Prejudice, Job Competition and Conflict:
Syrian Refugees and Host Community in Tripoli, Lebanon

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Windy Massabni (Lebanon)

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Members of the Examining Committee:

Professor Mansoob Murshed
Dr Helen Hintjens

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Disclaimer:

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Inquiries:

International Institute of Social Studies
P.O. Box 29776
2502 LT The Hague
The Netherlands

t: +31 70 426 0460
e: info@iss.nl
w: www.iss.nl
fb: http://www.facebook.com/iss.nl
twitter: @issnl

Location:

Kortenaerkade 12
2518 AX The Hague
The Netherlands

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List of Acronyms

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees

CLI Casual Labour Initiative

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Abstract

This study investigates the root causes of Syrian refugees and Lebanese host community non-violent conflict. To understand the tensions, it was first necessary to consider the political history of relations between Lebanon and Syria. The study examines the case of Tripoli, the 'capital of the North', a town that hosts almost 45,000 Syrian refugees. The researcher focused on a social cohesion analysis, through economic factors such as employment and livelihoods, as well as social relations and trust among others. The results show that competition on the job market exacerbates tensions and undermines social cohesion. A survey was conducted to test the hypothesis that inclusive employment can alleviate tensions between local-non-local communities, contributing to social cohesion. However, the study found that historical conflicts and prejudices undermine this option. Interestingly, such hostilities can appear among both the younger and older generations (mainly Lebanese). In contrast, Syrian refugees mostly expressed appreciation of their hosts, independently of their status of employment or vulnerability.

Relevance to Development Studies

Untangling root causes of tensions is an essential step for peacebuilding and may challenge current conflict resolution strategies and theories. This paper sheds light on the non-violent conflict between Syrian refugees and Lebanese, implying the role of prejudice, political history and competition on the job market in creating tensions.

Keywords

Social cohesion, Conflict, Syrian refugees, Lebanon, employment, trust, prejudice.

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

Scapegoating, discrimination, neighbours, family, business partners, occupation and conflict. If the relationship between Lebanese and Syrians could be summarized in a few words, all of these contradictory terms would fit the present situation. Throughout history, unification, colonisation, separation, wars and immigration, these two countries have built what could be called an "intimate-stranger" dynamic between their corresponding populations (Picard, 2016).

These complex ties could be seen through the lens of the current Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon, and more specifically through the refugee-host community relationship that evolves around it. The intricate relationship between Syrians and Lebanese rests on the co-determination and inseparability of economic interests, identity-based behaviours and social capital.

Since the outbreak of the Syrian war in 2011, more than 5 million Syrians have fled the country, mostly to neighbouring countries such as Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon. Around 6 million Syrians remained internally displaced in 2017 (UNHCR, 2018). To this day, there are almost 1 million registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon, adding to the estimated 500 000 who are unregistered (Carnegie, 2018). Given that the Lebanese population totals around 4 million, this corresponds to Syrians making up over one quarter of the total population of the country.

The population surge has affected the host country's socio-economic and political stability, being translated into tensions around jobs and livelihoods, as well as increased violence between different communities. More importantly, there is strong academic and political concern with the dynamics between host community and Syrian refugees. Displaced Syrians are subjected to discrimination, often leading to violence, from the Lebanese hosts. This is reinforced by harsh government policies, which limit their access to legal residency and local job markets. Hostilities vary from municipality curfews, scapegoating and violence from the host community, and generalised hostility towards the displaced.

Strains result on the economy and infrastructure, which seems an obvious root cause of further hostilities. However, any study on Lebanon should not be limited to economics or infrastructure alone. These factors are in turn embedded in a setting characterized by political and sectarian divisions that are unavoidable features of the host residents' context and social capital:

> Social capital is the glue that holds societies together and without which there can be no economic growth or human wellbeing. Without social capital, society at large will collapse, and today's world presents some very sad examples of [this] (Grootaert, 1998:2)

In order to untangle the conflict between the Syrian refugees and the Lebanese host community, it is paramount to focus on social capital. In our case, social cohesion and its determining factors such as trust, identity, inequalities, access to resources and livelihoods will be analysed.

According to official reports, 86% of Syrian refugees reside in Lebanese villages and towns that are inhabited by the most vulnerable Lebanese. New and old tensions seem to be resurging which affects the political, economic and religious climate and can fuel further instability, or even threaten the social cohesion of Lebanese neighbourhoods (OCHA, 2014).

One of the main interest of this paper is to investigate these existing tensions in Lebanon. The selected case study is Tripoli, the capital of North Lebanon. This city suffers from the country's highest urban unemployment rates and most extreme poverty conditions, exacerbated by the influx

of 45 000 registered Syrian refugees into the city since 2012, adding to an approximate 100 000 unregistered refugees from Syria (UNHCR, 2018; see Appendix 1). This is without counting other displaced populations (Palestinians, Iraqis and others).

Tripoli's suffering is illustrated by conditions in Jabal Mohsen and Bab el Tabaneh, located in the epicenter of conflict and instability in the city. As Tripoli's most underdeveloped communities, the cycle of violence has taken an incredible toll on residents of the city: the major form of poverty in Tripoli is unemployment and this is combined with income inequality. Estimates suggest half the population is 'poor' and unemployment exceeds 35%. Sectarian tensions exacerbate the poor living conditions in which the Tripolitans live, and a common belief is that their poverty has been exacerbated by the arrival of Syrian refugees (Abi-Yaghi et al., 2016).

Due to lack of context sensitivity and limited funding, development and humanitarian practitioners have so far failed to tackle the conflict dividing Syrians from Lebanese. Instead their interventions target emergency aid relief and often disregard the affected host communities, so that aid itself can become another source of tensions. Therefore, this paper attempts to map out the root causes (or drivers) of conflict in order to sensitise and inform policy-makers and other stakeholders, with a focus on inclusive employment as a tool to alleviate tensions and decrease inequality.

In fact, literature (to be discussed in Chapter 3) has shown that employment incentive policies are an efficient way to alleviate poverty and improve social cohesion. Whether through increased contacts or economic interdependency between rival groups, higher employment should eventually lead to a decrease in prejudice. It is not clear whether this is the case in Tripoli, and this paper aims to explore to test three hypotheses, to determine whether these conditions apply in the Lebanese-Syrian context.

1.2 Research Question

In line with these objectives, and within the particular context of Tripoli, the researcher aimed to achieve a better understanding of how an employment-oriented set of policies might alleviate rising tensions between these two communities, both located in a poor and vulnerable urban area.

The main research question of this paper is **"Would an inclusive job market alleviate tensions between the locals and non-locals?"**

This question implies first a clear understanding of intergroup tensions, which will be determined through an assessment of social cohesion in Tripoli. Unravelling the root causes of the conflict will help orient the focus of this study, enabling the researcher to study the hypotheses adapted to the specific context of the study. This will be done by answering the following sub-questions:

Sub-question 1: **To what extent are there tensions between the locals and non-locals?**

Sub-question 2: **What are the root causes of these tensions?**

Sub-question 3: **How can employment policies improve intergroup social cohesion?**

Sub-question 4: **What would limit the positive correlation between job creation and social cohesion?**

1.3 Research methodology

With the goal of understanding the context, secondary data was extracted from existing literature and international organisations' country reports. The limited literature capturing the relationship

between the local communities and the newcomers, Syrian refugees, pushed the researchers to conduct a survey to collect its own data. The field research, limited by time and budget constraints, was carried out amongst a sample of 90 participants. The sampling strategy will be discussed in Chapter 4.

A well-designed and implemented survey research is an efficient way of getting people or a group of people's subjective opinion (Fowler, 2012). The purpose of the survey was to shed light on the population's perceptions of the tensions, as well as their emotions and their openness to cooperate with the opposing group in the job market. Hence, a survey was considered to be the most appropriate and efficient strategy to analyse the research problem (as argued by Fowler).

The research uses predominantly a quantitative methodology. It has been the main method used for most behavioural social sciences research through empirical studies, or a statistical analysis. It has been proven that theory building and knowledge extraction is more effective with a scientific method (Newman, Benz, 1998). Moreover, a mixed method is necessary to complement the statistical analysis: As defended by Newman and Benz, understanding a reality or what is felt and experienced by a population, a qualitative approach fits best (Newman and Benz, 1998). Mixed methods is the most adequate to the purpose of our research design, the first steps allow us to shape the questions and targeted sample, and then build a new theory through the data results by comparing them to the existing theories (Creswell, 2017).

The research follows Creswell's mixed method approach, by first using a desk research to understand the context and the existing theories on the topic. This first step oriented the research to design the survey and the questions: The literature shows the correlation between competition on livelihoods, prejudice and conflict; as well as a positive relationship between the job market and peacebuilding.

The survey design was inspired by the theoretical framework. The quantitative questions with multiple choice answer options were complemented with comment fields and open-ended questions to enable a qualitative analysis: Indeed, the comments' analysis often turned out to be more revealing than the quantitative questions: The answer options could have influenced the respondents' responses, and also, quantifying perceptions and emotions (through scales) could be misleading and introduce biases in their answers. The comments and discussions that followed the survey were analysed through qualitative coding, which enabled the research to draw more truthful and accurate results.

1.4 Outline of Chapters

The present document is structured as follows: In **chapter 1** the introduction is presented as well as the research methodology. **Chapter 2** explores the literature on the root causes of local – non-local conflicts and will contextualise the theories within the Lebanese setting. **Chapter 3** involves a discussion of existing hypotheses on the relationship between social cohesion and inclusive employment, including their limitations and examples of their operationalisation on the field. **Chapter 4** will present the empirical strategy, details about the data collection and sampling strategy, as well as a description of the sample. **Chapter 5** presents and discusses results. **Chapter 6** concludes the paper.

Chapter 2 Root causes of tensions

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter we explore how the literature explains conflict between local and non-local communities. By reviewing relevant academic articles and reports from international organisations, the chapter examines how inequalities and social cohesion between different groups are understood in by scholars. How they theorise cohabiting, which seems essential to address the causes and dynamics of inter-group conflict, is also a focus. In his report, J. Guay highlights that tensions on the micro-level such as economic competition, can be very significant. He suggests that increasing social cohesion and therefore the propensity to violence, starts by untangling the local and micro-level causes of tensions and conflict (Guay, 2013).

We will first see how the perceived or real competition on jobs and strain on infrastructure and livelihoods can affect social cohesion and lead to conflict. The second half of the chapter will contextualize the theories, by elaborating on how their arguments and assumptions relate specifically to the Lebanese context. We first explore possible root causes of conflict, including inequalities, competition, prejudice and a lack of trust. We then place these various elements in the context informed by a history of sectarianism and identity politics in the Lebanese-Syrian region.

2.2 Literature Review: Livelihoods, Conflict, Prejudice

2.2.1 Inequality, competition and jobs

Horizontal inequalities, characterized by unequal access to livelihoods, different economic and social status, are often one of the main causes of conflict (Stewart, 2000). If one group is excluded from the access to resources, this feeling of isolation transforms itself to a form of resistance and resilience to gain access, and often through violence. The weakening of social cohesion caused by inequalities turns into conflict when the ingroup, the one who initially has greater access either gains power from this accessibility imbalances. Moreover, if resources are limited, tensions arise and the out-group becomes perceived as a threat (Stewart, 2000).

