ACHIEVING PEACE AND SECURITY IN A WORLD OF TURMOIL

An Arduous Challenge for the OIC

SESRIC

ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION

STATISTICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH AND TRAINING CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC COUNTRIES

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Preface

The OIC, since its inception in 1969, has been working assiduously to promote global peace, stability, harmony, security, and development. The OIC stature and influence rest heavily on the fundamental principle of Islamic solidarity and fraternity, which bring together the Ummah to strive for the common good. Promoting the welfare of Muslim communities also remain high on the OIC's agenda for promotion of peace, harmony, and stability.

As this report points out; almost 60 per cent of current worldwide conflicts occur in OIC countries. These conflicts lurk in the shadows of fear and frustration, breeding on despair and disillusionment, fed by poverty and extremism. Conflicts of our times are manifestations of growing anger, hatred and sense of helplessness, injustice, oppression and the denial of fundamental freedoms and rights. The consequences of the raging violence in OIC countries has been devastating. It is a human tragedy that has taken its toll on people's lives. More than 80% of global conflict fatalities and almost 90% of global terrorism fatalities have taken place in OIC countries. Millions of people have been forced to leave their homes. Two third of the world refugees originate from OIC countries. In addition, certain Muslim minorities and communities living in non-OIC countries are in conflict situation or facing security challenges.

The conflict situation described above, the level and frequency of perpetrations and an unabated spread is a matter of grave concern and warrants for our collective approach and strategy. The OIC Member States collectively and unanimously stand united in realizing the seriousness of this challenge and are forthcoming in doing whatever is required to be done to confront it even-handedly. It also calls for employing all the potentials of the OIC as an organization in resolution of conflicts and in establishing enduring peace. The OIC along with its specialized, subsidiary and affiliated institutions, with its global presence, and with its comparative advantages has indeed great potential to meet the expectations of the Ummah.

I am confident that this report of SESRIC will enlighten our understanding of the concepts and methodologies of establishing peace and security, and through its objective information and analyses, will contribute in devising appropriate policies and strategies that will enable OIC countries to successfully address the security challenges they face.

Dr. Yousef A. Al-Othaimeen
Secretary General
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation

Foreword

The OIC has proven to be one of the most successful project of the Islamic World, but this project has some difficulties in responding to the increasing security challenges of the 21st century. The founding principles of OIC calls for good neighborly relations, stability and prosperity as the main political priorities. However, the OIC region become less peaceful over the last 10 years and remains vulnerable to various contemporary threats. For that reason, more than ever, common responses are needed to secure peace and stability of the OIC Member Countries.

In today's OIC region, most security threats can be addressed only through regional or international cooperation. Stronger security dialogue and partnerships will not only enable the OIC governments to effectively tackle security issues, but will also lay the ground for resolving bilateral disputes and moving on towards a prosperous future.

This report focuses on changes in the OIC security environment and the resulting new challenges, mostly related to preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. It intends to contribute to the OIC's efforts in de-escalating tensions in and around its member countries. The report brings better understanding on the drivers and impacts of current security challenges and on the existing security architecture of the OIC. It points out to means and methods, and the best practices related to facilitating political dialogue and engaging in mediation activities that would help the OIC to achieve its full potential in addressing security challenges.

The modern goal of conflict resolution is to identify and eliminate the root causes, thus transform a system that encourages conflict and ensure a change. In this context, the report calls for greater solidarity among OIC member countries and advocates an approach that goes beyond building partnerships only at the governmental level. Efforts of strengthening the capacity of the OIC to more effectively deal with the complex security issues must be supported by building new and innovative partnerships with non-governmental actors, including civil society, private sector and media.

SESRIC will continue to invest its efforts in collecting and disseminating insights, best practices, lessons learned in conflict resolution, thus promote more security, which will eventually result in more economic prosperity of the OIC Member Countries.

I hope that you will enjoy reading the report and benefit from its findings.

Amb. Musa Kulaklıkaya
Director General
SESRIC

Acknowledgement

Executive Summary

Islam is a religion of peace and tolerance, constantly taking the side of world peace and global justice. Many OIC cities are meeting places for different ethnic groups and religious traditions, where over the course of centuries people have developed capacity for coexistence, trust and sensitivity to others. However, over the last few decades some OIC countries have passed through the challenges of which they need a long time to recover from.

Contrary to popular belief, the world today is living its most peaceful times in contemporary history, with conflicts, violence and causalities all on the decline. Unfortunately, the world peacefulness is not reflected in OIC countries, where the number of conflicts is showing an upward trend. Currently more than 60% of all conflict in the world occur in OIC countries, of which the overwhelming majority are internal conflicts. The main characteristic of these conflicts is the existence of opposition to the political, economic or ideological system of the state, causing many armed groups to engage in a violent struggle to bring about a change to the system; thus leading to the spectrum of terrorism. It is heart-breaking to note that terrorism today is associated to a large degree with OIC countries, where 76% of all terrorist attacks happen. It is also heart-breaking to observe that violence in OIC countries has had overwhelming results spanning from the loss of lives to displacement and economic and development losses.

Prevention is the least costly way to avoid the consequences of conflicts. To prevent conflicts, there is a need to understand their drivers and then eliminate them. The drivers and impacts of conflicts are not independent from each other. They are intertwined and in many cases, the lines between the drivers and the impacts of conflicts are obscure. Chief among conflict drivers and impacts is inequality, which plagues many OIC countries. When social differences coincide with economic and political differences between groups, the result is deep resentment that may lead to violent struggles. Human development is another central theme in conflict drivers and impacts discussions. A larger share of OIC countries remain at the low levels of human development compared to other country groups. Majority of OIC countries with low human development levels have suffered or have been suffering major conflicts.

Political and social exclusion can also be powerful motivators of upheaval leading to conflict. In OIC countries, the level of political participation as well as political and social integration is rather weak. This fact has rendered OIC countries vulnerable to unrest, as has been seen in a number of OIC countries particularly since 2011 which is the beginning of the so-called Arab Spring. Furthermore, conflict onsets since the mid-1990s have occurred in weak states that have experienced conflict repeatedly, with violence restarting. Weak institutions are not just

one of the driver of conflicts; they have also been the outcome of violent conflicts and fragility. Unfortunately, many OIC countries suffer from weak states and poor governance.

One of the major missions of the OIC is to promote international peace and harmony among various people of the world. Achieving this requires the OIC to be actively involved in conflict resolution and mediation. In this domain, the OIC is aided by a number of assets it possesses, which are: cultural competency, moral power, and partnership. The OIC has a number of accomplishments of extending its good offices to mediate in various disputes such as in Sudan & Chad, Afghanistan, Southern Philippines and Southern Thailand. The OIC paid special attention to support international efforts aiming at establishing peace and security in Somalia and restoring rule of law in Mauritania and Guinea. It also played a role in trying to end the sectarian strife in Iraq in 2006.

When examining the history of the OIC mediation and conflict resolution, one can observe many things that went right and many things that went wrong. There are many lessons to be learned from them. From the OIC experience in the Southern Philippines we learned the importance of implementation and the pitfalls of leaving early. From the OIC experience in Thailand and China we learned the significance of the "ethnic kin" factor and how it should always be on the mind of the mediator as it could play either a negative or positive role. We have learned that when genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity have occurred; it is vital for the OIC to balance between the principles of sovereignty and inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of states and the principle of Responsibility to Protect. We have learned the importance of NGOs and that sometimes a combination of official and non-official efforts is the best formula.

We have learned from the "War on Terror" that the OIC must encourage dialogue and engagement even when parties to a conflict are throwing around the label of terrorism. We have learned that resolving disputes in a timely manner before the number of parties grows is of paramount importance. We have learned that OIC has leverage; however, the OIC must use leverage, influence, and incentives wisely without false promises. Identifying where the spoiler problem resides and managing it is a lesson the OIC has learned the hard way from one of its disappointing experiences. From the case of Myanmar we learned the benefits of cooperating with the UN and OSCE and mediation could benefit from coordination and information sharing; and finally, we learned that the OIC needs to increase its capacity in regard to models and proposals for innovative approaches in power sharing and wealth sharing among many other fields.

The OIC peace and security architecture flows from the OIC Charter which aims at promoting inter-state relations, based on justice, mutual respect and good neighborliness to ensure global peace, security and harmony. The OIC peace and security architecture consists of four major components. The PSCU is the support unit within the OIC for peace, security, mediation and conflict resolution. The Wise Person's Council is composed of persons having wide recognition in the Muslim World as leaders, who are respected for their wisdom, experience, knowledge, sagacity, sound judgment and ability to provide guidance. The institution of

Special Envoys of the Secretary General is the extension of the good offices of the Secretary General and ensures OIC's presence in the field. The Special Envoys are experts chosen by the Secretary General from the Member States' political, diplomatic or scholarly fields depending on the issue for which the special envoys will be appointed. Complementing the above components of the OIC peace and security architecture are three initiatives: the Initiative on Islamic Rapprochement; the OIC Contact Group on Peace and Conflict Resolution; and the Contact Group on OIC Friends of Mediation

For the peace and security architecture of the OIC to fulfil its promise, it has to be fully functionalized and the components have to work with each other in an integrated and synchronized manner. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The Wise Person's Council has only been used once on a specific topic that is OIC reform. The governance of the Council is not clear. The number of members of the Wise Person's Council, currently four, is low and needs expansion. Equally critical is the fact that there does not seems to be strong linkages established between the Wise Person's Council on the one hand, and the PSCU and the Special Envoys on the other hand.

The PSCU is important for its own right and is also important because it provides support services to other components of the OIC peace and security architecture. However, the capacity of the PSCU is limited. The PSCU needs human resources as well as financial resources in order to function more effectively. The PSCU unit is expected to utilize the Network of Think Tanks for getting the scholarly and strategic analyses of conflict situation and recommendations for OIC's engagement. However, the network needs to be expanded and fully functionalized

The OIC peace and security architecture lacks an overall and primary organ for overseeing peace and security issues. For example, the United Nations has the UN Security Council. Under the United Nations Charter, the UN Security Council is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. The African Union has the Peace and Security Council. The Peace and Security Council is the standing organ of the African Union for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. Another missing component in the OIC peace and security architecture is a peace force. A peace force is needed to provide security and the political and peacebuilding support to help countries make the difficult, early transition from conflict to peace. For example, the United Nations has the UN Peacekeeping while the African Union has the African Standby Force. The last component that is missing from the OIC peace and security architecture is an early warning system. An early warning system is a necessity for the OIC so that conflicts can be reported in a timely fashion. A timely warning will lead to timely actions.

Overall, OIC's mediation mechanisms need to be more inclusive, considerate of local customs and practices of member states, and sensitive towards the particular context of the conflict. One way to make peace processes more inclusive is to involve religious actors and institutions in peace making and peace building processes owing to their unique role in any society. Since, Islam as a religion that promotes non-violence and peace building, a growing body of

literature argues that conflict resolution techniques rooted in Islamic customs and laws can prove effective for the resolution of contemporary conflicts. In addition to utilizing religious customs and traditions in peace building, more attention needs to be paid to OIC countries with positive experiences of conflict prevention, resolution, recovery and peace building supporting peace initiatives that are ongoing in conflicted areas. This can enable OIC states and institutions to share knowledge and best practices when it comes to the promotion of peace, sustainable development and stability in conflict-prone countries.

The OIC should also consider developing a security strategy, which will offer its comparative advantages, set expectations that the OIC can deliver upon, and guide the OIC's conflict resolution and peace-building policies in the years to come. The strategy should lend general support to more intensive security cooperation in the OIC area, which is not only needed for improving security, but also necessary for improving the wellbeing of member states and their citizens. Preventing conflicts, countering terrorism and the peaceful resolution of bilateral disputes should be among the basic aims of the strategy, while taking also into account the "responsibility to protect", in order to be able to contribute in protecting populations from mass atrocity crimes.

Finally, governments of OIC Member States have to realize that they have responsibilities towards each other and that they have many challenges in common. With deepening of security cooperation, the OIC have a good chance to consolidate stability as well as boost economic development of its member states.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Islam is a religion of peace. This is evident from the name "Islam" which is derived from the Arabic root "*sa-la-ma,* سَلَمَ" which refers to peace and security. The Holy Qur'an emphasizes that all belivers are brothers and that if a dispute erupts between them, it is the duty of believers to settle the dispute[1] (Qur'an, 49:10). The Holy Qur'an establishes the principle that conflicts should be resolved and not allowed to carry on "*And if two factions among the believers should fight, then make settlement between the two*; b*ut if one of them oppresses the other, then fight against the one that oppresses until it returns to the ordinance of Allah. And if it returns, then make settlement between them in justice and act justly. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly*"[2] (Qur'an 49:9). The Holy Qur'an's message of peace is echoed by Mohammad, the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, who says: "*You will not enter Paradise until you believe and you will not believe until you love each other. Shall I show you something that, if you did, you would love each other? Spread peace between yourselves*"[3] (Sahih Muslim, 1/74, no: 54).

We live in world where the number of conflicts are dropping and their lethality are in decline compared to the last century. However, this brings little comfort to OIC countries who are bucking the trends. The number of conflicts in OIC countries are on the rise and so are their

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[1] إِنَّمَا الْمُؤْمِنُونَ إِخْوَةٌ فَأَصْلِحُوا بَيْنَ أَخَوَيْكُمْ وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ لَعَلَّكُمْ تُرْحَمُونَ

[2] وَإِنْ طَائِفَتَانِ مِنَ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ اقْتَتَلُوا فَأَصْلِحُوا بَيْنَهُمَا ۖ فَإِنْ بَغَتْ إِحْدَاهُمَا عَلَى الْأُخْرَىٰ فَقَاتِلُوا الَّتِي تَبْغِي حَتَّىٰ تَفِيءَ إِلَىٰ أَمْرِ اللَّهِ ۚ فَإِنْ فَاءَتْ فَأَصْلِحُوا بَيْنَهُمَا بِالْعَدْلِ وَأَقْسِطُوا ۖ إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ الْمُقْسِطِينَ

[3] لَا تَدْخُلُوا الْجَنَّةَ حَتَّى تُؤْمِنُوا، وَلَا تُؤْمِنُوا حَتَّى تَحَابُّوا، أَوَلَا أَدُلُّكُم عَلَى شَيْءٍ إِذَا فَعَلْتُمُوهُ تَحَابَبْتُم؟ أَفْشُوا السَّلَامَ بَيْنَكُم

intensity. The consequences of the ranging conflicts and violence on human lives, infrastructure and economies have reached tragic levels. As a result; countering violent extremism, preventing conflicts before they occur, resolving conflicts when they happen, achieving security and promoting lasting peace becomes a priority of the highest order for the OIC and its Member Countries.

In the above described environment, the OIC has a major role and responsibility to play in establishing peace and security. This is in fact engrained in the DNA of the OIC. In the OIC's Charter, the Member States of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation expressed their determination: "to preserve and promote the lofty values of peace, compassion, tolerance, equality, justice and human dignity as well as to contribute to international peace and security" and "to contribute to international peace and security, understanding and dialogue among civilizations, cultures and religions and promote and encourage friendly relations and good neighbourliness, mutual respect and cooperation." Also, the OIC Ten Year Program of Action identified conflict situations as a major challenge facing the Muslim world and called for ''strengthening the role of the OIC in conflict prevention, confidence building, peace keeping, conflict resolution and post conflict rehabilitations in OIC Member States as well as in conflict situations involving Muslim communities."

The OIC Ten Year Program of Action is now superseded by the OIC-2025 Program of Action. The OIC-2025 Program of Action has taken stock of the peace and security situation in the OIC geography. In response, the OIC - according to the 2025 Program of Action - "has been developing mechanisms for effectively addressing important matters concerning peace and security, conflict prevention, mediation, and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Alongside, strengthening the existing mechanisms for the purpose of capacity building of the OIC personnel is necessary in promoting negotiating skills, election monitoring and other related subjects."

The goals of the OIC in the peace and security domain are quite clear and are outlined in the OIC-2025 Program of Action which states the following two goals:

- Strengthen the bonds of Islamic Solidarity to promote peace, security, friendship and understanding in the Islamic world and beyond.

- Enhance the role of the OIC in peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy, promotion of dialogue and mediation.

In light of the above, this report has been prepared by SESRIC in collaboration with the Peace, Security and Conflict Resolution Unit (PSCU) at the OIC General Secretariat. This report delves into the trends of violence and conflict in OIC countries, and their driving factors and implications. The report goes beyond explanations to probing the required ingredients for conflict prevention and management in OIC countries, enhancing the OIC peace and security architecture, developing Institutional Mechanisms for Sustainable Peace and Security in OIC Countries, and exploring alternative paths for achieving enduring peace.

CHAPTER TWO

Radicalism and Violent Extremism in OIC Countries: A Threat to Peace and Security

The world's efforts to maintain international peace and security have been undermined by terrorism, radicalism and violent extremism. Over the last two decades, the world has experienced many terrorist attacks. This has made people live in constant fear. The rise of radicalism, terrorism and violent extremism has also led to political, economic, social and environmental damage. This phenomenon increased the need to build a more effective and pragmatic system of international peace such that terrorists will find it very difficult to operate at the micro and macro-levels.

Contemporary approaches for tackling security issues require a coherent multi-dimensional approach, in which countering radicalism, terrorism and violent extremism can be emphasised as one of the key elements for maintaining peace, security and stability. This chapter starts with historical and contemporary trends of radicalism, violent extremism and the phenomena of terrorism in OIC countries. It then analyses best practices for countering radicalism and violent extremism with the objective of maintaining peace and security in OIC countries. The chapter also addresses the importance of social media in preventing and countering radicalism, violent-extremism and terrorism.

2.1. Historical and Contemporary Trends in OIC Countries

Radicalism and violent extremism have a long history, but their systematic analysis have a short past. At the beginning of the 20th century, anarchist movements turned to violent

terrorist tactics. They saw their actions as a means for polarizing the population. The activists of the time defined themselves as terrorists, as a direct challenge to the authority of the state and its systems of management and criminalization of violence. In the ideological realm, Marxism was the primary ideological challenger to the primacy of western style capitalism and liberal democracy. It was adopted by a range of terrorist groups (i.e. The New People's Army (NPA) in the Philippines) to varying degrees by using the powerful narrative: eradicate the hegemonic economic system and cultural superstructures (Rapoport, 2006).

Self-determination (or nationalism) was another prominent doctrine throughout the 20th century, when anti-colonial mass movements and violent radical groups were challenging colonial powers. Particularly, after World War II, the use of violent action in support of self-determination became widespread through the targeting of military and colonial institutions. The principle of self-determination was based on the belief in identifiable collective identities -usually ethnic and/or cultural- as the basis for political organization. Violence was characterized in this case as 'politics by other means' and a necessity forced upon a certain group by the actions of an enemy.

In the second half of the 20th century, radical movements started to be seen in more organized form; the majority of them transformed into international terrorist organisations. The nationalistic claims in radical (or terrorist) movements were combined with the belief that the existing national and global systems are not just. The links and joint action between previously national groups, who increasingly shared comparable ideologies, became more common (i.e. ETA-Spain). Particularly after 1970s, violence at national level crossed the border and terrorism started to become a global phenomenon.

With the end of the cold war, a unipolar world order emerged and the Marxist or nationalistic motivations in radical and terrorist movements shifted clearly to a new wave, which was based on the religious and ideological motivations. The new discourse was based on misinterpreted religious and ideological terms instrumentalized in supporting specific contexts and aims of global terrorism. In this new wave of terrorism, religious and ideological narratives became highly important, particularly as attractors for radical ideas and recruits. The emergence of Al-Qaeda as a global terrorist organization carrying out devastating strikes across the world shed a spotlight on radicalism and violent extremism. The attention has intensified later with the rise of DAESH, its atrocities and the regional surge in terrorist groups pledging allegiance to it. This in turn has pushed the issue of radicalism and violent extremism to the top of the OIC and international agenda.

When comparing the new wave of radicalism and violent extremism with the previous waves, there are certain points that are new. First, the new wave of radicalism and violent extremism has increasingly used the sharing and connectivity features of online platforms to organize their activities. Transnational networks and activities have become the distinctive characteristic of the new wave. In the new wave, radical and violent extremist movement's activities have also changed significantly. The Guerrilla / civil warfare (mostly used by Marxist movements) have partially turned to individual actions and suicide bombings.

The previous radical and violent extremist movements tended to use the ideological and nationalistic motivations, but in the current wave, religious narratives became the most important element. This fact affects OIC countries the most. Over the last decade, OIC countries became the main theatre of the new radical waves, which eventually turned to terrorist movements.

According to Figure 2.1, since 2003, the vast majority of terrorism has occurred in OIC countries. In 2016, collectively OIC countries account for around 76% of all attacks and more than 90% of fatalities (GTI, 2017). It is important to note that the year of 2003 coincided with the US invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as notable military operations in Yemen, Pakistan and Syria. Today all five of these countries fall within the top eight countries with the highest number of deaths from terrorism.

Figure 2.1: The Share of Global Terrorism incidents

Source: SESRIC staff calculations based on Global Terrorism Database

The rise in terrorism and violent extremism in OIC countries has created severe security threats as this growing phenomenon has resulted in death, destruction and instability in the countries and regions where terrorist groups operate. This fact increased the necessity to look at the policies for countering violent extremism and terrorism efforts. The following section presents countering terrorism, radicalism and violent extremism with the objective of maintaining peace and security in OIC countries.

2.2. Countering the Roots of Terrorism and Violent Extremism: De-radicalization in OIC Countries

Over the last two decades, counter-terrorism/violent extremism has come to the fore of international security, and remains in the news headlines almost daily. This is due in large part to the ongoing conflicts with the majority of them taking place in OIC countries. In addition, foreign-military interventions have left several countries in political turmoil, and led to the flourishing of terrorist groups and their activities.

When analysing the recent efforts of countering terrorism/violent extremisms, we come to the conclusion that hard security measures do not suffice, cost the most and their effectiveness is hard to measure. Thus, for OIC countries, comprehensive counter-terrorism and violent extremism must begin with a broader and more balanced approach, incorporating larger aspects of, 'soft' or 'smart' policies as an integral part of the counterterrorism tool kit. In this regard, de-radicalization programs represent one of the best means of achieving such progress via soft counterterrorism, seeking to undo the radicalization process and divorcing them from their extreme beliefs and misperceptions.

De-radicalization as a holistic program encompasses reversing violent extremist perspectives and countering the causes that engendered them in the first place. De-radicalization programs usually include motivating active violent extremist individuals to give up arms or defect, or targeting the group by means of effective counter-narrative campaigns that eliminate the impetus for organized violent action through reconciliation, dialogue and disillusionment campaigns.

In the field of countering terrorism/violent extremism, the approaches of de-radicalisation and disengagement are often confused with one another. De-radicalisation differs from disengagement in that it seeks to alter patterns of thinking and held ideologies while disengagement affects its external behavioural manifestation. Defined broadly, de-radicalisation refers to the socio-psychological shaping or change of the target's sympathy and commitment to violent extremism, to a point where the possibility of violence is extremely mitigated or made unlikely. Disengagement on the other hand, may choose to focus on the action of violent extremism as a target that reflects visible change, without necessarily touching on the root ideologies or sympathies that generate it.

Given that both approaches are often implemented together, it should be noted that a basic form of disengagement is necessary for a more comprehensive de-radicalisation process to occur. In the absence of healthy religious beliefs for instance, or functional nationalism; it may still be possible to appeal to the emotional side of an individual through disengagement using a case based on the harm caused to one's own family by carrying out violent acts for instance. Hard security practitioners are often inclined to disengagement due to its lower overhead costs and easier measurability; however, this may not reflect a sustainable solution (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2008). This is particularly critical given that disengagement relies on perceived costs and gains, where emotional appeals or provided employment may suffice for a time, but as

counter-terrorism campaigns progress the subject may choose to alter their mental equation suddenly in favour of resorting to violent extremism again. In this sense, it is crucial for any counter-radicalization strategy to include both approaches (Rabasa et al., 2010).

De-radicalisation seeks to generate a counter-narrative to undermine and educate against radicalizing agents, while simultaneously providing alternative streams of thought and engagement. This is done by reclaiming subverted narratives, generating new ones, or providing legal means of engagement, socio-political change and participatory citizenship. This does not constitute the suppression of radical opinions per se, but rather provides more acceptable means of channelling it while attempting to instil alternative worldviews in subjects. While radicalisation recruitment often relies on overwhelming group-thinking, ideological isolationism and mirroring of similar ideas as proof of the intrinsic validity of the idea, this may at times necessitate separation from instigating and radicalizing environments in cases of rehabilitation, and specifically in the case of minors (Qureshi, 2015).

2.2.1. Approaches and Models of De-radicalization in OIC Countries

Violent extremism has its roots in radicalism; however, it is worthy to note that the large majority of radicals do not opt to engage in violent extremism. Radicalization is therefore a process ranging from the non-violent to the violent. Similarly, de-radicalisation is a process that reverses the radicalisation process. The appeal of this reversal is to specifically roll-back violent extremism in individuals that have already acted violently, which is a more difficult achievement when compared to the de-radicalisation of individuals that have only reached a level of sympathy or emotional support for violent extremist groups. All approaches to de-radicalisation share the target of bringing a cognitive and behavioural change in target subjects, and in doing so, a reversal of the root causes that originally led to violent extremism in the first place. More critically, de-radicalisation programs target the specific use of violence as a means to social change, through either undermining the assumptions towards the effectiveness of violence; reinforcing a moral, religious, theological or ideological perspective inimical to violence; or altering subjective perceptions towards root causes of radicalism in and of themselves.

De-radicalisation remains a relatively nascent approach, with consensus only being found in the necessity for the inclusion of soft approaches. Bringing about behavioural change through disengagement, even if temporary, is usually easier and more quantifiable for the purpose of public policy. As a result, it is often favoured over fully-fledged de-radicalization, which is challenged by the inability to measure ideological changes in the individual. Equally critical to the development of de-radicalisation programs is the complexity of the radicalisation process itself, requiring policy and programs to be specific, adaptive and dynamic in a way that prevents standardization. This presents challenges to large-scale de-radicalisation or disengagement programs, given the focal emphasis usually made on the practitioner's expertise, innovativeness and emotional intelligence.

De-radicalisation may often benefit from complementing streams of parallel public policy. For instance, de-radicalisation programs may opt to offer economic aid and assistance to the families of program subjects; as practiced in Saudi Arabia for individuals convicted of violent extremism. To say that such efforts complement de-radicalisation progress would be a severe understatement, as such public policy initiatives often form the base of interventions.

For radicalisation catalysts originating from perceptions of economic hardship, de-radicalization programs can provide financial support or subsidies to families of the subject. In cases of ideologically based or theologically motivated extremism, de-radicalisation programs often make use of selective re-education, ideological counter-narratives, delegitimizing subject's figures of authority and the use of violence as a means to change. In the specific case of radicalised juvenile youths, programs target peer and family networks, and supplement mentorship programs with resiliency counselling, engaged public service programs and narratives reinforcing self-worth and civic engagement. Concerning the often-encountered perception held by de-radicalisation subjects of the lack of effectiveness of non-violent pathways to socio-political change, counter-narratives and re-education are used in emphasizing the ineffectiveness of violence and terrorism to bring about changes, combined with serious political signalling and public policy encouraging inclusive development and participatory politics.

Significant to the approach of generating effective de-radicalisation programs is the strength of constructive narratives, arguments, therapy and catalysts over deconstructive alternatives. Counter-intuitively, violent extremism often seeks out creation of a specific ideal for the perceived good of others. Undermining this narrative by pointing out ideological flaws will at best promote indifference. On the other hand, generating new constructive narratives that address root causes of the radicalized, which positively attracts them to civic life and public participation, would ultimately prove an effective strategy. In this sense, violence and repression would be the less effective of the two approaches.

Constructive approaches would utilize de-radicalization programs that fulfil the innate wish to live a normal life, get married, pursue education, find employment, and find meaning and purpose in public service, or through the provision of ideologies or beliefs more attractive than those offered by violent extremism. On the other hand, deconstructive approaches include legal prosecution and severe legal charges, disillusionment with violence, individual loss of stature within the group, exhaustion from fear, or having to make a choice between violent extremism while engaged in increased political participation.

