Who Keeps the Peace?
Reconceptualizing Peacebuilding Through Networks of Influence and Support

Jessica Maves Braithwaite
University of Arizona
jbraith@arizona.edu

Susanna P. Campbell
American University
susanna.campbell@american.edu

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Abstract[1]

International peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and development actors are increasingly focusing their efforts in conflict-affected states. In any single fragile or conflict-affected country, there are dozens, if not hundreds, of international actors operating with the aim of building peace, preventing violent extremism, reducing poverty, saving lives, or rebuilding infrastructure that was destroyed by conflict. They are connected to each other and to domestic state and non-state actors through formal contracts, informal relationships, and regular coordination meetings. Existing scholarship on international intervention in conflict-affected states largely ignores these networks and contractual relationships, instead treating all intervening actors as a single monolith, investigating only the behavior of a single type of intervenor, such as peacekeepers, or identifying the impact of a single peacebuilding intervention (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Fortna, 2008; Autesserre, 2009, 2010, 2014; Narang, 2014; Blair et al., 2016). We argue that it is important to redress this gap in the literature by examining the effect of networks among intervening actors and their domestic counterparts, on peace and security outcomes in conflict-affected states. We outline a new research agenda and present a theory of how variation in network diversity and the centrality of UN peace operations in these networks are likely to influence their achievement of peace and security outcomes.

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Introduction

In 2019, the US Congress passed the Global Fragility Act to improve the ability of the US Government to prevent violent conflict and build peace in fragile and conflict-affected countries, where poverty and violence are increasingly concentrated (Global Fragility Act of 2019; World Bank 2020). The US government is not alone in its desire to help these countries break out of the poverty-conflict trap; other bilateral donors, such as the World Bank, United Nations, European Union, International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), and private contractors, have increasingly prioritized assistance to this sub-set of countries (World Bank/United Nations 2018; Campbell 2018; OECD 2020). These diverse global actors have committed to work collaboratively to support conflict-affected countries because of their commitment to achieve the UN's Sustainable Development Goals and because the concentration of criminality, violent extremism, poverty, and population displacement in these countries threatens to catalyze future global ruptures. In any single fragile or conflict-affected country—whether Iraq, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Colombia, or Nepal—there are dozens, if not hundreds, of international actors operating with the aim of building peace, preventing violent extremism, reducing poverty, saving lives, or rebuilding infrastructure that was destroyed by conflict. They are connected to each other and to domestic state and non-state actors through formal contracts, informal relationships, and regular coordination meetings. Under what conditions do these networks of international actors contribute to building peace and preventing violence in conflict-affected countries?

Existing scholarship on international intervention in conflict-affected states largely ignores these networks and contractual relationships, instead treating all intervening actors as a single monolith, investigating only the behavior of a single type of intervenor, such as peacekeepers, or identifying the impact of a single peacebuilding intervention (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Fortna, 2008; Autesserre, 2009, 2010, 2014; Narang, 2014; Blair et al., 2016). We argue that it is important to redress this gap in the literature by examining the effect of networks among intervening actors and their domestic counterparts, on peace and security outcomes in conflict-affected states. These actors include the multitude of actors engaged in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, stabilization, and conflict prevention efforts in conflict-affected countries. For the rest of the paper, we will use the term "peacebuilding actors" to describe the broad range of international peacekeeping, development, humanitarian, and political actors who aim to improve the determinants of peace and security, as they define them, in conflict-affected countries (Campbell 2018).

The breadth of actors engaged in this effort is at the heart of our interest in exploring peacebuilding "networks of influence" – the multidimensionality of interventions to build and keep the peace, both in terms of various types of actors participating, as well as the relationships between these domestic and international organizations. To explain the effect of these networks on peace and conflict outcomes, we introduce a theory that peacebuilding actors that are connected through more diverse networks and networks where peace operations have high centrality are more likely to achieve their desired peace and conflict outcomes compared to those actors who have less diverse and sparser networks. Diverse networks include connections with both intervening actors (e.g., Western and non-Western, INGO and IGO and bilateral donor) and national stakeholders (e.g., state and non-state). The ties that connect these actors include both formal (e.g., contractual arrangements) and informal (e.g., friendships, back-channel informants) connections. Centrality refers to the number of ties an actor has to other actors in the network.

