentieth-century England*, Harmondsworth 1972 (*Pelican Books*) (first published by University of California Press 1966 and Routledge & Kegan Paul 1966); T.R. Gurr, Ted Robert Gurr, 'Psychological Factors in Civil Violence', *World Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1968), pp. 245-278; idem, *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton 1970.

20 See esp. M. Hechter, 'Explaining Nationalist Violence', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1995), pp. 53-68, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-5078.1995.00053.x>; H.I. Grossman, 'Kleptocracy and Revolutions', *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (1999), pp. 267-283, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/51.2.267>; P. Collier, *Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy*, World Bank, Washington D.C. 2000 (see archive at <http://www.worldbank/org/research/conflict>); idem, 'Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44, No. 6 (2000), pp. 839-853, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002700044006008>; idem, A. Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, World Bank, Washington D.C. 2001 (*Policy Research Working Paper*, 2355) (see at <http://www.worldbank/org/research/conflict>). Also published by Centre for the Study of African Economies, Paper 160 *Working Paper Series* (Berkeley Electronic Press, at <www.bepress.com/csae/paper160>); P. Collier, N. Sambanis, 'Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (2002), pp. 3-12, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002702046001001>; J.D. Fearon, D.D. Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 1 (2003), pp. 75-90.

21 See M. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge 1999.

22 See M. Van Creveld, 'The Clausewitzian Universe and the Law of War', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 26, No. 3/4 (1991), pp. 403-429, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002200949102600304>; idem, *Transformation of War*, New York 1991.

23 I am the first to use the terms "depredation" in the greed vs. grievance context.

24 See C. ten Dam, *Ways to Rebel: Values, Aims and Methods of Violence – Testing a Theory of Brutalisation on the Chechen and Albanian insurgents 1979-2001*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, forthcoming. This book will in essence be an expanded, updated and more detailed exposition of the analysis and findings presented in my 'Feud and Rebel' Series (see note 8).

avenge such sufferings experienced in the past), at least partially account for the outbreaks of and (consequent) brutalities in the latest conflicts.

ANTI-IMPERIAL REVOLTS: CASE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY

Tomasz Polanski's work on rebellions by suppressed and marginalised communities in areas colonised by Imperial powers, like those in Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt, and by communities with their own states (kingdoms, principalities, etc.)[25] resisting encroachments and conquests by Imperial powers, like Pontus and Kommagene against the Roman Republic, inspired the joint decision to expand my brutalisation research toward multiple cases across distinct historical epochs (see case 2 below).[26]

I agree with Polanski that wars in antiquity, particularly those waged by Rome against rebel communities they deem most *inferior*, share at least *some of their characteristics with modern wars, marked by pathological cruelty directed against non-combatants*.[27] The first stage of the research will analyse and compare the causes i.e. motivations and involved norms, sorts of violence and degrees of brutalisation in seven "peripheral--ethnic revolts" by indigenous communities against Imperial powers across the ages, roughly from 500 BC until the present day:

1. The Ionian Revolt and other Greek-Hellenic uprisings in Asia Minor against Persian rule, 499-493 BC. With references to other anti-Persian uprisings, like the Egyptian rebellion of 486 BC and the Babylonian uprising of 482 BC.
2. The native-Egyptian rebellion supported by the Nubian king Armakhis in 217--186 BC, and related uprisings against Ptolemaic rule, like the *Boukoloi* revolt of 172 AD.

[25] Resistance by states or other ruling entities against (attempts at) occupation, conquest and/or colonization by one or more Imperial powers may conceivably fit within my broad definition of rebellion as *armed conflict by one or more non-state, semi-state or alternative-state actors against any entrenched and generally recognised ruler, elite, authority, government, regime or state* (see Appendix B). Nevertheless, I will construct and adopt a separate concept of *resistance* that encompasses both state and post– or non--state violent opposition to foreign conquest and rule. Consequently, I may modify the project's title to "Brutalities in Anti-Imperial Revolts and Forms of Resistance" in order to clarify the research scope.

[26] See esp. T. Polanski, 'Boukoloi Banditry: Greek Perspectives on Native Resistance', *Grazer Beiträge*, Vol. 25 (2006), pp. 229-248; idem, 'Oriens Militans: Extreme Traditionalist Movements in the Provincial Populace of the Ptolemaic Egypt and their Ideology' in K. Grant-Skiba, Z. Lew-Wojciechowski (eds.), *Lux lucet in tenebris. Księga pamiątkowa z okazji nadania prof. Bernardowi Kozirógowi doktoratu honoris causa*, Vol. 1, Podkowa Leśna 2010 (reprint from *Studies in Ancient Art and Civilisation*, Vol. 9 (1999), pp. 23-48), pp. 335-360; idem, 'The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in the Kingdoms of Pontus and Kommagene during the Roman Conquest', *Iran and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2013), pp. 239-251, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573384X-20130302>. The latter publication, and other more recent publications by Polanski, will be discussed in more detail in future publications concerning the Brutalities in Anti-Imperial Revolts project.

[27] Idem, 'Boukoloi Banditry...', p. 243. Still, I wonder whether Rome's wars against their esteemed, "less inferior" enemies like the Parthians and the Germanic tribes – who, unlike the "forgotten" rebels or brigands (politicised bandits) of (semi-)nomadic peoples like the *Boukoloi* in ancient Egypt, were commemorated by Greek and Roman historians – knew any less cruelties against non-combatants.

3. The Great Jewish Revolt or First Jewish-Roman War, and associated Jewish uprisings, against Roman rule, 66-73 AD. With some references to other anti--Roman uprisings, like the *Bacaudae* revolts of 283-286 AD.
4. The Frisian uprisings of 782-785 and 793 AD against the Frankish Empire of Charles the Great.
5. The Scottish rebellion led by William Wallace of 1296-1298 AD against English rule (then) under Edward I. With references to the following Wars of Independence, until the victory at Bannockburn in 1314.
6. The Circassian rebellion(s) in North-West Caucasus against Russian rule, 1763--1864, also as part of the 1829-1859 Great *gazavat* (holy war), led by Imam Shamil in 1834-1859, which also involved the Chechens, Dagestanis and other North-Caucasian peoples.[28]
7. The Polish armed resistance against Soviet/Polish-communist rule, 1939-1953.

At this stage, we concentrate on seven ethnic-indigenous revolts against incumbent regimes that represent colonial powers and cultures whose home countries are elsewhere. Partial exceptions are the native revolt led by Armakhis against Ptolemy IV Philopator in Egypt between 217 and 186 BC and the anti-communist resistance in Poland between 1939 and 1953. In the former case, Ptolemaic rule was only culturally linked to the former Graeco-Macedonian homeland, and was not a colonial regime in the strict sense whereby the homeland and centre of the colonial power reside elsewhere. In the latter case, Polish guerrillas directly fought colonial occupiers – the Soviets and the Nazis – in their country from 1939 until 1945 (we also refer to anti-Nazi resistance, though our present focus is on anti-communist resistance). From 1945 until around 1953, Polish guerrillas primarily resisted the imposition of "indigenous" Communist rule, and thus their struggle cannot be considered anti-colonial in the narrow sense. However, the guerrillas opposed the ideology and consequent state-system of Communism, and rightly saw the domestic regime as dependent on that of the Soviet Union. In that sense, the latter was the true colonial power they opposed, and the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP; *Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza*, PZPR) was just the "Soviet vassal" they despised and sought to overthrow. As a form of colonial rule, the PUWP's regime was not very different from the British *Raj* ("reign" in Sanskrit) in India until 1947 – even though Poland was an informal Soviet "satellite" in the Eastern Bloc, rather than a formal colony or province in an Empire. Therefore, these two cases present anti-colonial revolts in the wider ideological-cultural sense. Simply put, the purpose of this stage is the study anti-colonial struggles. Following a most-similar design in comparative analysis, the aim is to make these "background variables" of the selected cases as similar as possible. Other such variables and consequent selection criteria are:

[28] I could have selected one or more Chechen and/or Albanian rebellions against Russian and/or Serb rule respectively, as I have done some considerable research on these cases already, much of which can be found in my 'Feud and Rebel' Series (see note 4). Still, at this stage I wish to study rebellions by a people that resemble the Chechens in many ways, in this case the Circassians. In that way, I can compare these kindred peoples in the next stage of the project. See for a short comparison between these (and other) peoples: C. ten Dam, 'How to Feud and Rebel: 2...', pp. 251-252.

- The ostensible aim of the rebelling indigenous community, or a movement claiming to represent that community, is *freedom*, through autonomy or independence from the colonial regime, at least in a culture sense – freedom to speak one's own language, and follow one's own customs and beliefs (typically seen as characteristics of an ethnic group or *ethnie*). Still, more extreme deprivations than marginalisation and discrimination, i.e. "devastations" that endanger the *survival* of the indigenous community, such as starvation, mass-murder, or genocide, may lead to revolt for the same aim, as freedom to express one's identity presupposes safety to express one's identity without fear of annihilation. The precise forms to mould, guard and guarantee such freedoms may differ, ranging from "vassal" autonomy in ancient and medieval times to intrastate autonomy and full statehood in "modern", i.e. industrial, times.
- A marked *cultural contrast* between the marginalised indigenous community and the dominant colonial community (which may include "collaborators"), or, at the very least, opposition of the culture of the latter community by the former even if their cultures are similar (in some respects).
- Indigenous revolts are ultimately *unsuccessful*, at least in military and political terms (no freedom, autonomy or independence from colonial rule), though they may weaken the Empire or even the survival of the Empire's home country in the long-term, i.e. beyond the lifespan of the rebels. Success in rebellion constitutes a different background variable, as success and failure may engender different kinds or degrees of "proper" violence that accords to the norms of one or both parties, and/or of "improper" violence that violates these norms – or violates the human rights and humanitarian norms of today.
- The leaders and/or movements of the indigenous revolts possessed, from the beginning, continuously and/or during the height of their temporary success, *state, semi-state or rival-state powers and capabilities*, such as ruling authority over a certain territory and its inhabitants. After all, rebellions by bandits, outlaws and (other) rebels who lack state-like powers and capabilities (such as fixed territories under their control) may exhibit different types and degrees of brutalities by all warring parties than those by actors who are able to act as "rival states" at least at one point in time. The Polish resistance between 1939 and 1953 may never have possessed state-like attributes at any point in time; if so, the seventh case does not fulfil this criterion.[29]

The Friesian, Scottish and to a lesser degree the Jewish insurgents still had their own autonomous if subject kingdoms, which sought to regain full independence by refusing to pay tribute, homage and other obligations to the overbearing, imperial powers.

[29] Yet according to Polanski, *the Polish resistance in 1939-1945 developed the civic structures which were parallel to the military structures. They had their "parliament" in conspiracy, their charity structures, fiscal system, and education. Remnants of those structures survived to 1948-49.* [...] *It was a state in conspiracy, based on the experiences from the anti-Russian uprising in 1863-64* (email-communication, 18 July 2013). At a later stage, after further investigation, we will decide whether such underground structures can or do amount to a rebel "counter-state" with true ruling capabilities.

These "rebels" or rather resistance-fighters[30] had their own ruling structures from the start. Thus they arguably had a better chance to succeed than rebels whose communities had been fully incorporated into a foreign empire for decades or even centuries, like the Ionians and the Egyptians in cases 1 and 2. Even so, the Ionian and Egyptian rebel leaders had ruling functions or capacities at the start of the revolt, or attained them at a later stage in the revolt.