Esses et al. (2001) agree on this idea and discusses how the perception of the out-group as a competitor is common when resources are scarce. In other words, out-groups tend to be perceived as a threat the more competition there is for resources; it is also commonly believed that if one group profits then the other one loses. As Esses et al express this: "Any gains that the other group might make must be at the expense of one's own group" (Esses et al. 2001:394). Esses et al. also insist on the fact that to be considered in a competitive, potentially conflictual situation, the out-group and ingroup must have common incentives and reasons to obtain the scarce resources. The risks of conflict are higher when they are from a similar socio-economic background and both vulnerable. This was certainly the case in Tripoli, as we will discuss further in this chapter, both Lebanese and Syrian refugees were mostly living in comparable conditions of economic poverty.

To put this another way: "Societies where local and non-local groups compete are likely to exhibit ethnic violence" (Jha, 2008:6). Jha's model is based on local and non-local group interactions that, as in the case of Tripoli, are both vulnerable and have almost equally poor living conditions. They live in over-populated areas. The author refers to Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) to draw

her conclusion about the correlations between poverty, insurgency and ethnic violence. Her main conclusion is that vulnerable and poor populations, characterized by ethnic differences are more prone to conflict than others. According to the author, economic competition is the main root cause of ethnic conflict in the context of Hindus and Muslims in India's towns in the 17th century (Jha, 2008). This historical study has been a source of insight for our own study, located firmly in the present (2018), but rooted in historical patterns of competition and distrust.

On the other hand, research also suggests that an influx of refugees is not always damaging for the local economy or local inhabitants. The demand for goods and services tends to increase with the demographic push of refugees, from which local businesses may also profit. In their report, Amy Kirbyshire et al. (2017) show positive examples from urban cities that have benefited from incoming displaced people, including the case of Kampala where small local businesses experienced growth in 2013. Another interesting example is Kenya in the 90s, where the government imposed an encampment policy to refugees coming from surrounding countries at war. It was not fully respected, and a mass movement towards urban areas took place. These areas have now been transformed and became hubs for small businesses, often owned by those displaced, notably including the Somali refugee community, linked to Kenyan Somalis by religion and identity (Kirbyshire et al., 2017).

The correlation between encampment policies and job market policies is a complex one, and focusing on this correlation has been defended by Lewis Turner (2015). According to his study, the decision to create refugee camps, or not, can be interlinked with the host country's job market structure and with the socio-economic class of the displaced (Turner, 2015). His case study combines analysis of two countries' policies (Lebanon and Jordan) and sheds light on the relevance of countries' home labour market goals in terms of the decisions related to 'refugee' encampment or dispersal. By focusing on the decision to oblige refugees to remain in camps, or not, Turner gives as an example the case of Jordan which has hosted a considerable amount of Syrian and other refugees (Turner, 2015). Jordan has a policy of fairly strict encampment and this limits competition in the labour market between Jordanians and refugees, by restricting access for Syrians, for example. This is a counter-example of the Lebanon case, where refugee encampment is not so far a policy adopted by government. Any encampments in Lebanon are not enforced by government.

2.2.2 The Role of Prejudice, Identity and Trust

This section will review a number of theories that have tried to explain both prejudice and trust, and how these are formed and their impact on competition and resources at an inter-group and individual level. Both prejudice and trust can be influenced by current culture, including national and ethnic-religious cultures and by historical relationships between groups of people. Another perspective that should be considered, from conflict analysis, is Francis Stewart who suggests that the 'perception' element is critical in understanding any conflict. Appreciating a group's perceptions of an opposing group allows for deeper-rooted analysis, and a higher context-sensitivity when implementing policies or development projects (Stewart, 2000). This leads us to the analysis of a second plausible reason for tensions, which is prejudice, as defended by Allport:

> "An adequate definition of prejudice contains two essential ingredients. There must be an attitude of favour or disfavour; and it must be related to an overgeneralized (and therefore erroneous) belief. Prejudiced statements sometimes express the attitudinal factor, sometimes the belief factor" (Allport, 1954:13)

Allport (1954) draws a parallel between prejudice or stereotyping on the one hand, and scapegoating on the other. Prejudices make individuals confident about discriminating against others in several forms: Antilocution, which can be verbal, involve avoidance; Institutionalized Racism; Violence Against Individuals or groups of individuals. This can even lead to Extermination and Genocide. He defends the idea that prejudices are socially constructed and that it is for most times a divider and deeply affects social cohesion in societies. Understanding the source of prejudice is often linked to understand the common history between the opposing groups, as well as the identity component, or specifically national identity (Esses et al., 2001). The latter is believed to be the main reason for the persistence of stereotypes, and they often give the stereotype some sort of power and self-esteem (Allport, 1954). The reason this study is still of great interest today is that more recent approaches to prejudice often cite Allport as one of the first social scientists to seriously analyse the conflict implications of prejudice.

Akerlof and Kranton (2000:1717) confirm this by showing the association of identity with behaviour as "identity can explain behaviour that appears detrimental". Thus, justifying bad behaviour by someone's need of identity affirmation or enhancement. Peace seems then harder to maintain when identities when identities are heterogenous. Leigh suggests that diverse ethnic identities rhymes with low trust levels. When different, minority groups are often less trusting than majority ones for example. Trust being one of the main characteristic of social cohesion. Leigh also suggests income inequality as another factor affecting trust levels, suggesting that the lower the income, the lower the trust towards others and governments is. In other words homogeneous groups tend to have similarities that creates a cohesive atmosphere, whether it's through culture, religion, income or other differences (Leigh, 2006).

2.3 Strained livelihoods in Lebanon

Based on this brief review of relevant theories, it is essential to now map out various vulnerabilities of locals and non-locals in Lebanon. This will allow the researcher to comprehend how and why competition for jobs interacts with livelihood security and insecurity, leading to tensions or trust in this specific context.

Recent events in the region, as well as domestic shocks, have caused Lebanon's economy to slow down since the late 1990s, and especially since 2011. Following the Syrian crisis, Lebanon's annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth reached an all-time low of 0.9 per cent. Exports dropped from almost USD $4.5 billion worth of Lebanese goods and services in 2012 to less than USD $3 billion by 2015. This decline is largely due to the disruption of land routes through Syria to markets in the Gulf, as well as a decline in Lebanese exports to the Syrian market, previously one of its largest trading partners. Lebanon's vibrant private sector has also been hit by a slowdown in local manufacturing output, due to depressed local and regional economies. According to the World Bank, due to the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis Lebanon has incurred losses on average of $13.1bn since 2012, $5.6bn incurred in 2015 alone (over 11% of GDP) (OECD, 2016).

As for the overall level of poverty, official data date back to 2011, which limits the assessment of the impact of Syrian refugees presence on poverty assessments for Lebanon. Other World Bank reports reveal some of the repercussions of the massive arrival of Syrian refugees in specific areas and towns of Lebanon, mostly referring to the Bekaa Valley and North Lebanon as being the most affected and the 'poorest' regions of the country (World Bank, 2018).

Today, Lebanon stands at a critical junction. It faces serious challenges to stabilise its macroeconomic landscape whilst needing to provide jobs for its own growing population and the recent influx of Syrians. The pressure of labour oversupply is most evident in major refugee-hosting regions such as North Lebanon (Where Tripoli is located) and the Bekaa Valley. An already weak economic composition and lack of appropriate government support to the job market has given birth to increasing rates of unemployment and competition for jobs. During the series of crises and economic depression, the private sector have struggled to expand and absorb the oversupply of labour and the public sector has failed to keep up with the strain on public services including education, health, energy, water, waste management and infrastructure (OECD, 2016).

In this context, it is not surprising perhaps that the Lebanese may tend to view out-groups, especially the relatively large number of Syrian refugees, as a threat to their already weak economy. Taking a closer look at this the strain on Lebanese people's livelihoods and resources, will help us understand why Syrian refugees may be viewed as a threat rather than an opportunity, and subjected to prejudice rather than relations of trust.

2.4 Healthcare and Education

Prior to 2011, the health sector was suffering from governmental budget cuts despite an overall improvement of the health status of the residents. The Syrian immigration has put pressure on demographic figures and therefore on the demand, facing a saturated offer. Reports mention the increase of contagious diseases, often due to unhealthy and bad water and sanitation infrastructures (OCHA, 2014). A majority of Syrian refugee children survive on a one meal per day basis, are subject to psychiatric symptoms and emotional violence, suffer from chronic diseases and respiratory issues, affecting their physical and mental health.

According to the OCHA, a rise of health-related costs, limited supply and decreased quality of health services is directly linked to the refugee crisis; as they represented almost 40% of the primary health care patients in 2012 (OCHA, 2014). It is important to note that there has always been a limited public assistance to healthcare in the country, which has been worsened with the demographic increase. Health conditions are fairly good, if compared with most European refugee-countries. Most registered Syrian refugees are entitled to free or subsidized access to primary healthcare through humanitarian organizations. However, by the same token, this can increase frustrations among more vulnerable Lebanese whose needs are disregarded by the same humanitarian organizations, due to a lack of context sensitivity or limitations in funding for non-refugee populations. Negative impacts of refugee demands on the healthcare sector, are seen by Lebanese as a direct repercussion of the refugee crisis, seen as increasing the Lebanese population's own vulnerability and reinforcing negative perceptions about refugee populations in terms of competition for access to scarce services. This will tend to undermine overall social cohesion in the country.

As for education, this sector has for some time been characterized by inadequate infrastructure and poor quality of public schools and little public investment. Primary schools had a 90% enrolment level, although regional disparities in enrolment levels exist: 30% of the students are enrolled in public schools, and the rest in private institutions that typically offer better education quality. Syrian children have had an open access to schools since the beginning of the crisis, granted by the Lebanese government. The latter did not improve the schools' infrastructure, inadequate to the increase of enrolment. Despite most public schools being understaffed, classrooms size

increased (in number of students) which affects the teaching quality, and afternoon shifts were created in order to host the new Syrian students (OCHA, 2014). Despite those efforts, almost two thirds of Syrian children remained out of school, due to limited access and the need to financially support their households: Lack of education increases their tendency to begging, exposure to child marriage, drug and alcohol abuse (Cherri et al., 2016).

Another important aspect of the education system is the differences in educational systems in Lebanon and Syria: In Lebanon curriculums are taught in French and English, languages that most of the new students do not know or are not comfortable with. This affects the Syrian students' wellbeing, access to education, on top of increased scapegoating by the local students. The context in which education and healthcare are accessed, is another aspect affecting the social wellbeing of the communities, and therefore increasing intercommunity tensions as seen in the literature.

2.5 Waste, Water and Electricity

The strain on infrastructure and services is particularly high on the already weak ones such as waste management, water sanitation and electricity. Most Lebanese rely on private water supply services as running water and public sanitation is limited to an average of 9 hours per day on average. The supply of water decreased by 7% between 2011 and 2013 according to the OCHA (2014). Tensions over water supply are clear as very often refugee shelters do not have access to clean water. This means that refugees are often accused of stealing water from local communities, and can be reported to the municipality, even where there is little evidence of this. This situation can lead to tensions, as well as to lack of hygiene, as the quality of drinking water is also variable and sometimes the quantity is meagre. Sanitation and water supply networks are both outdated and undermanaged, which reinforces these forms of conflict and competition.