In this paper we first examine how the existing literature on international peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and aid view the potential importance of networks among international actors. We then discuss the broader international relations literature on networks and its assertions of the conditions under which networks influence international relations outcomes. We follow this discussion of the literature with a case study of the networks surrounding the UN peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We close by presenting a theory of networks of influence and support between war and peace and outlining a research agenda for examining their effectiveness.

Actors without Networks: The literature on international intervention in civil wars

Current academic research on peacekeeping and peacebuilding during and after episodes of political violence largely ignores the heterogeneity of different actors involved in countries affected by this unrest. Most scholarship focuses on the actions and impacts only one set of actors -- whether that is governments, non-state armed groups, civil society organizations, international peacekeepers, international donors, or international NGOs. These studies often are able to consider variation in characteristics and/or activities within one of these groups of actors, sometimes controlling for the presence of the other groups, but there is a lack of attention to the diversity across organizations participating (often in concert with one another) in peacebuilding, peacekeeping, or stabilization initiatives.

For example, much of the existing quantitative, cross-national literature on post-conflict dynamics such as democratization or the durability of peace focuses on characteristics of the civil war itself or of the former combatant actors, without adequately accounting for the complexities of

international engagement beyond including a variable indicating the presence of peacekeeping missions (e.g. Flores and Nooruddin 2009, 2012, 2016; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007). Other studies focus on important variation in the dimensions of UN peacekeeping personnel, specifically (e.g. Fortna 2004, 2008; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013, 2014; Kathman 2013; Ruggeri, Gizelis, and Dorussen 2013).

Actions and traits of international donors, INGOs, and civil society groups are rarely if ever considered in these analyses of post-war dynamics. There is very limited systematically collected information examining the actions and engagement of non-combatant civilian actors and domestic organizations during and after civil wars. Some new initiatives, including the Nonviolent Action in Violent Contexts dataset (Chenoweth, Hendrix, and Hunter 2019) and the Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns dataset (Butcher et al. 2020) will aid our ability to assess engagement of non-combatant actors in these conflict environments, but the direct bearing of domestic groups and non-UN organizations on peacebuilding efforts remains obfuscated by our lack of comparable data across cases of conflict-affected states.

Furthermore, while considerable attention is paid to the post-conflict period, these peacebuilding efforts can be underway long before civil wars terminate (e.g. Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2017). Thus, by not knowing which domestic and international actors are actively participating in such activities while wars persist, we are considerably limited in our ability to assess timing and efficacy of peace processes, not to mention their varied participants. The mobilization of domestic and international organizations in spaces proximate to and beyond the battlefield almost certainly influences the trajectories of unrest and of conflict management (Uvin 1998, Jarstad 2008, Parkinson 2013, Matanock 2019). However, to more fully appreciate the effects of this mobilization by non-combatant conflict-related actors, we require new data on the wide variety of groups engaged in peacebuilding efforts during and after civil wars, as well as their relationships to and with one another.

We are interested in exploring the presence of and connections between the specific organizations involved in peacekeeping missions and broader peacebuilding efforts for a variety of reasons. These actors matter for the trajectories of conflict and post-conflict recovery because they condition the opportunities for combatants to manage their incompatibilities away from war zones. Particularly in environments where there may be limited to no trust in formal state institutions (as well as comparable institutions offered or imposed by rebel groups), provided such institutions existed to

begin with, these non-state and international organizations can help establish order and promote good governance (e.g. Campbell 2018; Lake 2014, 2018). In some cases, they can also limit the ability of (former) combatant actors to abuse civilian populations and engage in corrupt election practices (Bove and Ruggeri 2016; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013; Kathman and Wood 2016; Smidt 2016). There is also a wealth of research that suggests peacekeeping missions and other interventions in peacebuilding efforts can struggle to improve conditions in conflict-affected countries, and may even exacerbate conditions in unstable environments (e.g. Autessere 2010, 2014; Di Salvatore 2019; Kathman and Wood 2011; Murdie and Davis 2010; Reno 2008).