I have deliberately chosen to include William Wallace's uprising as a revealing example of a nearly successful revolt that was soon followed by the truly successful one of King Robert I, popularly known as Robert the Bruce, culminating in victory at Bannockburn in 1314. I wanted to include at least one rebellion that clearly harboured the seeds of eventual success in the near future, even if the rebellion itself was suppressed. Incidentally, and perhaps significantly, these and other cases often are artificial delineations of events that form part of a continuous or recurrent stream of uprisings. If one encapsulates, for instance, the Scottish Wars of Independence in the late twelfth and early thirteenth century as a single uprising, then Wallace's defeat in 1298, and his capture and horrible execution in 1305, were just temporary if severe setbacks in an otherwise successful struggle for freedom and independence.

The distinguishing and cobbling-together of events is ultimately a matter of perception. Thus in a distant future, historians may regard and reconceptualise World Wars I and II as a single global war in the twentieth century, with the Interregnum as just a temporary cessation of hostilities. The reason why I focus on Wallace's rebellion as a single "event", is that his military defeat at Falkirk in 1298 brought much despair among the Scots. Wallace's spearmen nearly brought victory, and King Robert the Bruce's adoption of Wallace's "spear-infantry" led – at least according to some scholars – to victory in 1314 through improved battlefield strategy, armour and training.[31] Still, prospects looked dire after Wallace's death, and ultimate victory for the independence struggle was all but a foregone conclusion, then and in hindsight.

Be that as it may, our findings on the commonalities and differences in violence and brutality across the selected cases, and the causes, patterns and consequences of such violence and brutality in each case, will be preliminary at the early stage of the research project. At the next stage of the project, we may compare multiple cases of successful rebellion. At a following, more advanced stage we could then compare the victorious

[30] Arguably, *resistance* involves armed opposition to foreign rule from a still-existing state; *rebellion* involves armed opposition within an integrated state, or in a province that might have been an independent state in the past. Here, I use the terms *revolt* and *uprising* as overarching concepts that may constitute either or both rebellion and (armed) resistance. I may apply these distinctions in other research as well, though at present the definitions-list of Appendix B regards the terms "rebellion", "insurgency", "uprising" and "revolt" as interchangeable ones.

[31] See D.H. Caldwell, 'Scottish Spearmen, 1298-1314: An Answer to Cavalry', *War in History*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2012), pp. 267-289, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0968344512439966>. Caldwell also enumerates other factors of King Robert's effective strategy, like avoidance of the traditional yet oft--calamitous reliance on fortresses – and at the same time denying these to the enemy by destroying them. See Caldwell's note 1 for: D. Cornell, 'A Kingdom Cleared of Castles: The Role of the Castle in the Campaigns of Robert Bruce', *Scottish Historical Review*, Vol. 87, No. 2 (2008), pp. 233-257.

rebellions with the ones that failed i.e. were quickly or ultimately defeated. In the same way, we plan to study rebellions or "civil wars" in which the opposing communities have similar cultures, or even share the same culture. At every successive stage, however, it will be increasingly difficult to find commonalities between the cases; the comparative will gradually, perhaps unavoidably, shift to a most-different design. In any case, at the first preliminary stage it would be interesting to see whether similar background variables also (help to) produce similar forms and norms of violence, and violations of violence-norms (brutalities) by one or more of the opposing parties, or, whether violence and brutality take different forms and degrees in each case, perhaps because the culture(s) of that time constitute the determining factor. The focus is on the violence and brutality (if any) by the rebelling community, if only because without rebels there would be no rebellions. Still, the violent methods, violence-values and any grievances of the colonising community must also be analysed, if only because the violence and brutality of one side is usually a response to the violence and brutality of the other side. The "spiral of violence" due to tit-for-tat retributions is perhaps the main hypothesis of the brutalisation theory – especially in the latter stages of any armed conflict.

GUERRILLA, BANDITRY, BRIGANDAGE AND OTHER FORMS OF VIOLENCE: CONCEPTUALISATIONS

At this first preliminary stage of the project, we focus on banditry, brigandry (brigandage), guerrilla and other forms of irregular warfare, as these forms of violence seem to typify the selected cases, and anti-imperial revolts in general. Terrorism, assassination and liquidation, and the wider concepts of violence, war and armed conflict, will be amply discussed in my *Conceptualising Brutality and Violence* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing) and other forthcoming publications. Therefore, more attention is paid to rebellion, resistance, revolution, banditry, brigandage and kindred concepts in the first phase of the project, as is reflected in the source references. Nevertheless, terrorism, a "the" form of violence that violates the norm of non-combatant immunity, is central t the issue of brutality and brutalisation. Consequently, terrorist violence – unlikely to have occurred at all in any of the seven anti-imperial revolts – will be analysed in the first phase of the project as well.

Elsewhere, I already have argued how best to circumscribe any phenomena through a tripartite distinction between *action*, *actor* and *motive* or human drive, whereby directly observable actions should constitute primary "universal" concepts, less easily identifiable actors should form "structural" concepts and the more or most elusive motives (including drives, goals and objectives) can best be captured by tertiary "empirical" concepts.[32] Thus I posit that *one should not define central concepts like terrorism by empirical, changeable phenomena. Motives and goals alter over time. Perpetrators use*

[32] See C. ten Dam, 'Let's be Clear...', esp. pp. 6-8 (incl. quotes). This *tripartite distinction between* action, actor *and* motive *or human drive* (ibid., p. 5) was first introduced in my 'Patriotism and Brutality...', esp. pp. 5, 7-8.

violence against civilians – a rare common element in [many or most] *terrorism definitions* [as I show in my *Conceptualising Brutality and Violence* and other forthcoming publications] – *for any conceivable reason. One must* [otherwise] *continuously modify such empirical definitions if one wishes to encapsulate any new trend*.[33] The consequent conceptualisations (see Appendix B) are applied in my own research on brutalisation and other, related phenomena – and thus also in the Brutalities in Anti-Imperial Revolts project.

Therefore, the "age-old recourse to escape into the desert" – apparently as a way to sustain *guerrilla* i.e. hit-and-run attacks without a fixed abode – was among the "ancient patterns of defiance" in Ptolemaic and pre-Ptolemaic Egypt that "could bring about serious civil disorder, widespread banditry or even a civil war"; Polanski thereby implies that *guerrilla* is as a mode of fighting that can characterise different types and levels of conflict (e.g. disorder, civil war) and possibly different kinds of actors (e.g. rebels, bandits – for, so far, these are distinct actors), though typically from the *semi-literate* [...] *lower classes* as in the Polish "guerrilla wars" of 1939-1944 and 1945-1953.[34] In that sense, Polanski's application of the term *guerrilla* resembles mine. At one point, he implicitly defines guerrilla as a hit-and-run, non-territory-occupying mode of fighting, when he refers to insurgents being usually most effective when *operating in the guerrilla war manner in their surprise-attack groups*; indeed, such *small and fast-moving units* constitute *one of the most essential properties defining a guerrilla war*.[35] Nevertheless, guerrilla as a hit-and-run tactic can just as easily or favourably occur in cities, towns and other urban areas – by all kinds of actors, by lightly or heavily armed insurgents, and lightly or heavily armed government (para)militaries. Likewise, *banditry* and *brigandage* can occur in rural and urban settings as well.[36]

Crucially, I define banditry as essentially robbery, more precisely as violent robbery for whatever reason and motivation, whether it be personal self-aggrandisement, survival, or as a means to attain and maintain power. More specifically, banditry is violent robbery through hit-and-run and kindred guerrilla tactics. I have had to construct the bandit and brigand concepts largely by myself, to make them consistent in logic and

[33] Idem, 'Let's be Clear...', pp. 6-7 (quote).

[34] T. Polanski, 'Oriens Militans...', pp. 345, 353 (quotes). The *same phenomenon* [of guerrilla resistance by nomads, semi-nomads and (former) peasants] *has often come to light in the* [...] *mountainous regions of the Caucasus, Tibet and Afghanistan* – ibid., p. 345.

[35] Ibid., pp. 354-55 (quotes). Polanski specifically refers to Polybius (V, 107), who disparagingly wrote that the war of Ptolemy IV Philopator against the indigenous-Egyptian insurgents (217-186 BC) was *conspicuous for its lack of any battle with army in array, any naval battle, a siege, or anything worth of memory* (p. 354) Polanski, citing Thompson, also refers to Ammianus Marcellinus' description (Amm. Marc. XXVII, 2, 11) of the "ignoble" tactics by the *Bagaudae* ("fighters") peasant-rebels during the reign of Valentinian I (364-75 AD) as being *ambuscades, surprises, faints, diversions, and skirmishes rather than of set battles* (p. 354; source: E.A. Thompson, 'Peasant Revolts in Late Roman Gaul and Spain', *Past and Present*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1952), p. 17, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/past/2.1.11>).

[36] My arguments that *guerrilla* and/or *banditry* can occur in urban as well as rural settings, and can be applied by lightly or heavily armed non-state *and* state actors, will amply appear in my *Conceptualising Brutality and Violence*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing (CSP), forthcoming.

content with my other concepts (as shown in Appendix B). Like other scholars, I have had to rely on Eric J. Hobsbawm's pioneering works *Primitive Rebels* (1959) and *Bandits* (1969). As stated by Richard A. Horsley, before Hobsbawm *we have had no clear understanding of banditry and its role in society*.[37] Hobsbawm is almost unique in considering banditry as a primitive yet genuine and honourable form of rebellion. Though banditry is essentially robbery – specifically violent robbery with weapons that can kill, Hobsbawm sympathises with *social bandits*, *peasant outlaws whom the lord and state regard as criminals, but who* [...] *are considered by their people as heroes,* [...] *avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation, and in any case as men to be admired, helped and supported*.[38] Hobsbawm perceives social banditry as the genuine precursor to revolution, even if in itself it is not a true, revolutionary form of rebellion. The ideal bandit is the "noble robber", exemplified by Robin Hood, who took from the rich to give to the poor and never killed but in self-defence or just revenge. Though Robin Hood is largely a mythical figure, some bandits do answer to this ideal type, such as Angelo Duca (Angiolillo) who lived from around 1760 till 1784 in southern Italy.[39]

Hobsbawm's distinguishing characteristics of the social bandit concord rather closely with the customs, norms and violence-values (honour, blood-feud, raid, hospitality and mediation) I have detected in tribal, clannish societies like those of the Chechens and Albanians. In future research, like in the later stages of the "Anti-imperial Revolts" project, I shall investigate more systematically the possible (hypothetical) and apparent (empirical) links between banditry, brigandry and both "traditional" and "modern" *violence-values* (a composite term coined by me).[40]

Hobsbawm's study of banditry is pioneering, insightful and fruitful, and his circumscriptions of the bandit as a robber and the social bandit as a 'primitive rebel' resembles my definitions of the bandit and the brigand. I agree that a *bona fide* bandit can be angry about and oppose the oppression of his fellow-beings, and can act honourably and decently even against his or her enemies. Yet Hobsbawm perceives banditry in socialist--Marxist terms, and that limits and skews his understanding of it, however revealing

[37] R.A. Horsley, 'Ancient Jewish Banditry and the Revolt against Rome, A.D. 66-70', *The Catholic Biblical Quarterly*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (1981), p. 411. Horsley: *Primarily through the pioneering work of E.J. Hobsbawm [...] we have come to recognize the characteristics and significance of social banditry in peasant societies as a form of primitive or pre-political rebellion* (ibid). Again Horsley: *Many of Hobsbawm's insights and generalizations are as valid for banditry in ancient Jewish society as they are for banditry in modern European agrarian societies* (p. 412).