Waste is also another source of water pollution and the waste management has been going through a crisis in recent years: With the surplus of population, solid waste almost doubled in Lebanon, and a waste crisis resulted due to a combination of demand outstripping supply, along with mismanagement. This crisis occurred in 2015, the year that government stopped treating waste through the "Sukleen[1]" contract. Instead during that year, open dumping and burning became the norm, increasing carcinogenic particles in the air and resulting in noxious fumes throughout the country. Finally when the situation became a public health hazard, government acted but not before refugees were blamed for the government-created crisis. The environmental crisis increased vulnerabilities of the Lebanese as well as the refugees, exposing of the whole population to health risks (OCHA, 2014).

As for the energy sector, power is only available for between 6 and 12 hours per day, and most households rely on pricey private generators. Prior to 2011, the public service only responded to 60% of the demand. The supply has dropped from 10% between 2011 and 2013. Electricity is then another burden on the inhabitants of the country, increasing vulnerabilities (OCHA, 2014).

[1] The waste management company that was subcontracted by the government to treat most cities' waste until 2015.

2.6 Livelihoods in a Competitive Job Market

Competition for jobs has been on the rise since 2011. Syrian migrant workers have always been present in Lebanon (to a lesser extent since 2005), but were confined in the construction and agriculture sectors (LCPS, 2017). Since the refugee crisis, an increase in labour demand in the low-skilled job market has surpassed the offer, therefore creating competition. The unemployment rates were already increasing before the arrival of refugees, particularly in poor urban areas such as Tripoli, where it reached 35% of the population in 2015. According to the World Bank, in order to balance the supply and demand mismatch of the job market, the Lebanese economy should be able to create 6 times as many jobs that are on the market currently (LCRP, 2017).

World Bank data shows that 170 000 Lebanese have fallen into poverty, and mostly in already vulnerable cities. The competition on employment has decreased the quality of the supplied work: Wages decreased, the informal market is taking over the formal one, no social security and so on. Syrians, who often do not get access to Humanitarian support, compete with Lebanese by requiring lower wages and working longer hours. Most areas where the majority of refugees were displaced, claim a decrease in income reaching almost 50%. (World Bank, 2018)

However, competition on the job market is limited to the low-skilled market. The new workforce is only affecting the poor Lebanese communities, or in other words high unemployment is affecting low-income host community households (OCHA, 2014).

> This is particularly the case in poor areas such as North Lebanon and Bekaa other studies and research indicated that around 90% of Lebanese workers in Bekaa reported a decline in income, mainly due to competition from Syrian workers, deteriorating security conditions (Masri and Srour, 2014:37)

Local small businesses are also at a critical stage. Some have been sacked out by Syrian businesses that would sell the same products for lower prices (OCHA, 2014). Most of those are illegal and do not hold business licenses but are still able to function in remote areas, such as Tripoli where most local businesses belong to the informal market. However, Lebanese business owners have also profited from the crisis, by hiring lower-wage labour, replacing their current Lebanese employees. Good for business but bad for the community. Syrian migrant workers are therefore not limited to the construction and agriculture market as the Lebanese response plan has expected: Lack of regulations and the increasing size of the informal market is allowing them to work whenever and wherever is possible which is why competition exists despite the government's efforts to limit it .

Another reason causing the economic competition is the country's strict policies towards refugees and non-encampment decision. It goes hand in hand with its history with Syrian labour that has always filled the country's need for 'cheap' labour; as encampment constrains the freedom of movement of the refugees and their access to the job market, which is the case in Jordan. In fact, the existing sectarian division of the host country affects the government's decision making, especially in terms of critical issues such as the encampment of refugees. Lewis Turner argues that the fact that the Lebanese economy was heavily reliant on Syrian Workers, from which a big part left during the 'cedar revolution' in 2005, pushed the government to have an open border policy at first. The non-encampment indeed increases the refugees' access to the labour market, but in the case of Lebanon, the government has implemented other policies to limit their access to the labour market: Through high work permit cost, large amount of paperwork that prevents the refugees to work in the formal economy as well as a limitation of the right to work to specific sectors such as construction and agriculture (Battistin and Leape, 2017). This pushes them to refer

to the informal economy and would therefore, instead of fulfilling the country's demand for labour in the formal economy, compete with vulnerable locals in the informal and low-skilled market.

Most Lebanese tend to justify the tensions with the Syrians by stating the lack of job opportunities. Studies have shown that most of the jobs performed by Syrian refugees, are low-skilled jobs that were available because of Lebanese' reluctance in taking low-wage jobs, first for social class reasons and second because the uneducated Lebanese are only a small portion of the Lebanese workforce. The low economic growth of the country, related to the refugee crisis but also linked to weak public institutions and political turmoil, are also the main reason for unemployment. Another one is linked to the war in Syria, where a big portion of farmers would export their production and found themselves out of job when the border control increased (and closed in 2015). (Cherri et al., 2016)

The structural and economic impact of the so-called Syrian refugee crisis on Lebanon is then obvious, but it does not seem to justify the tensions between the communities. Strain on livelihoods is definitely causing tensions as seen above but it is not directly related to the influx of refugees. Therefore, exploring other sources of conflict is necessary, knowing the history between Lebanon and Syria, and that scapegoating Syrian migrants is not something new in the Lebanese society.

2.7 Prejudice, Political History, Identity, Sectarianism

2.7.1 A Political History of 'Intimate Strangers'

The prejudices against Syrians and their relationships with Lebanese can be labelled in a 'dominant/dominated' box. The perception of Syrians as a political threat and at the same time as an uneducated low-class migrant symbolizes this dominated (immigrant/worker) / dominant (former colonizer) dynamic (Geisser, 2013). Paradoxically, Syrians are also associated to the 'dominator' or colonizer, reflecting back to the Syrian military occupation of Lebanon: At the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, Syria quickly deployed its army over the Lebanese territory to protect itself from a possible Israeli domination of Lebanon (Picard, 2016). The war was the result of international geo-political actors tousled up in the cold-war and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, all fighting on Lebanon's territory. Syria's political class, having close ties with the fragile Lebanese state, was then not indifferent to the conflict and profited from this fragility to strengthen its ties with the Lebanese political class and gain control over the country.

In the context of Syrians and Lebanese, a first attempt was made to understand the discrimination by looking at the current structural factors that may cause it. However, looking back at history is essential (Thorleifsson, 2016). Lebanon has had a tumultuous political history with Syria, shaping the dynamics between its populations: What was one country under the Ottoman Empire was then split into two under the French colonial rule (mandate). The separated nation remained connected through family, politics and work bonds (Thorleifsson, 2016):

Syrian immigration to Lebanon has been ongoing for several decades, with numbers varying between 250 000 and 500 000. They have been exposed to xenophobia and discrimination from their Lebanese hosts. Since the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, for which the Syrian government and its Lebanese counterparts are commonly blamed, those workers, mainly employed in the construction sector, have been the first target of the Lebanese population, as a way of revenge against this assassination (Geisser, 2013). Syrian migrant workers can then be seen as victims of their government's interventions in Lebanon. The weakened

cohesion between Syrians and Lebanese in Lebanon has then worsened with the arrival of Syrian refugees at the outbreak of the civil war in Syria. The prejudices against the 'dominated' Syrians evolve around unsubstantiated accusations of theft, harassment and an overall image of an uneducated, 'low-class' and opportunistic population.(Geisser, 2013)

29 years of military occupation, political control, as well as numerous human rights violations, such as freedom of speech (control of the press for instance), freedom of movement exacerbated by Syrian military checkpoints deployed all over the country, even after the war ended) amongst many others, left a bitter taste in the heads of Lebanese. Resentment against the Syrian government's representation, which were Syrian migrant workers and currently the refugees, has been growingly affecting the ties between both populations suffering from painful memories of occupation, division and political unrest.

2.7.2 Lebanon's bad experience with hosting refugees

Another historical event seems to be affecting Lebanese' attitudes towards non-locals is the Lebanese experience with hosting refugees throughout the years. A parallel can be drawn between the dominant perception of Syrian refugees as a threat and the continuous presence of Palestinian refugees. Those who have been on Lebanese territories since 1948, have been permanently excluded from the society, confined in refugee camps until today. They are armed and the camps transformed in no-go-zones where the Lebanese authorities cannot step in (Hägerdal, 2018:4). A fear of a non-local communities outgrowing the local one, as well a threat on Lebanon's sovereignty once again, is dominating Lebanese' spirits. This perception of threat, regardless of their sectarian identities, often defines the attitudes towards Syrians which will be discussed in the following section.

Lewis Turner's paper on the non-encampment policy sheds light on the repercussions of the Palestinian experience in Lebanon on the current relationship between Lebanon and the Syrian refugees: Lebanon's decision not to encamp the Syrian displaced population for instance. Encampment has proven to increase exclusion and isolation from the society, which also increases the propensity to racism and violence against the dominant population. In the case of Lebanon, it has led to a civil war, as the Palestinian camps became the epicentre of Palestinian armed resilience against the Israeli enemy and some of the Lebanese parties (Hägerdal, 2018). The fear that Syrian refugees, if confined in the same space, might create some sort of resistance or movement against the dominant and discriminating authority, pushed the latter to ban tent settlements (Newby, 2018). Surprisingly, the negative repercussions of this policy was quickly felt amongst the population as the security threat increased as well as tensions between the now cohabiting populations. Day-to-day interactions, marked by pressure on services and strained livelihoods, as well as history-based prejudice has had a crucial impact on the social cohesion in Lebanese towns where both communities cohabit, due to the lack of designated space for the non-locals.

This brief historical background might be explaining the stereotyping and the 'anti-immigrant prejudices' that determine the social cohesion between both populations right now, and will be tested in Chapter 5 (the empirical study).

2.7.3 Identity and Sectarian tensions

The political history defining the dynamics between Lebanese and Syrians also imply the perceptions of the non-locals as a threat to identity and sectarian divisions, leading to distrust and tensions. As mentioned above, the Levantine territory, has always been dominated by the east and

west, until the Sykes-Picot agreement (Picard, 2016). The intervention of the French in 1918, defined Lebanon as an independent state, creating then two nations, fragmented by contradictory cultural proximity and differences shadowed by sectarian diversity and political divisions, common to both countries. The particular protection that France provided to the Lebanese, allowed the rise of political power of the Christian Maronite community, traditionally closer to the western culture. In 1932, the population census (And the last one ever made) delineated an equal parity of Christians and Muslims in the country. Since then, a sectarian game of power defined the two countries' politics and international relations (Picard, 2016).

Lebanon's identity is described by Sandra Mackey as 'Split at its very soul…at the crossroads of West and East' (quoted by Larkin, 2011:1). Lebanon has always been fighting for its independence and wanted to distance itself from the Arab-World, prominently crumbling in a quest for identity and nationhood. In the 50s, there was a growing Sunni-Arab identity in the region, uniting Sunni Arabs of the region (Syrians and Lebanese included), facing a fragmented Christian unity in Lebanon, closer to western powers and aiming at a stronger dissociation from Syria who was predominantly Sunni. (Larkin, 2011).