To more completely appreciate when and where peacebuilding actors actually produce desired results in terms of improved security, social well-being, and so on -- both within and across conflict-affected states -- we need more comprehensive information about the peacebuilding organizations themselves in terms of what individual actors are doing and how their relationships to one another help or hinder peacekeeping mission objectives. This is what we call the "Networks of Influence and Support," a concept we explore in more detail in the next section.

Networks of Influence and Support

When identifying a network, it is useful to have a node around which the network forms. We focus on UN peacekeeping as the central node. Much of the existing academic work exploring the efficacy and implications of multidimensional peacekeeping operations fails to adequately explore variation in the engagement of international and domestic civilian actors during these missions, effectively putting these non-UN and non-combatant actors in a "black box." This prevents us from fully appreciating the roles they play in peacebuilding efforts. Our project seeks to elucidate these previously overlooked connections between domestic civilian and international actors that comprise multidimensional peacekeeping operations in an effort to more comprehensively explore how the "networks" comprising multidimensional peacekeeping explain important outcomes such as political reforms, social cohesion, and security improvements -- as well as how these networks help us understand potential gaps between observed outcomes and the *aims* or intended outcomes of missions.

Campbell (2018) highlights a critical tension in the peacebuilding process: pressures and structures imposed by international actors to promote accountability actually impede the ability of country-based peacekeeping personnel to effectively perform tasks related to their mandate. However,

when personnel engage and empower local actors, mission success improves. Additional work also stresses how these local actors and "everyday" conditions on the ground in post-war environments have important implications for how peacekeepers function and whether their missions will achieve mandated goals (Autessere 2014; Howard 2008).

But who are these local stakeholders, and is there important variation in which domestic actors are (more) efficacious partners in pursuing intended peacebuilding outcomes? Furthermore, who are the relevant international actors on the ground and which ones seem "better" at bypassing accountability structures and engaging local actors in demanding more from these global governors? These connections between domestic and international actors -- non-state and state-based organizations, IOs, INGOs, and donors -- engaged in peacebuilding are likely critical to understanding when missions "succeed" or "fail," yet we have limited data on the identities of relevant actors in many peacebuilding contexts, and even more limited information about the relationships between these actors.

The relationships between actors engaged in peacebuilding efforts may be just as important to success as the presence of certain actors themselves. Existing theories of peacekeeping effectiveness rests on the premise that the presence of peacekeepers increases the costs of war and reduces the costs of cooperation (Fortna 2008; Fortna and Howard 2008). However, the costs of cooperation may not be easily ameliorated if too many organizations are active in peacebuilding environments, especially if they are working across purposes and/or in similar areas such that they may develop negative, competitive relationships with one another that undermine efficiency and the flow of information necessary for mission success. Failing to observe and account for the organizational diversity as well as the positive and negative interactions between these actors in peacebuilding efforts leaves us with an incomplete understanding of how peacekeeping missions (fail to) achieve objectives, and this can result in placing undue credit or blame for mission results on the peacekeeping forces themselves.

Application of Network Analysis in Conflict Processes

Social network analysis is by no means novel in the study of international relations and conflict dynamics (Dorff 2013). Hafner-Burton et al. (2009, 560) define networks in the international relations context as "sets of relations that form structures, which in turn may constrain and enable agents." Network techniques have already been applied in contexts of conflict resolution processes by third-

party states (Aydin and Regan 2012; Böhmelt 2009; Hannigan 2019); troop contributions to peacekeeping operations (Ward and Dorussen 2016); the role of transnational advocacy networks in post-conflict development projects (Ohanyan 2010); and humanitarian aid following natural disasters (Moore, Eng, and Daniel 2003). Critically, network approaches allow us to move beyond dyadic analyses by considering extradyadic relationships between myriad actors (Dorussen, Gartzke, and Westerwinter 2016).

In general, though, while scholars have used networks to describe a variety of phenomena relevant to international relations, networks between different types of international actors, and particularly those intervening at the sub-national level, are largely unexplored (Maoz 2012). The applicability of social network analysis is in no way limited to a single type of actor or situational context, and in fact we argue that such an approach is essential in advancing our understanding of how peacebuilding activities occur and impact conflict-affected states in the short, medium, and long term through our Networks of Influence and Support. Given the considerable diversity of actors engaged in peacebuilding activities, network analysis offers an ideal method to capture the complexity of these operational contexts and to assess how variation in the organizational composition of the entire peacebuilding environment shapes the ability of missions to achieve desired objectives.