[38] E.J. Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, p. 13.

[39] Idem, *Primitive Rebels*..., pp. 13-14. Hobsbawm knows that few bandits meet all the conditions of motive (empathy with the suppressed masses) and behaviour (only violence against the oppressors) of the Robin Hood type. Many and perhaps most of them don the cape of "champion of the poor" in order to hide their motives of greed and power, and behave brutally towards anyone outside the immediate community he remains loyal to.

[40] See C. ten Dam, 'How to Feud and Rebel: 1...', esp. pp. 334-335. My definitions of *tradition*(*alism*) and *modernity* (*modernism*) as backward-looking, status-quo and forward-looking, innovative mindsets respectively (see Appendix B), are timeless in the sense that they are *not* explicitly or obliquely linked to any historical period in Europe or anywhere else (ibid., pp. 339-340 for argumentation).

and valid class-analysis can be.[41] Thus, contrary to Hobsbawm, I argue that both "criminal" bandits and "social" bandits can be found in urban areas. The classic author, and governor of Galilee at the time, Josephus (37-100 AD)[42] recognises in his *Jewish War* and *Jewish Antiquity*[43] that the *Sicarii* ("dagger men") opposing Roman rule in Palestine during the 50s and 60s AD were "another species of brigands" operating in Jerusalem rather than the countryside.[44] Though Horsley closely follows Hobsbawm and concentrates on Jewish ancient bandits from peasant communities, he does acknowledge that the *pattern of "social banditry" sketched by Hobsbawm* [...] *may not be universally valid*.[45] Still Horsley absorbs Hobsbawm's premise that *brigandage occurs in traditional rural societies, not urban areas*[46] and refuses to consider urban hit-and-run robbers as *bona fide* bandits. According to Horsley (and other scholars), Josephus uses *lestes*, *lesteia* and other Greek words[47] to refer to rural robbers, thus treating *the* sicarii *as "bandits" only in a qualified sense* despite their *predatory activity from the base at Masada*.[48] But Josephus himself characterises the urban "dagger man" as a "certain" bandit, not delimiting "the" bandit

41 In my *Conceptualising Brutality and Violence* (CSP, forthcoming), I will discuss shortcomings in Hobsbawm's banditry concept and analysis, all to do with his skewed, Marxist understandings and applications of the adjectives "rural", "social" and "revolutionary".

42 Horsley refers in passing to Josephus' political background. He describes how *there were still large groups of brigands in Galilee when Josephus arrived a few months later (end AD 66 – beginning AD 67) to take charge of the district*, and how Josephus was forced to pretend opposition to Rome given the strength of his main rival, the brigand-chief John of Gischala: 'Ancient Jewish Banditry...', pp. 427(quote), 428, 431. Josephus was *a representative of the well-to-do ruling classes* opposed to the bandit-rebels i.e. brigands, *horrified at their depredations and shocked at their democratic way of operation in their brief control of the Temple*: idem, 'Josephus and the Bandits', *Journal for the Study of Judaism*, Vol. 10, No. 1 1979, p. 60.

43 Josephus, *The Jewish War* (*Bellum Judaicum*), trans. by G.A. Williamson, rev. trans. E.M. Smallwood, Harmondsworth 1981 (*Penguin Classics*) (1st ed. 1959); idem, *The Jewish Antiquities* (*Antiquitates Judaicae*), Vol. 6: *Books 14-15*, trans. by R. Marcus, ed. A. Wikgren, Cambridge (Mass.) 1965 (*Loeb Classical Library*, 433. Eventually, I will use a "Loeb" translation of *BJ* as well.

44 R.A. Horsley, 'Josephus and the Bandits',, p. 40. See otherwise "different type of brigands" in idem, 'Ancient Jewish Banditry...', p. 424. Or: "another form of brigands" (Josephus, *War* 2.254) in idem, *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence. Popular Jewish Resistance in Roman Palestine*, San Francisco 1987, p. 40. Horsley (ibid.): Josephus distinguishes Sicarii *from ordinary brigands who operated in the countryside [...] supported by the peasants (cf.* War *2.253)*. Sicarii were *similar to modern anticolonial terrorists* (ibid.); Horsley calls them "terrorists" in earlier works ('Ancient Jewish Banditry...', p. 424). Perhaps he has fallen under the spell of Laqueur, erroneously distinguishing between "rural guerrilla" and "urban terrorism".

45 R.A. Horsley, *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence*..., p. 331, endnote 36 (p. 37). Horsley considers some Chinese banditry as an exception. He still adopts Hobsbawm's outline of social banditry because it thoroughly describes the predominant forms of banditry in (pre-)Roman Palestine (endnote 36).

46 Idem, 'Josephus and the Bandits', p. 44.

47 Horsley translates the Greek terms *lestes* and *lesteia*, as "bandits" and "brigands" interchangeably; *lesteia refers to piracy as well as to armed robbery on the land* and the Latin term *lestai* means "brigands" or "raiders": ibid., p. 38 (note 5), 48. Horsley suggests that piracy means "armed robbery on the sea", a circumscription I agree with – though Horsley considers this application of the term *lesteia* as being rather (too) loose.

48 Ibid., pp. 40 (1st short quote), 41 (2nd short quote); idem, 'Ancient Jewish Banditry...', p. 428 (*Sicarii* brigands *only in a highly qualified sense*); Sicarii *on Masada regularly raided villages in the surrounding*

as such to the countryside. True, general conditions like geographic make-up may determine whether banditry, brigandry and indeed insurgency can take root: *brigands flourish in remote and inaccessible areas* [...]. *The construction of good and fast modern roads is often enough to diminish banditry*.[49] Yet conditions like inhospitable terrains merely facilitate, and do not predetermine, banditry. The urban guerrilla may be more challenging than the rural guerrilla, but can and does exist. The same holds true for urban banditry and brigandage.

Hobsbawm perceives banditry as a lesser kind of anti-regime violence, a "primitive form of revolution" at best, at worst a form of violent crime.[50] Also, Horsley distinguishes bandits from "advanced" insurgents: *very seldom does social banditry lead to more serious popular rebellion*.[51] Yet he himself treats the 66-70 AD Jewish Revolt dominated by former and active bandits – our selected case 3 – as a major exception. The very argument that bandits can transform into insurgents – and foster proto-revolutionary and millenarian visions of a just world with freedom and equality – begs the following question: when do these people "cease" to be bandits and "become" insurgents? Hezekiah (Ezekias) during 48-47 BC until annihilated by young Herod; Aristobulus during 56-55 BC; Eleazar ben Dinai who operated for twenty years in the 40s and 50s AD; John of Gischala in the 60s AD: they and other Jewish brigands employed hundreds of men in raids and other military operations through robbery, plunder, kidnapping and extortion. They defeated or eluded Roman troops on many occasions, though they were eventually crushed themselves. Horsley, Hobsbawm and others give so many examples of impressive anti-regime bandit formations that their distinction between "bandits" operating alone or in small groups and "rebels" operating in large groups becomes moot.[52]

Banditry is not inherently "primitive". The distinction between primitive banditry and militarily advanced rebellion is invalid. A related error is to make "banditry" and "guerrilla" mutually exclusive categories. In fact armed actors can exhibit both properties. All my violence-concepts denote distinct yet possibly cross-cutting phenomena, not mutually exclusive ones (see Appendix B). At one point Horsley reserves the term "guerrilla" for rebels only, believing Josephus makes the same distinction.[53] Yet the very

countryside to obtain provisions (p. 430). These raids clearly amounted to robbery i.e. banditry as I see it: the violent and illicit appropriation of goods, properties and other valuables.

49 E.J. Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, p. 16; also p. 82. Hobsbawm sees economic development and political and social modernisations as major contributors to the bandits' demise. Such processes go hand in hand with increasing state power, which is eventually able to completely stamp out banditry – even in the remotest areas.

50 Idem, *Primitive Rebels...*, p. 27; idem, *Bandits*, pp. 21-23, 84-85.

51 R.A. Horsley, *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence...*, p. 39; esp. pp. 54-58 on Jewish revolt of 66-70 AD.

52 Idem, 'Ancient Jewish Banditry...', pp. 413-415, 418, 430-432; idem, 'Josephus and the Bandits', pp. 53--57, 59-60, 61 (*usually the bands are quite limited in number* – but not those of major brigand-chiefs). E.J. Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, pp. 19-21 ("Crocco" & "Ninco Nanco"), pp. 86-87 (Gujars and Cossacks), p. 90 (Pancho Villa).

53 Horsley: lestai *referred to by Josephus* [...] *not guerrilla fighters but rather ancient Jewish social bandits* – *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence...*, p. 37. Yet Horsley hardly applies the term "guerrilla".

bandit groups they both describe applied hit-and-run and other irregular tactics. Arguably the Romans and their allies were only able to destroy the brigands and bandits once the latter turned to regular warfare and tried to hold cities – most notably Jerusalem between 66 and 70 AD after the rout of Cestius Gallus – or their strongholds in villages and caves against advancing troops.[54] According to my definitions, bandits and bandit-rebels (brigands) use hit-and-run tactics to attain money, food and other commodities. While some and perhaps most rebels apply guerrilla and other irregular tactics, practically *all* bandits and brigands do so. Banditry and brigandry are simply "criminal" i.e. robber variants of irregular warfare and small-scale violence.

NORMATIVE CONCEPTS IN LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

One must keep in mind that current international law allows little if any room for local customary and written law – and may differ in some crucial aspects from "pre-modern" international law, which, for instance, allowed slavery. Many treaties are about combating, outlawing, and abandoning "unacceptable" past and present customs, like the 1926 Slavery Convention (amended in 1953); the 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention abolishes all attendant *institutions and practices* like debt bondage, serfdom or using women as property (Art. 1).[55] The 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits any *restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights* by the state's *law, conventions, regulations or custom* (Art. 5.2).[56] Many traditional norms clash with international norms of gender equality. The 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women declares that states cannot *invoke any custom, tradition or religious consideration* (Art. 4) to justify violence against women or refrain from condemning and eliminating it.[57] Such confrontations are inescapable if one adopts universal and egalitarian norms. Yet local variations of or deviations from these norms are not necessarily inferior; one must study these first before one can judge.

One must also keep in mind that *Just War* thinking allows little room for an end-justifies-the-means argument. The so-called "just war theory" is an amalgam of norms rather than a theory with causal and predictive suppositions.[58] Yet it signifies a com-

[54] Idem, 'Ancient Jewish Banditry...', pp. 413-415, 418, 429-432; idem, 'Josephus and the Bandits', pp. 53-61.

[55] Slavery Convention, signed 25 September 1926, amended by Protocol GA res. 794 (VIII) of 23 October 1953. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Economic and Social Council res. 608 (XXI), 30 April 1956.

[56] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA res. 2200A (XXI), 16 December 1966. See also Art. 5.2 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA res. 2200A (XXI), 16 December 1966.

[57] Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, GA res. 48/104, 20 December 1993.