The progressive pathway an individual takes towards violent extremism starts with disillusionment and culminates in carrying out acts of violence. For the purpose of maximum effectiveness in de-radicalisation approaches, models should identify stages of radicalisation where de-radicalisation programs have the most potential to succeed. More critically, programs should differentiate between different roles and distinct identities within radical extremist groups, given the vast intellectual and psychological difference between leadership cadres, and other segments of the organization (ICST, 2013).

Amidst the variation between approaches to de-radicalisation, an established guiding principle is the significance of social relations in reinforcing or defining held values. Re-education or theological reinterpretation find more success when directed towards families, as opposed to individuals (Hegghammer, 2006). This is perhaps even more relevant to OIC member countries where the socializing and guiding role of the family unit is more significant than in the West. As such, any approach to de-radicalisation that does not account for the potential inherent in co-opting family structures would be limited severely in effectiveness and sustainability (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2008).

Moreover, a core element of all de-radicalisation programs is public knowledge surrounding available initiatives. This has the benefit of engaging former violent extremists in such programs, and providing significant value and insight into program design and development. This often takes the form of volunteer de-radicalisation organizations that provide a sense of community and purpose. In specific cases as found in Germany, the majority of engaged former extremists working in de-radicalisation programs made individual decisions to contact such organizations and offer their services (Grunenberg & Van Donselaar, 2006).

Finally, de-radicalisation program efforts are time-sensitive and relative to surrounding events. For most criminal or politically motivated violent extremists, the turning point of de-radicalisation comes in a moment of disillusion or disenfranchisement usually because of excessive violence or actions not in line with their alleged ideals. This has critical implications for the necessary adaptive nature of de-radicalisation programs for targeted subjects and in outreach interventions.

2.2.2. *Approaches and Models of De-radicalization in OIC Countries*

Throughout the course of intense struggles against violent extremism, a significant number of extremists had been arrested. This led to the necessity for a diverse range of reform programs with the specific intent of rehabilitation to avoid or prevent recidivism and return to extremism. Such efforts are also positioned in a growing understanding within the security community that soft approaches to countering violent extremism are necessary, given the theological, ideological and psychological dimensions of the struggle (Cordesman, 2006).

While de-radicalisation programs may not necessarily provide a one-stop solution to the problem of violent extremism, they hold the potential to allow for reintegration of extremists into society. The base premise to all such programs is that extremists have been misinformed or mislead by their handlers and hold to misperceptions and flawed understandings of Islam. Prisons therefore represent ideal settings for such programs given the high level of control they offer.

Taken broadly, de-radicalisation programs take a range of approaches, beginning with targeting the understanding of the meaning of *Jihad* and *Takfir*. Others may focus on distancing the subject emotionally, physically and ideologically from extremist groups. Yet others choose to focus on healthy, monitored integration into society. A large majority of the programs not only seek to undermine held extreme ideologies, but also provide some

measure of social and economic support to subjects' families. The impact of such programs cannot be conclusively stated given limits to data collection and the relative novelty of such approaches.

While hard security approaches may have led to high rates of capture of violent extremist offenders, in most cases, not enough evidence exists to detain these individuals for life, or the judgements they receive are based on crimes that do not require life-sentences. In one study on violent extremist prison sentences, only 15% of offenders receive death or life sentences, where the rest receive 10 to 20 years or less. A large majority of offenders often acquire release through pardons or good behaviour. More critically, unlawful detainment of suspects will often do more harm than good to the moral high ground of narratives pertaining to government legitimacy and authority. In this case, the release of inmates is a foregone truth that requires necessary action, especially given high rates of reoffending and recidivism by extremists after release. If necessary action is not taken, a significant number of former militants or extremists will reintegrate with old extremist networks, and in the case of a number of countries including Morocco, Yemen, Egypt and Algeria; a significant number of former inmates returned to the same lifestyles of direct involvement or support of violent extremism.

It is also essential to bear in mind that prisons often prove fertile grounds for radicalisation. Numerous cases exist of inmates who had not held extremist ideas prior to entering prison, yet through the prison environment eventually came to be proponents of extreme ideologies. Harsh treatment is often a stimulus for increased radicalisation; as with cases of torture, deprivation and hostility. This naturally necessitates a conscious prison environment and rehabilitation program design inclusive of a broad range of aspects affecting prisoner psychology. In this respect, state funding and program design are two pillars critical to the success of such programs.

De-radicalisation models and programs are not new; having been used in Egypt and Algeria; but with emphasis on a larger group rather than a specific individual. These efforts were made less effective by crackdowns and overwhelming hard security approaches as opposed to any conscious studied effort to reform ideas and perceptions. Moreover, while de-radicalisation programs targeting religious extremism may exist from country to country, they usually differ significantly on the basis of each country's capacity, and their unique approaches to the problem.

Case 1: Saudi Arabian Model

Violent extremism in Saudi Arabia has traditionally been linked to extreme anti-Western sentiments (Hegghammer, 2006). This is usually invariably due to perceived close ties between Saudi Arabia and the United States, and discontent with alleged policy contentions. Religious extremism is also served to a significant extent by the return of Saudi nationals from Jihad in Afghanistan in 2002 (Hafez, 2009). Issues with this specific strain of radicalism include their interpretation of Islam, and the specific rationalizations for violence against the state to

fulfil ideological goals. In that regard, Saudi Arabia has developed a multi-faceted approach, specifically targeting understandings of Jihad, and the conception of Takfir. Moreover, other programs operate in parallel to counter internet radicalization, alongside a social reintegration program.

The Saudi Arabian de-radicalisation model remains the most comprehensive and funded program of all current approaches (Boucek, 2008). It consists of targeted Islamic re-education, psychological therapy and integration following pardon or release. Moreover, it is built on the base premise that violent extremists' views and ideologies have their root in misinformed or misperceived conceptions of Islam (Fink & Hearne, 2008). In this context, the inmate is seen as a victim of deviation and manipulation by extremist ideologues and influencers (Boucek, 2007a). Consequently, the subject-victim is seen as deserving of education and guidance, as would a misguided individual. To increase the impact of programs, the Saudi model places a significant emphasis on culture and tradition through the utilization of family networks and social relations to adopt responsibility for the participants' progress and well-being, with more stakeholders often reflecting greater sustainability of rehabilitation (Fink & Hearne, 2008). This is not to say however, that all violent extremists are entered into de-radicalisation programs. Rather, nearly 10% of violent extremists are identified as dangerous extremists, of whom a significant percentage refuse any form of engagement altogether with de-radicalisation programs (Ansary, 2008). Extremists who have taken part in violence against the Saudi Arabian government are disqualified from entry by default. Others who have carried out terrorism may take part, yet are not provided with release (Ansary, 2008). The core of the de-radicalisation program is found in its ideological approach to Takfir thought, by means of intensive dialogue and psychological therapy (Boucek, 2007b). The de-radicalisation program is administered by a committee within the Ministry of Interior, consisting of four sub-committees; the religious; security; media; psychological and social committees, respectively (Boucek, 2007a).

The religious committee arranges direct religious debate and dialogue with prisoners, from a pool of approximately 150 scholars and imams. This approach is no doubt supported by the high numbers of religious scholars within Saudi Arabia, which permits for filtering based on methods of communication (Boucek, 2008b). In this regard, selection of scholars is based on their ability to generate engaging dialogue (Boucek, 2007a). The psychological and social committee consists of a nearly 50 psychologists and social scientists with the mandate of assessment and diagnosis of progress, mental dysfunction and disorder and study of behaviour (Boucek, 2008b). The group is also charged with ascertaining whether the participant is genuine and sincere in their wish for reform, alongside assessment of the families of the inmates to determine the level or nature of support they require. The security committee assesses security risks, and is charged with recommending discharge, in addition to serving as parole officers following discharge and being responsible for monitoring them after their exit. The final committee pertaining to media designs and produces educational content for use in counselling, therapy and religious re-education sessions, as well as

producing content for use in public mosques and schools. In parallel to its internal de-radicalisation, the committee also provides outreach to youth cross-sections that may have been exposed to radical views (Boucek, 2007a).

Counselling is conducted through individual meetings between the program subject and the appointed scholar, where initially the scholar or cleric will begin by establishing their independence from the state security apparatus. In the remainder of the first session, attempts are made to engage the subject in discussion regarding actions that caused them to be imprisoned and to identify the religious rationale for their actions. This is followed by further dialogue of why these justifications were flawed, followed by the beginning of re-education (Boucek, 2007a). It is critical to note here that knowledge is not enough to generate effective de-radicalisation rather the cleric or scholar must earn the respect of the subject in some manner or form. Therefore, simple declarations of religious law are often not enough, but rather there is a need for persuasive, engaging theological and juristic interpretations of specific religious issues (Hassan, 2006). Following the individual session phase, programs shift into formal and informal dialogue sessions (Boucek, 2007a). With the end of short sessions, longer six-week courses are provided in subjects such as Takfir, terrorism and Jihad, with examinations that determine whether the subject must retake the course.

With the end of counselling and dialogue, release evaluation occurs where subjects are placed in a rehabilitation centre in a domestic suburb for a period of 8 to 12 weeks for further counselling and integration. During this period, they cannot leave the facility unless their family provides custody. With official discharge, parole is instituted where the subjects are observed and required to check in regularly with program officials. The challenge of radicalisation necessitated the separation of extremists from other criminals by building a total of five prisons for the specific purpose and needs of its de-radicalisation programs, with an individual capacity of 1200 subjects. Traditionally prisoners were kept in a large shared cell; unlike the de-radicalisation-specific facilities which ensure individual segregation. De-radicalisation prisons contain televisions for dedicated lecture broadcast. Additionally, the facility design minimizes contact between security personnel and inmates, and prevents contact between prisoners altogether. Furthermore, all cells are digitally monitored to prevent abuse or mistreatment. The prison design accommodates for family visit, given the vital role of family in reform, with specific accommodating areas. Conjugal visits for married prisoners are also permitted (Boucek, 2008a).

While a measure of success is reported in the use of the Saudi Arabian model, certain fall-backs can be identified. The model targets improper understandings of Islam; however, educational streams reflect a thorough immersion in religious knowledge, which may point to a different route to the problem than misconceptions per se; calling for a review of religious education in its own right. Moreover, while high success rates are reported, returns to extremism still occur. For instance, with citizens who underwent the program after return from Guantanamo, nearly 11 returned to violent extremism (Worth, 2009). This calls for better post-program monitoring and tracking methods.

> ## Box 2.1: Internet De-radicalisation in Saudi Arabia
>
> The Saudi Arabian de-radicalisation model is not limited to inmate rehabilitation, but is rather more expansive, with passive online dissemination, particularly on websites that support extremist thought. This is done from the base premise that the internet presents one of the most important fronts for extremist groups to spread their ideology to youth (Ansary, 2008). More critically, aside from its potential for radicalization, internet havens allow for the easy transfer of methods and coordination of planning with other extremists (Hafez, 2008). In this light, the Saudi government launched the al-Sakinah Campaign, to provide counter-narratives to online extremist dialogue through volunteer scholars and imams by engaging with radical members of extremist domains. The al-Sakinah campaign makes use of scholars, psychologists and social science experts who engage with extremists through the internet by means of infiltration, targeting individuals who are sympathetic to or support extremist beliefs, yet have not committed terrorist acts. In one presented case, over nearly 54,000 hours of interaction, a total of 972 online subjects were alleged to have reverted from their extremist ideologies (Ansary, 2008). It is safe to argue that the al-Sakinah campaign has been one of the pioneering effort in the direction of internet De-radicalisation. Even if its successes since its launch in 2003 have not been many nor much publicized due to the sensitive and anonymous nature of its work, the impact of its efforts is most certainly valuable as these may have resulted in the saving of many human lives all over the world (Khaled al–Saud, 2017).

That said, the model or its methods may be effectively transplanted into other OIC member countries. Note should be made however, that the Saudi model is based on the prevalence of significant resources set aside for the program, which other member states may find difficult to dedicate. Additionally, scholars and imams in the program may benefit from referent authority and legitimacy given the religious establishment to Makkah and Madinah, which would be difficult to reproduce elsewhere.

Case Study 2: Indonesian Model

Since the Bali bombings in 2002, the Indonesian government has altered their approach in the manner of engaging with militants. This included crackdowns seeking to capture violent extremists, while simultaneously changing their ideologies through a de-radicalization model and to a significant extent by replacing Imams and public speakers with the 'more' moderates.

Indonesia's attempt at de-radicalisation consisted of a model geared towards changing the ideologies of extremists, through a collection of individuals and groups that were required to make do with limited resources. In spite of relative low levels of staff and funding, Indonesia presents a model that has exhibited a good measure of success.

The Indonesian model approaches each inmate on an individual level. In addition to counselling, it offers educational opportunities to the subjects and provides financial assistance to families of imprisoned subjects (Sheridan, 2008). Government authorities provide financial assistance to families for the purpose of food, clothing and education, as well as additional opportunities to visit with the subject.

The program is built on two assumptions, namely that extremists only listen to other extremists and that the perception of the police can be changed through kind treatment (Schulze, 2008). Indonesia does not make use of religious scholars to provide counselling or religious re-education, as they believe the inmates do not find the scholars credible. The program instead relies on reformed violent extremists to talk to prisoners, believing that extremists are able to relate to these former extremists (Waterman, 2008). Commonly, reformed violent extremists used in the program were once senior leaders in extremist groups, which is helpful given the hierarchical culture of the region, which tends to exhibit deference to authority figures (Abuza, 2009).

While former terrorist leadership may be presented as credible to extremist inmates, they are easily undermined due to their documented and often publicized cooperation with security forces. Public identification of former leaders with public police officials and their lifestyles have been pointed out by Indonesian media, which contributes to a critical loss of credibility in the eyes of many extremists (Abuza, 2009).

Another weakness in this model is that the prison system undermines rehabilitation efforts by nature. In Indonesia, prisons struggle with corruption and overcrowding, with their own internal hierarchy and extortion. While efforts are made to separate extremists from the rest of the prison; no attempts are made to separate hardened violent extremists from extremists that are more likely to achieve success in the de-radicalisation program (International Crisis Group, 2007).

The Indonesian de-radicalisation model points to some measure of success through its unique approach to the challenges of radicalism. In this respect, to ensure continued viability of the Indonesian approach, a number of items require attention; including the need for effective prison reform, greater public funding for de-radicalisation programs, social welfare program to subjects' families, and the need for effective follow-up parole mechanisms.

As the number of program subjects' increase, resources available to deal with them in the prison environment are further strained, leading to overall less focus and results (Hannah et al., 2008). Moreover, separating extremists from the general population is essential to preventing radicalization. Caution should be taken concerning prison corruption, which can severely undermine de-radicalisation efforts. Therefore, Indonesian model's success is closely linked to the need for broader prison reform.

It is also worthy to note that local research has shown the critical role to be played by wives and families in initial disengagement from violent extremism (Fink & Hearne, 2008). Unfortunately, increasing focus on the role of family has yet to materialize. Of 400 violent extremists and family members offered counselling, only 20 participated. This is partly because while support is slowly phased in for families, extremist groups still extend financial and social support to these families (Abuza, 2009).

Finally, program subjects need a means of effective re-integration into normal society, with effective monitoring and follow-up mechanisms to prevent recidivism. Indonesia has no

parole system and is strained for resources to allow for effective monitoring of former program subjects (Pluchinsky, 2008). In addition, prisoners are able to secure early releases through the program, which encourages some measure of duplicity. Nonetheless, Indonesia has been able to initiate a relatively successful model despite shortages of funding and crowded prison establishments. This is perhaps best reflected in public rejection of violence extremist ideology by a number of former extremist leaders. In addition, the growing aid given to the program by Indonesia's executive branch is helpful in strengthening the program. Indonesia's de-radicalisation program may not be viable in the long run however, due to the above identified faults in the program. Unless Indonesia is prepared to tackle prison reform, it is likely that the de-radicalisation model will only be able to be effectively implemented towards a small minority of extremists.

2.3. The Role of Social Media in the Domain of Radicalism and Violent Extremism

De-radicalisation and soft/smart CVE (countering violent extremism) programmes can be a more effective way of tackling violent extremism than hard security measures and militaristic approaches. In this regard, online tools, particularly social media, are useful in the dissemination of counter narratives in multiple languages, to reach a broad, geographically diverse audience.

It is widely acknowledged that in recent years, the use of the Internet by violent extremists as a means of spreading propaganda, raising funds, recruiting members, and communicating with activists has expanded exponentially (UNODC, 2012). Violent extremists have also used the Internet as a virtual training camp, establishing various forms of online, private, and person-to-person or group communication to exchange experience and knowledge (Weimann, 2012). There are numerous examples of how advocates of violent extremism (i.e. DAESH) are developing media and communication strategies to promote violent extremism (Jones, 2013). These organisations are especially adept at their use of social media (Avis, 2016).

Social media is an effective tool to use to radicalize and recruit members into a cause. It is always there whenever the user is. It lures its users with a promise of friendship, acceptance, or a sense of purpose. It is an addiction for half of its users (Retrevo, 2010). Users may one day find themselves down the proverbial radical rabbit hole, unsure of how they ended up there; or they may very well have chosen the radical path, knowing full well where it leads (Thompson, 2011). Either way, social media ushers the individual down the path. Facebook and Twitter actually welcome and encourage users to support causes for political and/or social change. Blogs have also become a popular way for individuals to express what is on their mind (Thompson, 2011).

Global terrorist organizations and radical groups are also increasingly using the internet to manipulate the grievances of alienated youth, radicalize them, and give them a sense of

purpose (HSI, 2009). For example, Al-Qaida encourages home-grown terrorism. Through the use of propaganda messages and information found on the internet and transmitted through social media, more individuals have access to information and materials to carry out "lone wolf" operations against the targets (Thompson, 2011).

In OIC countries, the internet and social media are among the most important vehicles for radical and extremist groups to spread their ideology to the masses. The extremist and terrorist groups in the region widely use social networks to conduct their information campaigns and recruit particularly young people. In most cases, the success of their strategy is ensured by active followers in social networks, who disseminate their material, thus becoming volunteers in promoting radical ideas. Currently, the expansion of the strategies of terrorist and extremist groups is aimed at creating multi-language content for its further dissemination in many OIC countries. This increases the accessibility to a certain audience within the OIC region and enhances their comprehension of the speech and visual images in the audio-visual material and articles transmitted.

In OIC countries, the online tools, particularly social media, are increasingly understood to be fields where violent extremist ideas proliferate and where violent extremist and radical agents are able to exert a radicalizing influence and develop recruiting relationships that expand the reach and scope of their activities (Waldman & Verga, 2016). Interventions to counter these efforts are essential for national and regional security and effective CVE. Despite its importance, policy-makers and researchers have demonstrated difficulty in building on experiences from CVE programs, due to a shortfall of evaluations, which in turn is attributed to a lack of meaningful metrics by which to measure their effectiveness. Nevertheless, a scan of available reviews and evaluations of CVE programs demonstrates that it is possible to counter online radicalism and violent extremism in OIC countries in a number of ways.

First of all, social media monitoring and social network analysis can potentially be useful for identifying individuals, groups, subcultures, networks, online communities, tactics, and specific types of content and language that encourage and inspire violence on behalf of a cause (Abdo, 2014). Analysis can look for indications of political, economic, social or cultural factors regarded as root causes of VE that cumulate in a social environment in which violent extremism can grow, and which may include social alienation, collective narratives of grievance, de-legitimizations of the state and radicalizing ideologies that revere, glamorize, or offer rewards for violence (Waldman & Verga, 2016). It can also help to explain how ideologies, motivations and messages spread amongst networks and provide warnings of when online VE networks are expanding recruitment activities (Bartlett & Reynolds, 2015). Centrality analysis, which characterizes the position of any given node in a network to other nodes, can model features of the network such as "degree" or the density of interconnections, typically highest amongst leaders and influencers; "between-ness", or the proximity of a node to others, highlighting gate-keepers who connect clusters of a diffuse network; and "closeness", or the summed proximity of individuals to each other in a network, which describes the ease of communication amidst it (Bartlett & Reynolds, 2015).

Online counter-messaging that disseminates alternative messages to those being circulated by radical and extremist groups can also leverage the internet as a powerful and flexible medium to reach and engage with young populations who are looking for information and meaning (Davies et al., 2016). Counter-narratives can especially help to reach individuals who end up finding violent extremism after a quest for identity affirmation and recognition (Davies et al., 2016).

Online communication campaigns should cohere with and be supported by offline, face-to-face engagement, which is far more effective than online interventions at dissuading vulnerable individuals from VE (Romaniuk, 2015). Referral programs can identify vulnerable individuals and groups and intensively discuss and deconstruct extremist arguments (Briggs & Feve, 2013). In the creation of referral programs, training for social service providers, school counsellors, law enforcement providers, and clergy on how to identify individuals susceptible to CVE seems to contribute to the effectiveness of these programs (Romaniuk, 2015).

Other useful actions for governments in combatting the monopoly of VE narratives are collaborative efforts at translating key texts or developing media products that widen the range of alternative resources for people in quest of meaning and understanding (Briggs & Feve, 2013). Enabling the development of alternative, non-violent but relevant online or offline religious, political, and ideological resources can help stream individuals away from more toxic options (Ducol et al., 2016).

Media literacy programs can also raise the critical thinking and awareness of the tactics of online ideological propagation and recruitment (Ducol et al., 2016). In that regard, Users' panels could raise awareness of reporting mechanisms for unacceptable content, monitor companies' complaint procedures, develop partnerships between Internet companies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and generally serve as ombudsmen (Stevens & Neumann, 2009).

Overall, in OIC countries, the spectres of radicalism, terrorism and violent extremism require effort on a variety of fronts to eliminate them. The role of adaptive CVE and de-radicalisation programs cannot be understated. If designed with effective adaptive review mechanisms coupled with the sharing of good practices and individual member state experiences, the programs could gain much in the way of established effective practice, and collective experience. Along this parallel, there are a number of areas of interest to de-radicalisation and CVE programs that could potentially be solved through bilateral or multilateral OIC member country cooperation. This includes identifying the effects of cease-fires or ends to hostility on group moral and cohesion, identifying and mapping triggers for regret or disengagement across different radical leadership levels, as well as combining theological and scholarly approaches with applied psychometrics and unified psychological models or theories. An OIC framework towards countering terrorism, radicalism and violent extremism may also be of use in establishing linkages for concerted efforts towards uncovering a workable praxis for interoperable and replicable methods, which includes online CVE

programs, particularly the effective usage of online tools and social media to dissemination of counter narratives.

2.4. The Way Forward

The rise of Al-Qaeda and DAESH and the atrocities committed by them has had a devastating effect on many OIC countries, thus pushing the issues of radicalism and violent extremism to the top of the agenda of the OIC. In that regard, in the 13th session of the Islamic Summit conference held in Istanbul in April of 2016, Kings and Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the OIC voiced their alarm by the threat terrorism poses to peace and stability in many OIC Member States, and reaffirmed their strong condemnation of the atrocious and deliberate terrorist attacks that have occurred against the member countries and in various parts of the world. Moreover, the recently adopted OIC-2025 Programme of Action identifies "Counter-terrorism, Extremism, Violent Extremism, Radicalization, Sectarianism, and Islamophobia" as one of the priority areas.

Nonetheless, OIC countries cannot confront radicalism and violent extremism without understanding these phenomena. This is not an easy task since radicalism and violent extremism are very complex sets of phenomena, covering a great diversity of issue with different causes and consequences. The current wave of radicalism and violent extremism also differs fundamentally from previous waves. Radical and violent extremist groups have utilized gross misinterpretation of Islamic concepts to develop religious narratives. These religious narratives are at the heart of this current wave of radicalism and violent extremism. This fact affects OIC countries the most and, as a result, OIC countries have become the main theatre of this wave.

Hard security measure will not suffice. Radicalism and violent extremism have roots such as: relative deprivation, government ineffectiveness in providing services to the population and perceptions of state corruption. Understanding the root causes of radicalism and violent extremism and reducing - or even better - eliminating these root causes is essential if the efforts to counter radicalism and terrorism are to succeed. In addition, the economic and social impacts have to be fully understood by OIC countries in order to develop capacities and resilience in the face of violent extremism. An effective mean to countering violent extremism is the availability of channels for citizen engagement, if only to develop public engagement and civic responsibility. In the absence of this, violence and extremism become more attractive as a medium for change.

Similarly, comprehensive counter-radicalization must begin with critical social institutions including the family and educational curricula. In this context, no stone must be left unturned. Possible targets in need of focus include fostering increasingly participatory politics. Educational curriculum require thorough vetting and review to ensure healthy educational and to identify ideological narratives that may serve as base points for radicalization in the future. A healthy emphasis is also needed on instilling curricula with the spirit of critical

thinking and independent inquiry, so as to counteract the demagogic, simplified appeals to emotion and group-thinking often used by radicalising agents. This may be instilled through the study of critical and creative thinking, rhetoric and logic and the healthy and balanced inclusion of competitive sports in educational streams among other mediums for self-expression.

Taking a step back, and examining the role of radicalisation in fostering violent extremism per se, it is worthy to note that all effective radicalisation processes invest in developing initially easy commitment to a violent extremist group. This is followed by progressively stronger commitments. In this context, de-radicalization as an approach should target stages of radicalisation where the model's intervention can still provide an effective or feasible alternative to the material, emotional, psychological and social benefits of belonging to a terrorist group. In this context, a dynamic strategy is necessary where distinction is made between radicals that have reached the end of the line for ideological and emotional rewards in return for commitment to the group. There is moreover a need to ensure de-radicalisation models' dynamic adaptability towards distinctions such as education levels, varying levels of exposure, and the critical difference between regular operatives and senior leadership, given the variations between their respective roles and functions. In this regard, differences in commitment, interest, ideology, justification and perhaps goals may be observed.

The spectre of violent extremism requires effort on a variety of fronts to eliminate it. In this domain the role of adaptive de-radicalisation programs cannot be understated. If designed with effective adaptive review mechanisms coupled with the sharing of good practices and individual member state experiences, de-radicalisation could gain much in the way of established effective practice, and collective experience. Along this parallel, there are a number of areas of interest to de-radicalisation programs that could potentially be solved through bilateral or multilateral OIC member country cooperation. This includes identifying the effects of cease-fires or ends to hostility on group moral and cohesion, identifying and mapping triggers for regret or disengagement across different radical leadership levels, as well as combining theological and scholarly approaches with applied psychometrics and unified psychological models or theories. Other points of interest include the differences and similarities in de-radicalisation pathways between imprisoned de-radicalisation subjects and the independent disengagement by former violent extremists.

Finally, through a methodical and critical approach engaged in a broader multilateral effort to address the challenges of violent extremism, an OIC framework towards countering violent extremism may be of use in establishing linkages for concerted efforts towards uncovering a workable praxis for interoperable and replicable methods to not only reverse radicalisation, but project and produce internal fragmentation within extremist groups and dismantle their bases of support.

CHAPTER THREE

Conflicts in OIC Countries: Drivers, Impacts and Vulnerabilities

Violent conflicts in the post-Cold War era ravaged many societies, leading to death and destruction, the crumbling of weak states, local and international insecurity, and a vicious cycle of underdevelopment, instability, and aggression. More than any other part of the world, the OIC region has been struck by conflicts and organized violence. A major threat to peace and security in the region is the violent conflicts raging in, or spilling over into, some of OIC countries. Mozambique, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan — the list is long and sobering.

In this context, this chapter is devoted to identifying the drivers and impacts of violent conflicts in OIC countries and also vulnerabilities of OIC countries to conflicts with the understanding that violent conflicts are caused by a variety of factors, which are often interconnected, intertwined and complex. Thus, this chapter avoids the pitfalls of a simplistic and reductionist approaches and analyses violent conflicts using an integrated and multidimensional approach spanning the economic, political, social, and cultural contexts of violent conflicts.

3.1 Conflict Trends in OIC Countries

Many academics and practitioners now recognize that violent conflicts are caused by a variety of factors. The types of conflicts also varies, depending on causes and the actors of the conflicts. The literature defines four types of conflict: (1) Extra-systemic armed conflict occurs between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory; (2) interstate armed conflict occurs between two or more states; (3) internal armed conflict occurs between the

government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states; (4) internationalized internal armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides.