Existing scholarship on network analysis generally, as well as its specific applications in international relations and conflict processes, highlight some dimensions of networks that are particularly important to consider in the context of Networks of Influence and Support in peace operations and their likely impacts on mission outcomes and longer-term prospects for the cessation of hostilities. We might think of the different international and domestic actors engaged in peacebuilding activities as the "nodes" in our network. The network "ties", or the connections between these nodes in our networks – the relationships between the different actors involved in peacebuilding activities – can be described and differentiated by their degree, closeness, betweenness, strength, formality, direction, and homophily (Granovetter 1973; Borgatti and Everett 2000, 2006; Hafner-Burton et al. 2009; Dalla Costa 2015). These ties dictate the structure of our Networks of Influence and Support, and they reveal important information about the nodes (the peacebuilding actors) themselves.

Beyond nodes and their ties, a couple of key structural network features that we expect will be essential in identifying and analyzing Networks of Influence and Support in contexts of peace operations include network centrality and diversity (Freeman 1979; Bonacich 1987; Maoz 2006;

Borgatti et al. 2009). *Network diversity* refers to the variety of actor types (in the context of our Networks of Influence and Support, these would be UN peacekeepers, agencies, and offices; IOs; INGOs; and donors) as well as variation in their relationships to one another, or the ties constituting the network. *Network centrality* provides information about the structure of ties for individual nodes; for example, degree centrality allows us to identify how many connections a particular node has to other nodes in the network, while betweenness centrality allows us to identify nodes or actors that "bridge" other nodes that are otherwise unconnected.

A Case of Networks of Influence and Support

To illustrate the likely importance of networks of influence and support we examine the formal networks around the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO). MONUSCO is mandated by the United Nations (UN) Security Council to reduce the threat of armed groups in eastern DRC; improve the capacity of the DRC Government to protect its population; consolidate the authority of the DRC state throughout its territory by strengthening its civil administration, including the "police, territorial administration, and rule of law institutions in areas freed from armed groups" (UN Security Council 2010). Most of the discussion of the UN's success or failure in the DRC has focused on MONUSCO's 18,000 military or policy personnel and possibly its 4,000 civilian personnel (Fortna 2008; Ruggeri et al. 2013). But there are 22 UN programs, funds, and agencies working to support the implementation of MONUSCO's mandate.[2] Furthermore, MONUSCO collaborates with a broad range of bilateral and multilateral donors, International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), and national Non-Governmental Organizations for its stabilization efforts in Eastern DRC.[3]

The country-based offices of these diverse peacebuilding actors are connected to each other and to domestic state and non-state actors via formal contracts, informal relationships, and regular coordination meetings (UNDP 2017; Campbell 2018).

To illustrate the relationships between these diverse peacebuilding actors, we conducted a preliminary analysis of the formal coordination networks among MONUSCO and INGOs, NGOs,

[2] MONUSCO. *The UN in the DRC*. [Accessed, June 12, 2019: https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/un-drc.

[3] MONUSCO. *Stabilization Strategy (ISSSS)*. Goma: United Nations. [Accessed, June 12, 2019: https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/stabilization-strategy-issss].

and donors in the DRC, depicted in Figure 1. Each circular node represents one of 360 peacebuilding actors that we found operating in a formal coordination mechanism in the DRC. The lines, or "edges," represent a shared membership in (at least) one of these formal coordination mechanisms.[4]



Figure 1: Formal coordination networks among MONUSCO, other IOs, INGOs, and bilateral donors in the DRC

Figure 1 demonstrates the degree of formal coordination between a UN peacekeeping operation and a diverse range of peacebuilding actors, as well as the relationships among these other actors. Missing from this figure are the numerous formal and informal relationships with Congolese actors—both governmental and non-governmental—on whose buy-in and investment international peace and security outcomes are likely to depend (Campbell 2018).