[58] M. Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, Harmondsworth 1980 (first published in the US by Basic Books 1977), pp. 21, 44, 61-62, 76-85, 129-130, 151-55.

mon belief in human dignity, based on the justice-of-war (*jus ad bellum*) principles of *just cause*, *legitimate actor*, *last resort*, *probability of success*, and *proportionality of ends*, and the justice-in-war (*jus in bello*) principles of *proportionality of means*, *non-combatant immunity*, and *double discrimination* or *double effect*.[59] These principles are partly codified in international humanitarian law, and considered to originate from Christian and Western-secular thinking.[60] However, even if Western-Christian just war traditions have a wider scope, the *Islamic* jus ad bellum *traditions are strikingly similar*.[61] Thus *pre-emption* through *preventive (early offensive) war strategy* is *generally considered unjust*.[62]

Some argue that *jus-ad-bellum* and *jus-in-bello* are *logically independent* and that it is *perfectly possible for a just war to be fought unjustly and for an unjust war to be fought in strict accordance with the rules*.[63] Others insist that cause and conduct are interconnected ethics and that conduct carries more weight: any excesses vilify one's cause, however just. Exceptional cases may exist that require ruthless action, like the all-out war against Nazi Germany. Yet to many, the supreme danger posed by Nazism did not justify the Allied "terror bombing" of German cities. Victory was *so important or defeat so frightening* that it was *necessary to override the rules of war* – yet the *emergency passed long before* the attack on Dresden; one should override *jus-in-bello* to quicken the end of a given war only if innumerable lives on *both* sides will be saved as a result.[64]

Be that as it may, war or conflict is fully just only if *both its cause and conduct are just*.[65] In 1587, François de la Noue introduced the fictional peasant who confronts a French soldier about the cruelties of (holy) warfare: *Who will believe that your cause is just* [...] *when your behaviours are so unjust?*[66] Some believe goals and methods correlate in the same direction: *people who pursue noble goals tend to be scrupulous about how they achieve them, whereas unscrupulous people and rotten causes often go together*.[67] However, others believe that a just cause, particularly revolt against repression, fully absolves bru-

[59] St. Thomas Aquinas: *nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention – Summa Theologica*, IIa-IIae, q. 64, art. 7.

[60] See The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 (<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/lawwar.asp>), and Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949; Additional Protocols 8 June 1977 (<http://www.genevaconventions.org>).

[61] R. Kennedy, 'Is One Person's Terrorist Another's Freedom Fighter? Western and Islamic Approaches to "Just War" Compared', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1999), p. 11, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546559908427493>.

[62] N.C. Crawford, 'Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War', *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2003), p. 15, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592703000021>.

[63] M. Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars...*, 1980 (1977), pp. 21, 124 (not in 3rd 2000 ed.).

[64] Ibid., pp. 132 (not 2000 ed.), 261-262.

[65] N.C. Crawford, 'Just War Theory...', p. 20.

[66] F. de La Noue, *The Politicke and Militarie Discourses of the Lord de la Noue*, trans. by E. Aggas, London 1587, p. 225.

[67] G. Byford, 'The Wrong War', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 4 (2002), p. 38.

tality to the point of not calling it so. In the Mexican Revolution it was *not savagery that drove the Indians to assassination and pillage. Their acts could not be taken as proofs of cruelty, because their adversaries were a hundred times more savage and cruel*.[68]

Both Western and Eastern just war traditions abhor planned insurrections and spontaneous uprisings. Hostility to the "rage of rebellion" (Aquinas, from Augustine) predates the "modern" state.[69] Churches *developed workable ideas on just* war *but find themselves at a loss over just* rebellion *and* revolution.[70] Only in 1983 a U.S. Catholic Bishop Convention recognised revolt and humanitarian intervention as possible just wars.[71] In his *Law of Nations* (1740), Emmerich de Vattel, an early codifier of non--combatant immunity, considered almost all citizens non-combatants who should not be attacked or harmed. Still, he deemed warfare as the exclusive reserve of sovereign princes. If civilians interfered, joined the enemy or rebelled, no-holds-barred retribution against them was allowed.[72] Yet, in 1679, John Locke formulated the "right of resisting" when the state repeatedly and arbitrarily endangers people's lives, possessions or other basic rights, with no chance of judiciary or legislative redress. Locke based this right on his property theory, one of the earliest contract theories of state formation. As soon as the state ceases the systematic violations, and the affected citizenry can seek compensation, the revolt must cease; otherwise the people may seek to replace their rulers.[73]

Nowadays, some regard *just revolt* an unfettered right to overthrow a government or drastically alter a state and society (revolution): *Even if a tyrant would allow us to live, but not under institutions of our own choosing, we may justly fight to free ourselves*.[74] If *man is not to be compelled to* [...] *rebellion against tyranny and oppression,* [...] *human rights should be protected by the rule of law*.[75] The *just revolt* concept not only refers to a right to overthrow a government or regime within an existing state; it also refers to a right to secede from the state and form a new government and state

[68] B. Traven, *The Rebellion of the Hanged* (*La Rebelión de los Colgados*), London 1984, 1997 (Esperanza López Mateos & Josef Wieder, 1952), p. 201. One of Traven's six "Jungle" novels.

[69] Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II/II, q. XL, art. 1.

[70] B. Paskins, M. Dockrill, *The Ethics of War*, Minneapolis 1979, p. 209.

[71] Catholic Conference, 'Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response – Pastoral Letter on War and Peace' in J.B. Elshtain (ed.), *Just War Theory*, Oxford 1992, esp. p. 95 (*Readings in Social and Political Theory*, 1).

[72] E. de Vattel, *The Law of Nations; or Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns*, trans. by T. Nugent, London 1740, bk. III, sect. 6; J.T. Johnson, *Ideology, Reason, and Limitation of War. Religious and Secular Concepts 1200-1740*, Princeton 1975, pp. 244-49.

[73] J. Locke, 'Second Treatise: an Essay concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government' in idem, *Two Treatises of Government*, rev. ed. by P. Laslett, Cambridge 1960 (*Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought*) (1965 print Mentor; based on 1698 publication in London by Awnfham & John Churchill), pp. 45, 49 (not from 1688), 452-453 (§208, 209), 460 (§222).

[74] N.C, Crawford, 'Just War Theory...', p. 14.

[75] Preamble Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly res. 217 A(III) 10 December 1948.

on a new territory, also known as *earned sovereignty* or a *remedial right to secession* "based on alleged human-rights violations" i.e. grievances.[76] Such allowances are rare. Only resistance against foreign aggression and colonisation are recognised rebel objectives. Territorial integrity of existing states usually trumps self-determination of aspiring ones.

Given the brutalisation premise, the focus is on gross human rights violations (GHRVS) that endanger life and integrity of the person.[77] Some distinguish four, not mutually exclusive types: torture and ill-treatment; extrajudicial executions; disappearances; and arbitrary arrests and detentions without trial.[78] Yet, like Theodoor Van Boven, I include slavery under ill-treatment, and add forced deportation or expulsion as a fifth category and political murders and mass killings as a sixth category.[79] Genocide and crimes against humanity fall in the sixth category – almost all killings if we adopt the narrow definition of massacre as *killing* [...] *three or more people at one time in one area*.[80]

Individual insurgents may commit gross violations, yet current human rights law does not hold rebel groups collectively accountable; only humanitarian law does so, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, particularly its Additional Protocol II and Common Article 3 on *armed conflict not of an international character*.[81] Yet it seems *unlikely that states will* [...] *agree* [...] *that the international order includes other actors* [...] *whose natural tendency is to political rebellion*.[82] Thus "acts of terrorism" (Protocol II, Art. 4.2 (d)) "must" refer to armed non-state combatants. Keith Suter, contrary to Liesbeth Zegveld, believes that Common Article 3 and Protocol II insufficiently cover such combatants.[83] Nevertheless, customary just war norms are equally applicable to all parties – apart from perhaps legitimate actors –in intrastate conflicts, especially non-combatant immunity. Some human rights bodies hold rebel movements accountable if they exercise *de facto* state authority and territorial control. Here, I fully apply human right concepts so as to:

---

76 N. Caspersen, 'Separatism and Democracy in the Caucasus', *Survival*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (2008), p. 114, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330802329014> (quote & notes 5, 6). From M. Scharf, 'Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings', *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2003), p. 382.

77 Treaties nor jurisprudence come up with a single formulation of "gross", "severe", or "massive" HRVS.

78 A.J. Jongman, A.P. Schmid, *World Conflict and Human Rights Map 2000*, PIOOM, Leiden 2000.

79 D. Shelton, 'United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Reparations: Context and Contents' in K. de Feyter et al. (eds.), *Out of the Ashes. Reparation for Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations*, Antwerpen 2005, p. 14, note 12 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 at 7-8).

80 S. Krippner, T.M. McIntyre (eds.), *The Psychological Impact of War Trauma on Civilians. An International Perspective*, Westport 2003, p. 1 (*Psychological Dimensions to War and Peace*).

81 Once a state ratifies *Geneva Conventions and Protocol II, armed opposition groups operating on its territory become automatically bound* by its norms. L. Zegveld, *The Accountability Armed Opposition Groups*, Cambridge 2002, p. 15 (*Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law*).

82 B. Paskins, M. Dockrill, *The Ethics of War*, p. 103.

83 K. Suter, *An International Law of Guerrilla Warfare. The Global Politics of Law-Making*, New York 1984, p. 3; chapters 6, 7 (*Global Politics*); L. Zegveld, *The Accountability...*, pp. 38, 53, 227.

– counteract nation-state bias and confirm the true universality of human rights;
– follow common(-sense) applications of human rights on armed non-state actors; and
– encompass peacetime atrocities, which the Geneva Conventions do not.

Indeed *in terms of killing, human rights violations outside a state of war are* [...] *more destructive*.[84] Human rights law covers a broader range of violence than humanitarian law: *Genocide and crimes against humanity* [...] *involve widespread and intentional targeting of civilians* [...] *outside an armed conflict*.[85] This includes *ethnic cleansing*, i.e. the violent expulsion of an ethnic group, also in wartime.

Nevertheless, the main Geneva out-of-battle provision on humane treatment prohibits acts that roughly correspond to GHRVS: *a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; b) taking of hostages; c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment* (C. Art. 3.1; esp. Arts. 4 to 6 Protocol II). It also prohibits summary executions (C. Art. 3.1(d)). These humanitarian prohibitions and corresponding GHRVS are jointly categorised in Table II.

At a later stage in the research project, more advanced versions of Tables I and II in Appendix C will distinguish between current, "modern" international norms on violence as codified in humanitarian and human rights law, traditional violence-values salient in the rebelling communities, *and* contemporary "international" norms that usually were formed and agreed upon by major and rival powers at the time. It would be interesting to see to what degree "ancient" international law differs from current international law – and, if so, whether these differences are greater or smaller than each set of norms compared to the rebel's violence-values then. At an intermediary stage, one could compare "international" norms and practices in classical, medieval and modern (industrial) times, through, for instance, the following *debrutalisation* hypotheses:

1) During the course of human history, say from 500 BC to the present-day, the range, universality and enforceability of the *jus-in-bello* norm of non-combatant immunity through an independent judiciary have increased. This is due to the curtailment, reinterpretation and shift of the *jus-ad-bellum* norm of legitimate actor from the absolute ruler to the constitutional(ly restrained) ruler. Non-combatant immunity, the prohibition to enslave, kill or otherwise harm civilians in wartime, gradually changes from a rare *privilege* accorded to some civilians by the absolute ruler, commander and/or soldiers in the field, to a *universal right* for all civilians, codified in law, that every ruler, commander and combatant must adhere to. Crucially, also rebel leaders and fighters can be legitimate actors according to the just-revolt school of thought. The principle of non-combatant immunity changes and expands faster, however, than its practice; in other words,

[84] S.C. Carey, S.C. Poe (eds.), *Understanding Human Rights Violations. New Systematic Studies*, Aldershot–Burlington 2004, p. 3 (*Ethics and Global Politics*).