Despite the decline in interstate war over the past decades, armed conflicts and organized violence remain major threats to people's lives in most parts of the world (GPPI, 2017). For OIC countries, the number of armed conflicts exhibits an upward trend (Figure 3.1). In 2016, 31 of 51 conflicts recorded worldwide occurred in OIC countries, of which the overall majority were internationalized internal conflicts and internal conflicts. Main characteristic of the conflicts observed in 2016 was the existence of opposition to the political, economic or ideological system of the state, which caused many armed groups to engage in a violent

Figure 3.1: Conflict Trends

Source: SESRIC staff calculations based on the Uppsala Conflict Database.

struggle to bring about a change to the system. However, the motivation of these armed groups is not globally uniform and there is a clear distinction between the motivations of the armed groups' active in the OIC countries and the motivations of armed groups' active elsewhere. In non-OIC countries, armed groups are mainly motivated by ideologies whereas in OIC countries, armed groups are largely motivated by the desire to establish a new political system based on their distinctive understanding of Islam. Such a desire can be observed in the following cases: Algeria (AQIM), Mali (Jihadist groups in the north), Nigeria (Boko Haram), Somalia (al-Shabaab), Afghanistan and Pakistan (al- Qaeda and Taliban), Yemen (AQAP and al-Houthis), Iraq (DAESH) and Syria (DAESH and al-Nusra Front).

In 2016

61% of Armed Conflicts

took place in OIC Countries

The intensity of conflicts in OIC countries has also been increasing since 2003 (Figure 3.2), which corresponds to the year the USA invaded Iraq. Is this just a coincidence or is there

Figure 3.2: Conflict Intensity in OIC Countries

Source: SESRIC staff calculations based on the Uppsala Conflict Database.

causality between the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the increasing intensity of conflicts in OIC countries? Regardless the answer, one thing is sure: these high intensity conflicts are resulting in tremendous human suffering and widespread devastation and will leave these countries crippled for many years to come.

The nature of conflicts in OIC countries has undergone a significant change in the last decade and half. Since the year 2002-2003, OIC countries have witnessed a surge in the number of internationalized internal conflicts (Figure 3.3). This indicates that many OIC countries have become a battleground for many regional and international powers fighting directly or using proxies.

The nature, intensity, and frequency of conflict have changed over the past several decades, generally shifting from wars fought directly between states to various forms of "internal" or intrastate violence. This fact reveals that the range of potential causes of conflict and armed violence in OIC countries needs to be considered in an integrated manner. Such an approach can encompass comprehensive violence prevention and crime control measures. This will be helpful in enhancing the peace and security in the OIC region.

3.2   Drivers and Impacts of Conflicts in OIC Countries

The drivers and impacts of conflicts are not independent from each other. They are intertwined and in many cases, the lines between the drivers and the impacts of conflicts are obscure. Violent conflicts in OIC countries are caused and resulted by linked factors, originating from stateness problems, artificial borders, quasi states, political and social exclusion, inequalities, and underdeveloped economies. The following sub-sections assess multiple drivers and impacts of violent extremism in OIC and examine how these serve as a catalyst for conflicts in OIC region.

Figure 3.3: Nature of Conflicts in OIC Countries

Source: SESRIC staff calculations based on the Uppsala Conflict Database.

3.2.1   Inequalities and Exclusion

Many of the drivers are rooted in development deficits (UNDP, 2011). This suggests that there are many opportunities for development actors to contribute to breaking cycles of armed violence and creating virtuous cycles of peace and development. In many cases, the issues of political and economic inequalities are interlinked with conflicts. These issues can be considered as both drivers and impact of the conflicts.

Figure 3.4: Equal opportunity

Source: SESRIC staff calculations based on BTI INDEX 2018

One important hypothesis concerning the causes of violent conflict focuses on the presence of inequalities. This theory is based on the notion that when social differences coincide with economic and political differences between groups, this can cause deep resentment that may lead to violent struggles (Stewart, 2011). In OIC region, the emergence of particular inequalities should be considered as a driver that promote instability, conflict and violence. According to BTI index 2018, equal access to opportunity remains a serious concern in OIC region (Figure 3.4). In the OIC conflict zones, countries such as Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan, are ranked with very low scores in terms of the equal access to opportunity (Figure 3.4).

In addition to the presence of inequalities, political and social exclusion can also be powerful motivators of upheaval leading to conflict. In OIC countries, political and social exclusion is interlinked with violent conflict, because political and social exclusion may undermine social trust and may lead to instability, conflict and violence.

Political participation mainly reflects ability to form and join independent political parties or civil groups and the availability of free and fair elections. Political and social integration similarly reflects the existence of a stable and solid party system to articulate social interests, associations to mediate between society and the political system and democratic norms and procedures strongly approved by citizens. The level of political participation and political and social integration in OIC countries is rather weak when compared with other country groups, as respectively shown in Figure 3.5 and 3.6. This fact has rendered OIC countries vulnerable to unrest as has been seen in a number of OIC countries since the beginning of the so-called Arab Spring in 2011.

Figure 3.5: Political Participation

Figure 3.6: Political and Social Integration

Source: SESRIC staff calculations based on BTI INDEX 2018

The Problems of 'Stateness'

Most conflict onsets since the mid-1990s have occurred in weak states that have experienced conflict repeatedly. Weak institutions are not just one of the driver of conflicts; they have also been the outcome of violent conflicts and fragility. This is due to increased strain on political institutions and the social tensions that often come to prominence as a result of violent conflict.

Figure 3.7: Stateness

Source: SESRIC staff calculations based on BTI INDEX 2018

By definition, Stateness is the degree to which a state can carry out the functions of states. When it comes to the OIC region, the BTI index of stateness – which evaluates monopoly on the use of force, state identity, interference of religious elements and basic administration - shows that the performance of OIC countries, have worsened around 5% over the last decade. Figure 3.7 indicates that the average score for OIC countries in terms of stateness is 6.3, which is less than the world average of 7.3 and other country group averages (ranging between 7.7 and 9.8). Deterioration

was apparent in OIC countries in conflict such as Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen as shown in Figure 3.8. These countries demonstrate the strong correlation between low degree of stateness and conflict. Not all states experiencing conflict are weak states, but most of them-weak in the area of administrative and state capacities- are experiencing conflict in OIC region.

While the security conditions deteriorate in weak states, it is those same weakened states that bear the primary responsibility for maintaining security and preventing conflict. To meet that responsibility each state needs institutions capable of managing socio-political tensions and avoiding escalation into violence. Nevertheless, states that are not succeeding in managing such tensions are also the states that have the weakest political institutions and are the least likely to find means of effectively reconciling national conflict.

Box 3.1: Understanding Conflicts in OIC Countries: The Rise of Sectarianism

Over the last decade, a number of OIC countries have been facing the threat of breaking up or continuously engaging in armed conflicts sustained by external interventions and the dominance of radical groups. Current conflicts such as Syria, Iraq and Yemen, also highlight the contemporary relevance of critically examining sectarianism in OIC countries.

Sunni and Shia Muslims have lived peacefully together for centuries. In many countries, it has become common for members of the two sects to intermarry and pray at the same mosques. They share faith in the Quran and the Prophet Mohammed's sayings and perform similar prayers, although they differ in rituals and interpretation of Islamic law.

Nevertheless, since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, sectarian feelings have been rising in the region. The U.S. occupation also institutionalized a rough and ready form of ethno-sectarian consociationalism. When the uprisings started in 2011, the OIC region witnessed the rebirth of the 'sectarian question'. The 2011 uprisings resulted in the escalation of Sectarian tensions and further conflicts in some OIC countries. Particularly, in the Middle East region, the sectarian division has been deepened after the popular uprisings. Politicization of sectarianism has pushed already turbulent conflicts into an emerging sectarian conflict in the region.

Currently, it seems that sectarian narratives create a powerful rallying cry for popular mobilization, which is often leveraged and exploited by various actors, involved in conflict to help achieve their strategic and political goals. The politicization of religion and instrumentalisation of doctrinal differences also make disputes and crises worse, where the actors deliberately inflame fears to try to keep their hold on power. Uncertainty, fear, economic hardship, and violence also create the toxic conditions for sectarian mobilization to gain traction.

It is clear that sectarian rhetoric both from above and below is now a dominant ideological trend across the OIC. Yet, it is important to note that sectarianism is usually the result, not the cause, of a wide variety of tensions – between states, tribes, regional identities, classes and ethnic groups, or between the haves and the have-nots in society. Thus, the OIC countries need to consider integrated policies, emphasising socio-economic and political risks more than rising sectarianism in the region.

Sources: USIP (2013) and NAOC (2015).

Figure 3.8: Stateness of OIC Member Countries

KAZAKHSTAN, UAE

ALBANIA

ALGERIA, BURKINA FASO, OMAN, SIERRA LEONE, TAJIKISTAN, TUNISIA, UGANDA

GUINEA

KYRGYZ REPUBLIC, MALAYSIA, QATAR, TOGO, TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN

BENIN

CHAD, INDONESIA, JORDAN

BANGLADESH, MOROCCO, TURKEY

MOZAMBIQUE, SENEGAL

AZERBAIJAN, COTE D'IVOIRE, KUWAIT

LEBANON, MALI, NIGER

SAUDI ARABIA

MAURITANIA

BAHRAIN, CAMEROON

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

NIGERIA

IRAN

LIBYA

SOMALIA, YEMEN

SUDAN

IRAQ

Source: SESRIC staff calculations based on BTI INDEX 2018

3.2.2   *Human Deprivation*

Conflicts have a large impact on human life and dignity. Weak and conflict-affected states make slower progress in development compared to those with institutions that are more robust. Similarly, communities that experience the highest levels of violence and political instability in a country or a region are least likely to experience improvements in their livelihoods. They suffer in terms of access to economic and social opportunities and services.

Figure 3.9 highlights the current level of human development in OIC countries as measured by the Human development index (HDI). While OIC countries improved their HDI between 2005 and 2015, a larger share of OIC countries remain at the low levels of human development compared to other country groups. Majority of OIC countries with low HDI values have suffered or been suffering major conflicts in the region.

Figure 3.9: Human development index (HDI)

Source: SESRIC staff calculations based on HDI-2018

Exposure to conflict affects people in several ways, ranging from direct killings and injuries, to more subtle, yet persistent and irreversible effects on public services such as schooling, health and nutrition.

Violent conflicts have also severe adverse effects on the education system. In many conflict-affected countries, children's educational attainment is compromised by exposure to violence. Conflict-affected countries include over 20% of all children of primary school age, but account for around half of all out-of-school children of primary school age (UNESCO, 2011, 2013). The likelihood of young children dropping out of school is also significantly higher in conflict-affected countries than elsewhere in the world: only 65% of children in these countries attend the last primary school grade, in comparison to 86% across low-income countries (Justino, 2014). Research has highlighted in particular the causal adverse impact of conflict exposure in terms of reducing the number of years children spend in school and

restricting grade progression (Akresh & De Walque, 2008). These effects have been shown in turn to affect considerably future life prospects of affected children, including access to labour market, earnings and health outcomes in adulthood, which may aggravate risks associated with the outbreak or renewal of violent conflicts (Justino, Leone, & Salardi 2013).

Another aspect of human deprivation is in the area of health. Conflicts weaken health systems and damage health infrastructure. The greatest vulnerability of any country in an emergency is the health and well-being of its people and communities. Conflicts can put the continuity and sustainability of health sector services at risk, and destroy many years of health sector development. Conflicts also trigger poverty and population displacement, consequentially leading to the concentration of human populations in conditions that are conducive to major outbreaks. Following political unrest and armed conflict in Mali in 2012, for example, the WHO investigated the status of health facilities and services in all of the country's 60 health districts. The conflict had resulted in widespread population displacement, with 300,000 internally displaced populations (IDPs) and 174,000 registered refugees. Access to health care was affected by the destruction and looting of health facilities, equipment and supplies, the departure of public and NGO health care providers, and the suspension of priority health programmes. The results showed that almost one in five health facilities was at least partially damaged, with big regional disparities. In the hardest-hit Kidal region, nearly half of all health facilities surveyed were completely destroyed and 71% had ceased to function. Basic laboratory and blood bank services and emergency obstetric care were also reduced to almost nothing in the northern areas (WHO, 2015).

Armed conflicts have been the greatest driver of prolonged humanitarian need. Crises are also becoming more protracted and displacement levels are unprecedented due to the lack of durable political solutions. The majority of people needing humanitarian assistance live in conflict-affected areas (OCHA, 2016). Those who are forced to migrate are often confronted by life-threatening dangers in transit and exploitation to and at their destinations, along with cultural and language barriers, discrimination, exclusion and violence (IFRC, 2012). They may lose links with their families and communities, and experience severe socio-economic loss and impoverishment, with women and children are particularly at risk.

While many migrants move voluntarily to have access to better economic opportunities and different lifestyles, conflicts and oppressions lead to situations of sudden displacement and force people to move within or even across the borders, a situation described as crisis migration. The term "crisis migration" was coined to describe temporary or permanent movement within and across borders in response to or in anticipation of emergencies.

MORE THAN

25 MILLION

DISPLACED IN OIC COUNTRIES

Armed conflicts today account for the bulk of the displacement of civilian populations within or across the boundaries, particularly in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. In total, conflict and violence account for around 60% of forced migration (IFRC, 2012). Political instability, weak governance and state repression as sources of humanitarian crises are among the major factors forcing thousands of people to flee across borders, such as in Libya and Somalia.

Figure 3.10 shows the trend of displacement in the world over the last decade. There is a clear upward trend in the number of displaced people over the period under consideration. According to UNHCR, 71.4 million people are forcibly displaced worldwide in 2017. 19.9 million, of which are refugees, 39.1 million are internally displaced and 3.1 million are asylum seekers. Turkey is the largest refugee-hosting country with more than 3.5 million refugees, followed by Uganda, Pakistan, Lebanon and Iran (UNHCR, 2017).

Figure 3.10: Total Displacement in the World

Source: SESRIC staff calculations based on UNHCR

3.2.3   *Economic Collapse*

Conflict is "development in reverse". Low levels of development lead to conflict and conflict in turn leads to even lower levels of development. Festering grievances and opportunism created by armed conflict lay the groundwork for conflict recurrence. While exposure to conflict affects people and countries in several ways, an important implication of conflicts is observed in the economic field. Conflicts may result in the physical destruction of production capacity, infrastructure, factories, machinery, agricultural production capacity, physical destruction of land and higher military expenditure. In addition to these direct effects, further deterioration of economic activities can be observed due to repercussive impacts on other factors such as capital flight, dislocation of labour, discouragement of new foreign

investments, brain drain and reduction of trade. A fall in total factor productivity due to reduction in economic efficiency and technology absorption can be manifested in the contraction of output, acceleration of inflation, a loss of reserves and weaker financing systems (Sab, 2014).

The complex and mutually reinforcing relationship between conflict and economic collapse is widely recognised (McIntosh & Buckley, 2015). While prolonged conflicts lead to deteriorations in human and physical productive capacity of an economy, economic mismanagement and weak governance contribute to the factors leading to the onset of the conflict (Ncube & Jones, 2013). Moreover, public resources are diverted from productive activities and social services to defence and military finance. A shift can also be observed away from economic activities that are vulnerable to war (e.g., construction, finance, and manufacturing) towards activities that are less vulnerable but also less productive, such as subsistence agriculture (Costalli et al., 2014).

Table 3.1: Average annual GDP per capita growth in selected OIC countries (percent)

Start and end date of conflict	Pre-conflict (%)	Number of years in conflict	In conflict (%)	Number of years post conflict	Post-conflict (%)
Afghanistan 1978-2001	2.6	24	-6.5	6	10.4
Azerbaijan 1991-1994	-2.2	4	-17.8	13	9.4
Chad 1965-1990	...	26	-0.3	17	2.3
Lebanon 1975-1990	0	16	-5	17	3.7
Mozambique 1976-1992	1.6	17	-1.4	15	5.3
Sierra Leone 1991-2001	-0.1	11	-7.3	6	8
Tajikistan 1992-1997	-2.3	6	-15.2	10	7.1
Uganda 1979-1991	-1	13	-2	16	2.9
Ivory Coast 2002-2003	-0.6	2	-3.2	4	-0.1
Guinea-Bissau 1998-1999	0.4	2	-13.2	8	-3.2

Source: World Bank (2016).

Despite the linkages between two dynamics, the characteristics of economic growth and conflict differ widely across contexts (McIntosh & Buckley, 2015). Research suggests that conflicts lead to deterioration in the macroeconomic variables, but the magnitude varies significantly across countries. Table 3.1 shows the average annual growth in per capita income in selected OIC countries during conflict and post-conflict periods, which reveals great variation across countries. World Bank (2016) finds that restoring Libya's infrastructure will cost an estimated $200 billion over the next ten years. The damage to the capital stock in Syria as of mid-2014 is estimated between $70-80 billion. Conflicts may also impact the neighbouring countries depending on, among others, the level of economic integration with the conflict country, initial economic conditions and characteristics of refugees. The cost of

Syrian conflict to the five neighbouring countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt) is estimated to be $35 billion in output, equivalent to Syria's GDP in 2007 (World Bank, 2016). Conflicts can substantially destroy assets and productive capacities. Economic recovery from crises depends on several factors and the speed of recovery differs significantly across countries. Research finds that the economic and institutional development of the country, structure of the economy, the duration of the war, and engagement of the international community are some of the factors that are important in post-conflict recovery (Sab, 2014). There is also need for promoting the resilience of critical infrastructure, including health and education facilities, in addition to transport, energy, water and communication networks, which can be severely affected by conflicts.

3.3   Vulnerabilities to Conflict

Efforts by researchers to quantitatively measure vulnerabilities of countries to conflict tend to focus on four major categories: social, economic, governance, and security. Additionally, natural resources, ethnic fragmentation, demographic factors, denial of essential human needs, security environment, criminality and some trans-border issues have impact on vulnerability to conflicts. Given this richness of potential causality concerning vulnerability to conflict, a variety of measures are developed to assess the vulnerabilities of countries to conflict.

The report uses the Fragile State Index (FSI) developed by the Fund for Peace as a measure of vulnerability. The index is not designed to forecast when states may experience violence or collapse. Instead, it is meant to measure a state's vulnerability to collapse or conflict. The index is prepared by ranking sovereign states based on twelve indicators of state vulnerability – four social, two economic and six political. A vulnerable state is a state perceived as having failed at some of the basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign government. The following attributes, proposed by the Fund for Peace, are often used to characterize a vulnerable state:

- Loss of control of its territory, or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force therein,
- Erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions,
- An inability to provide public services, and
- An inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.

Since its publication in 2005, quite a number of OIC countries occupy the high ranks. Of the top 20 states in the list with highest vulnerabilities, OIC states have constituted more than half of the positions. Nevertheless, over the last decade, many OIC countries has shown a remarkable improvement in terms of vulnerability to conflicts. As shown in Figure 3.11, 19 OIC countries have shown significant or strong improvement, while 17 of them have achieved

some or marginal improvement. On the other hand, there are 20 OIC countries have shown worsening vulnerability, six of which being at critical or significant worsening. All these countries are also classified at 'alert' or 'warning' level.

Figure 3.11: Fragile State Index, Decade Trends (2008-2018)

Source: SESRIC staff calculations based on UNHCR

Here it is worthy to mention that poverty is per se not a direct cause of conflict, but poverty during the heightened conflict situations or wars may have various repercussions. Poor countries, unlike rich ones, lack the resources to address the grievances that can spark armed uprisings. In addition, poor countries tend to have weak security forces and so find it difficult to deter rebellions and to crush those that cannot be deterred. Conversely, armed conflicts can create or exacerbate poverty.

Being an important element in increasing vulnerability, the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on economic development can also be substantial. There is a growing body of literature showing that cross-country differences in ethnic diversity can explain a substantial part of the cross-country differences in public policies, political instability, and other economic factors associated with long-run growth (e.g. Easterly & Levine, 1997) and a high level of ethno-linguistic diversity implies a lower level of investment (e.g. Mauro, 1995). Ethnic diversity may also increase polarization and thereby impede agreement about the provision of public goods and create positive incentives for growth-reducing policies that create rents for the groups in power at the expense of society at large. A cursory look at the relationship between the share of largest ethnic group in total population of countries, as a measure of ethnic fragmentation, and their average economic growth rates reveals that the latter two are positively correlated (not reported here). This implies that low ethnic fragmentation increases the probability to

attain high growth rates. The impact of ethnic diversity on average growth is, however, not particularly strong. This leads to argue that exogenously determined ethnic fragmentation does not have severe consequences for economic growth and negative outcomes can be avoided if further supported by public policies and political stability.

The drivers and vulnerabilities to conflict here are not intended to be exhaustive – acknowledging the fact that there are other country and region specific factors affecting the level of fragility and susceptibility of falling into conflict situation. OIC countries need to place more emphasis on building resilience to shocks and vulnerabilities to conflict through a more integrated approach and with a view to ensuring more effective governance practices and greater collaboration. The complex causes of violence as well as prevention and early recovery need to be addressed with collective efforts of all OIC community as well as international partners active in conflict responses.

CHAPTER FOUR

Conflict Management: The Key Ingredients

As discussed in the previous chapter, while inter-state conflicts continue to be a rare occurrence in the 21st century, there has been a rise in the number of internal conflicts and internationalized internal conflicts. A large number of such conflicts are based on group-based grievances resulting from inequality, exclusion, and a sense of injustice. The shift in the nature of conflicts is also reflected in the way institutions and actors (local, national, regional, and international) deal with conflicts.

Ideally, successful conflict management should result in a total resolution of the issues causing the conflict partly due to a change in behavioural factors. However, what is more common is for conflicting parties to reach a settlement such as ceasefire or legal or customary peace agreement. In any case, conflict management is primarily concerned with the ending of a conflict (even if it is temporary), identifying and tackling the root causes of conflicts, and restructuring of institutions, including the redistribution of resources.

There are a range of policies, instruments and strategies that are a part of conflict management. The choice of particular policy, instrument or strategy employed to manage conflict is largely at the discretion of the parties to the conflict – albeit somewhat influenced by the surrounding conditions. In light of this, this chapter is dedicated to the key ingredients and the methods most commonly associated with the management of conflicts.

4.1. Conflict Analysis and Early Warning Systems

As discussed in Chapter 3, certain risks and vulnerabilities have the potential to lead to violent conflict if not mitigated early on. It is important to note that these risks, while present in most

conflicts, do not alone make violent conflict inevitable. The actual outbreak of violence requires a particular event or trigger.

Conflict triggers are almost always present in a society but are usually the last visible step in an already deteriorating situation that has the power to propel instability into violent conflict if not managed properly. Some common conflict triggers can include: regime change and military coups; elections; neighbouring conflicts; massive population movements; disasters etc. The main challenge from a policy-making perspective is to support the management and transformation of risks and vulnerabilities without sparking a violent conflict and in order to do so development of effective early warning systems is crucial.

Conflict analysis and early warning systems (EWS) are an important part of the overall conflict prevention architecture. Effective early warning systems include three necessary elements: "(1) estimating the magnitude and timing of risks of emerging threats, (2) analysing the nature of these threats and detailing plausible scenarios, and (3) communicating analysis to decision makers." (Woocher, 2008)

Since the evolution of security landscape owing to the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, conflict early warning systems have been revised over three generations. As shown in figure 4.1, each generation of early warning system is more sophisticated and capable than its predecessor (Nyheim, 2015). Over the past three decades, the focus of EWS have widened from merely predicting conflicts to analysing conflicts, providing evidence for decision making, and generating recommendations for response.

Preventive strategies supported by current early warning systems include a wider feed of information/analysis on crises that partly informs crisis management decision-making. Third generation early warning systems are more efficient in their crisis prediction capacity, largely due to mechanisms such as watch lists of groups/people and list of at 'risk' countries that are used to guide conflict management priorities and programmes (Nyheim, 2015). There have also been efforts towards formulation of a shared problem definition of crisis and conflict-affected countries, which enables various actors to respond coherently to conflicts. Furthermore, newer early response instruments and mechanism enable decision makers to consider a wide set of options and recommendations for response (Nyheim, 2015). This is in large part due to the development of local-level warning mechanisms that allow communities and local authorities to avoid the outbreak of violence. Most local organizations use early warning platforms to monitor and analyse sub-national conflict and initiate customized programmes in their communities to better address the root grievances threatening the outbreak of violence.

Early warning is more than just prediction. It is contingency planning in an attempt to prevent the emergency or escalation of violent conflict and is comprised of three elements: (i) risk knowledge and systematic data collection for conflict assessments, (ii) monitoring and warning services, and (iii) response capability.

Figure 4.1: Three Generations of Conflict Early Warning Systems, 1995 - present.

1st Generation EWS (1995-1999, still in use)	2nd Generation EWS (1999-2003, still in use)	3rd Generation EWS (2003-present)
First generation systems are centralised in structure and focused on prediction and providing analysis to inform decision-making.	Second generation systems are closer to the regions they cover, have field monitors, focus on prediction and analysis, but also make proposals for response.	Third generation systems are localised in structure; the monitor and responder are often the same person, and the focus is on using information as a response. These systems aim to prevent violence in specific localities.

Source: Adapted from Nyheim (2015).

4.1.1. *Risk Knowledge, Data Collection, and Conflict Assessment*

Risk knowledge and data collection for conflict assessment is based on a determined set of important variables to be monitored each with a pre-determined weight of importance that is contextually and even geographically specific. Data collection systems should reach from the national to the local level and may include anecdotal evidence such as information coming from communities and NGOs, reports in the press or empirical data and statistics such as population movements. To capture and analyse this information a large network of local expertise and engagement with civil society, NGOs and intergovernmental organizations is important. Some factors that can be used in the monitoring of early warning include:

- Sudden demographic changes or population movements,
- Rising unemployment rates,
- Rise in society intolerance and prejudice- often made explicit in the media,
- Economic shocks or financial crises,
- Destruction of cultural icons or religious sites,
- Inequality and discrimination within the State legal or legislative system,
- Destabilizing referendum or elections,
- Foreign intervention,
- Influx of refugees.

4.1.2. Monitoring and Warning Services

The monitoring of conflict trends assists national governments, local communities as well as intergovernmental organizations plan the appropriate intervention and facilitate advanced planning and early deployment of supplies and personnel as well as prompt diplomatic efforts depending on scale. At present, the coverage of early warning systems in OIC member countries is grievously low – as shown in Table 4. 1. In the OIC region, Local Observatories on Violence or Conflict can be an effective means to monitor trends, different types of violence, context and interventions. National Observatories have the ability to bring together diverse sectors such as public health, law enforcement, the media and local communities to develop an appropriate response or intervention. According to Ganson and Wennmann (2012), observatories can "serve as a connecting point for a variety of actors, exploring which data is needed and can be made available in a specific setting; and bring together and analyse situational intelligence that represents an enormous knowledge base on conflict drivers and stress factors".

Examples of projects seeking to produce early warning systems are: Global Events Data System (GEDS); Minorities at Risk (MAR); Crisis Watch; Failed States Index; and FEWER International. CEWARN, the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism in the Horn of Africa "is a collaborative effort of the seven IGAD Member States (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) and one of IGAD's programmes targeted at mitigating and preventing violent conflicts in the sub-region. Since its establishment in 2002, CEWARN has been functioning with a particular focus on cross border conflicts".

4.1.3. Response Capability

Any early warning mechanism is only as strong as its response mechanism. In a world of new technologies, information and warning can be alerted very fast, yet what remains problematic is the response side. In this regard it is good practice to invest in national capacities in the analysis of conflict dynamics, but also in the design of response mechanism to early warning mechanisms. An example of the latter is to link a capacity of local mediators to an early warning mechanism at a community level.

Infrastructures for peace, that make use of a society's collaborative capacity to find solutions to disputes through multi-sector stakeholder dialogue focusing on problem solving, is one means for response to potential early conflict (Kumar & De la Haye, 2011). While often time consuming to set-up, once functional this mechanism can work in tandem with early warning systems as an effective means to identify and address potential violent conflict.