Nowadays, power division is more or less representative of all religions in Lebanon, but with the rise of the opposing Iran and Saudi Arabia super powers in the region, backing the two main religious-political parties (Shia and Sunni) this equal representation veils a strong division and identity differences in the country, holding the country in a fragile state and on the verge of violence.

Thorleifsson (2016) links the intensification of the identity and religious divisions to recent history: The end of Syria's domination over Lebanon, marked by the assassination of its prime minister, Rafik Hariri, wealthy head-figure of the Sunni community, backed by Saudi Arabia. From that event, emerged two rival political groups: the Shiite-dominated 'March 8' supporting the Syrian government, and March 14, Sunni-led and accusing the Syrian regime of the assassination. The two main Christian parties were also taken over by these two coalitions, showing once again the sectarian divisions interlinked with politics (Thorleifsson, 2016).

A clear example could be the differences in perspectives on Syrian refugees by the different Lebanese political-sectarian parties: Christians are worried that the Sunni refugees (majority) would destabilize the demographic balance (although no census has been made since 1932), so most of the Christians do not support the presence of the refugees. The Shia party's[2] fighters are engaged in the war in Syria alongside the regime, its partisans tend to accept the Syrian refugees that belong to the same sect or that support the Syrian regime. Due to religious ties, Sunnis tend to be more friendly to Sunni refugees but studies have shown that it also depends on how they are economically affected and if they are able to dissociate the refugees from the Syrian regime, regardless of their religion. The 2011 mass displacement of Syrians to Lebanon has then destabilized the fragile security and sectarian balance of the country, and enhanced its divisions (Harb and Saab, 2014; Hägerdal, 2018).

2.8 Particular Case Study of Tripoli

With a population of around 200 000, Tripoli hosts around 45 000 Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2018). This city illustrates perfectly the implications of sectarianism and political history on the

[2] Also known as Hezbollah.

social cohesion of the city. The city's geographical proximity to Syria and its important port, positioned it as one of the main economic hub of the region in the early 20s. In the 30s, the city's population and political class were united against the separation of Lebanon from Syria, in the fear of losing its strategic position to Beirut. (Lebanon Support, 2016).

Despite being Lebanon's second largest city, Tripoli has been isolated from Beirut's politics. As a result, it has struggled with its identity as a Lebanese city, amplified by its close ties to the Sunni Syrian community but also its resentment of the Syrian regime. The drivers of conflict and instability in Tripoli are interconnected between Lebanese and Syrian tensions as well as local community conflict.

Lebanese Allawites in Tripoli (largely concentrated in Jabal Mohsen) have historically held a favourable view of the Syrian regime and represent, to the larger Sunni community (supportive of the Syrian opposition), the stronghold of the Syrian regime in Tripoli. These different positions have led to intercommunity violence many times. The violence has also increased with the arrival of the Sunni Syrians in Tabbaneh, such as the 2014 clashes between the Allawites and Sunnis. These tensions might then be hard to be labelled as 'Lebanese vs Lebanese' or "Lebanese vs Syrians' as the communities are interconnected with Syria and Lebanon's politics. Tripolitans' identity is then overshadowed by the city's politics and religion.

Despite this political dichotomy that fragilized Tripoli over the years, the city is still culturally very close to Syria. Families maintain deep connections with Syria, often strengthened by religious belonging. Complexities in understanding the drivers of conflict and stability in Tripoli, for as long as communities in Tripoli are connected to Syria through sectarian political allegiances, their nationality is overshadowed by their politics.

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2.9 Conclusion

Economic competition, strains on livelihoods, prejudices, and identity politics all seem to have a place in this conflict analysis. The complexity of the country's history and current structure, makes it almost impossible to draw clear or definite conclusions (though we shall try to do so in Chapter 5). The context and theories have shown that conflict is a result of a lack of reconciliation or conflict resolution mechanisms that escalate into sectarian or nationalistic implications and are exacerbated by the pressure on local services.

Chapter 3 Testing Hypotheses on the Job Market and Social Cohesion

3.1 Introduction

The present chapter presents the hypothesis to be tested in the study. To review, the overall motivation is to examine whether social cohesion can be built through the job market. To test this question, the first hypothesis assumes that diverse work spaces builds trust between co-workers and therefore alleviates existing tensions. The second one assumes that trade and a complementary market creates interdependency between groups which reduces the propensity to violence; the third one is based on the contact hypothesis: Prejudice can disappear with contact. The more contact opposing groups have the less prejudice there are. And contact is provided through work. To test those hypotheses we will present their limitations and illustrate them with concrete examples of how they were operationalized by development institutions.

3.2 First Hypothesis

Mixed[3] workspaces increase trust and improve social relations regardless of identity differences

This hypothesis is adapted from Kilroy, who provides us with a simplified definition of social cohesion that helps to appreciate the implications of the job market in building social cohesion. He believes that social cohesion is the product of three aspects: Trust, Friendship and Social Identities, and throughout his paper argues that a diverse (mixed-nationality that are presumably in conflict) workspace engages its members in relationships of trust and friendships and creates a constructed identity that all workers (no matter what they identify themselves as) can relate to. (Kilroy, 2012)

He justifies his main argument by first proving how trade implicates social relations. Indeed, working together or trading requires a minimum of interactions based on respect due to the economic interest the other group may provide. It is on this aspect that he defends his other arguments. Economic profit from work first generates a better lifestyle and overall a decrease of vulnerabilities. Overcoming vulnerabilities can involve less in-group conflicts, less domestic violence, an improvement in education and other services essential to positive cohesion. In this case, almost inevitably the outcome is an improved level of common social cohesion (Kilroy, 2012)

Kirbyshire et al. (2017) insists on the gender dimension of access to job markets. In extreme or very poor settings, the participation of women in the labour market increases to compensate for the lack of income resources of the household as a whole. Women's interactions with male co-workers combined with their economic contributions to their own households, may sometimes improve women's status and position, decreasing household violence targeting women. This is another way to show the relevance of access to the job market for decreasing tensions, including within households as well as across communities.

> "Jobs create overlapping social identities that help bridge social divisions and cleavages" (Kilroy, 2012:16)

Another argument supported by Kilroy is the identity factor: the workspace is capable of creating an identity that people may relate to, regardless of the other aspects that define their identities, he calls that 'cross-cutting social identities' that are socially constructed through work.

[3] The paper defines "Mixed" as the inclusion of groups from different communities or nationalities.

Limitations
There are however some limitation to this evidence. Not all types of jobs increase trust between co-workers and improve social relations. Jobs have to have provide high rates of interactions and positive working environments and more importantly have an equal distribution amongst groups - low status jobs should not only be given out to a specific group (Kilroy, 2012).

Another constraint is the identity aspect: Intersectionality of identities is also ignored, assuming that each group is homogeneous and that individuals are capable of building their identities through their jobs or position are overstatements and not generalizable.

Illustration of the hypothesis
In 2015, MARCH, a Lebanese local NGO, built a cultural cafe on the street separating the two enemy clans Bab el Tabaneh and Jabal Mohsen (Syria Street). The idea behind this project was to offer employment to youth from both communities with a social goal: To create a safe space where youth from the opposing communities would get to know each other and hopefully create friendships through employment, art and culture. The impact evaluation survey that was conducted after the project showed positive results, in accordance with the theory of change of the NGO: 60% of the participants admitted having actively participated in clashes before the projects. 81% of them claimed that friendships were built thanks to this project and that they wouldn't mind meeting up or working with youth from the opposing community again (MARCH, 2015).

3.3 Second Hypothesis

Economic interaction and interdependency reduce the propensity for violence

Jha supports this idea but insists on the condition that the market should be complementary, so that rival or different groups provide complementary goods: One of the main hypothesis that is being tested in the author's model is that religious tolerance and conflict resolution can emanate from a complementary trade market (Jha, 2008).

The dynamic of the interactions is determined by the nature of the goods and services provided by a group or another: If the products are similar, it will increase the risk of attack by a group producing the same goods, which should, hypothetically, push the merchants to diversify their goods and seek for complementarity instead of competitivity. The author goes even further with this theory and highlights the importance of complementarity of the goods: Complementarity lies in the added value one good provides to the other, this value is then proportionate to the strength of the social cohesion between communities. In other words, one improves his behaviour towards another one when economic profit is in question. (Jha, 2008)

From an economic perspective, it is widely believed that employment generates revenue which reduces vulnerabilities related to scarcity of jobs and competition are reduced with employment policies as such, which eventually leads to peacebuilding or in our case would potentially prevent tensions between the available labour force (Masri and Srour, 2014). Intercommunity trade may also provide room for individuals to not only become more interdependent in terms of tasks or a specific trade, but also to view themselves as such (Jha 2008). From this perspective, Kilroy's arguments imply that a rational individual would make sure to keep a good relationship with his or her co-workers, regardless of religion, ethnic identity or social class**.** Attitudinal change could be expected, as well as increased levels of trust. Kilroy justifies this by showing how business

relations and what he calls 'rational interests' tend to generate an evolution towards greater trust between the concerned parties (Kilroy, 2012).

Limitations
However, Jha insists on the limitations and conditions that should be met in the case of complementary trade and peace maintenance. Risk of expropriation for example, and to avoid it the goods must be difficult to acquire by the other group as expropriation may result in violence and tensions. (Jha, 2008:7).

Another condition that needs to be met, is the involvement of institutions for fair and inclusive redistribution of the gains from trade: If the communities do not benefit equally from the trade gains (proportionate to their contribution), tensions may arise and the problematic competition is then not resolved, nurturing feelings of exclusion and discrimination by the minority group.

The conditions for economic interaction and equal job access to decrease tensions have been deducted by Harb and Saab (2014) in their impact assessment report written for Save the Children's project CLI (Casual Labour Initiative): Equal Wage for both groups, Equal status or position in the work place, cooperation of both groups, as well as institutional support.

These conditions go hand in hand with Allport's suggestion, also related to intergroup contact theory that will be further explored in the following section. Allport insists on the role of public institutions in protecting the equal status of groups. The legal framework has to support the social cohesion created by economic opportunities and complementary trade for instance, through sanctions for bad behaviour for example. (Allport, 1954)

Illustration of the hypothesis
The Casual Labour Initiative project, implemented by the international organisation Save the Children in Lebanon, intended to create job opportunities for Syrian Refugees and vulnerable Lebanese with equal status positions and a common project that would provide equal wage in the Bekaa Valley. The report revealed that although the intentions were based on theoretical affirmations of the success of the project, the limitations were clear and affected the efficiency of the project. One of the limitations that was seen was the complementarity of jobs did not prevail as well as the equal status of the workers, due to weak monitoring, as the local leaders maintained the hierarchal and social status that defines the relationship between Lebanese and Syrians, despite their cooperation, increase in income and economic profit (Harb and Saab, 2014)

3.4 Third Hypothesis

Increased contact between diverse groups increases cohesion

These aspects are relevant to social cohesion because it can be built through trust and friendships. Yinger and Simpson explain that prejudices exist because of the lack of contact with members of different groups (Yinger and Simpson, 2017). Kilroy adds to this that that on top of economic benefits, intercommunity economic activities allow the members from opposing groups to get to know each other and eventually destroy these stereotypes or prejudice (Kilroy, 2012). According to Amir (1969), intergroup contact is one of the most prevalent factor that could have a positive impact in intergroup relations that are characterized by negative prejudice (Amir, 1969).