[85] J.D. Meernink, K.L. King, 'Crimes and Punishments: How the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Distinguishes Among Massive Human Rights Violations' in S.C. Carey, S.C. Poe (eds.), *Understanding Human Rights Violations...*, p. 148.

respect for or enforcement of the norm lags behind the moral and legal recognition and codification of that norm.

2) During the course of human history, say from 500 BC to the present-day, the range, universality and enforceability through an independent judiciary of the *jus-in-bello* norm of proportionality of means has increased due to the curtailment, reinterpretation and shift of the *jus-ad-bellum* norm of legitimate actor from the absolute ruler to the constitutional ruler. Proportionality, the prohibition of the use of unlimited, unrestrained, indiscriminate violence against either combatants and non-combatants when more limited and restrained, less destructive forms of violence are available and can achieve survival, victory or particular military objectives, gradually changes from a rare *privilege* granted by the absolute ruler or commander and/or soldiers in the field, to a general, moral and legal *obligation* for every ruler, commander or fighters in the field. The principle of proportional violence changes and expands faster, however, than its practice; in other words, respect for or enforcement of the norm lags behind the moral and legal recognition and codification of that norm.

The straight slopes in Diagrams A and B below are simplified depictions of these hypotheses, supposing linear, average(d) trends rather than curving, fluctuating trends. It would be practically impossible to quantify the norms beyond the ordinal scale (an ordinal scale of 1 to 5 (or 6) could be made from the grading scale in Tables I and II) in longitudinal analysis, and thereby truly test and possibly confirm the hypothetical trends and causalities.

Diagram A. Longitudinal expansion of non-combatant immunity and curtailment of exclusive powers by the legitimate actor (Hypothesis 1)



Hypothetical values y-axis: 0 to 10: non-combatant immunity only as a privilege recognized (trend *a*) and/or granted (trend *b*) by a ruler/commander/combatant with absolute prerogatives; 10 to 20: same norm recognized and/or granted by a "legitimate actor" with semi-absolute prerogatives, but feeling increasingly pressured to do so due to emerging codification; 20 to 30: universal norm recognized and/or respected by a legitimate actor with circumscribed, limited prerogatives.

Diagram B. Longitudinal expansion of proportionate violence, and Curtailment of exclusive powers by the legitimate actor (Hypothesis 2)



Hypothetical values y-axis: 0 to 10: proportionality-of-means only as a privilege recognized (trend *a*) and/or employed (trend *b*) by a ruler/commander/combatant with absolute prerogatives; 10 to 20: same norm recognized and/or employed by a "legitimate actor" with semi-absolute prerogatives, but feeling increasingly pressured to do so due to emerging codification; 20 to 30: universal norm recognized and/or practiced by a legitimate actor with circumscribed, limited prerogatives.

Nevertheless, the depicted trends, and the differences between "theory" and "practice" of non-combatant immunity and proportionate violence, are plausible. Thus, descriptive analyses of the selected seven cases of anti-imperial revolts – and any other cases of such revolts or any other kinds of armed conflict – may corroborate the positive and negative gaps between the normative trend *a* and the empirical trend *b* in each diagram. The empirical slope *b* in Diagram A is *above* the normative slope *a* in the left corner of the x-axis (time), because in early times the practice of non-combatant immunity may have been stronger than its normative and legal codification, due to numerous instances of magnanimous rulers and commanders deciding to spare the civilian populations from annihilation, enslavement, starvation or "lesser" deprivations. Perhaps they were morally or legally compelled to do so, because the norm was already becoming recognized at the time – accounting for the steeper gradient of slope *a*. Conversely, the empirical slope *b* in Diagram A is *below* the normative slope *a* in the right corner of the x-axis, because in recent times the practice of non-combatant immunity appears to have lagged behind its normative and legal codification: think of the massacres and genocides in World War I and II despite the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and the massacres and genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda in the early 1990s despite the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its protocols of 1977. Hypothetically, there may have been one point in time when the normative and empirical trends crossed: at that time, the theory and practice of the norm exactly corresponded to each other.

Similarly, the empirical slope *b* in Diagram B is above the normative slope *a* in the left corner of the x-axis, because in early times the practice of proportionate violence may have grown faster than its codification, due to conscientious rulers and command-

ers frequently using minimal violence to spare both civilians and combatants of the enemy. Perhaps they felt obliged to do so, as the norm already was becoming entrenched in the laws of warfare. Conversely, the empirical slope *b* in Diagram B is below the normative slope *a* in the right corner of the x-axis, because of the very same reasons that (may) account for the similar gap in Diagram A: the destructive and atrocious wars and "peacetime" massacres in the 20th century, due to extremist ideologies, weaponry innovations and other reasons. These factors could explain the lower gradient, i.e. lower averaged rise, of slope *b* – yet, as Steven Pinker would emphasize, it still rises.

ANALYTICAL LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES

Unavoidably, undertaking a comparative analysis of cases from such a wide of range of epochs spanning millennia, poses methodological problems that may not be entirely solvable. First, the most-similar design is very basic at best: as indicated earlier, what amounts to an "imperial" or "colonial" power is defined very broadly here: the precise systems of rule are closely tied to the cultures of the dominant, "colonising" communities, and differ – at least in their intricacies – radically from each other. So the commonalities of imperial rule across the cases are rather basic – and may turn out to be rather hollow on closer analysis.

Second, the selection of cases for this first preliminary stage of research is somewhat arbitrary – though we have tried to pick these as evenly as possible from distinct historical eras between 500 BC and the present day in Europe, the Near East and the Mediterranean. In the future, we will also study rebellions in wider Eurasia, the Far East and other regions of the world. We have tried to pick cases of major native rebellions against each dominant colonial power or Empire successively, i.e. rebellions against the Persian, Greco-Macedonian (Ptolemaic), Roman, British and Soviet (Communist) empires respectively. Several cases clearly lie in the Mediterranean world, though some cases lie in the Northern-Atlantic part of Europe (the Friesians, the Scots), and others in the Caucasus and Central Europe (the Circassians and Poles respectively). We also sought to select native rebellions that lasted at leach several years, so as to detect any brutalisation processes that may appear during long-lasting, attrition warfare in particular.

Third, and perhaps most seriously, the study of cases from the "ancient" eras faces the practically insurmountable problem of determining the validity and reliability of reported events. Inevitably, one must rely on a few or even single primary sources, like Herodotus' *Histories* and Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* for case 1, Polybius' *Histories* (and perhaps elements from Livius' extensive *History of Rome*, partially lost) for case 2, and Josephus' *Jewish War* and *Jewish Antiquity* for case 3.[86] Classical sources for sub-case 4, the "prolonged series" of *Bacaudae* ("peasant") anti-Roman re-

[86] For now, I use the following editions of these classical, primary sources (on Josephus's works, see note 23): Herodotus, *The Histories*, trans. by A. De Sélincourt, Harmondsworth 1954 (*Penguin Classics*, L34); Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. by R. Warner, Harmondsworth 1954 (*Penguin Classics*, L39); Polybius, *The Histories*, trans. by B.C. MacGing, New York 2010 (*Oxford*

volts in rural Gaul and Spain in the third, fourth and fifth centuries AD – which arguably contributed to the "fall of the Western Roman Empire" even though each revolt was suppressed in turn – are more numerous, including Cassiodorus' *Chronicles* and Marcellinus' partially lost *Res Gestae* (deeds, "things done"). Yet even these sources are relatively sparse if added over several centuries – and rather sparse and dismissive in their descriptions of the rebels, as they sought to downplay their impact. E. A. Thompson convincingly argues that all these historians, poets and chroniclers *belonged to* [...] *the propertied classes of the Empire, and therefore* [...] *had reason to dread the Bacaudae*.[87]

Nevertheless, if one wishes to analyse ancient events one unavoidably deals with a paucity of sources, as many more classical writings by both known and unknown philosophers, poets, statesmen and other authors have been lost than preserved. New discoveries of (fragments) of texts once thought "extant" (lost, presumed utterly destroyed or disintegrated) are extremely rare. One of the few avenues available, and increasingly used, remains an interdisciplinary marrying of philology with archaeology, with analysing texts on tablets, gravestones and other artefacts – and comparing these, together with architectural and other material remains, with claims of locations, customs and other "facts" in ancient treatises.

More generally, the study of rebellions and (any) brutalities – or any other theme and its concomitant concepts – in and across different epochs poses huge epistemological and ontological challenges to the historian (or any other scholar): how can one acquire and assess knowledge which witnesses, writers and historians gained, or claimed to have gained, from telling about and judging events in their own times? And do these accounts concern facts i.e. real events, however interpreted and embellished? And if they were factual, i.e. grounded in observable reality, could contemporary observers ever be objective, i.e. escape the subjectivities of their own cultural and moral views? Could we ourselves be objective when studying events of past cultures that may be radically different from our own? Even if we could shed or at least temporarily neutralise our own perspectives and judgments, could we ever fully understand the ones of peoples who lived in ages long past? These questions have haunted historians for centuries (if not longer), and scholars of other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences as well – especially those who doubt that they could ever approximate the precise methods and definite findings of universal laws in the natural sciences.

Those who question and oppose the positivism i.e. emulation of natural science, have branched into interrelated, overlapping yet basically distinct approaches of perspectivism, constructivism, relativism and other "critical" approaches to or even against objectivist-positivist science. In a nutshell, our position in this ongoing debate is that critical approaches protect us from easily assuming that we are or can remain objec-

Approaches to Classical Literature). I may use other (later) translations, like those of Loeb Classical Library, as well.

87 E.A. Thompson, 'Peasant Revolts...', pp. 11-23 (p. 11 – quotes). Thompson's suppositions of the rebel's actions, motives, objectives and degrees of popular support are plausible – yet remain speculative due to the rare, minimal and biased accounts of the (pro-)Roman scholars on the *bacaudae* revolts in their (life)times.

tive and that we can fully grasp the mindsets of bygone cultures and eras. However, the never-ending deconstruction of extreme relativism which supposes that one can never grasp reality as one never can withhold subjective judgment, implies all too easily that "pursuit of knowledge" is fruitless. Apart from "exposing" the subjectivities of others as the only "truth" to be had (which implies that one self is more objective than the other!), one could just as well stop with the businesses of humanities and social sciences altogether.

Though mindful that one cannot simply copy the methodologies of exact science, and aware of the pitfalls of subconscious prejudice, we basically agree with Max Weber's "critical-realist" position that one could and should (try to) uphold *value-freedom* (*Wertfreiheit*) during research, by separating, or trying to separate, "establishment of empirical facts" from *value-ideas* (*Wertideen*) and *value-judgments* or "evaluations of the unsatisfactory or satisfactory character of phenomena".[88] This holds true even if values of and judgments about violence constitute the nucleus of our research. I actually have introduced a "post-constructivist" (or neo-behaviourist) stance in the debate, arguing that observable action and justification of that action is the key to understanding human behaviour, irrespective of whether the expressed motivations and arguments for that action are real or imagined: thus *a genuine "acting-out" of norms, values and beliefs in vendettas, battles and other contests can shape one's identity, irrespective of whether these attributes are primordial, i.e. factual, or constructed, i.e. invented*.[89] Objectivity is a distant ideal, yet we can and must seek to approximate it.