Table 4.1: Early Warning Systems Coverage in OIC Member Countries, as of 2015

OIC Member Countries	Prevalent Conflicts* (in/as off 2015)	Early Warning Coverage
Afghanistan	a, b, c	No
Algeria	c	No
Chad	a	No
Egypt	c	No
Guinea-Bissau	b	No
Indonesia	c, d	No
Iran	c	No
Iraq	a, b, c, d	No
Jordan	c	No
Kyrgyz Republic	c, d	No
Lebanon	c	No
Libya	a, b, c	No
Mali	a, c	Yes
Mauritania	c	No
Morocco	a	No
Nigeria	a, b, c, d	Partly
Pakistan	a, b, c, d	No
Senegal	a	Partly
Somalia	a, b, c, d	Partly
Sudan	a, b, c, d	Partly
Syria	a, c	No
Tajikistan	b, c	No
Tunisia	c	No
Turkey	a	No
Uganda	b, d	Partly
Uzbekistan	c, d	No
Yemen	a, b, c, d	No

Source: Adapted from Nyheim (2015).

Note: Prevalent conflict types include: a – Violent Conflict; b – Criminalized Conflict or Armed Violence; c – Violent Extremism; d – Environment/Resource Conflict

4.1.4. Conflict Analysis and Early Warning – Best Practices

Best practice from international organizations and practitioners identify the following steps for an optimal configuration of early warning systems:

- *Nurturing Local Field Networks*: Given the use of misinformation to spread fear in conflict zones, an efficient early warning system is geographically based as close to the conflict area as possible, enabling the formation and utilization of strong field networks and open sources of information.

- *Using Open Source Information*: Open source information is defined as information that is publicly available to anyone and can be legally obtained by 'request, purchase, or observation' (Bean, 2007). The use of open source information can facilitate the formulation of a coherent response to the conflict. Since, government or intelligence sources are not easy to access or share, systems designed around such sources are not viable for a uniform response by multiple parties.

- *Using Qualitative and Quantitative Data Collection Methods*: statistics and narratives are equally important when designing a capable response to conflicts. Therefore, using a mix methods approach can yield the best response recommendations.

- *Using Technology*: Technology assists quick data collection, response generation, and dissemination that are three crucial stages of early warning systems.

- *Regular Analysis and Reporting*: The conflict landscape does not remain static throughout. Regular monitoring, analysis, and reporting of conflict situations can help adapt early warning systems to changing scenarios. Regular analysis and reporting can be in various forms such as detailed reports, daily/weekly briefs, etc. Regular analysis and reporting is the one thing that differentiates between an effective early warning system and an ad hoc analysis of the conflict.

- *Ensuring the Fluidity between Early Warning and Early Response*: As mentioned above, early warning is only as strong as its response mechanism. While most early warning systems focus on catalysis of response to the conflict, most response mechanisms do not focus on being informed by early warning. In this respect, a best practice is to interlink early warning with early response. In 2nd generation early warning systems, analysts who directly briefed response planners connected warning and response. In 3rd generation early warning systems the practice of interlinking warning and response is more common, where the monitor is also often the responder.

4.1.5. A Recommended Course of Action for an Early Warning Mechanism for the OIC

The ongoing conflicts and unresolved disputes afflicting the Member States and Muslim minorities, the changing dynamics of political order and geo-political upheavals call for an OIC based early warning system, whereby imminent and simmering conflicts can be reported in a timely fashion. A timely warning will lead to timely actions. This is more important and required now than any time before. The absence of such an early warning and early action handicapped the OIC in present day conflicts in Syria, Libya, Iraq, Somalia, Central African Republic and Myanmar, to name the few.

The United Nations, European Union, African Union, and League of Arab States have moderate to very elaborate systems of early warning for both humanitarian issues and political conflicts. These international organizations report from field offices, do centralized analysis of data and reports, and collaborate with international partners. Based on this the OIC early warning mechanism can be envisaged to be comprised of:

1. Reporting by OIC Regional Offices.

2. Reporting by Special Envoys.

3. Report and data analysis by the Peace, Security and Conflict Resolution Unit (PSCU) at the OIC.

4. Employing good offices of the OIC Wise Persons' Council (WPC) and Special Envoys of the OIC Secretary General (SESG).

4.2. Institutional Capacity Building for Conflict Resolution and Prevention

Institutional capacity building for conflict prevention relies on three initiatives that need to be implemented simultaneously as opposed to in a sequential manner. These are: institutional reform, structural remedies, and influencing actor's motivations towards preventative efforts (UN & World Bank, 2018).

4.2.1. Institutional Reform

Institutional reform takes into account the intertwined relationship between social relations of a community and legitimacy of institutions. Therefore, it is essential to reform institutions for preventing relapse of violent conflicts. Given that institutional reform is an important approach to enhancing institutional capacity building, policymakers should adopt the following initiatives accordingly.

At national level, political inclusion should be enhanced, broadened and enshrined in official documentation i.e. constitutions so that it reflects legitimate intentions of the state to reform the institutions. For example, the adaptation of a roadmap for a new constitution of Tunisia is a successful compromise between Islamist and secular camps to overcome an impasse that could result in a violent conflict (Norwegian Novel Committee, 2015). Moreover, political inclusion can also be manifested through the inclusion of opposing parties in the political process, as was the case in Burkina Faso (Chouli, 2015) and Niger (Perouse de Montclos, 2017).

The second initiative is to decentralize power and resources as they can have significant impacts on addressing the root causes of the conflict and can transforms actors' motivations. For instance, the extensive political and fiscal decentralization in Indonesia resulted in stabilization after years of conflict (Steven & Sucuoglu, 2017). Decentralization efforts can also

be combined with community-driven development (CDD) as evidenced by Indonesian's CDD program in strengthening the peace building process.

The third initiative deals with enhancing the accountability of security forces using judicial measures. The reformation of security institutions from "police order to a police service" and the restructuring of security infrastructure into three bodies, namely: National Guard/Armed Forces, National Police, and Civil Protection Unit can increase local transparency (Hanlon, 2012). Transparency in the security sector can help restore the trust that people have in state institutions.

4.2.2. Structural Remedies

Structural factors can have an impact on shaping the environment in which key governmental actors make decisions. While, structural remedies for deep-rooted grievances can be redressed in the long term, targeted responses are viable in effectively addressing specific challenges in the short-term.

With respect to institutional capacity building, there are three set of structural factors that are crucial to conflict prevention and relapse, namely: (i) economic and social grievances, (ii) land and resource related grievances and (iii) historical past and social cohesion (UN & World Bank, 2018). The main cause of violent conflicts based on the first two grievances is often the sense of exclusion felt by marginalized communities, especially in matters related to governance and judiciary. One way to ensure these issues do not spark violent conflict is to resolve such grievances using national resources. An example is Indonesia's 2015-19 National Mid Term-Development Plan (Jeffrey, 2017) and Niger's Renaissance project (Perouse de Montclos, 2017) that aims to resolve prevailing economic and social issues i.e. reducing inequality and promoting social reform in order prevent conflicts.

Governments can also adopt methods to redistribute resources and improve access mechanism for marginalized groups to ensure that the fairness and justice are meted out to, both, core and peripheral communities. For instance, despite the fiscal restraint, Indonesian government has managed to receive political support from core and peripheral communities resulting in successful reforms (Jeffrey, 2017).

In redressing land grievances, states can implement land reforms to ensure that marginalized individuals have a better access to land. In many former colonies, feudalism (over land and people) is still a significant social problem that often leads to civil grievances. The lack of adequate law and enforceable mechanisms at national level is seen as the government's placid support of oppressive practices. A viable solution to quell such grievances can be through legal and institutional reparations. For example, property-related right was legally affirmed by the 'Commission for the Return of Properties to Departed Asians" in Uganda which improved unbiased access to land for various communities (Parks, Colletta, & Oppenheim, 2013).

Box 4.1: Framework for Conflict-Sensitive Programming in Iraq, 2007

The on-going conflict in Iraq has prompted UN agencies and pertinent NGOs to formulate a framework in conflict management with due regard to the conflict-sensitivity approach, taking into account the varied underlying causes and forms of violence being carried out. The program focuses on institutional capacity building and asserts that the potential peacemakers rely on a collective effort from international actors, state, and grassroots groups - which is reflected in the three-track structure of the program. Within this framework, a combination of efforts at settling, resolving, and transforming the conflict are implemented tailored to the conflict's intensity at each stage.

To encourage capacity building activities in similar cases, the program recommends the following:

- To successfully engage in institutional capacity building, there is a need for absolute cessation of direct violence. For this, implementation of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes are key to ensure that the parties do not resort to violence again.

- Building relationships and confidence for the future, keeping lines of communication open, and exploring sustainable solutions that meet conflicting parties' interests and need is important for ensuring that conflicts do not recur for the same reasons.

- For durable peace, conflict transformation activities must be combined with the total efforts of other actors to fundamentally change the perception and mode of interaction among conflicting parties through reconciliation and rehabilitation.

Specifically for institutions seeking to engage in conflict sensitive capacity building programs and activities, guidance from Iraqi practitioners identify the following concrete actions:

- An explicit reference to conflict sensitivity approach should be thoroughly clarified within the organization's mission statement, goals, and approach which makes it clear for staff, donors, stakeholders and other relevant actors that conflict resolution is not merely an add-on activity for the organization.

- Conflict analysis should be carried out prior to implementation of any initiatives to ensure that there is a holistic assessment of the conflict.

- Local sources and perceptions are vital in assessment of institutional capacity for peace-building.

- Organizations undertaking capacity building measures should educate the staff on conflict sensitivity at all levels because the presence and operations of an organization can have lasting effects on the conflict dynamics.

- Lastly, there should be a direct relation between conflict analysis findings and 'programming and implementation strategies' for institutional capacity building.

Source: UNHCR (2007).

With regards structural factors affecting social cohesion, sustainable peace can be achieved if the state publicly accepts the past oppression against public. Using judicial or traditional mechanisms to issue and administer punishments for those responsible for instigating

conflicts and those who execute the wills of such instigators is also one way towards collective healing of the community. An example of this is the establishment of formal truth commissions in Sierra Leone and Tunisia to try the people responsible for inciting civil conflicts (Ainley, Friedman, & Mahony, 2016).

4.2.3. Influencing Actors towards Conflict Prevention

A range of actors involved in the conflict can assist institutional capacity building by forming effective coalitions (both, formal and informal) and shaping narratives in their societies. Some of the coalitions are established based on regional comparative experiences (with neighbouring countries) in order to address the triggers responsible for initiating conflict. For example, learning from the miscalculations made by Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt the Tunisian Islamist party Enahda resorted to a more inclusive and democratic approach while addressing people's grievances in Tunisia (Toska, 2017).

The actors who build coalitions are not only local but also regional and international. For instance, the peaceful government transition guided and supported by a coalition of local leaders, African Union, and United Nations in The Gambia recently is largely heralded as a success (Steven & Sucuoglu, 2017). Several reports indicate that majority of the peace processes owe their success to the role of civil society groups given the social trust and civic ties such groups have within the community (Aslam, 2017). A case in point is Tunisia where the Nobel Peace Prize Quartet has managed to incentivize an amicable dialogue between the government and the opposition paving way for a pluralistic democracy (Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2015).

The second capacity building approach deals with actors' ability to take control of the mainstream narratives. The inter-correlation between narratives, norms and motivations is significant because in times of conflict, prevailing narratives can influence social norms thereby influencing actors' motivations to either cooperate or resist peace processes. For instance, in the Nigerian case, the government steered the national narrative towards peaceful approaches and social cohesion as a means to influence existing norms and motivations to reduce hostility between opponents (Perouse de Montclos, 2017).

A significant approach to subduing extremism and preventing conflict is grounded in community-based approach where influential leaders comprising of women and religious leaders postulate and adopt practical strategies to engage with their communities. In the OIC, successful instances of this approach can be observed in Indonesia and Morocco. In both cases, favourable outcomes resulted from a concerted effort between the central government and religious actors. In Indonesia central government and religious leaders came together to challenge extremist narratives by composing songs based on notion of peace and love as promoted in religion (Ranstorp, 2009). In Morocco, incentives were offered to local elites to take part in a project organized by the state and religious institutions (Wainscott, 2017). Furthermore, in the past, Kyrgyz Republic's government has relied on women actors

to take up the role of religious leaders to identify and prevent radicalized women from joining extremist groups (UN & World Bank, 2018).

4.2.4. Coordination and Resource Mobilization for Conflict Affected People

Conflict-affected individuals require support to overcome the existing challenges they face and recover their livelihoods. Building the capacity of central state coordination units is often the best strategic approach to prevent uncoordinated activities that are adverse to early recovery, peace building and state-building approaches from taking place. A decisive governmental leadership would contribute to making substantial changes in political and social aspects given its inherent capacity to influence other key actors' incentives i.e. political groups to opt for prevention by controlling the conflict prevention vs. resorting to violence narrative that takes place in times of conflict. Additionally, the state plays a significant role during the period of post-temporal settlements i.e. cessation of hostilities as evidenced by the case of Sierra Leone and Liberia where continuity of peace was ensured by state actors post Mano river violent conflict (Marc, Verjee, & Mogaka, 2015). In situations where government's leadership in coordination and resource mobilization is yet to be sufficiently regulated, international partners can play a critical role in leading the response and building national capacity. However, donor coordination is more difficult to be undertaken in conflict-affected areas as compared to situations of natural disasters due to the disparate political and security interests harboured by states.

There has been a recent proliferation of new coordination tools and initiatives, including joint needs assessment and analysis, common strategic frameworks, Multi-Donor Trust Funds and joint implementation arrangements. Post-conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) should be conducted during or after a peace process or political transition as it will be used as inputs in coordination mechanisms. It can also provide a baseline and used as a means to raise funds. Further, Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) have become increasingly important in post-crisis situations. They can serve as a joint funding modality and a framework for strategic coordination. For example, the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020 is a platform for the Government of Lebanon, individual ministries, national and international NGOs, UN, and other private agencies to jointly respond to the Syrian and Palestinian refugee crisis currently unfolding in Lebanon. This platform is also useful for multiple donors to pool their resources and coordinate the response without putting extra strain on Lebanese resources and institutions (see Box 4.2).

4.2.5. Building Institutional Capacity for Conflict Resolution and Prevention – Best Practices

In addition to above-mentioned factors that can impact institutional capacity building in conflict zone, Table 4.2 highlights key measures and instances where an effective implementation of institutional capacity building would materialize. All of the structural and direct measures should be considered in whole or in part as a potential way to prevent and

resolve conflict based on a thorough analysis of the context, needs, opportunities, resources available (human, financial and technical) and ultimate purpose.

Box 4.2: Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017 – 2020

The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) 2017-2020 is a joint initiative between Government of Lebanon, United Nations, national and international NGOs, and private enterprise. The main aims of LCRP are two-fold: (i) ensuring an effective humanitarian response to the refugees from Syrian and other vulnerable groups (ii) To program this response in a way that it noticeably benefits Lebanon through investment in Lebanese services, economy, and institutions. LCRP is a vital platform through which the international community can support Lebanon in addressing the needs of its own people and displaced refugees currently in Lebanon. Interventions at various levels of LCRP are aligned to national policies and strategies, and seek to complement and build on existing international assistance in Lebanon. The LCRP has three main strategic objectives:

1- To ensure humanitarian assistance and protection for the most vulnerable Lebanese people (those living below the poverty line) the displaced refugees from Syria.

2- To strengthen the capacity of national and local service delivery systems. To improve the quality and access to basic public services.

3- To reinforce Lebanon's institutional, economic, social, and environmental stability in the long-term.

According to the priority needs identified jointly by the Government of Lebanon and national and international partners, the LCRP focuses on the most vulnerable communities targeting:

- Approximately 2.8 million Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian people that currently live in a state of vulnerability and marginalization.

- Roughly 1.9 million people for that require immediate or short-term protection and direct assistance (monetary and non-monetary).

- Roughly 2.1 million people that require access to improved service delivery, economic recovery, and community services.

Source: Government of Lebanon & United Nations (2017).

Best practice from global approaches to achieving a lasting peace as well as sustainable development show that five sets of institutional capacities are required:

- Systems that guarantee inclusive governance where citizens and groups perceive themselves as having equal access to the state especially rule of law and to the economy need to be in place;

- The recognition of basic human rights for all citizens without discrimination needs to be ensured through good governance mechanisms;

- Standing mechanisms and a solid base of skills for the resolution of conflict and peaceful settlement needs to be built;

- Transitions need to be managed inclusively, effectively and on the basis of consensus including governance transitions in post-conflict settings;

- A concerted effort on building social cohesion amongst polarized or divided groups or communities primarily through local education and dialogue and/or economic activity that links communities through shared values is needed.

Armed conflict is strongly correlated with institutional underdevelopment resulting in the absence of conflict management capacity. The promotion of human development on both institutional and human capacities needs to become a strategic objective for the OIC countries in order to successfully manage conflict.

4.3. Mediation for Resolving Conflicts

International policy instruments such as the United Nations Resolution on 'Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention, and Resolution', the OIC Charter, the OIC Ten Year Programme of Action, the OIC Vision 2025 Programme of Action , the OIC Conflict Resolution Mechanisms (see Chapter 6), the African Union Mediation Support Capacity Project, the European Union's Comprehensive Toolbox for Conflict Prevention and Peace building and numerous other international instruments recognize mediation as one of the more effective tools for the peaceful resolution of inter-state and intra-state conflicts. According to OIC Assistant Secretary General-elect Ambassador Askar Mussinov, "the OIC has long played an important role in mediation and conflict resolution, in particular taking action in countries that are members of the OIC or intervening when a Muslim community is part of a conflict" (Mussinov, 2017).

Mediation is a process in which a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict by helping them develop mutually acceptable agreements (UN, 2012). The role of a mediator can be that of a communication facilitator, a conduit of information, translator of information, promoter of specific outcomes, direct agent of influence and supervisor or guarantor of an outcome (Bercovitch, 1991a).

In the global political arena, conflicting states often resists legalistic-normative mediation because it is perceived as an encroachment of a state's sovereign rights. Therefore, in most cases, successful mediation is a voluntary endeavour that ensures consensus, autonomy, and mutual gains for all participants. Voluntary mediation is also flexible, affordable, and offers each party a chance at a somewhat satisfactory outcome (Bercovitch, 1991b). However, because voluntary mediation is not legally enforceable, its success is mostly dependent on the state's intentions and abilities to honour the terms of mediation.

Table 4.2: Structural and Direct Measures to Prevent Armed Conflict and Violence

Structural Measures	Direct Prevention
Economic Measures	*Early Warning*
Reducing deprivation and poverty	Establishing a UN early warning and assessment capacity
Reducing inequalities, especially horizontal	*Diplomatic Measures*
Promoting economic growth	Fact-finding
Supporting structural reform	Forming "groups of friends" among UN membership
Providing technical assistance	Deploying eminent persons/envoys
Improving the terms of trade and trade openness	Exercising the good offices of the secretary-general
Supporting community development and local ownership	Pursuing arbitration (including International Court of Justice)
Governance Measures	Supporting indigenous conflict resolution processes
Building institutional capacity and ensuring delivery of social services	*Sanctions*
Strengthening and supporting democracy	Banning travel
Supporting the diffusion or sharing of power	Embargoing trade and arms
Strengthening the independence of judiciaries	Freezing assets
Eradicating corruption	Imposing diplomatic sanctions
Strengthening local conflict resolution capacity	*Inducements*
Security Measures	Promoting economic or trade incentives
Strengthening rule of law	Offering political inducements
Ending/preventing impunity	*Military Measures*
Reforming the security sector	Mobilizing preventive deployments
Encouraging disarmament and effective arms control / management with particular reference to small arms	Developing and/or threatening rapid deployment capability
Human Rights Measures	Jamming and other means of preventing incitement
Protecting fundamental human rights and building national capacity, with specific protection of minority, women, and children's rights	*Legal*
Supporting the work of the International Criminal Court	Referring matter to the International Criminal Court
Social Measures	
Intergroup confidence building, including interfaith dialogue	
Strengthening and supporting civil society	
Establishing freedom of the press	
Preventing and punishing incitement and hate speech	
Educating on diversity and tolerance	
Source: Bellamy (2011, p. 5).	

4.3.1. Requisites for Successful Mediation

For the most part, practitioners believe that - amongst other things - successful mediation of international conflicts is heavily reliant on the following parameters:

- Firstly, and most importantly, parties to the conflict must be willing to negotiate a peaceful resolution; the parties should accept the mediator's credibility and impartiality; and the regional and international community must agree to support the mediation process (Vukovic, 2014);

- The mediation process must be structured and sustained over a period of time, instead of being conducted as one time diplomatic interaction between the parties (Vukovic, 2014);

- The mediation process must begin as soon as the mediator engages with the parties and relevant stakeholders (formally or informally) and lasts after an outcome or agreement has been reached – even when a third party is responsible for facilitating the implementation of the outcome (Kleiboer, 1996);

- The mediation process must be context and mode specific. A mediator's attitude, behaviour, and roles are determined by the requirements of specific circumstances. Therefore, a 'one-size-fits-all' mentality is not favourable to effective mediation efforts (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2001);

- The mediators must take into consideration particular details of the conflict including, the causes and dynamics of the conflict, interests and positions of conflicting parties, societal factors, and regional and international environments (Kleiboer, 1996);

- The mediator must act as a buffer between the parties to promote an exchange of information, guide dialogues and communication, encourages collaboration to solve problems, ensures that negotiating parties have the knowledge, information and skills to confidently negotiate, and when needed opens up the mediation process to include relevant external stakeholders (Bercovitch, 1991b).

It is the presence or absence of these requirements that often determines the success or failure of mediation efforts (Bercovitch, 1991a). Nevertheless, it is important to remember that in complex conflicts mediation is merely one of the many components of a peace process. Therefore, mediation needs to be located within the framework of effective conflict management and resolution rather than as a stand-alone activity.

Given that OIC's mediation support capacities are in its incipient stages, OIC Assistant Secretary General-elect Ambassador Askar Mussinov stresses on the need "…to define and describe the exact role of the OIC in this multi-coloured palette [international mediation]…" and doing so "…is not possible to comprehend the scale of international approach without knowing basic UN Documents…". (Mussinov, 2017) One such document in the UN Guidance

Figure 4.2: Fundamentals Factors Contributing to Effective Mediation

Source: Based on the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation, 2012.

for Effective Mediation (UN, 2012), which goes beyond the basic requirements for successful mediation discussed above to include realistic measures that make mediation processes more effective. The Guidance document stands out because it transforms mediation from being outcome-oriented to process-oriented through an acknowledgement of nuanced principles such as inclusivity, and recognition of the multiplicity of actors involved in mediation, including civil society, women, and indigenous groups.

Using the Report of UN Secretary-General on Enhancing Mediation and its Support Activities and the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation (2012), the following section offers guidance for effective mediation for policy makers in OIC member countries. For OIC, incorporating internationally acclaimed mediation guidelines into its Mediation Support Activities can be useful for advancing OIC's mediation capabilities and understandings, which can contribute towards improving the overall culture of mediation in OIC member countries.

4.3.2. Mediator Preparedness and Impartiality

In this respect, the guidance on preparedness for mediators (individuals or organizations) is to be able to commit resources to respond rapidly and to sustain support for mediation process. Mediator should be reinforced with a team of specialists such as legal experts, regional experts, thematic experts, logistic, administrative, and security support in the designing of mediation process (OSCE, 2014). It is also advisable for mediation teams to receive proper training and induction on the specificity of the conflict and its parties. And lastly, the mediating entity should partake in conflict analysis and internal assessment at

regular intervals to adjust mediation strategies. It is also important to address the topic of gender balance at the preparatory stage. The mediation team should include both men and women to establish gender inclusivity and set a positive example for the delegations of conflicting parties (Langis, 2011).

In a similar vein, impartiality is a fundamental characteristic of effective mediation efforts. Mediators should take extra efforts through their activities and communications to demonstrate that parties to the mediation process are treated fairly and impartially (UN, 2012). Similarly, the laws and norms guiding the mediatory efforts should be transparent to the conflicting parties. While internal exchanges between mediators and parties should be honest, the mediator should disassociate from any punitive measures against conflicting parties by other actors and should take efforts to minimize public criticism of the parties. And any external actors that can affect the impartiality of the mediator or the mediation process should be excluded (Izumi, 2010). However, if the mediator feels incapable of maintaining a balanced approach towards the process, they should at once hand over the process to another mediator.

4.3.3. Actor Consent and Inclusivity

Since mediation is a voluntary process, the consent of conflict parties towards the mediating entity and the process is of paramount importance. In order for mediation process to begin, it is important to understand whose consent is required (UN, 2012). If, at the onset, only a part of the conflicting parties have consented to mediate, the mediator needs to gradually gain the consent of other participating actors as well. It is entirely up to the mediator to analyse if initiating the mediation with the consent of only part of the parties is useful for the process (UN, 2012). Therefore, it is also the mediator's decision to exclude parties that are likely to obstruct the mediation process. For conflicting parties, the channels for informal participation in mediation should be kept open because it allows them to test the mediation process without committing to it completely. This can help the mediator cultivating the consent of various parties towards mediation by easing their insecurities in the informal phase. The mediators can also utilize local and community based actors, groups, or organizations and external actors with access to and relationships with conflicting parties can help convince conflicting parties to use mediation. Even after parties have consented to mediation, confidentiality should be respected and transparency should be maintained while managing the mediation process. It is common for parties to withdraw consent at a later stage of the process for a variety of procedural or ideological reasons (Engel & Korf, 2005). In such cases, regular assessments are useful to discern whether there have been any changes in the level of consent of any involved parties.

In intra-state conflicts that stem from social or civil grievances the inclusion of various local stakeholders in the mediation process is an absolute necessity. Inclusion helps mediators take required steps towards identifying and rectifying the root causes of the conflict. Here, inclusivity also includes the scope and method in which views of various conflicting parties

and stakeholders are represented and incorporated into the mediation process and the outcome of the process. Therefore, inclusive mediation processes are more likely to succeed and the inclusion of a diverse set of stakeholders enables the outcomes of such processes to be widely accepted by the community (UN, 2017).

Formally inclusive mediation processes do not necessarily mean direct participation of various groups, rather inclusive processes facilitate engagement between conflicting parties, stakeholders, local (armed or civil) groups to create a platform for the inclusion of all perspectives in the process (Aulin, 2015). The mediating entity can ensure inclusivity by clearly identifying all actors whose involvement is necessary for resolving the conflict. Also, mediators should inform conflicting parties of the benefits of broader participation on the outcome of mediation and reduce the pre-conditions required for participating in the mediation process.

The inclusion of women is of vital importance for effective mediation because women's groups are known to have significant influence at the grassroots level in a community. However, in order to not compromise the efficiency of the process, involvement of women's groups in the mediation process should be systematic and structured (UN, 2017). Mediators should also encourage conflicting parties to include women representatives in their delegations. In civil conflicts, the focus should be on identifying local actors that can help build the capacity of civil society and improve stakeholder engagement.

4.3.4. National Ownership of Mediation and its Outcomes

The burden of committing to the mediation process and its outcomes is not merely for states and governments. Local communities and society at large need to demonstrate national ownership of the entire peace process (Gienanth & Hansen, 2005). In order to develop national ownership, conflicting parties should be actively included in designing the mediation process. In turn, conflicting parties should consult with their national and local constituencies throughout the mediation process. A clear communication strategy by conflicting parties outlining expectations, timeline of mediation process, and outcomes is necessary to build local support for the process (AU, 2013). Furthermore, internal and external stakeholders and civil society should be informed of the progress of peace processes, so that they can contribute to the process (in terms of procedure and substance) when required (CRS, 2013).

4.3.5. Adherence to International Law/Normative Frameworks

International support for the mediation process and its outcomes plays an important role in legitimizing the process and making peace durable (Mason, 2007). One way to achieve international support is for the conflicting parties, mediators, and mediation process to abide by international laws and conventions. In addition to enforceable laws, the mediation process should also respect and support the adherence to universal norms such as justice, fairness, inclusivity, and empowerment of minorities, etc. (Lanz, Pring, Burg, & Zeller, 2017). In instances of mediation involving OIC counties, meditation should adhere to the spirit of the OIC Charter.