Allport's contact hypothesis suggests that when contact increases between majority and minority groups, prejudice will lessen. However, the level of contact is important, casual contacts and acquaintances have different intensity of impacts on cohesion as seen in his book "in contrast to casual contacts, most studies show that true acquaintance lessens prejudice" (Allport, 1954:264).

Limitations
However, intergroup contact creates positive impact on social relations generally but could also increase hostilities and deepen the negative prejudice if the contact is negative. Firstly, if the jobs are not evenly distributed and if a certain group tend to take the lower skilled tasks, due to biases in recruitment, legal status, cultural differences and differences in experience or education, it might actually accentuate the imbalance in power relations and lead to greater scapegoating from the group in power (Amir, 1969).

Second, casual contact at work does not represent social life contact. This is because some people may act differently at work than in their social life. They may courteous and respectful for business purposes, but once they go back home, to their community, the probability that they challenge common attitudes in their own community is not high (Kilroy, 2012).

Third, as shown above it is believed that prejudice comes from the fact that the opposing groups do not know each other well, and that in the case of immigration, the group members are often new to the country and therefore might be discriminated against just by the fear of the unknown. This is not the case in our context, where Lebanese and Syrians have interacted for decades and Syrian immigration to Lebanon is quite familiar, as discussed in the previous chapter.

To conclude, Allport sets conditions to the hypothesis, conditions that are linked to the context and personal variables of individuals. He suggests prejudice will decline "unless deeply rooted in the character structure of the individual" (Allport, 1954: 281). In this case, his argument implies that contact may not be accompanied by more 'equal status' interactions, and the theory fails or does not work in practice (Allport, 1954:281).

Illustration of the hypothesis
The following example contradicts this hypothesis. It is case that shows the limitations of economic interactions and peacebuilding. The same project that was discussed in the previous section (3.2), has resulted in friendships and increase of trust. However, the survey revealed that almost 48% of the participants admitted that they would still participate in clashes in case they occur again. Incentives to fight centre on around neighbourhood protection and self-defence. Protecting the neighbourhoods implies protection of one's own community. This example shows the flaws of these kind of interventions and suggest that working together is not enough for peacebuilding or at least not in the specific context, where sectarian violence has plagued the region for decades and is led by political leaders affiliated to the different religions of the area.

3.5 Conclusion

Considering the hypotheses and their limitations, jobs and social cohesion do not always have a positive correlation. Several factors should be taken into account before making such conclusions. For example, when competition over resources exists, intergroup violence or conflict cannot be alleviate through increased interactions at work (Esses et al., 2001). Also, empirical studies that show a clear positive relationship between employment promotion, social cohesion and peace are scarce (GIZ, 2015). This may also indicate that not all jobs help overcome social tensions and differences, as seen in this chapter, if cooperation and equal status are not provided by the job promotion, propensity to violence may increase, especially if there is a history of conflict and strong prejudice opposing two groups (World Bank, 2013).

Chapter 4 Empirical strategy and data

4.1 Introduction

The main objectives of the empirical strategy was to capture the perceptions of the host community and the Syrian refugees on the social cohesion in Tripoli, shed light on the root cause of the tensions and assess their willingness to work in mixed-groups (Syrians and Lebanese). This chapter explains the process of data collection, the survey design and location. It will then discuss the methodology or the sampling strategy, and concludes with the description of the sample.

4.2 Survey objectives and design

4.2.1 Research Team and process

The research team conducted a survey in Tripoli, a vulnerable urban setting of Lebanon (Full Survey in Appendix 2). The survey was conducted between July 24th and August 29th, in the northern capital of Lebanon, Tripoli. It consisted of seven separate visit to the field, and one visit aimed specifically at piloting the initial questionnaire. The research team was composed of two research assistants and the researcher herself, with the support of local NGOs that facilitated access to respondents.

4.2.2 Location

The neighbourhoods that were selected are in a conflict-torn area, characterized by high levels of unemployment and sectarian tensions marked by an inflow of Syrian refugees in the recent years. These neighbourhoods are Bab el Tabaneh and Jabal Mohsen, both located in Tripoli-Tabaneh (see map in Appendix 1). Intercommunity violence used to be common in these neighbourhoods but they are right now trying to maintain peace which is reported to be a tougher task because of the Syrian presence[4].

Table 1 below confirms that North Lebanon is one of the poorest areas in the country. No poverty data has been collected in Lebanon after 2011/12 (World Bank, 2018).

Table 1 *Poverty rates compared between regions of Lebanon 2011/12*



Source: World Bank, 2018

[4] Fieldwork notes, Informal discussion with a female NGO worker, 24.07.2018, Tripoli, Lebanon.

4.2.3 Survey design

The questionnaire consists of 8 basic household survey questions to get information on their household situation, such as source of income, number of children, age etc. This was followed by 4 scaled questions (Number) assessing the social cohesion between both communities, through the frequency and quality of contact and their emotions towards the out-group such as trust, anger, fear and affection.

In order to get an insight on the level of tensions and their opinion on the possible root causes, 3 scaled questions were asked to the participants. A comment field was added to this section for a more efficient qualitative analysis, in case their opinion is not captured in the suggested response.

The 3rd part of the survey consists of 5 questions evolving around their perception on the relationship between diverse work spaces (Open-ended question), their experience with working with people from different nationalities, followed by a scaled question assessing their willingness to work with people from the out-group.

4.2 Sampling strategy

In an attempt to respect the heterogeneity of the communities living in Tripoli, the research team employed a stratified sampling, this helps in representing groups in all their aspects, whether it's religion, gender or even age group (Onwuegbuzie and Collins, 2007). The choice of the setting was strategic in the sense that both nationalities cohabit, but the neighbourhood also host the two main religion of the city (Sunnis and Allawites). The stratum were then based on nationality (Lebanese and Syrians), religion (Sunnis and Allawites), gender as well as age categories. In order to do so the researcher approached local NGOs to facilitate the fieldwork and insisted on the categories that were needed for the survey. From that point, the NGO workers guided the researchers to specific streets where such categories of people could be found: Syria Street, that separates Jabal Mohsen and Bab el Tebaneh where most middle aged men were approached. The vegetable market for a bigger pool of people from all of these different stratum. MARCH[5]'s cultural café where where a workshop for Syrian and Lebanese women was taking place, another NGO centre where a training for Allawite and Sunni Lebanese and Syrian young males was taking place.

It is important to mention that the intention of representing the heterogeneity of the population was not successful and when faced with access issues, the researcher compromised its initial strategy to a convenient sampling, which means that what was conveniently available and whoever was willing to participate in the study (Onwuegbuzie and Collins, 2007). When the NGO workers were unavailable, the research team wandered around the streets of Tripoli and questioned only the willing passengers, regardless of the stratum.

Despite unforeseen schedule issues, time and budget constraint, the research team was able to reach a sample of 90 respondents that will be described in the following section. "The sample size determines the extent to which the researcher can make statistical or analytic generalisations" (Onwuegbuzie and Collins, 2007: 288). The limitations that affected the sample size in this study mean that the researcher does not aim to generalize on the basis of the findings. However, the sample size does make comparisons possible across different categories of respondents. The objective is mainly to explore and test specific theories in a specific context, and this allows the researcher to use the sample for statistical correlations, even if these may not be mathematically significant.

[5] Local NGO

4.3 Descriptive statistics

As illustrated in the graphs below (Graph 1), the sample consists of 90 respondents: 63 of whom are Lebanese, 17 Syrian refugees, 7 Syrian Lebanese (Syrians that were born and raised in Lebanon but that do not hold the Lebanese citizenship), and 3 Lebanese Palestinians (Palestinians born and raised in Lebanon that do not hold the Lebanese citizenship). The Lebanese-Syrians and Lebanese-Palestinians were merged with the Lebanese because they are considered to be part of the 'host' community, despite not having the Lebanese citizenship. The imbalances in informants' nationalities is due to unforeseen complications that limited the researchers' access to Syrian refugees.

Graph 1 *Nationality, Gender and Age of respondents*



Source: Results based on fieldwork done by author

The overall Male-Female ratio is of 61% - 39%. This ratio is similar in the Lebanese sample (64-36 % respectively) and is slightly higher for females in the Syrian sample (53% females and 47% males). Almost 40% of the full sample is between 18 and 24 years old, while 30% belong to the 25-34 year old category, and the rest is above 35 years old. The age categories % are similar for the Lebanese, while the majority of the Syrian respondents are between 25 and 34 years old.

Graph 2 *Education Level and Source of Income*



Source: Results based on fieldwork done by author

The education level of most of the participants is quite low as 41% stopped school at the Intermediate Level and 5% are illiterate. Only 21% finished high school, 16% hold a Bachelor's degree, 7% followed a vocational education (technical school or job trainings), and 2.2% have a master's degree. Both Lebanese and Syrians in Tripoli seem to have the same educational levels, although none of the Syrians hold a Master's degree. 59% of the sample is married and have an average of 1.5 children, which might be explained by the fact that almost 40% of the sample is between 18 and 24 year old. (Graph 2)

As for their employment status, 35% stated that they relied on seasonal or part-time jobs to meet their or their family needs. 25% have a full time job as their main source of income, while 12,22% stated not having any source of income. (Graph 2)

Poverty levels (as shown in Table 1 above) can be assumed to be higher than the average in 2011-12 of around 40 per cent. As the World Bank commented recently: "Given the large refugee influx after 2011, the poverty rate for 2011/12 most probably does not adequately reflect the current situation" (World Bank, 2018: 1-2).

4.4 Conclusion

Sampling, or the selection of the portion that was questioned, allows the researcher to explain his theory and generalise his findings, if the adapted methodology is used (Onwuegbuzie and Collins, 2007). As shown in chapter 1, the researcher uses a mixed-method, combining qualitative and quantitative analysis with the purpose of generalizing the findings. According to Onwuegbuzie and Collins (2007), the most efficient way to do this is to use a random sampling strategy, which this chapter has outlined.

Chapter 5 Results and Discussion

5.1 Introduction

The survey conducted in Tripoli's Tabbaneh neighbourhood, was described in section 4.2. The sample seems homogeneous in terms of education level and level of income, as was noted and more although more Lebanese and more men participated in the interviews than Syrians and women, there was a balanced representation of age categories. This chapter presents the survey results and discusses their implications for the hypotheses presented in Chapter 3. We first present the outcome of our assessment of the level and quality of inter-group contacts, as well as emotions involved by each side towards the other. We then proceed to map in-group/out-group tensions, and follow with an analysis of perceptions about the relationship between the competitive/complementary nature of the job market and social cohesion. How this influences people's trust and their willingness to work together is of particular interest. The concluding note discusses the results and their implications for our main research question.

5.2 Level and Quality of Contact

In order to estimate the quality and frequency of intergroup contact, 3 questions[6] were asked about the frequency in which they encounter each other or meet up, and then one where they rate the quality of interactions. The rating scale levels go from 1 to 5, from 'never' to frequently, and the 3rd question from 1 to 5, from very negative to very positive.

5.2.1 Frequency and quality of interactions

Nearly half of the Lebanese respondents revealed that they frequently encounter a lot of Syrians in the town.