[4] Each edge has a "weight," which is the number of shared coordination mechanisms between the two organizations. Out of a possible 64,440 edges, there are 16,839 that have a connection, which have an average weight of 1.14. The most "strongly connected" nodes are Germany's Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development's connection to USAID and the Humanitarian Office of the European Commission (ECHO), which share membership in 10 coordination mechanisms or sectors. The "thickness" of each edge corresponds to its weight and the size of each node corresponds to its eigenvector centrality, a measure of influence in a network that accounts for how many connections the node has to other central nodes.

Throughout the 2000s, the UN implemented new peacekeeping strategies that expanded mission mandates and relied on external organizations to achieve broader goals (Campbell and Di Salvatore 2020). The 2000 Brahimi report, issued by the UN Peace Operations panel created to address 1990s peacekeeping failures, laid the groundwork for this shift toward "complex peacekeeping" operations (Fortna and Howard 2008). Since then, most UN peace operations have been multidimensional, taking on a wider range of peacebuilding tasks and, consequently, expanding the network of international and domestic actors that are potentially instrumental in achieving peace and security outcomes (DPKO 2003, 2008; Tir and Karreth 2018). As an example of the networks surrounding UN peace operations, Figure 2 depicts the formal coordination networks of MONUSCO in the DRC, showing the variety of INGOs, NGOs, IOs, and bilateral donors with which MONUSCO plans and implements its peacebuilding and stabilization activities.[5] How do these formal networks shape the what MONUSCO does and how effectively it does it?



Figure 2: MONUSCO's formal coordination networks in the DRC

To construct our dataset of international actors comprising networks of influence and support around MONUSCO, used coded the coordination networks of three actor populations.

[5] The graph, despite showing MONUSCO's wide reach, is limited to its coordination in specific sectors (peace and security, justice, health, gender, and protection). A focused case study is needed to uncover how MONUSCO's networks operate and influence its peace and security outcomes.

The first actor population is the group of UN agencies, funds, programs, and departments that operate alongside and often implement projects in collaboration with UN Peace Operations. Like other populations of organizations, there is no comprehensive, easily accessible list of UN organizations operating in any single country. With seed funding from The Knowledge Management Fund of the Dutch Government's Knowledge Platform on Security and Rule of Law in The Hague, we used existing UN Country Team and Humanitarian actor lists to compile an initial dataset of 12,000 individuals working for IOs, INGOs, and NGOs based in 143 countries, including many conflict-affected countries (Campbell and Spilker 2000). This list includes over 45 UN Agencies, Funds, Programs, or Departments.[6]

The second actor population is bilateral and multilateral donors providing aid to conflict-affected countries, who often establish offices in-country. The breadth of international donors and funds provides a variety of humanitarian, development, and transitional aid directly to the recipient government and to other international and national actors, including the UN agencies, funds, and programs mentioned above, as well as INGOs, national NGOs, and in some cases civil society organizations or associations. We will leverage publicly available information for large donors and global funds, as well as useful existing datasets like the AidData database, which builds on the data collected by the OECD-DAC CRS system, and presents geo-coded project-specific information across a wide range bilateral donors, multilateral donors, and global funds.[7] We will also access the Financial Tracking System of the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which also provides complementary information about donor humanitarian aid contributions by country.[8]

Our third actor population is INGOs. This population is increasingly responsible for implementing programs and projects in conflict-affected countries; it is more dispersed and difficult

[6] We use a range of publicly-available sources to collect these data. First, we combined all contact lists that the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) present, which includes over fifty countries that are experiencing natural or man-made disasters, including civil war, resulting in increased need for life-saving assistance to the population (OCHA 2020). Second, we integrated this list with the contact lists of country-based UN leadership maintained by the UN Development Group (UNDG), which is charged with the coordination of development aid in all countries that receive development aid. Third, we added the contact lists maintained by the Logistics Cluster of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), which lists the specific contact people in donor and implementing agencies that can support logistical coordination during humanitarian emergencies. Fourth, we searched the websites of OECD donors to collect the available contact lists for their country-based staff.

[7] Tierney, Michael J., Daniel L. Nielson, Darren G. Hawkins, J. Timmons Roberts, Michael G. Findley, Ryan M. Powers, Bradley Parks, Sven E. Wilson, and Robert L. Hicks. 2011. More Dollars than Sense: Refining Our Knowledge of Development Finance Using AidData. World Development 39 (11): 1891-1906.