> **Box 4.3: Mediation for Resolving Conflicts in Papua, Indonesia, 1998**
>
> Separationist factions in Papua have demanded independence from Indonesia since the 1960s fuelled by a set of historic, economic, and political grievances. İn 1999, Indonesian government declared Papua as a special autonomous region, governed by OTSUS (special autonomy law).
>
> Since late 2000s, the Indonesian government has adopted a mediatory dialogue approach with Papuan separatist movements (Papuan Peace Network lead by Father Neles Tebay) to mediate the conflict. The people of Papua widely support the mediation process – believing that dialogue would only succeed if neutral third parties were present. In order to conduct an effective mediatory dialogue, the government of Malaysia and PPN has identified the following pre-requisites:
>
> i.   Establishing formal or informal network of facilitators' from across religious, ethnic, and political spectrum including leaders of the movement, NGOs, students, and youth leaders.
>
> ii. Building national consensus in favour of the dialogue by developing networks of pro-dialogue individuals in influential positions in central and local governments.
>
> iii. Seeking grassroots legitimacy through public consultations to maintain public support and legitimacy for the dialogue. These public consultations include discussions between Papuan groups such as pro-independence factions, armed groups, local authorities, Merah Putih groups (Indonesian nationalists), local tribal leaders, religious figures, youth leaders and women leaders and PPN.
>
> i.   Consulting with the Papuan diaspora in Vanuatu, Sweden, Netherlands, UL, and the US. Engagement with the Papuan diaspora is a critical aspect for gathering resources, developing support and consensus within the Papuan community concerning the mediation process.
>
> *Source:* Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (2011).

4.3.6. Coordination and Complementarity of the Mediation Effort

Joint or co-led mediation is one way to streamline the mediation process, especially in cases where state-level, regional, and international actors are working together. In his opening statement for the Mediation for Peace Program (3-7 September 2017) OIC Assistant Secretary General-elect, Ambassador Askar Mussinov, rightly observes that owing to its cultural competency and moral capital in the Muslim world, OIC has been involved in various joint and co-led mediation initiatives (Mussinov, 2017). For OIC, assuming the role of a lead mediator in partnership with national or regional actors has proven more successful when mediating intra-state conflicts. However, the decision to mediate as a single entity or jointly differs from conflict-to-conflict.

It is worth remembering that the entire process of mediation has significant political undertones, which is bound to have an impact on the balance of power in the region or amongst various states (Bercovitch, 1991a). In internationalized civil wars and intra-state conflicts, external environment can have significant impacts on mediation processes. For example, in regional conflicts other states that can impact a conflicting state's compliance or

resistance to mediatory outcomes. In such cases, impartial mediation processes should look beyond external pressures, while actively engaging other states into supporting the mediation efforts (Vukovic, 2014). If the mediator is well informed, they can use the interests other states have in the conflict to encourage parties into committing to an outcome.

4.4. Role of Religious Institutions and Scholars in Fostering Peace

As discussed in the previous chapter, misinterpretation of religious teachings is one of the root causes of violent extremism and sectarian conflicts around the world. A common belief amongst policy makers is that "religion either incites violence or remains silent in response to it" (Sandal, 2017). As a consequence, religious institutions and scholars are often overlooked when it comes to their role and participation in peace processes. To illustrate, between 1989 and 2008, there has been a significant decline in the number of religious group based peace processes, which are indicative of either a decline in participation of religious groups in peace making engagements or a rise in religious armed conflicts (Jhonstone & Svensson, 2013). Yet, numerous communities with diverse cultural and customs continue to resort to religious prescriptions for conflict resolution (Kadayifci Orellana, 2007).

4.4.1. Religious Actors – Influences of Public Policy

Religious actors are expert practitioners of a faith, who are knowledgeable in studying, interpreting, and applying faith-based principles to private and public life. In conflict resolution, a religious actor can be an individual, a leader, or any organization that works under religious principles. Through their interpretation and dissemination of religious knowledge, religious leaders partake in shaping the public understanding of religion that can influence various policy areas (Sandal, 2012). Therefore, religious groups should ideally be treated as experts in public policy to some extent. This makes it understandable why contemporary policy makers assign significant value to the views of religious groups that have entered politics (Thomas, 2005).

In many cases, religious actors are in a position of influence to head organizations or networks that are responsible for spreading religious knowledge and transforming religious interpretations and guidance into applicable policies and practices. For a large number of people, knowledge perpetuated by such networks has more relevance than science itself. Religious knowledge can either be the cause of peace or violence; it can either be manifested publicly in a positive or negative manner. In both cases, overlooking the role of religious actors in conflict resolution and peace building can have grievous consequences (Paris, 1997).

> ### Box 4.4: Sierra Leone and the Lome Peace Accord, 1999
>
> The Lome Peace Accord is an outcome of a violent civil war in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 2002 involving the government of Sierra Leone Government and Revolutionary United Front. The peace accord is a salient example of the role religious leaders and organizations can play in resolving conflicts in their communities. In Sierra Leone, Christian and Muslim religious actors were monumental in organizing activities that fostered political and religious rapprochement, reconciliation, and social cohesion such as "The Programme for Christian-Muslims Relations" and "Interreligious Council of Sierra Leone". These initiatives played a major role in peace building as they essentially addressed the root causes of the conflict by tackling delicate grievances.
>
> Using Sierra Leone as an example, the following recommendations can be made for involving religious actors into the conflict resolution mechanism at various levels:
>
> - Religion should be perceived as a form of expertise as opposed to a mere spiritual resource meaning that it should not simply be treated as a religious study but as a pragmatic instrument to resolve conflicts.
>
> - In multi-conflict contexts, religious actors bring with them a network of other actors that work inside and outside the religious institutions at various levels. Such networks are useful in coordinating conflict resolution activities in local communities even in post-conflict setting.
>
> - Conflict resolution and peace building efforts undertaken by different religions may differ in their approach and practices. For example, hierarchical structure, existing schisms, the nature of educational system, how strict/binding certain religious teachings are, are some of the factors that influence a religious actor's participation in the public sector. Each religious actor should be able to define and explain his or her own narrative.
>
> - In order to effectively involve various sectarian actors in conflict resolution activities, policy makers and practitioners should gain an in-depth knowledge of the region's economy, politics and history to be able to decide whether a particular variant of religious expertise or knowledge could be integrated into peace building efforts.
>
> - Networks of religious actors should work together on various public policy issues, even in the absence of conflict, to foster an environment of cross-platform understanding and tolerance. There should also be open communication between religious actors and secular actors that can predict the emergence of any triggering grievances in the community.
>
> - Peace building efforts should not negatively affect the non-partisanship of religious actors. Any perceived partiality on the part of a religious actor can negate their credibility as an independent mediator.
>
> - Policy makers should take dissemination of religious expertise into account. Sharing knowledge and experiences of religious and customary conflict resolution mechanisms can lead to an improvement in long-term conflict resolution and peace building policies and practices.
>
> *Source*: Sandal (2017).

4.4.2. Islamic Cultural Practices for Conflict Resolution and Peace-Making

From an Islamic perspective, the Qur'an is a valuable source for understanding modes of conflict management and reconciliation. As a principle, the Qur'an preaches equity in cases

of revenge and for forgiveness in cases of apology and remission (Irani, 1999). Moreover, a growing body of literature has also examined conflict resolution techniques rooted in Islamic customs and laws that may have applications for the resolution of contemporary conflicts in the recent years (Abu Nimer, 2000; Rehman, 2011). Scholars identify Islamic customs of *tahkim* (arbitration), *wisata* (mediation), *sulh* (settlement), and *muslaha* (reconciliation) as the customary precedents of Western conflict resolution mechanisms (Irani, 1999; Ozcelik, 2006). For OIC, these Islamic concepts are particularly important for two reasons: (i) OIC is the collective voice of the Muslim Ummah and (ii) OIC documents (i.e. OIC Charter) are in line with the emphasis on the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts as stated in the Holy Qur'an.

According to religious customs, third party interventions have been used to settle individual, societal, and inter-religious conflicts in Islamic societies throughout history. Generally, conflict resolution in Islamic tribes and societies are conducted in three steps shown in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3: Traditional Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation Practices in Islamic Societies

Sulha (settlement) and *Muslaha* (reconciliation)

Tahkim (customary arbitration)

Wisata (mediation)

Source: SESRIC Staff design.

The customary practice of *wisata* (mediation) comprises of: a *wasit* (mediator) who conducts dyadic and group based negotiations for the mediation process. The *wasit* can be either an individual or a delegation of elders, high-level office holders, or experts who have previously mediated on similar cases. The *wasit* has to be transparent, impartial, trustworthy, truthful, and knowledgeable of Islamic Shari'a. Mediation process is held in neutral locations. The proceedings are structured, yet open to people. The *wasit*'s duties include fact finding, reviewing evidence and history of the conflicting parties, and imposing sanctions or positive rewards for one or both parties. However, unlike Western conflict mediation, perhaps the most important characteristic of *wisata* is that a central aim of the mediation process is to preserve and restore relations in the community instead of prioritizing revenge or personal/collective gains (Ozcelik, 2006).

The practice of *wisata* and *tahkim* (arbitration) can be complementary. Here, *tahkim* refers to an Islamic practice that is not the same as Western arbitration. In Islamic societies, *Tahkim* is not an alternative to the judicial system; instead it is the only means of dispute resolution when negotiation and mediation do not result in a settlement (Sayen, 2003). Therefore, while

hakam (arbitrators) are influential in society, they do not have any direct political or legal power (Sayen, 2003). Historically, pre-Islamic arbitration practices were incorporated into Islamic law because *tahkim* was widely used in pre-Islamic societies to settle tribal conflicts (Ozcelik, 2006). The process of *tahkim* begins with the appointment of two arbitrators who attempt to provide reconciliation. In many cases, the decision of the arbitrators is final. In selected cases, the case can be further referred to an official imam or person of authority (who has the religious/legal authority and expertise concerning conflict resolution process) (Ozcelik, 2006).

The final stage of conflict resolution is the formal *sulh* (settlement) and *muslaha* (reconciliation). The practice of *sulh* and *muslaha* are ritualistic and symbolic promoting forgiveness and establishment of peace. According to Islamic Shari'a, "the purpose of *sulh* is to end conflict and hostility among believers...*sulh* is a form of legally binding contract on the individual (private *sulh*) or community (public sulh)." (Khadduri, 1997) Public *sulh* (between communities or states) is similar to a legally binding peace treaty. In tribal traditions, *sulh* can be total or partial/conditional. Total *sulh* ends conflict between two parties, who decide to not hold any grudges against one another (Irani, 1999). Partial or conditional *sulh* ends conflict between two parties as per the conditions agreed upon during the peace process (Irani, 1999).

Procedurally, reconciliation begins when conflicting parties commit to ceasing hostilities by monetary or verbal promise. If an agreement is reached between the parties, it has to be announced in public. While exact progression of rituals concerning *sulh* and *muslaha* vary in different societies, the basic practice always includes: *musafaha* (shaking hands) and *mumalaha* (breaking bread together) (Jabbour, 1996) signifying the restoration of social relations.

4.4.3. Creating Spaces for Religious Actors in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding

As mentioned in the previous sections, more and more policy makers are realizing the benefits of inclusivity in peace processes. There is also a growing realization amongst practitioners that conflict resolution mechanisms should: (i) be considerate of local customs and practices and (ii) be sensitive towards the particular context of the conflict. Religion and religious actors are an integral part of all of these realizations.

Yet, even when there is evidence supporting such realizations, states have been reluctant to formally recognize religious actors in the field of conflict resolution. On the other hand, regional and international organizations have been more receptive towards the inclusion of religious actors at various stages of conflicts. As a matter of fact, the UN's Millennium Summit of World Religious and Spiritual Leaders (2000) was a celebrated initiative because it brought together more than 1000 representatives of transnational and indigenous religious traditions to recognize their influence in global politics.

While many contemporary conflicts and civil wars have a religious angle, this does not mean that the conflict is about religion (Fox, 2004). In many societies, religion is inexplicably related to conflict because it is either a part of the country's political identity or it forms the basis of

national narratives. In both cases policy makers cannot eliminate religion even when dealing with secular issues. At the same time, there is evidence supporting that while religion does not necessarily make a conflict more difficult to manage (unless parties are fighting for religious causes), it is still important for the achievement of durable peace – even in secular conflicts (Svensson, 2007). For example, in Uganda, religion was not the main cause of conflict, yet Acholi religious leaders contributed significantly to the peace process efforts through their expertise on local traditions and Islamic approaches to conflict resolution (Khadiagala, 2001).

In practice, religious peacebuilding is based on "beliefs, norms, and rituals that are relevant to peacebuilding, as well as a range of actors, from religious institutions, faith-based private voluntary organizations, and individuals who are religiously motivated to participate in peacebuilding."(Powers, 2010) As opposed to secular conflict resolution mechanisms, religious peacebuilding focuses more on repairing social relationships, improving inter-faith cooperation, discovering shared beliefs and practices, promoting collective action, and urging peaceful actions (Powers, 2010; Smock, 2006). Religious leaders can use their societal influence and power to leverage conflicting parties into mediating, reconciling conflicting parties, mobilizing communities, and gathering international support for peace processes (Brecovitch & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009). Religious leaders can also take a more active part in mediation by providing trainings in conflict resolution, arbitration, or mediation specific disputes within a larger conflict. For example, the Christian community of Sant'Egidio played a major role mediating negotiations that led to the end of civil war in Mozambique (Lederach & Appleby, 2010). Similarly, the Corrymeela community in Northern Ireland created a safe space for Protestants and Catholics to come together and discuss possible resolutions for the conflict without the fear of hostilities (Sandal, 2017). Therefore, from a conflict management perspective, religious leaders can play a vital role in not only promoting peaceful resolutions but also to mobilize individuals into accepting formal outcomes of peace processes.

4.4.4. Incorporating Religion in Policy Making

From a policy perspective, utilizing religious actors for conflict resolution and peace building can occur in three stages (Sandal, 2017):

- *Stage 1:* Introducing religious actors into the conflict resolution mechanism needs to occur gradually at various stages throughout the conflict. In order to gain public's acceptance, faith-based ideas, norms, and solutions should be framed in a way that creates positive instead of negative identities.

- *Stage 2:* It is important to recognize appropriate political processes that are conducive to the involvement of various religious actors. Religious peace building can only occur when politicians give some power to religious actors as part of the political process. In turn, religious actors should support inclusive public theology to begin the reconciliation process between conflicting parties.

- *Stage 3:* Diffusion refers to the spread of applicable resolutions amongst the diverse set of actors and parties involved in the conflict. Diffusion of possible solutions amongst various actors is useful for (i) creating an inclusive space for various parties to contribute to the discussion, (ii) incorporating the feedback of various stakeholders to the proposed solution, and (iii) ensuring all the parties are unified in their approach towards conflict resolution and peace building. In this specific context, diffusion of religious peace building can also include the replication of peace building practices and norms in various settings.

4.5. Post Conflict Recovery

There are a number of opportunities to promote peace, sustainable development and stability among OIC member countries. Three clusters of opportunities stand out in the context of this chapter: management of transitions to lead to greater peace and development; management of recurring tensions over land and natural resources; and preventing relapse into conflict.

4.5.1. Management of Transitions Leading to Peace and Development

Transitions and demands for reform and participation need to be managed so that they lead to more successful polities and economies rather than to further breakdown of society and systems. Heightened sectarian tensions, prolonged deadlocks over critical reforms and sustained social and economic turbulence could lead to chronic instability and greatly reduce the growth prospects of these countries.

Opportunities: The OIC should work in partnership with member countries to establish national platforms to manage social, political and economic transitions by fostering multi-actor dialogue, engaging critical actors and encouraging sustained conversations among them in order to build confidence or consensus around development priorities.

Multi-actor dialogue has been central to stable transitions in recent years in Tunisia, Niger, Guinea, and Senegal. National dialogue platforms -with women's organizations playing significant roles- have brought together critical actors for sustained conversations in order to build confidence or consensus around crucial priorities. Egypt's Social Contract Centre (a part of the Information and Decision Support Centre) provides a platform for consensus building on development priorities.

4.5.2. Management of Recurring Tensions over Land and Natural Resources

Cyclical conflict over land and natural resources has often characterized relationships among and between communities, especially in sub-Saharan Africa and central Asia. As pressures from climate change and global economic instability have grown, so has the duration and intensity of such conflicts. In many OIC countries, including Nigeria, the Sahel, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, these conflicts have taken on regional, inter-religious or inter-ethnic dimensions and threatened the stability and development of these countries.

Opportunities: The OIC should seek to establish organized platforms of religious leaders and elders as part of a systematic conflict resolution mechanism as well as regional and district peace committees or commensurate mechanisms with a view to addressing cyclical conflicts over land and natural resources.

Several countries and regions within countries have built effective 'Infrastructures for Peace' for managing recurring tensions. These instruments have included actors from both governments and organized civil society. Systematic conflict resolution efforts by organized platforms of religious leaders and elders have been crucial to addressing cycles of violence in Nigeria, Uganda, Benin, Afghanistan and Somalia. Regional and district peace committees or commensurate mechanisms, often working closely with local governments, have played similar roles in Kyrgyzstan, Sierra Leone, Chad, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. Lebanon's Common Space Initiative plays a standing role at the national level in this regard.

4.5.3. Preventing a Relapse into Conflict

Several OIC member states are engaged with situations of post-conflict recovery, either nationally or within particular regions. The north of Uganda, Somalia, Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Comoros, Libya, Tajikistan and Aceh in Indonesia are all witness to ongoing efforts in this regard, some with international assistance. Lasting peace will necessitate identifying and addressing future challenges peacefully and based on equitable development. Capacities towards this end will have to be systematically built.

Opportunities: The role of women and civil society in sustaining post-conflict peace and development methods for participatory peace building should be explored further. With regard to post-conflict recovery, some of the most advanced best practices are now provided by OIC member States.

Engaging women and civil society to constructively support peace processes has yielded results in places like Aceh. Uganda has piloted innovative measures to address land conflicts precipitated by the return of IDPs and refugees to the north. After several false starts, Somalia's emerging system of government reflects some of the best available methods for participatory peace building through power sharing agreements with subnational administrations and non-state entities and open discussions on the concept of federalism and the role of religion. Sierra Leone's Political Parties Registration Commission carries out effective conflict resolution at the national and local level on matters relating to elections, and to the role and work of political parties therein.

4.6. Final Thoughts on Conflict Management Ingredients

The concept of conflict prevention and peace building within the Islamic world is supported by traditional principles of non-violence and peace building that include the pursuit of justice; doing good; the universality and dignity of humanity; the sacredness of human life; equality; the quest for peace (personal, interpersonal, communal, regional, and international); peace-

making via reason, knowledge and understanding; creativity; forgiveness; proper deeds and actions; responsibility; patience; collaborative actions and solidarity; inclusivity; diversity; pluralism and tolerance (Smock and Huda, 2009). These principles are the foundations for the prevention of conflict as well as its resolution and it is these principles in action that produce a vibrant and well-functioning society able to promote objectives such as increasing solidarity among members of the community; bridging the gap of social and economic injustice; relieving the suffering of people and sparing human lives; empowering people through participation and inclusivity; promoting equality among all members of the community; and encouraging the values of diversity and tolerance (Abu Nimer, 2003). Peace traverses two core Islamic values: Compassion and Justice. Building upon this philosophy with capacities inherent in each State is the means to prevent violent conflict as well as break the cycle of recurrent conflict.

Women play a pivotal role in defending and promoting peace in their communities and countries. It has also been shown that if women are not involved in peace processes, peace is likely to be unsustainable. Muslim women have been at the forefront of democratic movements and have been recognized internationally for their work in ending conflict and supporting transitions to democracy.[4] It is also argued that through the education of women and girls, by encouraging micro-finance, supporting entrepreneurship and promoting political inclusion, Muslim women around the world can be empowered to assert a more significant role in conflict prevention and peace building processes.

While there is extensive literature that focuses on Islam and violence, there is a dearth of resources that describe/outline/focus on Islam, nonviolence and peace. More attention needs to be paid to OIC countries with positive experiences of conflict prevention, resolution, recovery and peace building supporting peace initiatives that are on-going in conflicted areas.

Many within the established Muslim religious leadership are providing legitimacy through religious interpretation to oppressive and despotic regimes. While religion does not create violence independent of predisposing social, economic and political conditions, it can be a catalyst for those who would use the power of religious leadership to justify violent responses to injustices. Therefore, there is need to train and support a new class of religious scholars who are well versed in both the traditional Islamic sciences and the modern social sciences. There are civil movements with worldwide reach in education and interfaith dialogue in many conflicted Muslim countries. Through these movements, dialogue activities foster tolerance and acceptance, educational projects indirectly help to raise socio-economic standards of a community and encourage local communities to cooperate around charity and educational

4 In Liberia, Leymah Gbowee brought together women from all faiths to form the Women for Liberia Mass Action for Peace, an organization that played a critical role in ending Liberia's civil war. In 2011, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Tawakkol Karman for her defense and promotion of human rights in Yemen.

projects, and poverty alleviation programs are helpful for the establishment of pluralistic societies and the sustainability of democracies. All this aids in the realization of basic human rights to reduce conflict and provide opportunities for building social cohesion within conflictive communities.

OIC member states, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, have experienced profound transformation over the past few years. This transformation has opened up possibilities for economic and political reform that could lead to more inclusive growth stability and sustainable, equitable development. At the same time, rapid change has also opened up risks for greater social and sectarian conflict and the burgeoning demands and expectations of newly mobilized groups- especially youth and new political movements- could lead to prolonged and potentially violent tensions. The experiences of many OIC member states themselves offer creative solutions for addressing these challenges.

CHAPTER FIVE

Alternative Paths to Achieve Peace and Security

In one of his addressees, the former Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan stated, "Human security, good governance, equitable development and respect for human rights are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. If war is the worst enemy of development, healthy and balanced development is the best form of conflict prevention" (UN, 1999). The challenge of achieving peace and security is detailed in previous chapters of the report. A fact highlighted here again by using data from the Institute for Economics and Peace (2018), which identified Afghanistan, South Sudan, Iraq, and Somalia as the least peaceful countries in the globe, according to their index average scores in 2018. Three out of these four countries are members of the OIC.

Conflicts are not only responsible for the loss of millions lives in different parts of the OIC region but also constitute a barrier for social and economic development. In this regard, it is vital to avoid conflicts as much as possible. In fact, many countries all across the globe have successfully managed high-risk conflicts and avoided descending into violence thanks to their functioning institutions, well-educated human capital and soft power mechanisms. These experiences offer lessons on prevention of conflicts and can be applied to other contexts including OIC countries. Nevertheless, there is no one-size-fits-all formula, as each situation is specific to the actors, institutions, and structures of each society, but common threads can be teased out of these experiences.

According to Mueller (2017), prevention of a conflict/violence is cost effective. In the most pessimistic scenario, where preventive action is rarely successful, the average net savings are close to US$5 billion per year. In the most optimistic scenario, the net savings are almost

US$70 billion per year. Since prevention is cost effective for any nation, it is essential for OIC countries to develop their capabilities to prevent outbreak of a conflict.

In order to quantify factors that affect peace and security, Institute for Economics and Peace developed a concept called *Positive Peace*, which is defined as the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies. In addition to the absence of violence, Positive Peace is also associated with many other social characteristics that are considered desirable, including stronger economic outcomes, higher resilience, better measures of well-being, levels of inclusiveness and environmental performance. According to Institute for Economics and Peace (2017), countries with high Positive Peace are more likely to maintain their stability and adapt and recover from both internal and external shocks. Therefore, Positive Peace creates the optimum environment for human potential to flourish.

Positive Peace is measured by the Positive Peace Index (PPI) which consists of eight domains (high levels of human capital, equitable distribution of resources, free flow of information, sound business environment, well-functioning government, low levels of corruption, acceptance of the rights of others, and good relations with neighbours), each containing three indicators, totalling 24. A higher index score in the PPI indicates existence of a lower level of positive peace.

Figure 5.1: Positive Peace Index Scores in 2017

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace

According to Figure 5.1, OIC countries, on average, obtained the highest score (3.5) in the PPI in 2017 indicating the worst performance when compared with the averages of non-OIC developing countries (3.2), developed countries (1.7) and the world (3.0). In other words, OIC countries, on average, are far away from the optimum level of societal development that could ensure a peaceful environment. On the other hand, the average PPI score of developed countries (1.7) is the lowest reflecting their well-developed institutions and governance systems. The well-functioning institutions and governance systems seen in developed countries not only help them stay away from conflicts as much as possible but also enable them to address existing conflicts and threats effectively. Moreover, in case of a conflict developed countries are able to recover quickly thanks to their high level of capabilities in maintaining positive peace.

Institute for Economics and Peace (2017) estimated that the economic impact of containing or dealing with the consequences of violence was 12.6% of the world GDP or approximately $14 trillion, highlighting that improvements in resilience and peace have substantial economic advantages to the global economy. This holds true for OIC countries, where the number of conflicts are relatively high and prevalence of positive peace, on average, is relatively low. Therefore, it can be inferred that by achieving peace and security through alternative paths, OIC countries not only could prevent millions of people from suffering from violence and conflicts but also could allocate additional financial resources to invest more into the well-being of people including basic services such as health and education.

The discussions in this chapter are a continuation of the discussions presented in chapter three but from the opposite side. Whereas chapter three was dedicated to identifying drivers of conflict, this chapter attempts to address those drivers and turn them into prevention mechanism that will ultimately lead to more peaceful and less conflict prone OIC countries.

5.1. Economic Development

In societies where peace is maintained and security is ensured, it is likely that economic growth would be sustained and consequently development would be achieved. In other words, there is a close positive association between peace and economic growth as well as development. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace (2017), at the global level, countries which are improving in peace compared to countries that are deteriorating in peace (measured by Positive Peace Index) had nearly 2% per annum higher growth rate in per capita income from 2005 to 2016.

Peacefulness is also correlated with strong performance on a number of macroeconomic variables. Interest rates are lower and more stable in highly peaceful countries, as is the rate of inflation. Foreign direct investment is more than twice as high in highly peaceful countries. At the individual country level there is also supportive evidence that war and conflicts hit economic development severely. Afghanistan's per capita income has remained at its 1970s level due to the continued war, and Somalia's per capita income has dropped by more than 40% over the same period (Mueller and Tobias, 2016). On average, countries bordering a high-intensity conflict experience an annual decline of 1.4 percentage points in gross domestic product (GDP) and an increase of 1.7 points in inflation (Rother et al., 2016).

However, the link between peace and economic development also works in the other way around where economic development and sound macroeconomic performance support achieving peace and security. Over the last decade, countries with the largest improvements in peace recorded seven times higher per capita GDP growth than those that deteriorated the most (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017). Put differently, efforts and initiatives of governments to maintain peace and security are correlated with economic development through supporting macroeconomic stability and reducing uncertainties.

Having peaceful relations with other countries is as important as ensuring good relations between groups within a country. Countries with positive external relations are more peaceful and tend to be more politically stable as well as are regionally integrated. This positively affects the overall business environment and enhances foreign direct investment, tourism and human capital inflows.

A *Sound Business Environment* implies the presence of regulatory systems that are conducive to business operations in which the formal institutions that support the operation of the private sector and other economic agents. Economic agents and countries require predictability and credibility from each other in international trade and finance. If two countries are entering into an agreement, they are both taking a risk that the other country may not hold up its end of the bargain. This risk is mitigated with peaceful relation, and therefore fosters cross-border economic activity. A sound business environment therefore helps to alleviate risk factors stemming from conflicts especially for the private sector and economic agents.

On the other hand, in existence of a sound business environment, economic actors are more reluctant to any kind of disturbance and shocks in economy including conflicts and upraises as they would like to maintain their economic interests. In such an environment, private sector and economic agents would tend to become an important pressure group to maintain peace and support public institutions to ensure national security. There is also supportive empirical evidence that business-friendly societies tend to be more peaceful (Schwab, 2010).

Figure 5.2: Sound Business Environment Sub-Index Scores in 2017

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace

Note: A Subindex score of the Positive Peace Index

Nevertheless, according to Figure 5.2, OIC countries, on average, have the least sound business environment in 2017 with a score of 3.5. As a lower score in this sub-index implies the presence of sound business environment, developed countries, on average, had the best business environment with a score of 1.8 when compared with the averages of OIC countries (3.5), non-OIC developing countries (3.4) and the world (3.1).

The state of economic development in OIC countries, on average, is also not very promising when measured in terms of *equitable distribution of resources*. Inequalities between groups defined by religion, ethnicity, or regional identities are linked to a significantly higher risk of armed

conflict (Nygard, 2018). In Figure 5.3 countries with more equitable distribution of resources are represented with a lower score. In this regard, in developed countries, on average, resources are distributed more equitable that their average score is measured at 1.5. On the contrary, OIC countries, on average, obtained the highest score (3.3) among country groups reflecting the existence of significant problems in distribution of resources.