Graph 3 *Frequency of interaction (%)*



Source: Results based on fieldwork done by author

[6] Questions 12, 13 and 14 – See Appendix 2 (survey)

As for the Syrians, when asked about the level of contact with Lebanese, 42% of them said that they frequently encounter Lebanese and would often spend time with them, but 29% admitted never spending time with them. The overall level of interaction is low, as 54% of the sample admitted rarely or never hanging out with people from the other group and only 21% of the sample claimed to meet up frequently

Graph 4 *Quality of interaction (%)*



Source: Results based on fieldwork done by author

As for the interaction quality, most of the Lebanese respondents said that the interaction was often neither positive neither negative, which might be due to the fact that a lot of them admitted that they were not able to generalize and said that the interaction is positive with some Syrians and negative with others.: 30% rated the interaction as positive and around 18% as negative.

Almost 25% of Syrian refugees rated the interaction as very positive. Almost 40% said that it was neutral, so neither negative neither positive and that it depended on the attitude of the Lebanese. The pentagon figure (Graph 2) shows however a slightly more negative rating from the Lebanese than the Syrians, which could be seen as indicator of their attitudes or feelings towards the out-group.

It is important to take into account the fact that the research team noticed some sort of reservations in answering this question (Q13). Respondents seemed a bit sceptical about the purpose of the survey, and seemed not to want to discuss any negative sentiments they might have towards Syrians, responding by labelling their daily interactions as mostly 'very positive'. This is clear through the following questions where they were asked to assess / scale their emotions towards Syrians. As the interviews progressed, and the informants relaxed, they seemed more willing to express some negative sentiments, as they became more comfortable with the interviewer. We noticed our Syrian respondents were also a bit uncomfortable with these particular questions. Although it is hard to give evidence of this empirically, there was a sense that they had a feeling of obligation, or gratitude towards the Lebanese hosting them. In their case also, it was interesting that towards the end of the interview some admitted that they were actually discriminated against in some way or other by Lebanese. Yet they tried to reassure the interviewers that they did not wish to diminish their hosts, or portray them in a negative way. As well as reflecting how two communities manage to 'rub along' together, the reluctance to be critical may indicate the way that hierarchy and 'respect' are deeply embedded in most middle-eastern societies,

explaining both the Lebanese and Syrian refugees' attitudes to one another (Fieldwork notes, Tripoli, Lebanon, 2018).

5.2.2 Emotional Experience

Question 15 was inspired by Harb and Saab's report where they analyse the social cohesion in several towns in Lebanon, following their comment that: "Emotions tend to play important mediating roles between attitudes and collective action, and often constitute a motivational drive for action" (Harb and Saab, 2014:24). This assumes that shedding light on emotions that link or divide communities is a good indicator of the level of cohesion and that emotions are the main motives for action.

Graph 5[7] *Emotions towards each other*



Source: Results based on fieldwork done by author

As seen in Graph 5, positive emotions such as Sympathy, Respect and Affection towards the other community has been scaled at a slightly lower level by the Lebanese (so towards Syrians) than by Syrians. In other words, Syrians generally have somewhat more positive feelings towards Lebanese than the other way around. In fact, respect and affection were scaled at 4.43 and 4 respectively (weighted average) by the Syrians and at 3.74 and 2.9 by the Lebanese.

When asked about respect, 40% of respondents would say that they respect everyone (scale 4 and 5), and often explained that if a person respects themselves, then that person has to respect everybody. This again, as mentioned in the last section, seems something deeply rooted in the Lebanese, or Arab, society, where respect almost sounds like a sacred word and a lack of respect is deeply disapproved of. Interestingly, the difference between Syrians and Lebanese is greater when it comes to trust. Almost 40% of the host community said they did not trust the Syrian refugees at all (scale 1) while 28% of the Syrians said that they trust Lebanese to a certain extent. (Graph 5)

Surprisingly, perhaps because of pressures of poverty and disappointed expectations, the majority of participants said that they did not trust anyone, no matter what the other's nationality is. Whilst trust was generally low, especially for Lebanon, fear, anger and hatred were not defining qualities of the feelings of the two communities towards one another. It became clear during interviews that certain emotions are not easily expressed, and may even be considered taboo. The low levels

[7] The scale used goes from 'not at all (1)' to 'to a very big extent (5)'

of open expression of hatred, anger and fear are shown in Graph 5, where the scores were almost equally low for both groups.

A correlation with gender was noticed, where women seemed more open and positive towards the other group (both nationalities), as will be discussed below. Some Lebanese women did express higher levels of fear, but mentioned in comments that this was mainly towards 'Syrian Men"(Fieldwork notes, 27.07.2018, Tripoli, Lebanon). Syrian and Lebanese females showed slightly higher sign of positive emotions towards the 'other' group, and yet with women also, as with men, the level of overall trust remained low (2.31/5 for the Lebanese and 3/5 for the Syrians). Syrian women also show a particularly high level of respect towards the Lebanese hosting community with a weighted average score of 4.44/5.

Graph 6 *Women's emotional experience*



Source: Results based on fieldwork done by author

5.3 Mapping of Host Community-Refugee Tensions

This section covers the questions 16 and 17 and discusses perceptions of respondents regarding host community-refugee tensions in the neighbourhoods (See Appendix 2, Survey). A number of themes derived from the review of literature are used to organise this section. Starting with level of tension, and root causes of conflict, the section also covers others issues, from security threats and cultural difference to political history.

5.3.1 Level of tensions

When asked to rate the level of tensions between Syrian refugees and Lebanese in Tripoli, almost 42% of the surveyed population expressed their concerns about the high level of tensions between both communities. Only 1% of the overall sample do not see any conflict between Syrian refugees and Lebanese and 10% said that there are a few tensions but to a low extent.

Interestingly, as seen in graph 7 bellow, Lebanese perceptions seem to be more negative than the Syrians: 35% surveyed Syrian refugees recognize the high level of tensions but almost 24% of the sample see low or no tensions between the communities. Lebanese on the opposite almost all agree on the high level of tensions, as more than 60% of the host community sample gave a rate between 4 and 5 to the intensity of conflict.

Graph 7 *Perceptions on level of tension*



Source: Results based on fieldwork done by author

The majority of women (Lebanese and Syrians) agree that there are some tensions but to a lower extent than the majority of the sample (Rated as 3.7/5), which could be interpreted by their detachment from the actual city life. Most women see tensions as existing but is limited to men but consider that women are not interested or involved in such tensions. They also often expressed the view that there was some kind of solidarity from other women, regardless of their nationalities.

When this question (Q16) was asked, respondents were more comfortable and often did not hesitate to share their personal opinion on the other group. Despite the previous question results showing weak signs of **negative** emotions, most of the Lebanese expressed their anger against the refugee influx and the fact that their living conditions worsened since their arrival and that they feel threatened by the high presence of refugees. Although not captured in the previous question, Some Lebanese also voiced their anger towards the refugees, suggesting that they should return to Syria. (Fieldwork notes, Tripoli, Lebanon, 2018).

5.3.2 Root Causes

As respondents were more comfortable with the researchers, a question (question 17) about their perceptions on to what extent the following factors are source of conflict between the two communities: Most respondents agreed on the high impact of competition for livelihoods, the common political history on the intergroup relationship. Strain on infrastructure is also seen as impactful, culture and security to a lesser extent.

Cultural differences

Opinions differ on the cultural differences as being a cause for conflict. Most of the sample do not see it as a real threat to social cohesion, although some Lebanese claimed that Syrians have a different lifestyle which affects their relationships, while others state that Lebanon and Syria share the same values and culture which explains the low score of this factor (2.8/5). This outcome is correlated to the specific context of Tripoli which is geographically and culturally close to Syria.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the close ties of Tripoli and Syria and often family ties between its inhabitants and Syrians justify the low score attributed to this factor.

Graph 8 *Perceptions on Root causes of Tensions*



Source: Results based on fieldwork done by author

Competition for livelihoods

64% of the Lebanese claim that competition for livelihoods and particularly jobs is the main root cause of conflict and blame the Syrians for taking upon the available jobs because of their low wage requirements. Syrians also seem to feel the threat of the strain on livelihoods, as 35% of the surveyed said that it causes the tensions to a very big extent, and 14% (2 people) do not see it as causing any trouble at all.

Graph 9 *Competition for livelihoods*



Source: Results based on fieldwork done by author

Women also agree with the rest of the population, despite saying that it mostly concerns men, as they are the ones competing in the job market (according to Syrians and Lebanese females). No noticeable differences in opinions on the impact of this factor on social cohesion in age categories. Youth and older surveyed people all ranked it as the most relevant factor threatening peace in the city (Between 4.17 and 4.33/5 for all categories). Pressure on the limited resources is felt by the whole sample who mainly claimed that uncertainty of generating income and lack of resources increases their frustrations and therefore they often resort to violence in order to get what they need.

Political history of Lebanon and Syria

The Lebanese host community seems to be associating Syrian refugees to the Syrian regime that occupied the Lebanese territory for over 30 years. The displaced population also expressed that they were often discriminated because the host community would blame them for their country's politics. Politics is then the second highest rated root cause of the tensions in this survey, reaching almost 4/5.

Graph 10 *Prejudice based on Political History of Lebanon and Syria*



Source: Results based on fieldwork done by author

68% of the surveyed Lebanese cited that it affects their interactions with the refugee community to a big and very big extent, while only 18% disagree or agree but to a lower extent. 35% of the refugee group think that it affects to a certain extent, while 43% place it as a major cause of tensions (28.57 + 14.29). The older Lebanese generation (35+) who experienced the military occupation also confirmed this statement (61% for 'big and very big extent') and surprisingly the younger ones (18-24) also seem to feel the impact of politics into their social interactions with the different communities.

Two Syrian women shared their lack of awareness of the root cause and misunderstanding of the 'hate' between both populations. One of them blamed Syria's despotic regime for destroying any potential friendship between Lebanese and Syrians.

Security Threat

Both communities also agree on the fact that they do not particularly see a security threat as a cause for tensions (3.06). Some stated that they are used to live under threat and in unsafe conditions, and that it does affect their relationships but to a certain extent.

Syrians seem to be less affected by this factor than Lebanese (2.69 vs 3.11 respectively), which is justified by some statements by Lebanese who see the influx of refugees as an additional pressure on the country's security.

Opinions are divided on this matter, this might be due to the fact that security is interpreted differently: A few Lebanese females voiced out their fear towards Syrian men and that they do not feel safe around them, although 30% do not feel that this threat affects their relationship with Syrians. 37.5% of Syrian women do not place security threat as a root cause of tension ('Not at all') while the same ratio feel that it affects the cohesion to a big extent. The youth (18-24 year old) seem to feel more concerned about security issues than older ones, as it's rated 3.33 over 5 while labelled as a root cause to the tensions.

Strain on infrastructure

Strain on infrastructure also worsens the relationship between host and guest communities. 46% of the surveyed said it has a big or very big impact on tensions while 36% feel that it is a low

impact root cause. All categories (male, female, Syrian, Lebanese and age categories), agree on that factor and the overall given rate is 3.05/9, meaning that it affects social cohesion but to a lesser extent than water.