RELEVANCE OF BRUTALISATION AND RELATED THEORIES

The brutalisation theory assumes rebels or other armed non-state (and state) actors to increasingly violate international norms, in a cycle of violence involving four main variables: *values* on "good" and "bad" violence; *conflict-inducing motivations* leading to armed conflict; *combat stress* leading to atrocities; and new *conflict-induced motivations* emanating from such atrocities, spawning counter-atrocities, and eventually hardening or debasing the original *violence values*. Likewise, Evelin Lindner has developed *a theory of humiliation* as part of a *new multidisciplinary field* that *incorporates* [...] *anthropology, history, philosophy, political science, social psychology, and sociology*. Indeed, humiliation is a major, perhaps primary form of grievance (complaint-of-a-hardship) or actual hardship (deprivation), and the "cycle of humiliation and retaliation" does resemble my theory's brutalisation cycle, particularly if focused on the latter's original-grievance and conflict-grievance variables.[90]

---

88 M. Weber, 'The Meaning of "Ethical Neutrality" in Sociology and Economics (1917)', part 1 in E.A. Shils, H.A. Finch (eds. and transl.), *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, Glencoe 1949, pp. 1, 11.

89 C. ten Dam, 'How to Feud and Rebel: 1...', pp. 331 (quote), 335-338.

90 E.G. Lindner, *Making Enemies. Humiliation and International Conflict*, Westport 2006 (*Contemporary Psychology*), pp. xiii-xiv (quotes). Literature on the "cycle of humiliation" is sparse: eadem, 'Humiliation as the Source of Terrorism: A New Paradigm', *Peace Research*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2001), p. 59 & note

Although theoretical research on humiliation, as a ground for revolt or other forms of political and non– or apolitical violence, may be sparse, numerous scholars do note it as a major factor causing and/or characterising armed conflict and interpersonal violence. Thus age-old state propaganda denigrating rebels as "barbarians", "criminals" and "bandits" seeks to humiliate, deligitimise and thereby undermine either victorious rebels or the memory of (ultimately) defeated rebels, and to hide histories of state repression that had led to humiliation and consequent rebellion in the first place. Such state propaganda and censorship also entail the destruction of written, oral and ornamental stories and justifications (i.e. counter-propaganda) of revolt. This is exactly what happened to (the memory of) the (semi-)nomadic *Boukoloi* ("shepherds", "herdsmen") people in Egypt and their uprising against the Roman overlords around 172 AD – just one example of the numerous lost histories of *peripheral communities and cultures* rebelling against the Roman Empire. Retrieving and analysing the sparse historical evidence of these communities and their (grounds for) revolt, and debunking the biased *literature that went hand in hand with the state-sponsored violence* of dominant regime-communities like the Greeks, (Hellenised) Macedonians and Romans, is a primary objective of classical scholars like Tomasz Polanski: when there is *no voice of protest, not even a cry of desperation, there is no limit to the cruelty and humiliation* of blackening the name of an entire people or blotting out its culture from the pages of history.[91] Polanski clearly deems denigration or humiliation as an integral part of brutalisation, though his focus lies on internal or civil wars: he refers to the observation by Polish dissident P. Jasienica, who participated in the anti-communist armed resistance in the late 1940s, that *every civil war gets crueller and crueller as time goes on*; Polanski also remarks that asymmetric civil wars, between a "powerful state" and "isolated insurgents" or between a foreign occupier and resistance fighters, are known for "extreme and intensifying brutality", given the highly polarised and traumatic "local divisions within the native population" – and are most brutal in cases where the militarily dominant (state) party seeks to exterminate "peripheral communities", whose revolts threaten its legitimacy and hold over the disputed territory (and state functions).[92] My brutalisation theory, however, suggests that these horrors can or do occur in all kinds of violent conflict between and within states, not just in civil wars as circumscribed by Polanski.

Corrected and updated version,
November 2015, Leiden, the Netherlands

1. See for other examples of the sparse literature eadem, 'Humiliation and Human Rights: Mapping a Minefield', *Human Rights Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2001), pp. 47-48, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12142-001-1023-5>.

91 T. Polanski, 'Boukoloi Banditry...', pp. 232, 247 (quotes).

92 Ibid., pp. 241-242 (incl. quotes). See P. Jasienica, *Rozważania o wojnie domowej* (Reflections on the civil war), Warszawa 1989.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: A Separatist Insurgency Model of the Brutalisation Theory



Brutalisation theory: formal description

Fear, pain, desperation, humiliation, anger, disillusionment, trauma and other emotions and responses emanating from imagined, perceived or experienced sufferings (deprivations, devastations and depredations) lead to a "degeneration", i.e. *brutalisation*, of means ("*terrorisation*", *criminalisation*) and ends (*radicalisation*, "*extremisation*") in each successive conflict, and the longer each conflict lasts (*protraction*). A *base conflict* concerns the first confrontation opposing actors formulate and pursue in the same language, rhetoric, ideology and mindset in following conflicts. Traumas and grievances may exist earlier, but in different form and context. The cycle of violence as shown in Diagram I runs as follows: intolerant, zero-sum, winner-takes-all *violence values* (aggregate variable 1) that do *not* adhere to (once) internationally and/or locally recognised norms like those of

honour, *hospitality* (including fair treatment of captured opponents), *proportionality* and *non-combatant immunity* (such norms present particular variables under aggregate variable 1) lead to *conflict-inducing motivations* (aggregate variable 2) like *grievances*, "*greeds*" or *avarices*, *interests*, and *ideologies* that may or may not be based on greeds and grievances (particular variables under aggregate 2); the aggrieved, greedy and/or ideologically driven take up arms, leading to *combat stress* (aggregate variable 3) through *stress-responses* induced by innate aggression (*eagerness to use violence*) as opposed to innate restraint (*reluctance to use violence*), and *social pressures* to carry out and condone atrocities (particular variables under aggregate 3); these violations engender *conflict-induced motivations* (aggregate variable 4) like grievances about atrocities and other injustices suffered during the conflict, leading to *revenge* attacks and *tit-for-tat* retributions, and/or using opportunities to amass riches, power, status and privileges ("*greeds*" or *avarices* and/or *interests*) or realise sought-after ideal states (*ideologies*) during and out of the conflict, whether or not driven by greeds and grievances, leading to more deprivations and devastations. These conflict-engendering and conflict-engendered motivations together with (consequent) brutalisations negatively affect society's (violence) values after the conflict. This may lead to a new, more brutal conflict. The countervailing variables are: A) *tolerance* and kindred values (pluralism, equality, democracy, etc.) respecting basic human and humanitarian rights; B) *professionalism* ensuring discipline, self-restraint and thereby respect for humanitarian norms i.e. rules of warfare in particular; C) *intervention* by external and internal actors, ranging from mediation to military occupation, to stop and halt excessive violence, while at the same time respecting human rights, humanitarian and local norms (for so far the latter resemble or complement international norms); and D) *justice* through measures ranging from reconciliation (e.g. by truth commissions) and prosecution (e.g. by international tribunals) to ameliorate traumas, resolve grievances, overcome greeds and replace these by equitable, balance interests, and respect local secular and religious ideologies – for, so far, these have respected human rights and humanitarian norms. Yet according to the brutalisation theory, these positive variables are either non-existent or too weak to prevent, counter or impede the negative variables and the entire process of ends-and-means degeneration.

The variables are continuous, and *not* to be necessarily or exclusively understood, applied and tested in the strict empiricist, quantifiable and statistic-analytical sense: variable 1 works through all successive phases i.e. variables, as variable 2 does so in the next phases, and so on. They can be exogenous causes (independent variables) and endogenous effects (dependent variables) of each other, especially in short-term causal feedback loops. Thus combat stress may engender conflict-induced grievances, which in a feedback loop may exacerbate combat stress. Or violence values may directly engender combat stress, which in turn immediately brutalises violence-values. The brutalisation model here is tailored to secessionist struggles, as most conflicts appear to be internal, insurgent, and separatist in nature. This accounts for the intervening or contextual variables "state disintegration", "secession", "new state formation", and "new state failure". Building new states and destroying old ones may constitute conflict causes, grievances (or other motivations), objectives or outcomes. Still, the model could be ap-

plied and tested on *any* kind or instance of public or private violence, and not solely or exclusively on internal armed conflicts involving rebels.

Appendix B: Definitions of identity and violence

With additions and improvements since 2010

Collective identity concepts

The "modern": any mindset, norm, project or activity that is forward-looking or future-oriented, set on changing – and keep innovating – the established order, belief or custom into something new that (presumably) has never existed before in a certain dwelling, territory, country or other place. ("modernity", "modernism")

The "traditional": any backward-looking or past-oriented mindset/norm/project/activity set on restoring or maintaining an idealised order, belief or custom that has presumably existed in a distant past in a certain place. ("tradition", "traditionalism")

Patriotism: the belief that it is one's duty, irrespective of one's motive – love, sense of obligation, sense of self-respect i.e. honour, or even self-interest and opportunism – to defend or otherwise maintain and secure the peace and prosperity of one's home, ranging from one's personal and family homestead to one's village or regional community, all the way up to the homeland i.e. the (nation-)state one happens to live in, not necessarily one's place of birth.

Nationalism: the belief that a nation i.e. a (supposedly) homogeneous people with common characteristics – shared history, territory, culture, religion, language, ethnicity (actual or perceived common ancestry), race, etcetera – should have its own state i.e. system of rule. When a national people attain a state, i.e. governing authority, its rights are paramount over any other people residing within its territory.

Irredentism: the belief that a nation i.e. a territory with a supposedly homogeneous people with common characteristics – shared history, culture, language, ethnicity, etcetera – should have its own state, including territories of other, neighbouring states where (the majority of) people with the same characteristics reside. When a national people attain a state, i.e. governing authority, its rights are paramount over any other people residing within its territory.

Statism: the belief that the territory of a region, republic or any other entity should have its own state. Such a state does not necessarily have to be based on a homogeneous people of one race, ethnicity, or other common characteristic. Its citizens may belong to heterogeneous communities, yet they in principle hold the same rights of citizenship ("Expansionism" parallel to irredentism).

Generic violence concepts

Aggression: deliberate infliction of physical or psychological force, perhaps accompanied with pain, other harm or coercion (force), by sentient beings on other beings for

whatever end, which may be done through physical force, and may be immoral and illegal i.e. violate basic human rights in the broad sense, including humanitarian law.

Violence: deliberate infliction of physical force, perhaps accompanied with pain, other harm or coercion for whatever end, which may be lethal and violate basic human rights in the broad sense.

Political violence: deliberate infliction of physical force, perhaps accompanied with pain, other harm or coercion for whatever end in the public arena beyond the private sphere (yet possibly with private motives) which may be lethal, and violate human rights and humanitarian law.

Conflict: fundamental disagreement between one or more actors due to opposite aims, interests, needs or grievances, which for some reason are or appear to be unsolvable or irreconcilable.

Armed conflict: violent confrontation between one or more armed actors with opposite aims, interests, needs or grievances that appear to be unsolvable or irreconcilable through non-violent means, or that one or more actors have been unwilling to resolve or settle through peaceful means.

Armed actor: any group, party, organisation or entity that for whatever reason carries lethal weaponry for violent use or threat of violent use.

Armed non-state actor: any private, non-governmental, illegal or unsanctioned group, organisation or entity beyond the control and sphere of the state that carries for whatever reason lethal weaponry for violent use or threat of violent use.

Armed state actor: any public, governmental, legal or state-sanctioned group, organisation or entity belonging directly or indirectly to the state that carries for whatever reason lethal weaponry for violent use or threat of violent use.