Figure 5.3: Equitable Distribution of Resources Sub-Index Scores in 2017

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace

Note: A Subindex score of the Positive Peace Index

Economic stability and peace are intimately entwined. If you lose one, you are likely to lose the other. Peace is a necessary precondition for trade, sustained economic growth, and prosperity. In turn, economic stability, and a rising prosperity that is broadly shared—both within and among countries—can foster peace. Ultimately, peace and prosperity feed on each other. History teaches us this lesson. We all remember how the Great Depression created fertile ground for a devastating war. More recently, in many parts of the world, economic instability provoked political upheaval, social unrest, and conflict (Strauss-Kahn, 2009).

Figure 5.4 shows macroeconomic stability in OIC countries with comparison to other country groups. A lower score in the macroeconomic stability sub-index is associated with a lower level of stability. The average score of OIC countries (5.7) in terms of macroeconomic stability sub-index in 2018 points out relatively lower levels of stability in comparison with the averages of non-OIC developing countries (6.4) and the world (6.3) in 2018. The index score unsurprisingly

Figure 5.4: Macroeconomic Stability Sub-Index Scores in 2018

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018

Note: A Subindex score of the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation (BTI) Index

reveals that developed countries, on average, have the highest level of macroeconomic stability in 2018, reflected with a score of 9.4.

Overall, three indicators presented in Figure 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 support the argument that economic development is an important determinant for peace and security. As OIC countries, on average, have a relatively less conducive business environment where economic agents and investors have to overcome challenges such as access to finance, macroeconomic instability, and uncertainties, it is relatively difficult to maintain peace and security in such a climate.

5.2. Human Development

Human development is defined as the process of enlarging people's freedoms and opportunities and improving their well-being. Education is one of the fundamental building blocks through which societies can build resilience and develop mechanisms to learn and adapt. A skilled human capital base is reflected in the extent to which societies educate citizens and promote the development of knowledge. This improves economic productivity, care for the young, enables better political understanding, and increases social capital. High level of education also fosters innovation. Notably, there is a strong relationship between innovation and peace, likely reflecting society's ability to engineer solutions and be adaptable (Heeks et al., 2014; Miklian & Hoelscher (2018). Also by increasing the overall skill base, an economy can significantly decrease its level of poverty and social exclusion, increase its stability and improve its levels of peace (Davies, 2004; UNICEF, 2011).

In societies with high levels of human development, there is often a common sense and understanding to protect existing levels of well-being by maintaining social peace (UN, 2013; Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017). High levels across these areas in society can foster the required skills and social cohesion to increase a country's level of stability, peace and economic development.

In fact, increased levels of human capital can build the institutions that foster peace. There is some country-level evidence. Such as in Rwanda, significant investment was placed in education and health following the civil war which ended in 1994. By 2005 the primary school enrolment rate had reached 95%, up from 67%, while the percentage of the population living in poverty had decreased from 78% to 57% (United Nations & World Bank, 2018). Economic development and peacefulness substantially improved in the years following the end of the armed conflict.

Health is another cornerstone of human development and in this regard is as important as education. It is therefore, included as one of the three dimensions of the Human Development Index of the UNDP. There is strong evidence that investment into people's health positively affect peace and security (MacQueen & Santa-Barbara, 2000). Internal peace correlates significantly with levels of infant mortality (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017). This indicates how societies that place emphasis on health tend to be more peaceful.

Figure 5.5: Correlation between Level of Socioeconomic Development Sub-Index and Conflict Intensity Sub-Index in OIC Countries

Conflict = -0.55*Development + 7.6

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018

Note: Subindex scores of the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation (BTI) Index

Societies which encourage the development of human capital show higher levels of peace compared to those which do not. In other words, where public services such as health, education and investment in infrastructure are performed efficiently and effectively, community needs are more likely to be met, thereby encouraging greater wellbeing and a more peaceful community. It is also of importance to deliver such basic services to all segments of a society where inclusiveness matter as much as quality (Sturge et al., 2017).

Evidence from OIC countries, as shown in Figure 5.5, also supports that there is a negative correlation between the level of socioeconomic development and conflict intensity. OIC countries with a higher socioeconomic development score tends to experience a lower conflict intensity. All else equal, a 1 unit increase in the socioeconomic

Figure 5.6: Level of Socio-Economic Development Sub-Index Scores in 2018

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018

Note: A Subindex score of the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation (BTI) Index

development score of an OIC country associates with a 0.55 unit decrease in the conflict intensity sub-index score. In other words, the impact of an increase in socioeconomic development score is not only positive but also higher than 0.5, reflecting existence of a strong and positive spill over effects stemming from human development towards peace.

Figure 5.7: High Levels of Human Capital Sub-Index Scores in 2017

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace
Note: A Subindex score of the Positive Peace Index

Unfortunately, the average level of socioeconomic development of OIC countries is modest when compared with other country groups (Figure 5.6). The same thing can be said about human capital (Figure 5.7).

Overall, the results indicate that it is relatively easier to prevent conflicts and violence in countries with high level of human development. In other words, achieving peace and security is possible through enhancing human development. This constitutes a very cost effective alternative path that OIC countries should follow. Nevertheless, the prevailing scores of OIC countries, on average, is not very promising (as shown in Figure 5.6 and 5.7).

5.3. Political Inclusion

Societies whose political institutions are more inclusive and participatory tend to be more peaceful and resilient, just as societies practicing exclusion tend to be more vulnerable to fragility and conflict (see Chapter 3). This reality is underscored by the importance of "Inclusion" in the 2030 Agenda, including through SDG#16, SDG#10 and SDG#5. Inclusive political processes are crucial to sustaining peace and conflict prevention, as they contribute to remedying structural inequities and other root causes of conflict.

Political inclusion measures the extent to which all members of a society are able to access the institutions that play a role in decision-making. Inclusive decision making through political inclusiveness is fundamental to sustaining peace at all levels, as are long-term policies to address economic, social, and political aspirations. Fostering the participation of all segments of a society including elderly, young and women as well as of the organizations that represent them is crucial. It is important that individuals and groups within society feel that the government is responsive to their needs and can protect them from violence.

Effective interactions between citizens and governmental institutions are critical in ensuring peace and satisfying people that their voices are heard. One of the most effective ways that views of ordinary people could reach to the decision-makers is to include them into decision-making processes. Organisations that represent people's views play a great role in functioning of societies. These organisations include political parties and civil society organizations.

One of the functions of a political party is to represent views of citizens in national assembly/parliaments, which are tasked with making legislation for the institutions of state. In inclusive societies, citizens are free to be a member of political parties and vote for any party in elections. In this way, citizens are involved in policy-making as well as decision-making processes. Barriers for becoming members of political parties or voting processes could create an environment where extremist ideologies or ill-intended organisations may substitute political representation. In such environment, it is not only difficult to maintain peace and social harmony but also impossible to strengthen national capacities for external threats. Therefore, it is extremely important to build up a society where there is a strong political participation. Evidence from a sample of OIC countries supports the above arguments. In OIC countries where political participation is weak, the level of conflict intensity tends to be higher (Figure 5.8). A unit increase in the political participation sub-index score associates with a 0.1 unit decrease in the conflict intensity. Unfortunately, in OIC countries, on average, political participation is very weak when compared to other country groups as chapter three has detailed.

**Figure 5.8:** Correlation between Political Participation Sub-Index and Conflict Intensity Sub-Index

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018
Note: A Subindex score of the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation (BTI) Index

Civil society actors also play a role and fill a gap between public institutions and citizens through collectively conveying views of people to policy and decision-makers. Such a function of civil society actors tends to promote confidence and build trust, which encourages cooperation among members of society and creates incentives for collective action. This ability to build bottom-up trust gives civil society an instrumental role in forming coalitions for peace broadly (Boix and Posner, 1996; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Civil society groups also play an important role in promoting social norms that discourage violence, for example, by increasing awareness of the costs of violent conflict and showcasing opportunities that can come from engagement across rival groups (Barnes, 2009).

Civil society actors cannot be strong and effective in an environment where there is limited tolerance. *Acceptance of the Rights of Others* ensure the level of tolerance between different ethnic, linguistic, religious, and socio-economic groups within the country. According to Figure 5.9, acceptance of rights of others is measured through a sub-index where a higher score associates with a limited acceptance rate. In OIC countries, on average, the level of acceptance of rights of others is very weak reflected with a high score of 3.7 in the sub-index score. On the other hand, developed countries, on average, respect and accept the rights of others in a strong manner, reflected with a score of 1.9.

Figure 5.9: Acceptance of the Rights of Others Sub-Index Scores in 2017

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace
Note: A Subindex score of the Positive Peace Index

The results reveal that OIC countries need to exert more efforts to improve political inclusiveness and promote acceptance of rights of others. By doing this, more people take part in decision-making processes. This would help to balance the social pressure as well as promote peace and security.

5.4. Good Governance

A well-functioning government is the one that provides strong structures and effective institutions to support the collective pursuits of the society and provide mechanisms to reconcile grievances and disputes. A government is responsible for the maintenance of the safety and security of its citizens and for the provision of public services. A government that does not exercise good governance and does not provide effective services leaves a gap that

is then filled by radical and violent extremist groups. By filling the gap left by governments and by providing services to the population, radical and violent extremist groups gain a footing in society and gain some degree of legitimacy in the eyes of some of the population they serve. This, in turn, provides radical and violent extremist groups with an audience to propagate their radical views and ideology and a pool of potential recruits.

In particular, security and justice institutions that operate fairly and in alignment with the rule of law are essential to preventing violence and to sustaining peace. Rule of law describes how power is exercised, disputes are resolved and to what extent government is separate and compliant with the legal system. Strong rule of law of constitutes a strong basis for protection of the rights of individuals and groups; also, it ensures an impartial judiciary.

Good governance also affects the business environment and economy. An investor looks for a business environment where predictability and transparency are high. Governments are responsible to collect taxes in fair basis to provide services to the public. Managing huge amount of public funds requires full accountability, transparency and lack of corruption and therefore they are also indispensable components of good governance. The way how revenue is collected and how public funds are spent not only impacts provision of services but also shapes perceived fairness of a government. For instance, in countries where the average level of corruption is high people have difficulties to access public services. Such an environment leads to a tension between institutions and society at large. In this regard, having good governance positively affects peace and security in a society.

The quality of governance also affects external peace and relations with neighbours. Countries with good governance and well-functioning institutions have better capacities (e.g. diplomacy, soft power measures etc.) to manage crises with neighbours. Good governance also affects abilities of governments to address regional crisis and conflicts especially in reducing escalations and building up peace. Having good relations ensured by good governance have positive impacts on cross-border activities.

Overall, there is a close positive association between good governance and peacefulness. Unfortunately, for OIC countries, good governance is not widely

Figure 5.10: Levels of Corruption Sub-Index Scores in 2017

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace.
Note: A Subindex score of the Positive Peace Index

practiced (see Figure 3.7). In addition, SESRIC (2015) showed that the overall quality of institutions in OIC countries are not very strong in comparative perspective and, on average, deteriorated between 2006 and 2014 by using 21 indicators from property rights to judicial independence.

As discussed above, the state of corruption is an important determinant factor of governance. High levels of corruption can misdirect resources, compound inequities and undermine trust throughout society. In some cases, resulting inequities due to corruption can lead to civil unrest and in extreme situations can be the catalyst for more serious violence. In this regard, Figure 5.10 presents an indicator that measures the levels of corruption in a country. The figure shows elevated levels of corruption in OIC countries.

Overall, the results indicate that OIC countries, on average, have some problems in building up strong institutions and ensuring good governance. The problems related with the quality of governance impede peacefulness of OIC countries. Such problems also affect the overall quality of well-being of people and providing some room for ill-intended or radical groups to flourish. In this context, it is of importance for OIC countries to focus on reforms with a view to upgrading the quality of institutions.

5.5. Towards a Peaceful Society

Prevention of conflicts is the least costly way to avoid their consequences. Many OIC countries experienced conflicts at varying degrees mainly stemming from inadequate prevention efforts before the outbreak of a conflict. In particular, limited economic development, underinvestment into human development including health and education services, insufficient political inclusiveness, and problems associated with governance have emerged as main drivers of conflicts in the OIC region. It implies that exerting efforts towards curbing drivers of conflicts and security threats would help OIC countries build up an environment where all segments of society could benefit from the existing peace and ill-minded groups could not find room to flourish. In this context, OIC countries should take steps forward in the following four main areas to achieve peace and security.

First of all, OIC countries need to take policy actions to ensure a higher level of economic development. These actions include re-calibrating fiscal, monetary, and business policies with a view to improving the business climate, ensuring more equitable distribution of resources, and restoring macroeconomic stability. By doing this, OIC countries could utilize their capacities and capabilities in achieving peace and security and prevent extremism and violence from taking foot. It is worth mentioning that economic growth and poverty alleviation policies are crucial but alone will not suffice to sustain peace. Preventing violence requires going beyond traditional economic and social policies especially when risks are on the rise. This also implies seeking inclusive solutions through dialogue, adapted macroeconomic policies, institutional reforms in economic governance, and redistributive policies.

Second, in order to benefit from the power of high levels of human development in maintaining peace and coping with security threats as well as preventing violence at the national level, OIC countries need to invest more into education and health services with a view to improving the overall quality of well-being. Moreover, it is also essential to achieve higher levels of per capita income through ensuring sustainable economic growth that would pave the way for people living in OIC countries to invest into their self-development.

Third, on the political inclusiveness front the results suggest that OIC countries need to consider making reforms with a view to encouraging and promoting participation of people into decision-making processes such as through taking part in civil society organizations. Such reforms would help OIC countries to experience conflicts to a lesser extent as well as to achieve and maintain internal and external peace. In addition, OIC countries need to pay utmost attention to improving the level of acceptance of rights of others. This requires activities to raise awareness in society about rights of people and measures to eliminate prejudices against certain segments of the society.

Finally, building strong institutions and ensuring good governance constitute a strong path to maintain peace and to cope with security threats. In this regard, OIC countries need to design policies to strengthen their institutional and governance capacities. In this context, the first step is to define the problematic areas related with the quality of governance and prepare a strategic roadmap with the involvement of relevant stakeholders. Political willingness and strong commitment emerge as two key success factors in this exercise. As improving the quality of governance requires time and tireless efforts, long-term policies with concrete KPIs need to be prepared and implemented. In this way, OIC countries as a group can have strong institutions in which the rule of law is fully observed and levels of corruption are minimized. This would help OIC countries not only reduce the number of conflicts and crisis but also equip them with capacities in the conflict management.

CHAPTER SIX

OIC and Conflict Resolution: From Past to Present

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation is the second largest intergovernmental organization after the United Nations. The OIC consists of 57 diverse member states spanning across four continents and home to various ethnicities and religions. One of the major goals of the OIC is to promote international peace and harmony among various people of the world. Achieving this requires the OIC to be actively involved in conflict resolution and mediation.

In fulfilling its mission in establishing peace, the OIC is aided by a number of assets it possesses. Sharqieh (2012) summarizes those assets in three different areas: cultural competency, moral power, and partnership. Cultural competency is derived from the OIC developing a special expertise in the cultural components that drive conflicts in the member states. This in turn allows the OIC to conduct knowledge-based and culturally sensitive mediation. Moral power stems from the fact that unlike interventions by the UN, the OIC has no means to implement forceful resolutions. Physical force is replaced in the OIC case by moral power. Parties to the conflict realize that the settlement decision is ultimately their own. Agreements reached on this base will likely be more sustainable, as they emerge from the full conviction of the parties themselves. As for partnership, the OIC collaboration with international organization and more specifically with the UN has allowed for a more effective response to mediation requirements of world conflicts (Sharqieh, 2012).

6.1.   History of OIC Mediation Efforts

Since its foundation, the OIC has played an important role in mediation and conflict resolution, in particular taking action in countries that are members of the OIC or intervening when a

Muslim community is part of a conflict. Throughout its history, the OIC has successfully mediated various disputes including conflicts in Sudan, Chad, Afghanistan, Southern Philippines and Southern Thailand. In Somalia, Mauritania and Guinea, OIC afforded special attention to support international efforts aiming at establishing peace and security and restoring the rule of law. Also in Iraq, the OIC played a key role in trying to end the sectarian strife in 2006. The following cases are important in highlighting the potential and limitations of OIC's conflict resolution and mediation mechanisms.

Philippines

The conflict in southern Philippines can be traced back to the inclusion of Mindanao and Sulu to the Philippine Commonwealth territory of 1935. The inclusion of Mindanao and Sulu resulted in the marginalization of the local population due to the Resettlement Policy (Gutierrez & Borras, 2004). By 1969, political tensions and open hostilities had emerged between the Government of Philippines and Moro Muslim rebel groups. However, the Moro Insurgency was ultimately triggered by the Jabidah massacre where 60 Filipino Muslim commandos on a planned operation to reclaim the eastern part of the Malaysian state of Sabah were killed. In response, the University of the Philippines professor Nur Misuari established the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), an armed insurgent group that was committed to establishing an independent entity composed of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. Over the successive years, the MNLF splintered into several different groups, one of which is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) that wanted to establish an Islamic state within the Philippines.

The OIC has been involved in this conflict since its inception and has also granted MNLF observer status. In return, MNLF drew support from the OIC leading the Philippines government to assume that OIC was perhaps the only institution that could pressurize MNLF into negotiating a peace outcome. Throughout its intervention, the OIC strictly adhered to the principles of international law and to preserving the territorial integrity of the Philippines. A major reason why Mindanao did not secede was because of the pressure OIC applied on the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) – rival to the MNLF and advocates of secession. The OIC insisted that addressing the cause of the Muslims in the southern region could only be achieved through a negotiated settlement with the Government of Philippines. Furthermore, the OIC refused to recognize the MILF as the sole representative of Muslims in the Philippines in the 2003 OIC summit meeting in Malaysia, thereby weakening the front and its call for secession (Buendia, 2004). Hence, all the parties to the conflict treated OIC as an honest mediator.

OIC's intervention in this conflict began with a fact-finding mission to the Southern Philippines in 1972. The OIC later used this mission's report, in 1974, to issue an appeal calling on the Government of the Philippine and MNLF to engage in negotiations toward a peaceful solution of the crisis while preserving the sovereignty of the Philippines and its territorial integrity (Ihsanoglu, 2010). The OIC acted as an interlocutor and mediator, resulting in the signing of the Tripoli Peace Agreement of the 1976. The main outcome of the negotiation was that MNLF

would forgo their claim for secession and independence in return for full autonomy of the region. The agreement, however, failed in the constitutional process for its implementation. While, the MNLF accused the government of flagrant violation and non-implementation of some vital provisions of the peace agreement; the government maintained that it had faithfully implemented the accord (Ebrahim & Bin Mohamed, 2013). The collapse of the peace pact resulted in the resumption of hostilities between the MNLF and Philippines government forces. This is also the time period when MNLF split into two factions: MNLF and MILF. In 1996, after intensive mediation efforts, OIC was able to convince the Government of the Philippines and MNLF to sign the Final Peace Agreement (FPA). However, the Philippines parliament refused to ratify the agreement leading to a new wave of fighting.

Following the failure of previous rounds of mediation, the Government of the Philippines accepted OIC's offer of restarting the peace process and launching a new fact mission. To achieve tangible outcomes, OIC mediation extended its scope, speaking directly to multiple stakeholders; its 2006 fact finding mission met with the parliament and a variety of civil society organizations. Furthermore, the mission visited Sulu Islan- where fighting was still taking place- and negotiated directly with the parties to reach a ceasefire (Sharqieh, 2012). The OIC was also able to launch the tripartite talks with the Government of the Philippines, the MNLF and the OIC. These talks were entrusted with the task of examining obstacles impeding the full implementation of the FPA. On the topic of these talks, Ambassador Sayed El-Masry, *former Special Envoy of the OIC Secretary General for Minority Issues and the OIC Secretary General Peace Envoy to Southern Philippines*, states:

"…in fact this mechanism should have been a part of the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) as a monitoring structure, but unfortunately we, meaning the OIC, left early, perhaps because the word final conveys the "finale", or the end of the process."

As mentioned earlier, the Moro National Front split into two fronts after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement in 1976: MNLF and MILF. The MILF did not accept the basic premise on which the agreement was based, that is autonomy in lieu of independence, and took up armed struggle. After years of fighting, Malaysia succeeded in bringing the Government of the Philippines and MILF to the negotiation table on the same basic principle: autonomy instead of independence. The OIC is involved in this track through Malaysia, in capacity of facilitator. Besides OIC, Saudi Arabia and Turkey (both members in the International Contact Group) also attended the talks along with the Special Envoy of the OIC Secretary General. According to Ambassador Sayed El-Masry: *"the two tracks are talking about the same area and discussing almost the same issues; thus, for peace to have a chance there is a need for coordination between the MNLF and MILF peace."* Accordingly, the OIC expended efforts in bridging the gap between MNLF and MILF. Several meetings took place in Jeddah on the margins of the OIC Conference of Foreign Ministers. As a result of these efforts, the gap between the two fronts was narrowed.

The OIC Secretary General, Dr. Yousef Al Othaimeen, welcomed the cooperative and accommodating position declared by the MNLF on July 19, 2017 that it will no longer submit

a for a new autonomy law to avoid complications and will contribute directly to the fast tracking of federalism. Finally, on July 26, 2018, President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines signed a landmark law aimed at giving an expanded autonomy to the Muslims in the south of the country, with the legislation expected to bring some measure of peace.

Thailand

The insurgency in southern Thailand is active primarily in Narathiwat, Patani and Yala provinces. Patani is a name often used to refer to a region in the far south of Thailand along the border with Malaysia. The name comes from the former sultanate of Patani, which was founded in 1390 and annexed by Siam (Thailand's historical name) in 1902. At the time of the annexation, Patani included the modern-day Thai provinces of Narathiwat, Patani and Yala and parts of Songkhla along with neighbouring areas of Malaysia. The combined population of Narathiwat, Patani and Yala provinces is approximately 1.8 million, 80% of which are Malay Muslims (ICG, 2005).

The instability in southern Thailand since 1940s can be traced back to an oppressive Thai Buddhist state and its repression policies against the Muslim minority. Throughout the conflict, the Muslim community has largely demanded the establishment of an autonomous government in the south, recognition of their language and culture, and control over the resources in the region. However, matters escalated sharply in 2004. On 25 October 2004, during the holy month of Ramadan, a demonstration outside the Tak Bai Police Station led to the arrest of more than 1,000 protestors. Upon arrest, the protesters were piled onto trucks several layers deep leading to the death of seventy-eight people as a result of asphyxiation. Following the Tak Bai deaths, the number of incidents and the brutality of the violence in the southern provinces escalated sharply. In response, the government intensified its efforts to suppress the insurgency (Melvin, 2007).

Thailand has an observer status with the OIC, which resulted in OIC's involvement in the conflict as a mediator and a facilitator. In 2005, the OIC intervened in the conflict after the OIC Secretary General received the agreement of the Thai Government to receive a mission from the OIC. Initially, OIC's mission focused on observing and assessing of the conditions of Thai Muslims in the southern region. Subsequently, OIC focused on mediation, owing to its diplomatic leverage with the Thai government and credibility within the Muslim community.

OIC's mediation efforts in the conflict eased the obstacles that stood in the way of negotiations between Thai Muslim representatives and Thai government on recognition of Thai Muslims as rightful citizens of Thailand. As a result of OIC's efforts, Thai authorities also reduced their acts of violence and oppression against Muslims, so as to pave the way for peace and stability in Thailand all the while respecting the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Notably, OIC sought to help discredit stereotypes and misconceptions that often cause obstruction to effective dialogue, understanding, and resolution of conflicts. The OIC delegation concluded that unrest in the south was neither the result of religious

discrimination against the Muslims nor was it rooted in the religion itself, instead it could be traced to culture and historic neglect of the south (Bangkok Post, 2005).

In late 2006, the interim prime minister appointed by the new military junta, General Surayud Chulanont, made his first visit to the southern border provinces of Thailand. During the visit he apologized for the past actions of the Thai security forces against ethnic Malay Muslims, including the 2004 Tak Bai incident (Pathan, 2006). Furthermore, in order to diffuse ethnic tensions in the South and address the grievances of Malay Muslims, Surayud proposed setting up a special development zone incorporating Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala along with neighbouring Songkhla and Satun provinces and even indicated that there might be a possibility to implement of Sharia law amongst southern Muslims. Lastly, the government also initiated talks with the insurgents to quell various factions that were party to the conflict (Srivalo & Shinworakomol, 2006).

Somalia

State failure in Somalia in 1991 coupled with drought and famine led to a catastrophic humanitarian crises claiming the lives of almost one million people. In 1993, the United Nations intervened in reaction to the crisis, but unfortunately the UN-sponsored peace process did not make sufficient progress. Likewise, the OIC tried to contribute to the efforts of saving Somalia by establishing a contact group. Unfortunately, the realities on the ground proved to be very complex and OIC efforts ultimately reached a dead end.

Ethiopia intervened military in Somalia in 2006. This action introduced new dynamics leading to the revival of peace talks. The OIC participated in the negotiation process which led to the signing of the Djibouti agreement of August 2008 between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, as well as the expansion of the transitional parliament and the election of a new president (Ihsanoglu, 2010). Furthermore, the OIC supported peace efforts that followed the signing of the Djibouti agreement and became active in the International Contact Group on Somalia. In addition, at the 2009 Brussels Donors Conference, the OIC pledged $210 million in various forms of assistance to Somlia (Ihsanoglu, 2010).

The OIC also intervened on the ground in 2011 by establishing the "*Humanitarian Coordination Office-Somalia*" to coordinate relief efforts. The Humanitarian Coordination Office works closely with a coalition of 47 members of humanitarian Islamic organizations and other humanitarian key actors in Somalia. It ensures efficiency in service delivery and elimination of potential overlap through regular information sharing meetings. In brief, the OIC intervention in Somalia effectively contributed to the humanitarian relief efforts especially at a time when the Shahab militant group, which only trusted the OIC to deliver humanitarian assistance, forced many international organization to leave the region. The OIC provided access to the affected areas that were separated from the rest of the world, provided a coordination framework with the organizations OIC member states, and coordinated the signing of the memoranda of understanding with international organizations.

Iraq

The sectarian tension that followed the 2003 U.S-led invasion of Iraq reached unpresented levels of violence between the country's Sunnis and Shias. Violence targeted ordinary civilians, holy shrines, mosques, graveyards and residential areas. The widespread and vicious level of violence necessitated a national reconciliation process. The OIC reached out to Sunni and Shia leaders and invited them to a reconciliation meeting in Mecca. To ensure success, the OIC secured support from all stakeholders including Iraqi, regional and international parties involved in Iraq. Furthermore, the OIC paid special attention to the time and place of the reconciliation meeting. The OIC selected Ramadan October 2006 and Mecca; the holiest month and place for Muslims. The religious dimension of the time and place added considerable moral impetus for the parties to demonstrate cooperative attitude. Approximately 50 Iraqi Muslim scholar representing both the Sunni and Shia communities met, and after long discussions, signed what came to be known as the Mecca Declaration.

6.2. Lessons Learnt from the History of OIC Mediation Efforts

As mentioned in the previous chapters of this report, conflict resolution is not an exact science. Mechanisms that work for one conflict might not always work for another conflict and a one-size-fits-all approach to conflict resolution is often detrimental to the parties, the process, and the outcomes. Throughout its history of conflict resolution, OIC has faced several setbacks in its efforts to assist in the resolution of complex conflicts. Recognizing the benefits of incorporating past lessons in current and future efforts at resolving conflicts, Ambassador Sayed El Masry highlighted the major takeaways from OIC's conflict resolution efforts in a recent interview[5]. Lessons learnt from past experiences of OIC are shown in Figure 6.1:

- **Implementation Mechanism**: The OIC experience in the Southern Philippines conflict and in particular to what was called the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) of 1996 shows us the downfall of leaving too early. Signing peace agreements is a very important step but does not mean the end of the conflict. The real and most challenging work is in the implementation of the agreement. Monitoring mechanisms should be part of the agreement and mediation should not end once an agreement is signed.