5.4 Job Market and Social Cohesion

As for the job market, residents of Tripoli believe that there are several factors that limit their access to it. Most of the surveyed population relies on temporary jobs or multiple short term jobs (43%), 25% have a full-time job, which is for most cases a low-skilled job and the rest relies on humanitarian assistance, partner and family support or stated not having any source of income.

When asked about the factors that limits their access to the job market (question 18), the lack of opportunity came as the primary cause, but also the lack of education or training followed by the nationality. Nationality was highly supported by Lebanese, stating that being Syrian is seen as advantage in the job market, because of low salary requirements. It is also supported by Syrians to a high extent as they voiced out a lot of discrimination when applying for jobs. According to the sample, gender is not an important factor affecting the decision to employ or not (weighted average of 2.55/5), although 4 male respondents felt that women were sometimes advantaged in the job market because of NGOs pressure. Some Lebanese men complained about the new wave of women that are willing to work for a lower wage, which increases the competition in the job market. In terms of wage discrimination, 83% of the respondents are aware of a wage discrimination in the country or an unfair difference in wages based on several factors such as nepotism.

In order to assess the Tripoli residents about their opinion on the role of employment and social cohesion, a first question (question 21) was asked about their experience in working with people from different nationalities, and if their opinion on the nationality has changed; followed by a general open ended question (question 22) and their willingness to work in mixed-nationality groups.

54% of the sample has worked with people from different nationalities before, 57% of the Syrians and 54% of the Lebanese. Half of the Lebanese admitted that it has changed their opinion on the other group in a positive way. 26% of the host community said that it changed in a negative way.A few specified that they enjoyed working with different people except for Syrians: their opinion on Syrian refugees has not changed or worsened when working with them. As for the Syrians, 62% did not experience a change of opinion and those who did, had a positive change in attitudes towards the other group.

When asked about their opinion on the relationship between social cohesion and a mixed-ethnicity workplace, **83%** of the Syrians and **92%** of the Lebanese confirmed the positive correlation. **35%** of the total sample justified the statement by saying that it would increase acceptance and open mindedness. **11%** said that it creates friendships and **4%** supported the fact that it is a good way for knowledge and cultural exchange. A few expressed their concerns on the fact that it depends on the personalities of the colleagues and not the nationality, or that cultural differences might weaken the social cohesion. These comments will be further analysed in the discussion section of this chapter (5.5).

Question 23 results revealed different attitudes towards working in mixed groups as seen in graph 11:

Graph 11

Working in a mixed team (1) | Under the supervision of a Lebanese or Syrian (2) | Leading a team of Syrians-Lebanese (3)



1 2 3

Source: Results based on fieldwork done by author

46% of the Syrians seem to be comfortable in working in an equal status Lebanese-Syrian team. Their attitudes are mostly positive or neutral when it comes to being supervised or trained by a Lebanese national, and indicated a high level of comfort with the idea leading a group of Lebanese. As for the Lebanese, the shape of the pentagon (Graph 11(1)) is leaning towards lower rates of comfort in the case of working in mixed groups (equal status), they are also very uncomfortable with having a Syrian superior (Graph 11 (2)) but quite comfortable in an opposite situation (leading a team of Syrians).

5.5 Discussion: Social Cohesion, Trust, Identity and Gender

The first section of the questionnaire revealed an intermediate level and low quality of intergroup contact, which is a clear indicator of a weak social cohesion amongst Lebanese and Syrian refugees, which may be increasing prejudice as suggested in chapter 3 through the contact hypothesis (Hypothesis 3).

In fact, the negative emotions that the groups feel towards one another seems to be stronger than the positive ones, and more particularly from the Lebanese side towards Syrian refugees. This illustrates the theory that suggests that locals tend to be more negative and have hostile attitudes towards new-comers, and particularly when in vulnerable living conditions. (Geisser, 2013)

In light of understanding the drivers of distrust, literature has proven that employment status is positively correlated to the feeling of trust towards an outgroup as stated by the world bank:

> Having, or not having, a job can influence how people view themselves in relation to others, with implications for values, attitudes, and behaviours. (World Bank, 2013)

However, as seen in the following table (Table 2), our findings narrate a negative correlation between those two variables.

Table 2 *Correlation Employment Level and Trust*

	employ~s	trust
employment~s	1.0000	
trust	-0.0863	1.0000

Source of income has been split into three categories: Unemployed, for those with no source of income, those who rely on family support. Semi-employed, for those who rely on part-time jobs, and fully-employed for those with full-time jobs. Trust was rated by the respondents, from a scale of 1 to 5, from very low to very high extent. The reasons why the correlation is negative are many and various but we should take into account that first, the sample is dominated by Lebanese so the results are biased: It seems that the more comfortable financially they are, the more distrust they feel towards the outgroup. Therefore contradicting Leigh's theory that suggests that the lower the income is the lower the trust levels are.

The following statement by a Lebanese restaurant manager could help us illustrate the discussed results: "I don't trust them. They are opportunistic and take our jobs" (Fieldwork notes, 08.08.2018). This respondent admitted not interacting with Syrians, and shows that outgroup may be perceived as a threat to his economic stability. The results show low correlation and are statistically insignificant (see Appendix 3), which leads us to test another variable that may affect the trust levels: Level of interaction or contact. The same comment may also imply that when someone has a full-time job, he or she may have less time or interest to interact with Syrian refugees or the other way around. Another explanation could be in the power dynamics or social class sphere: Someone who has a stable or full-time job in a setting where most people are financially unstable, may feel superior to the rest of the population, and particularly those from a different community or nationality.

In fact, when the correlation between level of contact and trust was tested, the following results were displayed:

Table 3 *Correlation Frequency of Interactions and Trust*

	lvoint~t	trust
lvointeract	1.0000	
trust	0.0894	1.0000

The results show a positive and weak correlation. This may confirm the contact hypothesis mentioned in chapter 3, that shows that the higher intergroup contact, the higher intergroup trust is. Increased interactions decreases negative prejudice and therefore affects trust and social cohesion on a longer term. However, the low correlation may indicate the fact that intergroup contact in the case of Syrian and Lebanese, may not be as effective as the literature suggests.

Other factors may affect the bias. In fact, the younger part of our sample seems to have more positive interactions with the other community. 20% of the 18-24 age category, and 4% of the 25-

34 evaluated the interactions as negative, against 30% for the 35 and older categories. This may imply that age has an impact on social interactions in this context. Age differences means different experiences, and different upbringing context. The younger generation (18-24) was too young or not even born during the Syrian occupation, we could then question the persistence of the negative prejudice, if not based on experience, then the influence of the community they belong to and wonder if political belonging trumps their personal thoughts and fuels their attitudes.

Another factor that may cause differentiations in trust levels and interactions is the gender. In fact, women seem more positive towards the outgroup than male. 48% of them admitted having good and positive interactions with other women. However, most of them revealed not going out much and that their intergroup contacts are limited to grocery stores and pharmacies. This allows the researcher to explore the gender dimensions in their study. Women are often placed in their socially constructed reproductive roles in this area and men in productive tasks, such being the breadwinners of households. Their level of education is low, and they rarely contribute to household's income. Their interactions with other groups are often limited and therefore their attitudes and emotions are far more positive than males. However, their grievances evolve around the lack of financial stability and access to education to their children. Two single mothers, both illiterate and living in extreme poverty, revealed that their 8 year old sons were the bread winners of the households, and that they couldn't go to school. Here again, the values and social pressure limits any possible empowerment of women, which impacts the social capital of the city. Despite NGOs' efforts to provide women with spaces where they could learn or get vocational trainings, social norms overlaps their will in this context.

On another note, during the pilot session, the NGO worker strongly advised the research team not to refer to religion in any of the questions. Sectarianism may be one of the main cause for tensions in this neighbourhood but bringing the topic up as an outsider might make the respondents question the neutrality of the researcher and the purpose of the survey. The informants live under the control of religious leaders and a fear of being judged was felt. Nevertheless, the researchers were aware of the respondents religions, because of the segregated neighbourhoods. For example, when discussing with Lebanese from Jabal Mohsen (predominantly Allawite), the researcher noticed their affection to the Syrian Regime and therefore the refugees belonging to the Allawite community. In fact, one young Lebanese respondent commented "If they (the Syrian) support Assad, like us the Allawites, then I would befriend them" (Lebanese respondent from Jabal Mohsen, Fieldwork notes, 20.08.2018). This shows the impact of religious identity in social relations, but also politics, as religion and political affiliation seem inseparable in our case. This leads the research to wonder if social class would trump religion identity? Would a Lebanese Allawite disregard the negative prejudice on Syrian refugees if they belonged to the same religious group? This respondent might not be an isolated case, however the findings are not specific (in terms of religion) enough to make generalisations on the role of religion in the cohesion. As mentioned above, religion and politics are interlinked and therefore political affiliation may be equated to religion in our context, but yet, drawing conclusions will not be possible for this factor.

Another aspect that deserves attention is the link between prejudice and conflict. As seen in chapter 2, prejudices may be a leading driver of conflict. In fact, our sample perceive the tensions as being rooted as much in competition for jobs as political history prejudice. Interestingly, Interestingly, the Lebanese respondents seem more aware of the impact of prejudice than Syrians. Which confirms the positive correlation between prejudice and conflict, as defended by Alport (1954), mitigating discrimination and scapegoating and prejudice and stereotyping, as seen in Chapter 2.

> "Lebanese are blaming Syrian men for what our government did in Lebanon in the past" (Syrian Women, 28.08.2018, Bab El Tabaneh, Tripoli)

> "We did not have enough water and electricity before the Syrians arrived. And now that they're here, we can barely survive. I do not like them because their presence is threatening the satisfaction of our need" - (Lebanese man, Fieldwork notes, 08.08.2018, Bab el Tabaneh, Tripoli)

These comments show the impact of politics and scarcity of livelihoods as a direct cause of conflict and pressure on social cohesion in the neighbourhood. In fact, both groups seem to agree on the underlining dynamics of conflict. These factors seem to be limiting any positive impact an inclusive employment policy may have on social cohesion in Tripoli. This is could be seen in the results allocated to the social cohesion and jobs section (questions 21, 22 and 23) of the questionnaire. Opinions are diverse but seem to narrate the fact that Lebanese do not want to cooperate with Syrians, for the reasons stated above, which may indicate the strength of the prejudice. Indeed, several Lebanese respondents agreed with the statement that working together brings cohesion in a multicultural setting. However, they insisted on the Syrian refugees-Lebanese exception. One of the respondents also mentioned that social cohesion will always be threatened by the involvement of politicians or warlords in the neighbourhoods; which is something that needs to be taken into consideration in this assumption.



Table 4

> "My experience in the NGO world showed me that when you give people what they're missing, in an inclusive and 'equal way' then there is no reason to fight anymore; unless the warlords get involved again." (Lebanese NGO worker, 08.08.2018, Tripoli, Lebanon)

> "Working together will stop conflicts - you get used to being around them and stop seeing them as "the others"" (Syrian respondent, 28.08.2018, Tripoli, Lebanon)

> **"**My opinion changed towards Egyptians, I thought they were different but working with them proved me wrong. However, this doesn't apply to Syrians, working with them confirmed everything that I thought of them" (Comment during Survey, 09.08.2018, Tripoli, Lebanon).