[8] OCHA, *Financial Tracking System*, Geneva: United Nations, 2020. https://fts.unocha.org/content/faqs-about-fts

to capture than the previously discussed populations. These data are maintained primarily by the UN Cluster System and local INGO coordination networks.[9]

In future iterations of this paper, we will supplement these network diagrams with a detailed description of some of the networks of influence and support that surround MONUSCO in Eastern DRC.

A New Research Agenda

The DRC example above helps to highlight the critical importance of these diverse, varied Networks of Influence and Support in peacebuilding contexts. These networks exist in the real world; they are central to the ways that actors behave in conflict-affected states, and thus we must take the myriad types of actors and their connections into account when assessing the outcomes of peacebuilding efforts – and the prospects for longer term peace. These Networks of Influence and Support are, in so many words, referenced and eluded to across existing civil war and intervention literature, but they have never been systematically theorized or empirically assessed.

Having highlighted some key components of network structures generally that likely have important implications for our Networks of Influence and Support, specifically, we now offer one example of how these characteristics of actors and their interactions could be used to inform a new theory about the role of international actors on peace operations. The following theoretical expectations set the stage for a new research agenda that advances our understanding of peacebuilding processes and impacts by bringing together concepts from work on peacekeeping, foreign aid, international organizations, civil society, statebuilding, and, of course, social network analysis.

Here, we focus specifically on the aforementioned concepts of network diversity and centrality and their relevance for the ability of our Networks of Influence and Support to assist UN peace operations in completing tasks related to their mission mandate. Network diversity in this context refers to the variety of actor types (UN peacekeepers, agencies, and offices; IOs; INGOs; and donors) as well as variation in their relationships to one another, or the ties constituting the network. Network centrality provides information about the structure of ties for individual nodes; for example, degree

[9] For a discussion of the Cluster System, see United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2020. "What Is the Cluster Approach?" https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach.

centrality allows us to identify how many connections a particular node has to other nodes in the network, while betweenness centrality allows us to identify nodes or actors that "bridge" other nodes that are otherwise unconnected.

The following table simplifies our expectations about how the intersection of centrality and diversity in Networks of Influence and Support likely affect the degree to which UN peace operations will be able to successfully carry out mission objectives.

TABLE I: Network traits and expected outcomes for mission mandates of UN peace operations

	High Centrality of Peace Operation	Low Centrality of Peace Operation
High Diversity	Successful Mission	Disconnected Pockets of Success
Low Diversity	Success at Simple Tasks	Unsuccessful Mission

In particular, we expect that *high* degrees of centrality and diversity allow these networks to facilitate the highest degree of success by missions, because having a diverse set of actors (nodes) with high connectivity and cooperation between them more readily facilitates the completion of complex tasks. Conversely, in situations where the types of actors involved in peacebuilding is limited (low diversity), and their connections to one another and to the UN peace operation are sparse (low centrality), we anticipate a mission that will generally struggle to achieve its objectives.

On more middle ground, we would expect contexts where actors in support of peacebuilding missions are considerably varied in their type but limited in their connections and coordination with one another (high diversity, low centrality) we anticipate more fragmentation within the network and

a propensity for inefficiencies and duplication of efforts. Where variety among actor types is lacking yet the relationships between those involved are more extensive (low diversity, high centrality) we anticipate a context where simple tasks oriented around the limited and particular type(s) of engaged actors to be successful, but the ability to pursue more multifaced and complex missions will fall short.

Applying our concept of Networks of Influence and Support specifically to a UN peace operation, such as MONUSCO, we are able to elucidate the network structure surrounding that mission. Traditionally, we attribute on-the-ground observable outcomes to the UN mission itself, but here we argue that it is important to conceptualize the broader network supporting the UN mission because other actors or their interrelationships constituting the network may be more directly to praise or blame for particular outcomes.

Beyond thinking about the important topic of when peace operations are more or less likely to succeed at achieving their mission objectives, we also speculate that Networks of Influence and Support have implications for broader domestic and international relations as well. These networks likely affect the types of domestic institutions we observe being created or reformed; the dimensions of governance that dictate state-society interactions; the nature of and degree to which the conflict-affected state is subsequently engaged in the international system, and more.

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