- **The "Ethnic Kin" Factor**: This factor and its influence have been observed in Thailand and China. In Thailand, Muslims in the central and northern regions enjoy all the freedoms like their fellow citizens. However, this is not the case in the South where the majority is ethnic Malay and the language is Bahasa Malaysia or Jawi, same as neighboring Malaysia. A similar case is observed in China. A delegation of the OIC that visited China in 2009 based on an invitation extended by the Chinese

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[5] The interview with Ambassador Sayed El-Masry was conducted within the scope of this report on the 16th of October 2018 in Cairo, Egypt.

Figure 6.1: Lessons Learnt from Past OIC Experiences

Leaving Early — 1	2 — Ethnic Kin Factor
Sovereignty — 3	4 — NGOs
War on Terror — 5	6 — Timely Resolution
Leverage — 7	8 — Spoilers
Cooperation — 9	10 — Capacity Building

Source: SESRIC Staff Design

Government to acquaint itself with the conditions of the Muslim minorities in China witnessed a stark contrast between the Northern province of Xinjiang and the central province of Ningxia. The atmosphere in Ningxia was relaxed while in Xinjiang it was very tense. For instance in Xinjiang there were very rigid restrictions on frequenting mosques and performing public religious ceremonies, while in Ningxia there were no such restrictions. This could be attributed to the ethnic factor. In Xinjiang the Muslim inhabitants belong mostly to the Turkic Uyghur ethnicity, similar to neighboring Turkic countries. While in Ningxia they belong to a mix of Arab and Persian descendants who married into Chinese Han ethnicity and melted into the Chinese pot. This "ethnic kin" factor should always be in the mind of the mediator party as it could play either a negative or positive role.

- **Sovereignty and Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States:** OIC, as an organization, respects the principles of sovereignty and inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of states. These principles generally help mediators from OIC establish their intent and legitimacy while assuming the role of mediators and/or facilitators in a conflict. However, there are instances where the OIC adherence to these principles has posed as a major challenge and obstacle for OIC mediation and conflict resolution efforts. This is especially true when genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity have occurred. In this regard, it is vital for the OIC to balance between the principles of sovereignty and

inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of states and the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

- **NGOs:** NGO's are playing an increasingly important role in bridging gaps in conflict resolution mechanisms. Sometimes NGOs are in a better position to facilitate peace outcomes because they are independent (not aligned with the government or any of the conflicting parties), have wider grassroots networks, and can be viable representatives of marginalized groups. Often a combination of official and non-official efforts is the best formula. The OIC has had a limited but encouraging experience with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) based in Geneva.

- **The "War on Terror":** The "War on Terror" is an international military campaign that was launched by the government of United States of America following the 9/11 attacks. The globalisation of the war on terror has led to an overuse of the word 'terrorism' in conflict situations. If any of the involved parties is considered to be a terrorist threat, it changes the dynamics of the conflict considerably. This creates challenges of obscurity within the actors who are party to a conflict and those that are mediating the conflict. In order to circumvent this problem, the OIC needs to continue to push the international community for a clear definition of terrorism. In a similar vein, the OIC must encourage dialogue and engagement even when parties to a conflict are throwing around the label of terrorism. Accusation of terrorism did not prevent dialogue and negotiations in the Northern Ireland conflict nor did it prevent the USA from engaging the Taliban in dialogue and negotiations.

- **Timely Resolution of Conflicts:** Resolving disputes in a timely manner before the scale of the conflict surpasses existing resolution mechanisms is of paramount importance. This is highly relevant for OIC countries where the majority of conflict are **internationalized internal** wars or **internal** armed conflicts. The internationalizing of conflicts in OIC countries means the presence of foreign powers as key actors involved in the conflict, thus making the resolution of conflicts more complex, case in point is Syria. As for internal armed conflicts, they occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s). As time goes by new groups join the conflict and existing groups splinter into faction. This adds a new dimension of complexity to mediation efforts as there is a need to bring the opposition groups under one umbrella to negotiate with the central government.

- **Leverage:** When aggregated, the OIC has a significant economic leverage derived from the international trade and investments of its member countries. The OIC must use leverage, influence, and incentives wisely without false promises.

- **Spoilers:** Identifying where the spoiler problem resides and managing it is a lesson the OIC has learned the hard way from one of its disappointing experience in this regard. A memorandum of agreement (MoA) was ready for signature between the MILF and the Government of the Philippines that would have paved the way for a

real breakthrough. However, on the eve of the signing ceremony, a group of hardliners filed a complaint before the Manila constitutional court and won a ruling declaring the MoA unconstitutional. Some analysts believe that this could have been avoided by some language and drafting modifications.

- **Cooperation between OIC, UN, and OSCE:** Successful mediation could benefit from coordination and information sharing. For instance, in the case of Myanmar, the OIC had great difficulties in establishing contacts with the local authorities. In this regard, the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) could help the OIC establish such contact. On the other hand, China accepted a visit by the OIC mission and later by the OIC Secretary General himself after the violent events that took place in Xinjiang in 2009, while it was difficult for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) Special Rapporteur to carry out a similar mission. A coordinated effort from OIC, UN, and OSCE can lead to the emergence of resolution instruments that are otherwise unavailable.

- **Capacity Building:** Mediation can be assisted by providing ideas, models and proposals for innovative approaches in many fields including power sharing and wealth sharing. The OIC is interested in these two areas, as they are now among the contentious issues in the OIC mediation efforts. The OIC needs to develop a plan to build and to strengthen this capacity while the UN, OSCE, and other regional organisations would be the wright partners in this regard.

6.3. OIC Peace and Security Architecture

The OIC peace and security architecture flows from Article 1(6) of the Charter which aims at promoting inter-state relations, based on justice, mutual respect and good neighborliness to ensure global peace, security and harmony. It is further defined by the commitment of its Member States to settle their disputes through peaceful means and refrain from use or threat of use of force in their relations.

Chapter XV of the OIC Charter, which is devoted to the peaceful settlement of disputes, requires Member States to seek peaceful means of dispute resolution through the use of "good offices, negotiations, enquiring, mediation, arbitration, conciliation and judicial settlement and other peaceful means of their choice including consultation with the Executive Committee and the Secretary General." The rubric of establishing peace and security for the OIC include the following activities: fact-finding missions to conflict zones; participation in international diplomatic negotiations and/or presenting Muslim parties to conflict; assignment of OIC special envoy and/or contact group to conflict cases; public declarations and statements, financial assistance for humanitarian relief; leveraging OIC Member State votes in international organizations on special conflict cases; and offering mediation services to conflict parties (usually for intra-Muslim conflicts).

The current OIC Peace and Security Architecture is the outcome of a series of consultative meetings among intergovernmental experts, scholars, and the brainstorming session of Foreign Ministers from OIC member states held during the 41st CFM in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on the 18th and 19th of June 2014. The OIC 2025 Programme of Action, a set of strategic goals for the Ummah, further strengthens the OIC's peace and security architecture by stressing on peaceful settlements of disputes and conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy, dialogue, mediation and promotion of peace, security, friendship, and understanding in the Islamic world and beyond. In practice, the goals and objectives of the OIC Peace and Security Architecture are not different from those adopted by the United Nations, European Union, the African Union, and the League of Arab States. Some commonalities exist such as: roles of the organization, contribution of member countries, special envoys, and presence in the field. However, the architecture, size, extent, and capacity of OIC's Peace and Security Architecture differs from other inter-governmental organizations. Figure 6.2 shows the different components of the OIC Peace and Security Architecture. In the future, OIC Peace and Security Architecture aims to improve its role and modus operandi learning from the successes and best practices of organizations such as the United Nations, European Union, and African Union.

Figure 6.2: Components of the OIC Peace and Security Architecture

SI
Special Initiatives

PSCU
Peace, Security & Conflict Resolution Unit

SESG
Special Envoys of the Secretary General

WPC
Wise Person's Council

Source: SESRIC Staff Design

6.3.1. Peace, Security and Conflict Resolution Unit (PSCU)

The PSCU is the support unit within the OIC for peace, security, mediation and conflict resolution. Three major functions are to be rendered by the PSCU: the first is mediation and preventive diplomacy; the second is counter terrorism; while the third is to serve as the secretariat for the Wise Person's Council (WPC) and the Special Envoys of the Secretary General (SESG) under the direct supervision of the Secretary General. The main objective of the Unit is to strengthen the Organization's role in the fields of mediation and silent diplomacy as instruments of conflict prevention and resolution.

While the PSCU is still in its nascent stages, in the near future it intends to provide the following services:

a. Operational:

- Provide support for quiet, active, and preventive diplomacy conducted by the WPC and SESG;

- Provide support for fact finding missions and talks conducted by the Department of Political Affairs and Muslim Minorities Department;

- Utilization of the comparative advantage of the OIC in religious peace-making.

b. Guidance and Knowledge Management:

- Be a repository of lessons learnt, best practices, and past shortcomings from conflicts in which OIC has been involved;

- Engage in evaluation, knowledge accumulation, and dissemination for OIC's involvement in particular conflicts.

c. Policy Research:

- Conducting conflict related research to supplement OIC's activities;

- Organizing seminars/conferences involving the member states in order to raise awareness of about relevant issues and the Unit's activities.

d. Training and capacity building of institutions and human resources from OIC member states in the areas of peace, security, mediation, and conflict resolution.

e. Building short term and long term partnership with other international, regional, sub-regional and civil society organizations involved in conflict resolution and mediation efforts.

In assuming these tasks, The PSCU can take into account good practices of other organizations, including the OSCE (see at Box 6.1). In order to strengthen its capability in rendering its services, the PSCU is expected to utilize the OIC Network of Think Tanks for getting the scholarly and strategic analysis of conflict situations and recommendations for the OIC's engagements. The OIC Network of Think Tanks will:

a. Be grouped according to their area of expertise and each group will contribute to the relevant areas according to the priorities set by the OIC.

b. Provides expertise, stimulate discussion and raise awareness of the OIC on given topics within the OIC mandate.

c. Contributes to the ongoing negotiations of the OIC on various priority issues.

d. Helps address common threats and challenges and contributes to the efforts of the OIC in the field of conflict resolution.

e. Provides the OIC with early warning.

f. Be used for the exchange of expertise and the coordination of activities among its member think tanks.

6.3.2. Wise Person's Council (WPC)

In Islamic religious customs, third party interventions have been used to settle individual, societal, and inter-religious conflicts in Islamic societies throughout history. In most cases, conflicting parties have a moral obligation to abide by the decision of the third party (see Chapter 4). The OIC has a mandate for convening eminent persons from the Muslim World for advisory purposes. From this mandate and from the Islamic religious customs originates the concept of the Wise Person's Council (WPC).

The WPC is composed of persons having wide recognition in the Muslim World as leaders, who are respected for their wisdom, experience, knowledge, impartiality, and ability to provide guidance. Particularly, statesmen who have successfully fulfilled their political roles, renowned scholars, international personalities, and reputed conflict resolution experts from within the Muslim World are considered for the WPC. The WPC members represent the three geographic regions of the OIC - Arab, Asia, and Africa. At present, the WPC is comprised of four members:

1. H.E. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono , Former President of Indonesia,

2. H.E. General Abdulsalami Abubakar, Former President of Nigeria,

3. H.E. Abdullah Gul, Former President of Turkey, and

4. HRH prince Turki Al Faisal, Former Chief of Saudi Intelligence Service and Ambassador to the USA.

In its scope, WPC's overall mandate is, both, consultative and mediatory. Through its activities, WPC aims to contribute towards the peaceful resolution and prevention of conflicts, peace-making, and peace-building. More specifically, WPC's aims to:

a. Support and guide the efforts of the OIC Secretary General and the Peace, Security, and Conflict Resolution Unit (PSCU) in conflict resolution;

Box 6.1: The OSCE Mediation Support Team

The OIC region has become less peaceful over the last 10 years and there is a growing need for strengthening the capacity of the OIC to more effectively deal with the existing and emerging security challenges within and beyond borders of its Member States. For that reason, learning from the experience of other organizations is urgently needed. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) could serve as a useful example in this regard.

Similar to the OIC, membership in OSCE spans across a vast geographic space. Although covering different countries, it is an interesting coincidence that both the OIC and OSCE have 57 Member/participating States. The important thing is that OSCE possesses longstanding experience in facilitating political dialogue and engaging in mediation activities with the aim of preventing, managing or resolving conflicts.

The OSCE serves as a forum for dialogue itself. There are different formats available the OSCE brings its participating States together for dialogue, for example in the weekly Permanent Council, the yearly Ministerial Council or the Summit on special occasions. Moreover, the OSCE serves through special representatives of the yearly changing chairmanship and the OSCE's mediation mandated field missions as a mediator. Thus, the OSCE works with conflict parties to find commonly agreeable solutions, by ensuring that communication channels at national and local levels remain open and through various dialogue formats. Currently the OSCE is involved in a diverse range of mediation processes, such as the Transdniestrian Settlement Process ("5+2"), the Minsk Group dealing with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Geneva International Discussions that addresses the consequences of the 2008 conflict in Georgia, and the Trilateral Contact Group in Ukraine.

The OSCE provided many instruments and approaches to conflict settlement over the years and it is committed to a certain set of principles based on the UN Guidance on Effective Mediation, which are further developed in the OSCE Guidance on Mediation and Dialogue Facilitation. The later defines mediation as a "structured communication process, in which an impartial third party works with conflict parties to find commonly agreeable solutions to their dispute, in a way that satisfies their interests at stake." However, dialogue facilitation represents a distinct approach according to the OSCE Guidance, as it is "a more open-ended communication process between conflict parties in order to foster mutual understanding, recognition, empathy and trust. These can be one-off conversations, or go on over a longer period of time. Although dialogues can lead to very concrete decisions and actions, the primary aim is not to reach a specific settlement, but to gain a better understanding of the different perspectives involved in a conflict."

In this regard, the OSCE believes that legitimacy can be foremost achieved in a mediation process when all major stakeholders, including civil society, get a seat at the table (inclusivity). Another important principle for the OSCE as a mediator is impartiality. However, bound to the international principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty, the OSCE cannot facilitate negotiations that, for instance, may lead to the secession of particular territory. Further, the OSCE is guided by principle of coherence, to ensure cooperation and coordination with other organizations involved in mediation process.

Having in mind the increased complexity of conflicts, in OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/11, the OSCE participating States agreed in 2011 to strengthen the OSCE's mediation capacity. As a result, the Mediation Support Team (MST) within the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre/Operations

Service was established, which offers OSCE special representatives, heads of field operations and other mediators targeted assistance.

The MST offers methodological support to OSCE mediation and dialogue facilitation efforts throughout all phases of the conflict cycle. The mediation support provided by the MST is request-based and is provided to fill identified needs. Activities provided by the MST include the following:

- Training and capacity building: Through training and capacity building, the skills of OSCE staff and mission members who support and conduct mediation and dialogue facilitation processes are strengthened. For this purpose, OSCE mediation courses are organized and dialogue facilitation trainings are conducted in OSCE field operations.

- Knowledge management and operational guidance: Lessons learned and best practices regarding OSCE mediation processes are captured and disseminated to inform future mediation efforts. For this purpose, guidance notes and handbooks on mediation topics are drafted and OSCE mediators debriefed.

- Outreach, networking, cooperation, and coordination: The OSCE's cooperation with relevant mediation and mediation support actors in international and regional organizations, OSCE participating States, Partners for Cooperation and NGOs, is strengthened through the organization of outreach events and the participation in mediation-related events.

- Operational support: High-level OSCE mediators, such as Special Representatives of the Chairperson-in-Office and Heads of Field Operations, are provided with tailor-made support services. For this purpose, high-level mediation coaching, process design workshops and strategy retreats are conducted. In addition, ad hoc expert deployments to support mediation processes or crisis response missions are implemented.

Note: This text is prepared based on interview with Dr. Christina Horváth-Stenner, the Mediation Support Officer at the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre/Operations Service-Mediation Support Team and her article "Understanding the Mediator: Taking Stock of the OSCE's Mechanisms and Instruments for Conflict Resolution" Security and Human Rights 27 (2016), pp. 256-272.

b.   Provide the vision and guidelines to deal with a conflict situation – particularly with an aim to prevent or redress the occurrence of issues that can trigger a conflict;

c.   Mediate and guide negotiations aimed at resolving conflicts and crises;

d.   Use their good offices to support conflict mediation and facilitate negotiations among conflicting parties;

e.   Help the OIC General Secretariat and the PSCU in particular in mapping out potential threats to peace and security in Member States;

f.   Recommend possible interventions to contain a conflict situation or to prevent eruption of a conflict;

g.   Recommend activities on peace building and promotion of culture of peace in Member States; and

h.   Form cooperative networks with other regional and international organizations.

6.3.3. Special Envoys of the Secretary General (SESG)

The institution of Special Envoys of the Secretary General (SESG) is the extension of the good offices of the Secretary General and ensures OIC's presence in the field. The Special Envoys are experts chosen by the Secretary General from the Member States' that can belong to political, diplomatic or scholarly fields, depending on the issue for which the SESG is appointed.

The overall role of the SESG is to analyse emerging and ongoing crises within their respective areas of jurisdiction and suggest preventive or remedial measures towards resolving the case. They actively contribute to existing international efforts towards mediating or finding sustainable solutions for specific conflicts. The SESG also has the responsibility to lead the implementation process of various OIC resolutions in conflict zones. In addition, the SESG:

- Devise a plan that focuses on identifying the root causes of the conflict and means to address them using the OIC comparative advantage and OIC institutions;

- Support and collaborate with regional and international organizations and their special envoys in mediation, reconciliation and peace-making initiatives;

- Publicly represent and articulate in good faith the policies and positions of the OIC;

- Actively engage and continuously encourage the parties and stakeholder of a conflict to constructive dialogue;

- Work towards the possible establishment of an OIC field presence;

- Mobilize the required resources to contribute to humanitarian relief and development in the region; and

- Provide regular reports and briefing on their activities and developments concerning the conflict situation.

6.3.4. Special Initiatives

There are three initiatives complementing the above components of the OIC peace and security architecture: the Initiative on Islamic Rapprochement; the OIC Contact Group on Peace and Conflict Resolution; and the Contact Group on OIC Friends of Mediation.

During the 13th Islamic Summit in Istanbul, President of Turkey, H.E. Mr Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the President of Kazakhstan, H.E. Mr. Nursultan Nazarbayev, presented an initiative to establish a process of Islamic rapprochement in the Muslim world based on the following principles:

- Demonstration of goodwill and constructive approach for peaceful resolution of disputes;

- Respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of states;

- Principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states;

- Encouragement of amicable relations between the Member States of the OIC; and

- Strengthening the Unity of the Islamic Ummah.

The OIC Contact Group on Peace and Conflict Resolution was proposed by the Republic of Indonesia during the 42nd session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Kuwait in May 2015. This initiative was later supported by the 13th OIC Summit in Istanbul in April 2016. The Contact Group is tasked with building a framework for collaboration for OIC member states to collectively find solutions to various challenges. The Contact Group works primarily on emerging issues namely, radicalism, extremism, sectarianism, terrorism, religious discrimination, islamophobia, xenophobia, and challenges to peace with the consent of the OIC member states. In fulfilling its tasks, the Contact Group is fundamentally guided by the following principles:

- Advancing the belief in Islam as a blessing to all humankind "Rahmatan lil Alamin";

- Solving collective challenges and conflicts faced by member states through peaceful means;

- Upholding the principles of international law, including non-interference in domestic affairs, sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of states.

Lastly, the Contact Group on OIC Friends of Mediation was proposed by Turkey and adopted during the 45th session of Council of Foreign Ministers in Dhaka, Bangladesh in May 2018. So far, the initiative has received significant support and interest from the member states with many states already having joined or expecting to join the Contact Group in the near future. The first inaugural meeting of this group was held amongst Ministers of Foreign Affairs from member states in September 2018, concurrent with the 73rd session on the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

6.4. Evaluation of the OIC Peace and Security Architecture

The OIC peace and security architecture has a number of shortcomings (Figure 6.3). For the peace and security architecture of the OIC to fulfil its promise, it has to be fully functionalized and the components have to work with each other in an integrated and synchronised manner. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The WPC has only been used once on a specific topic that is OIC reform. The governance of the Council is not clear. The number of members of the WPC (currently four) is low and need to be expanded. Equally critical is the fact that there does not seems to be strong linkages established between the WPC on the one hand, and the PSCU and the SESG on the other hand.

The PSCU is important for its own right and is also important because it provides support services to other components of the OIC peace and security architecture. However, the

Figure 6.3: Shortcomings of the OIC Peace and Security Architecture

Source: SESRIC Staff Design

capacity of the PSCU is limited. The PSCU needs human resources as well as financial resources in order to function effectively.

The OIC peace and security architecture lacks an overall and primary organ for overseeing peace and security issues. For example, the United Nations has the UN Security Council (UNSC). Under the United Nations Charter, the UNSC is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. The African Union has the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the standing organ of the African Union for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.

Another missing component in the OIC peace and security architecture is a peace force. A peace force is needed to provide security and the political and peacebuilding support to help countries make a difficult, early transition from conflict to peace. For example, the United Nations has the UN Peacekeeping Force while the African Union has the African Standby Force.

Finally, the last component that is missing from the OIUC peace and security architecture is an early warning system. The subject of early warning systems was discussed in Chapter 4 and a course of action for an early warning mechanism for the OIC was recommended in section 4.1.5. An early warning system is a necessity for the OIC so that conflicts can be reported in a timely fashion. A timely warning will lead to timely actions.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Developing Institutional Mechanisms for Sustainable Peace and Security in OIC Countries

The OIC Member States are confronted with different challenges, such as state failures, ethnic and religious intolerance, organized crime, violent extremism, terrorism, overpopulation, migration, human trafficking, pandemics, climate change, social and economic insecurity and resources shortage (water, food, energy and land). These challenges are not specific to the OIC, but are in fact transnational and global in nature. However, many of them are the root causes of existing conflicts in the OIC area, or at least contain within themselves the potential for conflict. Therefore, the solutions to these challenges should start at the national and regional level.

Islam is a religion of peace and tolerance, which stands at the side of world peace and global justice. Many OIC cities are meeting places for different ethnic groups and religious traditions, where over the course of centuries people have developed capacity for coexistence, trust and sensitivity to others. However, over last few decades some OIC countries have passed through the challenges of which they will need a long time to recover from.

Recent developments in the OIC region are creating impression as if this geography has two contrasting faces. The first face of the region is dominated with political and security

challenges, periodic oscillations in bilateral relations,[6] as well as with persisting old sources of tension, which are reflected in forms of frozen and active conflicts. In the second face of the OIC region, the countries are trying to work together and develop regional projects spanning from trade, investment and rural development to scientific cooperation. In this context, for decades the OIC is contributing to building solidarity and mutual confidence among its Member States, and ensuring effective and joined-up response to the challenges that need to be addressed.

7.1.   The Characteristics of Contemporary Conflicts

Nature of conflicts and wars has undergone many changes. As discussed in chapter three, the OIC is witnessing decline in typical twentieth-century form of warfare, that one between states, but increase in internal ones. However, much of existing conflict resolution experiences is built upon such traditional interstate wars.

Because of increase in internal conflicts and wars, non-state actors are on the rise worldwide, especially since 2010 (World Bank, 2018). With the breakdown of law and order and even collapse of state structures in some countries, states no longer monopolize armed force. For that reason, it is not anymore surprising to hear that a non-state actor that is engaged in violent conflict against one or more OIC governments overtakes particular territory. On the other side, even if some radicalized groups appear minor and marginal, their potential to promote hatred, reproduce rhetoric, and provoke masses should not be overlooked.

Sometimes it is hard to identify all terror-driven non-state actors that are engaged in a conflict. Further, members of non-state actors are frequently untrained and undisciplined gangs motivated by plunder and lacking a centralized leadership. Some of them may be active particularly in cyberspace, without having a physical base, while others may be transnational, including foreign terrorist fighters phenomenon. Report of the UN Secretary General confirms the fact that transnational terror-driven non-state actors have generally found it easier to survive than those with a more nationalist agenda (UN General Assembly, 2016)

History teaches that terror-driven non-state actors may end due to a number of factors, such as removal of a leader, the inability of a group to sustain its ideology and transfer it to the future generations, political integration or negotiations, the loss of public support or the achievement of the group's objectives (For more details look at Alterman, 1999). These

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[6] Existing disputes within the OIC area or between the OIC Member States and neighbouring countries largely fall within the political sphere and are primarily related to differently perceived "truths" regarding specific historical events and the recent wars. Bilateral disputes encompass a vast range of issues - from unresolved border or territorial disputes, challenges to the sovereignty, identity protection and minority rights, to the status of refugees from the neighbouring countries. These unresolved bilateral disputes, poses permanent risk on stability and security in the OIC area. Unfortunately, most of the OIC Member States are dealing with more than one dispute. For that reason, many nations mistrust their neighbours' and feel insecure. In some cases, they seek to overcome these feelings by developing defensive military forces.

historical facts speak of the two options that are before governments: State should compromise, find solutions with non-state actors, or defeat them – which is a more preferred option by the states.

Additional emerging and worrying characteristic of contemporary warfare is increase in the cases of violent attacks on unarmed civilians, with consequential humanitarian disasters, including mass movements of people who become refugees and displaced persons, and destruction of human settlements. Civilians are been killed as a primary target, rather than collateral damage. Under such conditions, effective protection of civilians or delivering humanitarian assistance in peacebuilding requires stronger partnerships with regional organizations, such as the African Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (UN Security Council, SC/8575).

When speaking about new nature of warfare in the OIC region, it is necessary to notice the increase in internationalized internal conflicts too (see chapter three for more details). Rise in internationalized internal wars confirms that conflicts do not have clear boundaries and that security at home depends on peace beyond national borders. Indeed, interdependence in things both good and bad, is what governs relations in today's globalized world. Investments, trade, transport, energy, innovations etc. inevitably tie places together. On the other hand, resolution of the security issues whose nature and dimension exceed the national area requires transnational cooperation. This modern independence calls for the corresponding modern approaches in conflict resolution. More than ever, partnerships and institutions are needed to find compromise and solutions acceptable for all.

Due to changed nature of conflicts, peace operations became more complex. Even if there are early warning sources, interventions and political solutions may be stacked for different reasons. For example, conflict resolution demands political will and consensus building. However, ensuring full consent and cooperation of the increasing number of conflicted parties may be very difficult. This is particularly true for the conflicts such as those in Syria and Libya that have local, national, regional and global dimensions. In many cases, conflicting actors responsible for the outbreak of violence may have to be decisive part of an eventual, sustainable solution.

Another important characteristic of contemporary conflicts is related to economic security. Today, economic stability and peace are, more than ever, closely linked. Achieving sustained economic growth and prosperity without peace is impossible. On the other hand, economic stability and a rising prosperity may foster peace and expand bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Unfortunately, human economic insecurities such as poverty, unemployment and inequality threaten the everyday life of average citizens in many countries and in some cases lead to social unrest and political instability. Further, the deep economic and social problems significantly contributes to the continuity of negative national and religious stereotypes and to the deterioration in interethnic or interreligious relations. Particularly when resources or space is scarce, political leaders, the media and intellectuals my intentionally spread stereotypes and propaganda against some people, present them as alien

and threatening, thus provoke a conflict (Toscano, 1998). For that reason, for success in efforts targeting sustainable peace and security, it is necessary to address socioeconomic issues of a country.

Traditionally international system is based on the respect for the nation-state. However, it is not difficult to notice that principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states is being relaxed, and this can be considered as a new element of contemporary conflicts. For example, Western interventions in Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2003) took place without the consent of the UN Security Council.[7]

Insisting on existing principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs had to be balanced with "Responsibility to Protect" over the past years, due to the painful lessons from the conflicts such as those in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the genocide in Rwanda and genocide in Srebrenica (Desmidt & Hauck, 2017). However, out of this moral obligation, geopolitical importance of some parts of the world continues to be a motivation of great powers for controlling them. In this context, it would not be overstated to believe that some wars in OIC region are proxy wars - a wars fought between groups or countries that each represent the interests of other larger powers. Without funding and arming from outside, particularly smaller local actors would not have means to sustain military operations. For that reason, it could be argued that never before has war been as capital-intensive as it is today (Srinivasa-Raghavan, 2008).