These statements collected through the open-ended question (question 22) and coded as seen in table 4 enhance the Syrian refugee – Host Community exception to Alport and others' contact theories. The fact that Syrians and Lebanese have been interacting for a large amount of years, whether through the Syrian military occupation of Lebanon, through the 90s wave of Syrian workers migration to Lebanon or more recently with the influx of Syrian refugees or through business or family ties.

What is also relevant to the dynamics is the role of current politics and their implications in the city's social affairs. As the NGO worker mentioned 'Unless the warlords get involved again'. As seen in chapter 2, Tripoli has been constantly subjected to intercommunity violence, led by political parties, using the Allawite and Sunni neighbourhoods as a battlefield. This may indicate that whatever peace-building policy has to be implemented, it has to take involve the stakeholders of the city, who have the power to turn things over.

The last question (question 23), testing their willingness to work together, the results imply that Lebanese are not comfortable when placed in an equal position job as Syrian refugees. They are however, contented with the idea of supervising a team of Syrians. This final question, shows that whether this is a question of identity as suggested in much of the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, but also the fact they've known each other and the prejudices are so deeply rooted that they define the relationships and breaking them through employment policies with equal status jobs would not work.

5.6 Conclusion

To conclude, it seems from this study that intergroup contact does not necessarily improve intergroup cohesion or alleviate tensions. Our sample does show clear tensions between the communities, which are rooted in political divisions. These tensions are informed by prejudices but also exacerbated by the lack of resources and employment opportunities of both communities. Income indicators show very low levels throughout the whole sample, and this can help to explain why non-locals are seen as competitors and not contributors to the economy. In order to answer Kilroy and others' assumptions on the relationship between employment policies and social cohesion, this did not apply well to the case of Syrians and Lebanese in Tripoli. What this empirical study shows is that regardless of their need to work, or of employment empowerment projects, the Lebanese community of Tripoli are almost as vulnerable as the newcomers. Whilst job creation may keep an uneasy peace, any employment policy even it if benefits both equally is not seen as fair to the host community, and will not alter the opinion of the Lebanese towards the economic impact of Syrian refugees on their own welfare. Economic interest and profit seem to be trumped by identity and social class.

Chapter 6 Conclusion

Economic competition, strains on livelihoods, prejudices, and identity politics all seem to have a place in this conflict analysis. The context and theories presented and tested in this study have shown that the complexity of the country's history and current structure, makes it almost impossible to draw clear or definite conclusions. However, the findings support the idea that conflict is a result of a lack of reconciliation or conflict resolution mechanisms that escalate into sectarian or nationalistic implications and are exacerbated by the pressure on local services.

To untangle the root causes of the intercommunity tensions in today's Lebanon, it was decided to go through extensive research and data collection. The findings suggested that the most 'obvious' reason for discrimination against Syrians was competition for livelihoods among almost equally poor hosts and refugees. Another factor, which covered up this economic competition, was the expression, indirectly, of deeply-rooted negative prejudices that the Lebanese acquired throughout their history towards Syrians in general.

The first conclusion is that Lebanon's complex history and strong ties with Syria help to define the relationship between the local population, reinforcing tensions rooted in competition for livelihood. In a poor urban settings such as Tripoli, this sense of competition was palpable in the survey responses, especially from the Lebanese side.

To create conditions where the selected theories could be applied, the researcher tested three hypotheses that together suggest that inclusive employment opportunities could improve social cohesion and decrease vulnerabilities to conflict. Moreover, the researcher linked those hypotheses to the particular context in which this study took place. Evidence that would support the hypotheses would include intergroup cooperation, relatively equal status and backing through a legal framework provided by the government. Other indicators could include economic interdependency, without much competition between groups, and a relative lack of inter-group prejudice or fear.

Another conclusion was that trust does not equate with peace. In Chapter 3 this was explored through the literature, and this was also one of the hypotheses. The findings in Chapter 5 suggested that trust can be low, even where negative emotions like hate are not high. Interventions which work to increase trust are sometimes assumed to decrease tensions. However in societies like Lebanon (or in other societies like Northern Ireland or India) where the region has been affected by sectarian violence historically, and where political leaders have mobilised the population along sectarian lines, trust-building may not be enough for peace-building.

What is distinctive about this study and perhaps this town, is how Syrian refugees and Lebanese do live on the same streets and do associate, not only in work, but also in cafes, and especially among men. This may explain why indicators of anger and fear are low. This does not imply equality between the two communities, even though both are poor and competing for work and livelihoods. It does mean that despite Syrians being victims of discrimination, there is not the hostility that has been found in other studies of the situation in other cities. Perhaps the key lesson is that more local studies are needed in future to provide a more nuanced understanding of how Lebanon works, and how Syrians have been received by the Lebanese host communities.

As seen in Chapter 1, the intended goals of this study were both academic and practice-oriented. In particular, the hope was to address NGOs and humanitarian practitioners working on peace-building and refugee issues. I conclude that livelihood provision interventions alone do not provide long-term solutions. Rather these are part of thinking of refugees' presence as a perpetual 'emergency'. The solution is that those designing peace-building should be more conflict-sensitive

and be aware of dividers and connectors, analysing the way in which interventions could promote social cohesion.

It is hoped that this study has provided a 'deeper look' at the root causes of prejudice and fear that can potentially make conflict – including violent conflict – more likely in future. To be sustainable, interventions in an area like Tripoli should take into account the setting in which social change is being implemented. Since each region in Lebanon has its own particular demographic, history, historical trajectory and even identity, generalisations should be avoided about what can work and where. Even in the case of this paper, the conclusions are mostly confined to Tripoli, and may not apply in Beirut or in the Bekaa Valley. To avoid exacerbating tensions in vulnerable contexts, NGOs should avoid becoming dividers themselves, and should ensure that they become connectors. Therefore no generalised conclusions about Lebanon as a whole, let alone the Middle East, can be drawn from this single case study of Tripoli.

This study was inspired by researcher's personal experience of having a Syrian mother, yet growing up in Lebanon surrounded by negative prejudices towards Syrians. The research results revealed the importance of tackling prejudices as a priority when implementing peacebuilding project. In fact, the researcher's most surprising findings were the youth's attitudes, transmitted not through school – since the school curriculum does not include modern history of the region – but from their parents. This is a worrying aspect of Lebanese society, with potential implications for memories of war, and how attitudes towards previous events prejudice a new generation. It can be suggested that further study could help tackle this issue of inter-generational transmission of attitudes rooted in past relations with historical 'enemies'.

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Appendix 1 Map - Registered Syrian Refugees in Lebanon

Source: UNHCR, 2018.



Appendix 2 The Survey questionnaire

Question 1

What is your nationality?

i) Lebanese

ii) Syrian

iii) Other

Question 2

Please state your Gender

i) Male ii) Female iii) Other

Question 3

How old are you?

Question 4

What is your marital status?

i) Single ii) Married iii) Divorced iv) Widow/widower

Question 5

How many children do you have?

Question 6

What is the highest education level you attended?

i. Other
ii. None (Illetrate)
iii. Primary school
iv. Secondary School (Post-Brevet)
v. High School
vi. Technical school or Vocational Training
vii. University (B.A)
viii. Master's

Question 7 (For Syrians only)

How long have you been in Lebanon for?

Question 8 (For Syrians only)

Did you work before coming to Lebanon ?

i. Yes

ii. No

If Yes – Please specify your job

Question 9 (For Syrians only)

Was it your main source of income?

i. Yes
ii. No

Question 10

What are your current sources of income?

i. Full-time Employment

ii. Temporary employment (seasonal or short term)

iii. Humanitarian assistance (in-kind and in cash)

iv. Full-Time Employment + Humanitarian assistance

v. Temporary Employment + Humanitarian assistance

vi. None

vii. Other – please specify --

Question 11

If employed: What field of work are you currently employed in ? (= What's your job title)

Question 12

To which frequency do you encounter Syrians/Lebanese in the town?

Never (1)	Rarely (2)	Often (3)	Very Often (4)	Frequently (5)

Question 13

To which frequency do you spend time with Syrians/Lebanese living in town?

Never (1)	Rarely (2)	Often (3)	Very Often (4)	Frequently (5)

Question 14

How would you rate the quality of the interaction (if any)?

Extremely negative (1)	Negative (2)	Neutral (3)	Positive (4)	Extremely Positive (5)

Question 15

On a scale from 1 to 5, to what extent do you feel the following towards Syrian refugees/Lebanese ?

Fear	1	2	3	4	5
Sympathy	1	2	3	4	5
Anger	1	2	3	4	5
Respect	1	2	3	4	5
Hatred	1	2	3	4	5
Affection	1	2	3	4	5
Trust	1	2	3	4	5

Question 16

How would you rate the tensions between Syrian refugees and Lebanese?

1	2	3	4	5

Question 17

To what extent do you see the following factors as a root cause of the tensions?

Cultural Differences	1	2	3	4	5
Competition for livelihoods	1	2	3	4	5
Political History	1	2	3	4	5
Security threat	1	2	3	4	5
Strain on infrastructure	1	2	3	4	5

Question 18

To what extent do the following factors limit your chances of getting a job?

a. Gender	1	2	3	4	5
b. Nationality	1	2	3	4	5
c. Lack of skills training (job related)	1	2	3	4	5
d. Lack of education	1	2	3	4	5
e. Cultural differences with employer or co-worker	1	2	3	4	5
f. Lack of job opportunities	1	2	3	4	5

Any comments?

_____

Question 19

Do you think that some groups earn less than others for the same type of job?

i. Yes
ii. No

Question 20

If yes, on what characteristic is the differentiation based?

i. Gender
ii. Nationality
iii. Religion
iv. Other

Question 21

Have you ever worked with someone from a different community?

i. Yes ii. No

If Yes - Did your perception on the other community change?

i. Yes ii. No

If Yes - How ?

i. Extremely positive
ii. Positive
iii. Neutral
iv. Negative
v. Extremely negative

Question 22

Do you think that working with people from another community increases the social cohesion between both communities?

_____

Question 23

On a scale from 1 to 5, how comfortable would you be in the following situations:

1-Not comfortable at all 2- Not comfortable 3-Neutral 4-Comfortable 5-Very comfortable

Working in a mixed-team (Lebanese and Syrian Refugees) on an equal status basis	1	2	3	4	5
Having a Lebanese/Syrian supervisor	1	2	3	4	5
Receiving training from a Lebanese/Syrian	1	2	3	4	5
Being the supervisor of a Lebanese/Syrian	1	2	3	4	5

Appendix 3 Fieldwork Locations

Photo 1

Photo 2

Photo 3

Photo 4

Photo 1: **27.07.2018** - Author interviewing middle aged Lebanese men on Syria street, Tripoli, Lebanon.

Photo 2: **08.08.2018** - Research Team interviewing Syrian and Lebanese in the Vegetable Market

Photo 3: **09.08.2018** - Research Team interviewing Lebanese young men in Bab el Tabaneh

Photo 4: **29.08.2018** - Research Team interviewing Lebanese and Syrian women at March[8]'s cultural café on Syria street, Tripoli Al-Tabaneh, Lebanon.

[8] Local NGO

Appendix 4 Regression Employment Status, Trust

employment~s	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
trust	-.0472679	.0584795	-0.81	0.421	-.1635022	.0689664
_cons	1.130285	.1547222	7.31	0.000	.8227581	1.437812