Concepts of violent and non-violent change

Reform: significant modification in a society, authority or state within the parameters of an existing culture i.e. set of values, norms, beliefs, rituals and life-patterns. This constitutes improvement rather than transformation, and transpires peacefully rather than violently. Yet it may occur through violence when (certain) people yearn for it and their rulers are unresponsive to it. Discontented and radical(ised) people may actively seek it through violence.

Revolution: far-reaching change of a society, authority or state involving drastic alteration in a culture i.e. set of values, norms, beliefs, rituals and life-patterns. [Variation: drastic change that significantly alters or radically transforms a society, state and/or its political system, which almost intrinsically involves a change in culture (values, norms, rituals, life-patterns, etcetera).] This transformation may occur violently or peacefully, or may be actively sought by violent or non-violent means.

Protest: public demonstration of dissatisfaction or defiance on an issue deemed or experienced as unfair, unjust or intolerable, expressed silently or loudly, in a disciplined or rowdy manner, peacefully or violently (sit-ins, marches, strikes, riots, etc.), that may amount or lead to peaceful resistance or armed rebellion.

Main forms of violent conflict between different or similar kinds of actors

War: armed conflict with one or more opposing parties fighting in such a way as to achieve complete victory over or utter defeat of the other (enemy, opponent), as evident from the type and scale of fighting methods, tactics and strategies employed.

Interstate or external armed conflict: violent confrontation between the armed forces of two or more states or governments that represent them, due to actually or seemingly irreconcilable aims, interests, needs or grievances.

Intrastate, internal, or domestic armed conflict: violent confrontation due to actually or seemingly irreconcilable aims, interests, needs or grievances between one or more armed non-state actors and the state, or among (quasi-)state actors in "civil conflicts" and among non-state actors in "absent states" and "failed states".

Civil conflict: intrastate, internal, or domestic conflict in which the main opposing parties represent and control populations, infrastructures and other assets sufficient to fulfill state-like functions, signifying a conflict between state, semi-state, "partial-state" or "counter-state" actors.

Civil war: civil conflict in which one or more opposing parties capable of state(-like) functions fight in such a way as to achieve complete victory over or utter defeat of their opponents, as evident from the fighting methods, tactics and strategies employed.

Rebellion or insurgency: armed conflict by one or more non-state, semi-state or alternative-state actors against any entrenched and generally recognised ruler, elite, authority, government, regime or state, for whatever personal reasons (grievance, grudge, greed, etc.), goals or ideologies.

Revolt or uprising: spontaneous rebellion by individuals or groups, with little or no planning, instigation or involvement of political parties or other entities (at least not in the initial or early phases), possibly but not necessarily arising from riots and other disturbances.

Insurrection: planned rebellion by individuals or groups belonging to political parties or other entities, possibly but not necessarily arising from revolts, riots and other outbursts of violence.

Coup d'état: focused insurrection that attempts to immediately grab and gain control over the reins of power of the state, possibly but not necessarily through small-scale, speedy operations to capture government buildings and other vital objects.

Main methods of violence in means, tactics and fighting techniques

Conventional or regular conflict: violent confrontation between state and/or non-state forces whereby at least one side or party attempts to gain physical, visible and stable control of (the other's) territory and fixed objects, as evident from the fighting methods employed, typically, but not necessarily, via heavily armed forces on or across battlefields.

Unconventional or irregular conflict: violent confrontation whereby one or more of the parties do not seek or need to hold (the opponent's) territory or fixed objects, as evi-

dent from non-territory-occupying fighting methods like sabotage, diversion, ambush or interference of communications.

Guerrilla: unconventional conflict (or tactic) based on flexible, irregular fighting methods with hit-and-run tactics ranging from sabotage to ambush without aim or the need to hold on to territory or fixed objects, typically but not necessarily by lightly armed individuals or small units.

Main means of violence that violate or tend to violate international and/or local norms

Brutality: violation of international and/or local norms of justified violence and those norms guarding the life, health and integrity of the person, particularly through ill--treatment, torture, killing, imprisonment and execution without trial or due process; international norms and local norms or violence-values may differ on what kinds of violence are deemed justified against which persons for what reasons and under what circumstances.

Brutalisation: the process of increasing violations over time, both in severity and scale, of international and/or local norms of violence and those norms guarding the life, health and integrity of the person.

Terrorism: sudden lethal violence without preceding warning of the act for whatever purpose against (groups of) unarmed or weakly armed and thereby effectively defenseless civilians, unarmed off-duty security personnel, soldiers and policemen, and other defenseless non-combatants.

"Terrorisation": the process of increasing resort to terrorism over time, both in severity and scale.

Liquidation, or "terrorist assassination": sudden lethal violence without preceding warning of the act for whatever purpose against selected individuals who are totally or practically unarmed and unprotected, like ordinary civilians who cannot defend themselves or bodyguards and other security personnel.

Assassination: sudden lethal violence without preceding warning of the act for whatever purpose against selected individuals who are armed or protected by bodyguards and other personnel, like politicians, generals and community leaders – who thus in principle are able to defend themselves or to be defended by others.

Criminality, or Crime: any violent or non-violent act or activity prohibited and punishable by law, directed for whatever reason – not necessarily out of greed – against persons and properties that result in money and valuables being illegally and illicitly taken or earned.

Criminalisation: the process of increasingly resorting to crime over time, both in terms of severity and scale.

Gangsterism: violent criminality out of greed or any other purpose, that is any violent act or activity which illegally and illicitly takes, collects or earns money, (from) people, goods and properties.

Banditry: gangsterism that resorts to robbery i.e. forceful taking of money, people and goods for whatever reason through use or threat of lethal violence, involving

plunder, kidnapping and kindred acts, by using guerrilla or other irregular tactics, often though not necessarily in mountainous, wooded, inhospitable, urban and other terrains suited for such tactics.

Brigandry, or Brigandage: banditry in the context of rebellion, whereby (certain) rebels act like or operate as bandits, or (certain) bandits turn into rebels i.e. join the rebellion for whatever reason, and (continue to) resort to pillage, ransom and other violently criminal acts through guerrilla(-like) tactics.

Norms and behaviours that may or may not (tend to) violate international and/or local norms (these do increasingly violate such norms according to the brutalisation theory)

Violence-value: any norm of right i.e. "proper", "good" and "justified" violence vis-à-vis wrong i.e. "improper", "bad" or "unjustified" violence, like those of honour and restraint, hospitality including fair treatment of captured opponents and enemies, proportionality and non-combatant immunity; in short, any notable, distinguishable and (most) significant local and/or international norm of justified violence and those guarding the life, health and integrity of the person.

Grievance: protest, complaint or lament of a past or present injustice i.e. international and/or local-norm violation of one or more individual and collective rights, regarding one or more deprivations (sufferings) ranging from poverty, discrimination and other hardships to repression, genocide and other atrocities.

Greed or Avarice: desire to (m)attain wealth, status, power and privileges for oneself, one's family, friends and supporters or a wider group (clan, tribe, ethnie, nation, etc.) one feels one belongs to or feels entitled to protect or enhance to the detriment of others (if not necessarily or automatically detrimental to others: an *interest*); these ends one seeks and tries to maintain through either or both legal and illegal means, like depredations (extortion, stealing, robbery, plunder, etc.), whereby legal means may be "unjust", discriminatory and/or other draconian laws formalising the depredations to the advantage of a certain group or a few individuals.

Ideology: a belief system that contains a set of principles, convictions and objectives that are orally and/or scripturally expressed and transmitted for and to actual and potential followers or opponents, to achieve secular and/or religious goals like a pious community, a just society, democracy or independence to redress hardships, sufferings and other injustices (grievances) and/or further individual and/or collective interests (the greed of these disadvantaged others?), or to change the present situation irrespective of or without any greed, interests and grievances.

Combat-stress: one or more of the following stress-responses: shock, fear, fatigue, rage, and consequent trauma among one or more fighters, soldiers, rebels or other (kinds of) combatants prior to, during and after battles and other high-risk operations. Such stress may lead to atrocities induced by innate aggression (eagerness to use violence) or – paradoxically – by innate restraint (reluctance to use violence), with social pressures of group convictions, bonding and expectations, typically enhanced through military training, indoctrination and conditioning to either carry out and condone atrocities or restrain from and punish them.

Appendix C: local and international norms and practices of violence in indigenous anti-imperial revolts

Table I: Just conflict (war, revolt) principles vs. violence-values and combat-stresses

Case:

Actors: Rebelling community/movement vs. Imperial community/state/force

Causes & means in conflict, war, combat	Violence-values: Honour, Revenge, Proper violence, etc.	Combat-stresses: Shock, Fear, Fatigue, Rage, Eager to kill, etc.*
Jus ad bellum criteria Just cause Just revolt if systematic abuse** Legitimate actor Last resort Just revolt if no redress** Probability of success Proportionality of ends -Overthrow ruler if no redress**		
Jus in bello criteria Non-combatant immunity Double discrimination (double effect) Proportionality of means		

Grading scale NB: when in doubt, two gradings given, e.g. "+/-, -".
+, ++: norms compare favorably, or correspond strongly or very strongly (++) to international norms
+/–, 0: local norms are ambiguous (like death penalty) or neutral (0) vis-à-vis international norms
-, – –: local norms diverge from or violate directly (– -) international norms

* Combat-stresses include: a) stress-responses or distresses of shock, fear, fatigue, rage, trauma (PTSD) and other stressors i.e. "stressful events" like receiving or witnessing gruesome injury, or seeing a friend killed; b) avoidance and *overdrive* behaviours, from a *reluctance* to kill, injure, capture or otherwise incapacitate the enemy, to an *eagerness* to kill, injure, capture or otherwise incapacitate the enemy; and c) *social pressures* of or through military training, indoctrination, conditioning, and group convictions, bonding and expectations.

** Separate just revolt principles according to strict parameters by John Locke (1632-1704)

Table II: Deprivations that violate international norms, and/or equivalent or diverging norms in the culture of each warring party

Case:

Actors: Rebelling community/movement/force vs. Imperial community/state/force

Humanitarian & human rights norms; Prohibitions	Grievances causing the conflict: deprivations and devastations*	Grievances in and by conflict: deprivations and devastations*
Violence to dignity Degrading treatment – Discrimination (severe, systematic; Apartheid) – Ill-treatment e.g. in prison (below torture level) – Rape (also violations of bodily liberty and worse) – Slavery (ibid)		
Violence to bodily liberty – Hostage taking – Disappearances – Arbitrary arrests, detentions w/out trial (or justification in war)		
Violence to bodily safety – Deportation, expulsion – "Ethnic cleansing" (also lethal violence)		
Violence to life and person – Summary execution – Torture, mutilation, other cruel treatment – Murder of all kinds, e.g. > Mass killings > War crimes > Crimes against humanity > Genocide		

+, ++: norms compare favorably, or correspond strongly or very strongly (++) to international norms
+/–, 0: local norms are ambiguous (like death penalty) or neutral (0) vis-à-vis international norms
-, – –: local norms diverge from or violate directly (– -) international norms
* "devastations" are extreme deprivations like mass-murder and genocide. Deprivations like discrimination and second-class citizenship typically form grievances that, together with heightened expectations and comparisons with those better off, lead to rebellions according to *relative deprivation*.[93]

[93] T.R. Gurr, 'Psychological Factors...'; idem, *Why Men Rebel*; see my critique on Gurr's RD theory in 'How to Feud and Rebel: 2...', pp. 237-239.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bell J.B., *The Dynamics of the Armed Struggle*, London–Portland (OR) 1998.

Bell J.B., *The Myth of the Guerrilla; Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice*, New York 1971.