Many would agree with the fact that West is not always cooperative and in some cases Western countries have not been able to engage with other countries as an equal partner. Some western countries do not even hide their suspicion of an increasingly capable and assertive China and Russia for example. As far as Russia is concerned, with its military operations in Europe and the Middle East, Moscow is following the policy of balancing the West. However, rivalries like this are not good news for unstable regions, including some of the OIC Member States, which are very sensitive to the shifts in relations between major powers. It is important therefore for all countries, large and small, to work together towards strengthening the UN based international system. Otherwise, nations will start to pursue their own security and self-interests with little regard for the interests and sensibilities of others, paving the way for more intensive interstate rivalries, new arms race and disorder in the world politics (Iriye, 2008). It is a worrying fact that world already passes through the period of building of the walls between countries, people, and cultures, including closing borders to "suspicious" foreigners.

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[7] International law and diplomatic practice are in favour of state autonomy in matters that are considered domestic. On the other side, multilateral treaties allow for collective action in situations where governments violate generally accepted norms of behaviour (Cronin, 2002: 147). However, international law is not as rigid as for example criminal law, and allows for more flexible interpretations, which can be shaped accordingly to political expectations. In such situations, ensuring a "critical mass of countries" supportive to particular way of interpretation will be decisive, as it was a case for Kosovo independence.

How to address these new warfare challenges? Unfortunately, there is no perfect mechanism or agreement, which could give a clear and comprehensive answer to this question. Nevertheless, there is no doubt lessons learned from the international experience in peace operations could be useful for other conflict-affected regions, although almost each conflict may need different approaches.

7.2. Preventing and Bringing Conflicts under Control: Lessons Learned

Typology of conflict solutions goes from prevention, mediation, management, resolution to transformation. It is easier to prevent the outbreak of conflict than end it. For that reason, it is important to control the behaviour of disputed parties and discourage them from seeking solutions through inciting conflict. When the conflict escalates, conflict analysis aims at reducing the negative and destructive capacities of conflicted parties, terminating conflicts, eliminating the root causes of conflicts, ensuring national reconciliation as well as moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development (Sousa, 2018)

Multilateral peace operations involves UN, UN-authorized and non-UN operations. UN remains a central address for issues of global relevance. Over 70 years, the UN succeeded in preventing new global conflicts and UN peacekeepers have helped to bring peace and stability to many places. However, some local and regional conflicts remained out of control. On the other hand, in most of the conflict-affected countries, the culture of conflict still exists.

As presented in the Figure 7.1, UN peacekeeping significantly expanded after the Cold War. The number of forces deployed in UN peace operations rose from 10,304 persons in 1990 to 92,682 persons in 2017. About 85% of peacekeepers are military personnel, 12% are police and the rest are under the category of international civilian personnel. `It is interesting to note that number of personnel from developed countries serving in the UN peacekeeping operations is decreasing. Military and civilian staffs from developing countries are increasingly taking place in multilateral peace operations. By the end of 2017, contribution of developed countries to the personnel deployed in all multilateral peace operations was around 8%, and the rest was from developing world. In the same period, the 33 OIC Member States were contributing to the UN peacekeeping missions, whose deployed personnel share accounted for 42% of total. With 7,246 uniformed personnel, in 2017 Bangladesh was OIC's most contributing country. Pakistan (6,238), Egypt (3,274), Senegal (3,215) and Indonesia (2,688) comprise the rest of the top five most contributing OIC Member States.

The UN peacekeeping has three main principles: 1) Consent of the parties (peacekeepers cannot enter a country unless invited by the government that must show at least enough commitment to peace); 2. Impartiality (peacekeepers do not take sides in conflicts, but simply help to implement existing cease-fire or peace agreements); 3. Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mission's mandate (military intervention is a final option for UN, for the most hopeless situations).

Figure 7.1: Contributions to the UN Peacekeeping Missions, 1990-2017

Source: United Nations Peacekeeping, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data.

During first half of 1990s, UN peacekeeping missions faced serious challenges that triggered doctrinal debates about peacekeeping (Badsey & Latawski, 2004). For example, UN mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina - UNPROFOR, has become the symbol for an unattainable mandate, unforgivable mistakes, inappropriate resources, wrong predictions and insufficient political cohesion in the UN Security Council. Furthermore, instead of punishing aggressor and providing real protection to victims of the Bosnian War (1992-1995), Permanent Members of UN Security Council behaved in the way as if they wanted to cover-up atrocities committed against Bosniaks, thus paving the way for the genocide that took place in Srebrenica (Arria, 2008; Türbedar, 2005).

On April 2016, the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council simultaneously adopted identical resolutions on sustainable peace (UN General Assembly, GA/11780; UN Security Council, SC/12340), by which the UN is trying to become proactive, rather than remain reactive in peace operations. Resolutions calls for, inter alia: (1.) Focusing on conflict prevention (stop conflicts before they start); (2.) Considering greater links between peace, development, and human rights; (3.) Ensuring constant voice for local actors and critical role for women and youth in peacebuilding; (4.) Enabling predictable and sustainable financing for peacebuilding; (5.) Developing coherence within UN system for sustaining peace and more strategic and close partnerships with diverse stakeholders.

Interaction with other stakeholders is of particular importance for the UN. Similar to trend in UN peacekeeping operations, last two decades have witnessed a rise in the role of regional organizations in the peace-oriented activities. In general, these regional organizations, including the OIC, are cooperating or have shown interest in cooperating with the UN in the peace-related activities (UN, 1999). Particularly the African Union appears to be recognized as an important UN partner in peacekeeping operations.

According to SIPRI data presented in Table 7.1, by the end of 2017, 62 multilateral peace operations were active in the world. The total number of personnel deployed in all multilateral peace operations was 145,911. Of those deployed, 94% were uniformed personnel (125,803 military and 12,172 police) while 7,936 were international civilian personnel.

In 2017, half of the multilateral peace operations in the world were concerning the OIC region. 72% of the global number of uniformed personnel was deployed to the OIC related region. Further details on multilateral peace operations concerning the OIC geography are presented in Figure 7.2.

Table 7.1: Multilateral Peace Operations around the World, 2017

	Number of operations		Military personnel (troops and observers)		Police		International civilian personnel	
	World	OIC related	Total	OIC related	Total	OIC related	Total	OIC related
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations	16	9	68957	41094	8277	3363	3947	2152
United Nations Special Political Missions	7	5	1142	1021	75	30	1070	966
United Nations/African Union	1	1	11449	11449	2731	2731	706	706
African Union	4	2	20530	20522	466	466	108	62
Economic Community of West African States	2	2	707	707	270	270	-	-
European Union	12	7	1361	662	326	90	773	228
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	2	1	19077	15046	-	-	-	-
Organization of American States	1	0	-	-	-	-	26	-
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe	9	1	-	-	-	-	1000	6
Southern African Development Community	1	0	222	-	24	-	12	-
Ad hoc coalitions of states	7	3	2358	1187	3	-	294	273
TOTAL	62	31	125803	91688	12172	6950	7936	4393

Source: SIPRI Database

Figure 7.2: Multilateral Peace Operations around the World, 2017

Ukraine
- OSCE Special Monitoring mission to Ukraine
- EUAM Ukraine
- OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine

Macedonia
- OSCE Mission to Skopje

Serbia
- OSCE Mission to Serbia

Moldova/Transnistria
- JCC/JPKF
- OSCE Mission to Moldova

Bosnia and Herzegovina
- EUFOR ALTHEA
- OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina
- OHR

Kosovo
- KFOR
- EULEX Kosovo
- UNMIK
- OMIK

Montenegro
- OSCE Mission to Montenegro

Albania
- OSCE Presence in Albania

Mediterranean Sea
- EUNAVFOR MED

Cyprus
- UNFICYP

Libya
- UNSMIL
- EUBAM Libya

Sinai
- MFO

Darfur
- UNAMID

Mali
- MINUSMA
- EUTM Mali
- EUCAP Sahel Mali
- MISAHEL

Haiti
- MINUJUSTH

West Africa
- UNOWAS

Niger
- EUCAP Sahel Niger

Gambia
- ECOMIG

Guinea-Bissau
- ECOMIB
- UNIOGBIS

JF-G5S

Colombia
- UNVMC
- MAPP/OEA

Boko-Haram Affected Areas
- MNJTF

Central Africa
- UNOCA

Central African Republic
- MINUSCA
- EUTM RCA
- MISAC

Democratic Republic of the Congo
- MONUSCO

Lesotho
- SAPMIL

Russia
OSCE Observer Mission at the
Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk ■

Lebanon
UNIFIL ▬
UNSCOL ■

Golan
UNDOF ▬

Kazakhstan
OSCE Programme
Office in Astana ■

Uzbekistan
OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan ■

Nagorno-
Karabakh
OSCE PRCiO ■

Turkmenistan
OSCE Centre in Ashgabat ■
UNRCCA ■

Georgia
EUMM
Georgia ■

Kyrgyzstan
OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek ■

South Korea
NNSC

Tajikistan
OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe ■

Iran
UNAMI ▬
EUAM Iraq ■

Afghanistan
RSM ▬
UNAMA ▬

Palestinian
Territories
UNTSO ▬
TIPH ■
EUPOL COPPS ■
UNSCO ■
EUBAM Rafah ■

Abyei
UNISFA ▬

Gulf of Aden
EUNAVFOR Somalia ▬

Mindanao
■ IMT

Somalia
AMISOM ▬
UNSOM ▬
EUTM Somalia ▬
EUCAP Somalia ■

South Sudan
UNMISS ▬
CTSAMM ■

LRA-Affected Areas
AU-led RTF ▬

Burundi
AU Observer Mission in Burundi ■

Democratic Republic
the Congo
USCO ▬

sotho
PMIL ■

KEY

Civilian > Military Military > Civilian

	< 50
	50-500
	500-5,000
	5,000-10,000
	> 10,000

per operation   number of personnel   per location

AMISOM
21,039

MONUSCO
17,954

UNMISS
15,389

RSM
15,046

UNAMID
14,886

MINUSMA
14,086

MINUSCA
13,352

MNJTF
10,772

UNIFIL
10,737

Others
30,129

LARGEST OPERATIONS
> 10,000 PERSONNEL

BREAKDOWN OF OPERATIONS

BY ORGANIZATION

- G5 Sahel, 1
- LCBC, 1
- OAS, 1
- NATO, 2
- SADC, 1
- ECOWAS, 2
- UN, 25
- AU, 5
- Ad hoc, 7
- OSCE, 16
- EU, 16

BY REGION

- Americas 3
- Middle East 11
- Asia and Pacific 11
- Europe 21
- Africa 31

BREAKDOWN OF PERSONNEL

BY ORGANIZATION

- Ad hoc, 2655
- OSCE, 1061
- ECOWAS, 977
- EU, 3895
- SADC, 258
- OAS, 26
- G5 Sahel, 5000
- LCBC, 10772
- NATO, 19077
- AU, 22122
- UN, 97547

BY REGION

- Americas 1,606
- Europe 9,555
- Middle East 14,047
- Asia and Pacific 15,523
- Africa 122,659

Source: SIPRI (2017). For a detailed list of operations, please see Annex I.

There are many conflict-specific lessons to draw from different peace related activities worldwide. An overview of lessons learned can be summarized as follows:

- States should understand that conflict prevention is in their interest. Best prevention tools are human rights, rule of law, good governance and equality. The rights of people and basic liberties should be acknowledged regardless of ethnicity, race and religion. Otherwise, inequalities and exclusion may pay a way for violent conflicts (World Bank, 2018). Equal treatment under the law, transparency of law, an independent judiciary and access to legal remedy are crucial elements for a country to be on stable ground (Jeninngs, 2017).

- Improving access to education may consolidate peace and security in many ways, be it through eradicating poverty, improving social well-being, promoting democratic attitudes, or generating social consensus on the necessary reforms (Altwaijri, 2014). Furthermore, education has an important role in reducing prejudice and hatred on which conflicts are based, as well as preventing radicalization of young people that are joining foreign terrorist fighters. Education is also important for developing a culture of peace, which reject violence and stands for solving problems through dialogue.

- There are a number of sophisticated instruments and indicators that seek to identify the risk of violent conflict (Look for example the Dialogue, 2013; USIP, 2009; Hinds & Carter, 2015). Use recommended indicators as conflict early warning system, to avoid outbreak of conflicts and address its root causes.

- Governments should recognize, avoid and punish behaviours that provoke aggression of people. When intervening in a violent situation, authorities should also control their own violence (Opotow, 2000).

- Multilateral diplomacy, dialogue facilitation and mediation are important tools in preserving and achieving peace. However, if not backed by political will of all conflicting parties, dialogue and mediation efforts are doomed to fail. Often dialogue and negotiation are continuation of conflict with verbal means, for that reason it ends without solution. On the other hand, the presence of spoilers may also risk the whole peace process.

- For successful preventative diplomacy, goals must be prioritized and demands of mediators should be clear, impartial, credible, acceptable and flexible if needed (Touval, 1996; OSCE, 2011). Proposed interventions must be practically realizable, supported by necessary resources and equipment, and proportional to the problem they address.

- Deploying peacekeeping troops does not make sense without consent of the host government(s). In general, UN Member States do not like interference in their internal affairs. However; if a government systematically massacres its own civilians, then military intervention rather than a peacekeeping operation have to be

considered. Peace operations need more authorization for use of force, in order to protect mandate, civilians and their own personnel (Williams, 2013).

- There is a need to include more gender perspectives in the peace processes. Female peacekeepers may enhance operational effectiveness, particularly in dealing with female combatants and women victims of war (Williams, 2013).

- Private sector actors are also been recognized as important element of peace efforts, due to their role as mediators (negotiating privately with political leaders), promoters of peace (through media and publicity campaigns, funding peace initiatives) creators of positive environment for economic growth, as well as due to their employment policies which are in many cases supportive to reconciliation among former combatants (World Bank, 2018).

- For de-escalation of conflicts, in the short-term it is legitimate to focus on the most visible reasons, with the aim to stop the conflict, prevent further deaths and destruction, and re-establish security through an effective demilitarization process. In long-terms, however, establishing conditions for lasting peace and stability is essential. Nevertheless, crisis driven responses and short-term objectives should not determine the longer-term peacebuilding agenda. On the contrary, short-term objective need to be extracted from the context of longer-term plans, goals and projects (Lederach, 1998).

- Peace is more than the absence of war. Finding solution to conflicts without changing anything is unsustainable. The recent conflicts in the world have shown that the signing of an agreement does not necessarily bring an end to all conflict dynamics. Problems that remain unresolved may sooner or later bring back the conflict (Reppell at al., 2016). The modern goal of conflict resolution is to identify and eliminate the root causes of conflict, thus transform a system that encourages conflict and ensure a change (Rubenstein, 1993). For that to happen, it is necessary to promote confidence building measures, reconciliation at the societal level and develop appropriate political processes, regulatory frameworks and institutional mechanisms supportive to reconciliation.

- Trauma of violence may be so deep that addressing social, psychological and spiritual issues also becomes precondition for transforming conflictual relationships, so that parties can rebuild conflict-torn societies (Bush, 1996). According to the World Bank findings, 30-70% of people who have lived in conflict zones, suffer from symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and depression (World Bank, 2018).

- People would like to forget what happened during the war, but they cannot. These memories and frustration by itself carry a potential for renewal of conflicts. To avoid this, international community must take the decisive measures necessary for return of refugees and displaced persons, including war crimes prosecution. A confrontation with the true history of violent events and moral issues such as apology should not be avoided. Instead of focusing solely on their own suffering,

nations have to be ready to acknowledge serious grievances that have been inflicted in their name upon others.

- Policies at international and national level can only introduce change from the top. Top-down approaches mostly contribute to the establishing of legal and political institutions to guaranteeing human security, non-discriminatory public services and to initiating economic recovery projects. All these are a prerequisite for establishing conditions for peace and security. On the other hand, bottom-up approaches initiated by grassroots actors are more effective when it comes to reconciliation, reintegration and development of a sustainable coexistence (Dimitrijevic & Kovacs, 2004). In general, when the root causes of conflicts are outside the reach of authorities, civil society should be involved. Civil society organizations may assists governments in addressing many other challenges, such as addressing structural inequalities that underlie conflicts, resettling refugees, re-establishing basic services (food, water, health and sanitation), supporting local capacity building in different areas, creating neutral forums for communication, as well as initiating economic interventions designed to offer young men alternatives to fighting. However, to achieve effective results through such activities, civil society must coordinate its work more closely with relevant national and international bodies.

- Regional organizations have their added value in preventive and quiet diplomacy, dialogue facilitation and mediation. For that reason, peacekeeping in partnership with one or more international/regional organizations is increasingly becoming new norm of peace operations, where one side provide the majority of personnel and other assist in terms of financing, training, logistics and planning (Williams, 2013). In general, developed countries are reluctant to deploy their own military forces to preventing foreign conflicts (look at figure 7.1). On the other hand, due to the multiplicity of international and regional organizations active in a conflict, a balanced division of tasks and a strategic coordination is essential (OSCE, 2011). Of course, capabilities of regional organizations should not be overestimated.

7.3. Improving Policies and Mechanisms for Peace Efforts at the OIC Level

The OIC Member States determined in the OIC Charter to preserve and promote the lofty Islamic values of peace. For this reason, the OIC Member States should take security cooperation very seriously into consideration, in order to strengthen the ability of OIC to act as a security provider, better manage security concerns and promote stability in its geography. More security and peace would lead to more prosperity.

As a first step, the OIC should consider developing a security strategy, which will offer its comparative advantages, set expectations that the OIC can deliver upon, and guide the OIC's conflict resolution and peace-building policies in the years to come. The strategy should provide general support to more intensive security cooperation in the OIC area, which is not

only needed for improving security, but also necessary for the wellbeing of member states and their citizens.

Further, the strategy should rely on respect to international law and the leading role of UN, and express readiness to cooperate with other relevant regional organizations/initiatives and partner countries, which share the OIC values and are willing to contribute to security in the OIC region. Prevention of violent extremism, countering terrorism and the peaceful resolution of bilateral disputes should be among the basic aims of the strategy, while taking also into account the "responsibility to protect", in order to be able to contribute in protecting populations from mass atrocity crimes.

Having in mind possible differences in opinions among the OIC Member States, both due to political and financial reasons, the strategy could provide a flexibility for creating an initial coalition of able and willing member states which would pursue closer security cooperation, leaving the door open to other OIC Member States to join later.

The OIC has to invest its best efforts in building a network for cooperation and information sharing among its Member States, in order to efficiently combat threats of radicalisation and terrorism, including terror driven non-state actors. In this regard, measures such as exchange of suspect lists, partnership in border control, curtailment of travel and transit of suspected persons, cutting off access to funds, preventing attacks, as well as control of malicious cyber activities, disinformation campaigns and attempts to radicalise vulnerable members of society are essential. Establishing the OIC Centre for Police Cooperation and Coordination is a great step in this direction. Further, the OIC should consider increasing its cooperation with friendly non-OIC countries and international organizations which have capacities or knowledge in these subjects.

Settling bilateral disputes should be another priority of OIC. Successfully resolved bilateral disputes worldwide may serve as a source of ideas for the countries in the OIC area. At the beginning, resolving easy disputes, such as border issues should be preferred. Resolution of this kind of issues may be facilitated mainly through technical assistance, while effects of successful examples may be much stronger, because it can serve as model for other countries in the OIC region.

Engagement of OIC can be fruitful and bring a solution only where domestic commitment exists. To ensure these commitments, the OIC has to promote mediation by linking national interests of its member states to the advantages of conflict prevention or resolution.

If a bilateral agreement is reached, civil society has to be involved to communicate solutions to the broader public, thus ensure larger acceptance of negotiated solutions and increase the likelihood of its successful implementation. If parties cannot reach agreement through bilateral negotiations and the OIC mediation, then they should be encouraged to go to the International Court of Justice or other arbitration bodies, and agree in advance to accept the final ruling.

Having in mind the lessons learned and summarized above and being aware of the fact that long-term peace and stability in the OIC cannot be assured without strengthening democracy,

rule of law, and human rights, the OIC has to undertake the following long-term activities on regular basis, in order to contribute to a better security environment in its geography:

- Develop an implementation mechanism, which involves relevant national bodies, regional organizations, civil society and other external stakeholders.

- Play the role of an incubator for new low cost regional security initiatives, in areas where the needs are identified but mechanisms for cooperation do not exist.

- Do systematic risk assessment of likely flashpoints in the OIC area with the intention to warn on potential conflicts and outbreaks of violence.

- Provide capacity building, expertise and assistance to OIC governments as contribution to stabilization in case of conflict or instability, and upon request, organize training for the soldiers of OIC Member States that have to be deployed to peacekeeping missions.

- Streamline with international financial institutions and donor community the external resources in activities with obvious added value to security building measures in the OIC region.

- Foster dialogue between different national communities and promote efforts of reconciliation at the grassroots level. In this context, support local people who are working on sustainable peace and partner with them.

- Address daily human insecurities, such as poor housing, unemployment, crime, drugs abuse, corruption and environmental challenges.

As a way of conclusion, it should be highlighted that over decades the OIC has managed to create an atmosphere of trust among its member states that differ politically, economically and historically. However, the OIC and its institutions should do much more in explaining to both political leaders and wide public why multilateral security cooperation in the OIC area is needed, so that efforts to prevent and de-escalate crises at early stage may be successful.

OIC governments have to realize that they have responsibilities towards each other and that they have many challenges in common. By deepening of security cooperation, the OIC Member States have a good chance to consolidate stability as well as boost their economic development.

Unfortunately, conflicts are harder to manage today, than it was the case before. Modern diplomacy faces a number of challenges in preventing and resolving ongoing disputes and conflicts. Diplomacy at the highest levels of government is not enough anymore and modern conflicts have to be addressed at different levels, including lower, grassroots levels, by a variety of actors.

There are regional, international and non-governmental actors that not only share common values with OIC, but a common commitment to make the OIC region more stable and secure.

Still, peace is a process, not a project. Without addressing long-term drivers of conflict, efforts targeting peace and security will only have limited success.

Appendix

Annex: List of Multilateral Peace Operations around the World, 2017.

Institution	Name of the Operation	Military|Police|International Civilian
United Nations (UN)		
Peacekeeping Operations		
MINUJUSTH	UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, 2017	M-0|P-1199|C-111
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, 1991	M-227|P-2|C-74
MINUSCA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, 2014	M-10683|P-2020|C-649
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, 2013	M-11698|P-1725|C-663
MONUSCO	UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC, 2010	M-15856|P-1351|C-747
UNDOF	UN Disengagement Observer Force, 1974	M-990|P-0|C-45
UNFICYP	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	M-888|P-68|C-32
UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon, 1978	M-10492|P-0|C-245
UNISFA	UN Interim Security Force for Abyei, 2011	M-4522|P-37|C-140
UNMIK	UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 1999	M-8|P-10|C-95
UNMISS	UN Mission in South Sudan, 2011	M-12969|P-1559|C-861
UNMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, 1951	M-44|P-0|C-22
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organization, 1948	M-152|P-0|C-77
United Nations/African Union		
UNAMID	AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, 2007	M-11449|P-2731|C-706
Special Political Missions		
UNAMA	UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2002	M-4|P-2|C-303

UNAMI	UN Assistance Mission in Iraq, 2003	M-245│P-0│C-313
UNIOGBIS	UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, 2010	M-1│P-11│C-59
UNOCA	UN Regional Office for Central Africa, 2011	M-0│P-0│C-28
UNOWAS*	UN Office for West Africa, 2002	M-0│P-0│C-32
UNRCCA*	UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, 2007	M-0│P-0│C-7
UNSCO*	Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, 1999	M-0│P-0│C-28
UNSCOL*	Office of the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon, 2007	M-0│P-0│C-18
UNSMIL	UN Support Mission in Libya, 2009	M-232│P-3│C-148
UNSOM	UN Assistance Mission in Somalia, 2013	M-539│P-14│C-143
UNVMC	UN Verification Mission in Colombia, 2017	M-121│P-45│C-104
European Union (EU)		
EUAM Iraq	EU Advisory Mission in Support of Security Sector Reform in Iraq, 2017	M-0│P-9│C-14
EUAM Ukraine	EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine, 2014	M-0│P-42│C-92
EUBAM Libya*	EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya, 2013	M-0│P-8│C-15
EUBAM Rafah	EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point, 2005	M-0│P-1│C-7
EUCAP Sahel Mali	EU CSDP Mission in Mali, 2015	M-0│P-38│C-63
EUCAP Sahel Niger	EU CSDP Mission in Niger, 2012	M-0│P-30│C-67
EUCAP Somalia*	EU Maritime Security Capacity Building Mission in Somalia, 2012	M-0│P-6│C-76
EUFOR ALTHEA	EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2004	M-536│P-0│C-21
EULEX Kosovo	EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, 2008	M-0│P-194│C-225
EUMM Georgia	EU Monitoring Mission in Geogia, 2008	M-0│P-0│C-206
EUNAVFOR MED*	EU Naval Force Mediterranean/Operation Sophia, 2015	M-944│P-0│C-2
EUNAVFOR Somalia*	EU Naval Force Somalia/Operation Atalanta, 2008	M-377│P-0│C-7
EUPOL COPPS	EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories, 2005	M-0│P-12│C-36
EUTM Mali	EU Training Mission Mali, 2013	M-510│P-0│C-31
EUTM RCA	EU Training Mission in the Central African Republic, 2016	M-163│P-0│C-1
EUTM Somalia	EU Training Mission in Somalia, 2010	M-152│P-0│C-10

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)		
OMIK	OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 1999	M-0|P-0|C-76
OSCE Centre in Ashgabat*	OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, 1999	M-0|P-0|C-7
OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina	1995	M-0|P-0|C-29
OSCE Mission to Moldova	1993	M-0|P-0|C-9
OSCE Mission to Montenegro*	2006	M-0|P-0|C-8
OSCE Mission to Serbia	2001	M-0|P-0|C-20
OSCE Mission to Skopje	1992	M-0|P-0|C-37
OSCE Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk	2014	M-0|P-0|C-22
OSCE PRCiO	OSCE Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office for the Conflict Dealt with by the Minsk Conference, 1995	M-0|P-0|C-6
OSCE Presence in Albania	1997	M-0|P-0|C-16
OSCE Programme Office in Astana*	1998	M-0|P-0|C-7
OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek*	OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek	M-0|P-0|C-12
OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe*	OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe	M-0|P-0|C-19
OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine*	1999	M-0|P-0|C-4
OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan*	2000	M-0|P-0|C-4
OSCE SMM	OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 2014	M-0|P-0|C-785
African Union (AU)		
AMISOM	AU Mission in Somalia, 2007	M-20522|P-466|C-51
AU Observer Mission in Burundi	2015	M-8|P-0|C-37
AU-led RTF*	The AU-led Regional Task Force for the elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army, 2011	M-1018|P-0|C-0
MISAC	AU Mission for the Central African Republic and Central Africa, 2014	M-0|P-0|C-9
MISAHEL	AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel, 2013	M-0|P-0|C-11
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)		
KFOR	NATO Kosovo Force, 1999	M-4031|P-0|C-0

RSM	Resolute Support Mission, 2015	M-15046|P-0|C-0
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)		
ECOMIB	ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau, 2012	M-332|P-145|C-0
ECOMIG	ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia, 2017	M-375|P-125|C-0
Southern African Development Community (SADC)		
SAPMIL	SADC Preventive Mission in the Kingdom of Lesotho, 2017	M-222|P-24|C-12
Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC)		
MNJTF*	Multinational Joint Task Force, 2015	M-10752|P-0|C-20
G5 Sahel		
JF-G5S	Joint Force of the G5 Sahel, 2017	5000 (as authorized)**
Organization of American States (OAS)		
MAPP/OEA	OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia, 2004	M-0|P-0|C-26
Ad hoc Coalition of States		
CTSAMM	Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism, 2015	M-0|P-0|C-97
IMT	International Monitoring Team, 2004	M-25|P-3|C-8
JCC/JPPKF	Joint Control Commission/Joint Peacekeeping Forces, 1992	M-1136|P-0|C-0
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers, 1982	M-1187|P-0|C-113
NNSC	Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, 1952	M-10|P-0|C-0
OHR	Office of the High Representative, 1995	M-0|P-0|C-13
TIPH	Temporary International Presence in Hebron, 1997	M-0|P-0|C-63

Source: SIPRI (2017)

All figures are estimates of the actual number of personnel in theatre as of 31 December 2016, unless otherwise stated.

*Not a multilateral peace operation according to the definition applied by SIPRI

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