Bell J.B., *On Revolt. Strategies of National Liberation*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1976.

Bell J.B., *A Time of Terror. How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence*, New York 1978.

Berkowitz L., *Aggression. A Social Psychological Analysis*, New York 1962 (*McGraw-Hill Series in Psychology*).

Berkowitz L., *Roots of Aggression; a Re-examination of the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis*, New York 1969.

Bourdieu P., *Political Interventions. Social Science and Political Action*, texts selected and introduced by F. Poupeau, T. Discepolo, trans. by D. Fernbach, London–New York 2008.

Byford G., 'The Wrong War', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 4 (2002).

Caldwell D.H., 'Scottish Spearmen, 1298-1314: An Answer to Cavalry', *War in History*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2012), at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0968344512439966>.

Carey S.C., Poe S.C. (eds.), *Understanding Human Rights Violations. New Systematic Studies*, Aldershot–Burlington 2004 (*Ethics and Global Politics*).

Caspersen N., 'Separatism and Democracy in the Caucasus', *Survival*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (2008), at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330802329014>.

Collier P., *Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy*, World Bank, Washington D.C. 2000 (see archive at <http://www.worldbank/org/research/conflict>).

Collier P., 'Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44, No. 6 (2000), at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002700044006008>.

Collier P., Hoeffler A., *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, World Bank, Washington D.C. 2001 (*Policy Research Working Paper*, 2355) (see at <http://www.worldbank/org/research/conflict>). Also published by Centre for the Study of African Economies, Paper 160 *Working Paper Series* (Berkeley Electronic Press, at <www.bepress.com/csae/paper160>).

Collier P., Sambanis N., 'Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (2002), at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002702046001001>.

Cornell D., 'A Kingdom Cleared of Castles: The Role of the Castle in the Campaigns of Robert Bruce', *Scottish Historical Review*, Vol. 87, No. 2 (2008).

Crawford N.C., 'Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War', *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2003) at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592703000021>.

Dam C. ten, 'How to Feud and Rebel: 1. Violence-values among the Chechens and Albanians', *Iran and the Caucasus*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2010), at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573384 10X12743419190340>.

Dam C. ten, 'How to Feud and Rebel: 2. Histories, Cultures and Grievances of the Chechens and Albanians' *Iran and the Caucasus*, Vol. 15, No. 1-2 (2011), at <http://dx.doi.org/10.11 63/157338411X12870596615674>.

Dam C. ten, 'How to Feud and Rebel: 3. Combat-stress and Violence-values among the Chechens and Albanians', *Iran and the Caucasus*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2012), at <http://dx.doi.org/10. 1163/1573384X-20120010>.

Dam C. ten, 'Let's be Clear: A Call for Tripartite Action-Actor-Motivation Conceptualisations in Social-Scientific Research' (Editorial), *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2015).

Dam C. ten, 'The Limitations of Military Psychology: Combat-stress and Violence-values among the Chechens and Albanians' in U. Bläsing, V. Arakelova, M. Weinreich (eds.), *Studies on Iran and the Caucasus. In Honour of Garnik Asatrian*, Leiden 2015.

Dam C. ten, 'Looking at Conflict Patterns: Declining Frequencies yet Persistent Brutalities in both Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Conflicts', *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2015) (incl. Critical Responses and authors' reaction).

Dam C. ten, 'Patriotism and Brutality vis-à-vis Nationalism, Ethnicity and other Identity Formations' (Editorial), *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2014).

Dollard J. et al., *Frustration and Aggression*, London 1944 (*International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction*) (first published New Haven 1939).

Elshtain J.B. (ed.), *Just War Theory*, Oxford 1992 (*Readings in Social and Political Theory*, 1).

Fearon J.D., Laitin D.D., 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 1 (2003).

Feyter K. de et al. (eds.), *Out of the Ashes. Reparation for Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations*, Antwerpen 2005.

Grossman H.I., 'Kleptocracy and Revolutions', *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (1999), at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/51.2.267>.

Gurr T.R., 'Psychological Factors in Civil Violence', *World Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1968).

Gurr T.R., *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton 1970.

Hechter M., 'Explaining Nationalist Violence', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1995), at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-5078.1995.00053.x>.

Herodotus, *The Histories*, trans. by A. De Sélincourt, Harmondsworth 1954 (*Penguin Classics*, L34).

Hobsbawm E.J., *Bandits*, London 1969.

Hobsbawm E.J., *Primitive Rebels. Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Century*, Manchester 1959.

Horsley R.A., 'Ancient Jewish Banditry and the Revolt against Rome, A.D. 66-70', *The Catholic Biblical Quarterly*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (1981).

Horsley R.A., *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence. Popular Jewish Resistance in Roman Palestine*, San Francisco 1987.

Horsley R.A., 'Josephus and the Bandits', *Journal for the Study of Judaism*, Vol. 10, No. 1 1979.

Horsley R.A., Hanson J.S., *Bandits, Prophets and Messiahs. Popular Movements in the Time of Jesus*, Minneapolis 1985 (*New Voices in Biblical Studies*).

Johnson J.T., *Ideology, Reason, and Limitation of War. Religious and Secular Concepts 1200--1740*, Princeton 1975.

Jongman A.J., Schmid A.P., *World Conflict and Human Rights Map 2000*, PIOOM, Leiden 2000.

Josephus, *The Jewish Antiquities* (*Antiquitates Judaicae*), Vol. 6: *Books 14-15*, trans. by R. Marcus, ed. A. Wikgren, Cambridge (Mass.) 1965 (*Loeb Classical Library*, 433).

Josephus, *The Jewish War* (*Bellum Judaicum*), trans. by G.A. Williamson, rev. trans. E.M. Smallwood, Harmondsworth 1981 (*Penguin Classics*) (1st ed. 1959).

Kaldor M., *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge 1999.

Kennedy R., 'Is One Person's Terrorist Another's Freedom Fighter? Western and Islamic Approaches to "Just War" Compared', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1999), at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546559908427493>.

Krippner S., McIntyre T.M. (eds.), *The Psychological Impact of War Trauma on Civilians. An International Perspective*, Westport 2003 (*Psychological Dimensions to War and Peace*).

La Noue F. de, *The Politicke and Militarie Discourses of the Lord de la Noue*, trans. by E. Aggas, London 1587.

Lindner E.G., 'Humiliation and Human Rights: Mapping a Minefield', *Human Rights Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2001), at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12142-001-1023-5>.

Lindner E.G., 'Humiliation as the Source of Terrorism: A New Paradigm', *Peace Research*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2001).

Lindner E.G., *Making Enemies. Humiliation and International Conflict*, Westport 2006 (*Contemporary Psychology*).

Locke J., *Two Treatises of Government*, rev. ed. by P. Laslett, Cambridge 1960 (*Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought*) (1965 print Mentor; based on 1698 publication in London by Awnfham & John Churchill).

Meernink J.D., King K.L., 'Crimes and Punishments: How the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Distinguishes Among Massive Human Rights Violations' in S.C. Carey, S.C. Poe (eds.), *Understanding Human Rights Violations. New Systematic Studies*, Aldershot–Burlington 2004 (*Ethics and Global Politics*).

Miller N.E. et al., 'The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis', *Psychological Review*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (1941), at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0055861>.

Paskins B., Dockrill M., *The Ethics of War*, Minneapolis 1979.

Pinker S., *The Better Angels of Our Nature. Why Violence has Declined*, New York 2011.

Pinker S., 'Decline of Violence: Taming the Devil within Us', *Nature*, Vol. 478, No. 7369 (2011), at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/478309a>.

Polanski T., 'Attalos III, King and Sculptor. An Appendix to Volkommer's *Künstlerlexicon*', *Studies in Ancient Art and Civilization*, Vol. 17 (2013), at <http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/SAAC.17.2013.17.15>.

Polanski T., 'Boukoloi Banditry: Greek Perspectives on Native Resistance', *Grazer Beiträge*, Vol. 25 (2006).

Polanski T., 'The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in the Kingdoms of Pontus and Kommagene during the Roman Conquest', *Iran and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2013), at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573384X-20130302>.

Polanski T., 'Oriens Militans: Extreme Traditionalist Movements in the Provincial Populace of the Ptolemaic Egypt and their Ideology' in K. Grant-Skiba, Z. Lew-Wojciechowski (eds.), *Lux lucet in tenebris. Księga pamiątkowa z okazji nadania prof. Bernardowi Kozirógowi doktoratu honoris causa*, Vol. 1, Podkowa Leśna 2010 (reprint from *Studies in Ancient Art and Civilisation*, Vol. 9 (1999)).

Polybius, *The Histories*, trans. by B.C. MacGing, New York 2010 (*Oxford Approaches to Classical Literature*).

Runciman W.G., *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice – A study of attitudes to social inequality in twentieth-century England*, Harmondsworth 1972 (*Pelican Books*) (first published by University of California Press 1966 and Routledge & Kegan Paul 1966).

Shelton D., 'United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Reparations: Context and Contents' in K. de Feyter et al. (eds.), *Out of the Ashes. Reparation for Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations*, Antwerpen 2005.

Stouffer SA et al., *The American Soldier*, Vol. 1: *Adjustment during Army Life*, Princeton 1949 / Manhattan (Kan.) 1977 (*Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*, 1).

Suter K., *An International Law of Guerrilla Warfare. The Global Politics of Law-Making*, New York 1984 (*Global Politics*).

TenDam H., *How People Make the World: The Ten Global Challenges – An essay on politics, civilization and humanity*, Ommen 2010 (1st ed. 1991).

Thompson E.A., 'Peasant Revolts in Late Roman Gaul and Spain', *Past and Present*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1952), at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/past/2.1.11>.

Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. by R. Warner, Harmondsworth 1954 (*Penguin Classics*, L39).

Traven B., *The Rebellion of the Hanged* (*La Rebelión de los Colgados*), London 1984, 1997 (Esperanza López Mateos & Josef Wieder, 1952).

Van Creveld M., 'The Clausewitzian Universe and the Law of War', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 26, No. 3/4 (1991), at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002200949102600304>.

Van Creveld M., *Transformation of War*, New York 1991.

Vattel E. de, *The Law of Nations; or Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns*, trans. by T. Nugent, London 1740.

Walzer M., *Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, Harmondsworth 1980 (first published in the US by Basic Books 1977).

Weber M., 'The Meaning of "Ethical Neutrality" in Sociology and Economics (1917)', part 1 in E.A. Shils, H.A. Finch (eds. and transl.), *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, Glencoe 1949.

Zegveld L., *The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law*, Cambridge 2002 (*Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law*).

Caspar ten DAM (**MA** political science) worked for the Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM), Leiden University, between 1998 and 2002. He wrote confidential reports, like one on the Kosovo conflict for the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP), Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) in Vienna, Austria. He has been a freelance consultant and independent scholar since then. Presently he is finalising a comparative study on Chechen and Albanian insurgents and the applicability of his own *Brutalisation theory* on their aims and methods of violence. The findings of this study are presently being published as a 'How to Feud and Rebel' series in the peer-reviewed journal *Iran and the Caucasus* (Brill), for which he hopes to be awarded a PhD at the Institute of History at Leiden University. He is also conducting research on the applicability of the Brutalisation theory on other intractable conflicts, like the one in and on Nagorno Karabakh. Together with Dr. Babak Rezvani and Servet Sahin (MA political science) he has established the *Forum of Ethno-GeoPolitics* (first issue: Vol. 1, No. 1 (2013); most recent issue: Vol. 3, No. 2 (2015)), an academic journal for analysis and debate within the field of ethnogeopolitics.